Deterrence Supplement Wave 2 7 Week Juniors HKMP 2010

Deterrence Supplement – Wave 2 7 Week Juniors – HKMP 2010

Index

Index 1

***AFGHANISTAN*** 2

COIN Good/Works – General 3

1NC – COIN Good/Global Modeling 4

Exts – COIN Modeling 5

COIN Good – Laundry List 6

Sustained Effort Key 7

AT COIN Fails – No Success Yet 8

AT COIN Fails – Empirical Proof 9

***IRAQ*** 10

UQ – AT Withdrawal Inevitable 11

Iraq Strategy Working (1/2) 12

Iraq Strategy Working (2/2) 13

1NC – Withdrawal Bad 14

Withdrawal Bad – Iraqi Instability, Refugees (1/2) 15

Withdrawal Bad – Iraqi Instability, Refugees (2/2) 16

Withdrawal Bad – Iraqi Instability 17

Withdrawal Bad – Elections, Political Stability 18

Withdrawal Bad – Terrorism 19

AT Withdrawal Good – Allows Development Assistance 20

AT Syria/Iran Fill In (1/2) 21

AT Syria/Iran Fill In (2/2) 22

Korea UQ 23

***AFGHANISTAN***

COIN Good/Works – General

COIN works, critical to stabilizing the region

Strmecki, 2009

[Marin Strmecki, SPECIAL TO THE WASHINGTON TIMES, 4-5, "What should the U.S. do about Afghanistan?" Lexis]

An official briefed on President Obama 's new strategy for Afghanistan has aptly characterized it as "going all in," pushing his chips into the center of the table by committing to send a total of 21,000 additional troops, mobilizing a surge of civilian capability and undertaking more active regional diplomacy. His action was a rejection of calls to narrow or diminish our objectives and to cynically seek an exit strategy. Though even greater efforts may be needed over time, this was the right decision. The stakes are great. The international community faces a threat in western Pakistan - a diverse group of violent extremists given sanctuary and supported by elements within Pakistan - that radiates in three directions. Some of these extremists launch cross-border attacks into Afghanistan. Others threaten to destabilize Pakistan, the world's second largest Muslim-majority country and a nuclear power. Still others seek to launch terrorist attacks against the United States. Ignoring this threat is not an option. Success in Afghanistan - defined as a stable, representative and effective Afghan state capable of policing its territory - is a realistic objective. Greater action is required today because the security situation has been deteriorating since late 2005, a result of escalating enemy activity, underperformance by the Afghan government and drift in American policy during the past two years. At the same time, Americans should not exaggerate the challenge: the level of violence in Afghanistan today is roughly the same as that of post-surge Iraq. Yet, there are five actions we can take to maximize the ability of our military and civilian personnel to turn the situation around rapidly. First, the Obama administration must undertake a clear-eyed assessment of the activities of Pakistan's military establishment, particularly its intelligence service. Enemy sanctuaries developed in western Pakistan after the fall of the Taliban, and while the Pakistani military has partially cooperated in going after al Qaeda, it has done little against the Taliban. More troubling, recent press accounts have reported that the Pakistani military is providing operational support to the Taliban. To secure Pakistan's full cooperation, special envoy Richard Holbrooke must allay or address the fears and other motivations underlying its current posture. Many Pakistanis believe that their rivals - particularly India - are gaining an upper hand in Afghanistan and that the United States will soon abandon the region. This means the Obama administration must work with the Afghan government to establish redlines on the influence of regional actors in Afghanistan, committing to a long-term U.S. relationship with Afghanistan, and creating a U.S.-Pakistan relationship based not just on short-term counterterrorist objectives but on an active American role in realizing a positive vision for Pakistan's future. Second, the United States, other NATO countries and the Afghan government must develop a campaign plan based on classic counterinsurgency principles. During the past three years, NATO has largely shifted to raids and kinetic strikes targeting small insurgent units or individual leaders. This has resulted in few enduring security gains and in greater civilian casualties. Yet, success in counterinsurgency derives from creating persistent security for the local population, which is the key to persuading villagers to conclude that it is safe and worth the risk to provide intelligence on the enemy to Afghan government and NATO forces. The Obama administration must direct its commanders to make population security the main effort in Afghanistan. The short-term objective should be to use the newly deployed U.S. forces to establish sufficient security to enable full participation in the August presidential elections in all areas of Afghanistan. This effort should then transition into a three- or four-year campaign to secure the people living in contested areas, district by district and province by province. Third, to support this counterinsurgency campaign, the United States should work with the Afghan government to increase dramatically the size and capabilities of the Afghan National Security Forces. The planned end strengths of the Afghan National Army should be increased from 134,000 to 250,000 and of the Afghan National Police from 86,000 to more than 100,000. This will be expensive and potentially require a larger commitment of U.S. trainers and mentors. However, since deploying a NATO soldier costs 50 to 100 times more than an Afghan soldier, the most economical and sustainable approach to secure Afghan territory is to build robust Afghan security forces. Fourth, the United States must work with Afghan leaders to improve governance by reducing corruption and appointing officials who inspire support on the part of the people. Some progress has been made in recent months by President Harmid Karzai. If given a hypothetical choice between getting more military forces or having more effective local Afghan officials, American commanders in the field almost always opt for the latter. Therefore, the Afghan government and the international community should together systematically evaluate - and replace where necessary - all Afghan provincial governors, district administrators and police chiefs. Fifth, the United States and other supporters of Afghanistan must work with the Afghan government to bring into balance the military and nonmilitary elements of strategy. It is a truism that counterinsurgency campaigns should be composed of 80 percent political and economic actions and 20 percent military activity. In Afghanistan, current efforts are the converse. The Obama administration should work with the Afghan government to increase Afghan capacity in order to enable, for example, the delivery of development assistance through Afghan ministries and civil organizations. The United States turned the tide of events in Iraq under much more difficult circumstances. Though ethnically diverse, Afghans share a national identity. Most important, the U.S. effort in Afghanistan has the overwhelming support of the Afghan people. Polls typically show that 80 percent to 90 percent of Afghans surveyed want their government to succeed. This reserve of support is the indispensable foundation for progress, and Mr. Obama's decision to recommit to Afghanistan is the essential first step to realize such an enduring success.

Countinerinsurgencys comparably more effective than counterterrorism.

Malka, 5-13-2010

[Haim, DEP. DIRECTOR AND SENIOR FELLOW, MIDDLE EAST PROGRAM, moderator of the 2010 GLOBAL SECURITY FORUM, CSIS, http://csis.org/files/attachments/100513_middleeast_panel_transcript.pdf]

I think we’ve made one great development in Afghanistan and that is, we’ve changed our tactics from counterterrorism to counterinsurgency. Now, that may sound pretty esoteric but it basically means that counterterrorism, if you see a bad guy, you go after him and you take him out. And if you kill some civilians, it’s too bad but it’s collateral damage. If your goal is counterinsurgency and you have the same situation, you don’t take out the bad guy because the trouble you create by killing the civilians is greater than the benefit you get by taking out the bad guy. So we have changed that, and that is basically our objective in Afghanistan. And that is to give the Afghan people a sense of relative stability and security. We don’t need an Afghan state which is a modern nation-state. We’d be delighted if we could move back to the old days 30 or 40 years ago when there was a king of Afghanistan who presided over a loose collection of political and economic entities. So that’s basically our goal. I think we’re on the right track. Is it enough? Our job really is to provide the locals a sense of security because previously what we would do is go in and clean out villages and then leave. Well, as soon as we left, the Taliban and al-Qaida would come back in, kill all the people who supported us and preside over a reign of terror. So we’re clearing out areas and we’re holding them. But we don’t have the troops to hold them forever. We have to turn them over to the Afghan military, which is now insufficient in size and training to do it. So we have to train the Afghan military to do it. The other aspect of it is the political influence from Kabul. In many of these areas, Kabul is seen is as, as bad in many ways as the Taliban – not terrorizing, necessarily, but corrupt and so on. So we need Kabul to appear to be helping, not a part of the oppression of the locals. That takes the Kabul government. Karzai is in Washington even as we speak. We’ve had a troubled history with him but he is the president of Afghanistan. And I think that is what we’re trying to put together. If it all comes out right, Afghanistan will be a tolerable situation. And a tolerable situation is all that we need in the region. It won’t end our problems with Pakistan, but not a part of our subject today.

1NC – COIN Good/Global Modeling

Counterinsurgency works in Afghanistan and failure there collapses efforts in Phillipines, Africa, Pakistan and Yemen – makes terrorism inevitable.

Henriksen, 2009

[Thomas, senior fellow at the Hoover Institution and the U.S. Joint Special Operations University, whose book American Power after the Berlin Wall appeared in paperback in August, National Post, 11-3, "As goes Afghanistan ...", lexis]

The outcome of the Afghanistan strategy debate within Barack Obama's administration will carry deep consequences for the fight against terrorist-based insurgencies around the world. The current U.S. counterinsurgency efforts in the Central Asian country is similar to anti-insurgent campaigns elsewhere. What impacts one, therefore, is likely to affect others. If President Obama abandons counterinsurgency in Afghanistan, it will be difficult for it to be applied elsewhere despite many successes. Army General Stanley Mc-Chrystal, the overall U.S. and NATO commander, requested 40,000 additional American troops to conduct a population-centric counterinsurgency campaign. Although the McChrystal counterinsurgency strategy is rooted in specific cases in U.S. military history, its most recent success came late in the Iraq War. After the 2003 invasion to topple Saddam Hussein, the Persian Gulf country exploded in a paroxysm of violence against the U.S. and its coalition partners. America's initial "train and transition" response failed to train enough effective Iraq soldiers and police to countenance an orderly departure as the insurgency raged. Instead, Marine and Army units in the field turned to "hearts and minds" tactics to win over local towns and tribes to reduce the number of their foes. Befriending the Sunni tribal leaders combined with a surge of 28,500 combat troops in early 2007 defeated the local al-Qaeda affiliate and turned the tide toward a decidedly less bloody Iraq, paving the way for the current U.S. military withdrawal from that country. Lifting a page from the Iraq counterinsurgency campaign, Gen. McChrystal is implementing what has come to be regarded as a classical counterinsurgency. His plans entail protecting the local Afghans from Taliban terrorism, expanding Afghanistan's army and police, and providing modest economic development and jobs to villagers so they will provide intelligence and recruits for the security forces, and take up a better life without the Taliban. The global stakes could not be higher in the forthcoming decision by the administration about the future course of action in Afghanistan. If Washington ditches its counterinsurgency course here, it will deliver a blow to similar U.S. and Western counterinsurgency doctrines worldwide. Counterinsurgency tactics have been successful in keeping the lid on budding low-intensity conflicts around the world. Compared to conventional wars they are low-budget and low-or no-U. S. casualty affairs. The U.S. supplies training, equipment, arms, guidance and financial support. But indigenous forces take the lead in combating terrorists and insurgents and in creating better societies with less neglect of marginalized groups who often provide recruits for terrorism. Allowing the domestic security forces to take the credit, U.S. special operations forces help in refurbishing mosques, building schools, digging wells and staffing medical and veterinary clinics. Currently, the United States has about 600 Special Operations Forces in the Mindanao, a southern island in the Philippine archipelago. These troops and others assist the Armed Forces of the Philippines in combatting Abu Sayyaf, a terrorist movement founded, in part, by Osama bin Laden's brother-in-law and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front, a violent separatist group. Over the past near-decade, Washington has also provided some $500-million in aid to Manila for reconstruction projects in southern islands. Without the American military and financial help, the radical movements would have carved out sanctuaries, breeding terrorists to threaten the United States. On the other side of the globe in the Horn of Africa, the Pentagon stood up a command structure just after the 9/11 terrorist attacks. Operating out of a former French military post in Djibouti, some 1,800 U.S. troops conduct lethal attacks on such wanted terrorists as Saleh Ali Saleh Nabhan, who was killed by helicopter-borne missiles in Somalia last month. Nabhan had headed an al-Qaeda-affiliated cell, which struck a resort in Mombasa, Kenya, in 2002. Gaining intelligence from local sources, the U.S. killed Nabhan and several other militants in an attack that avoided civilian deaths. But American forces also perform much non-lethal work in Kenya, Uganda, Tanzania and Djibouti to pre-empt insurgencies from developing. Across the Gulf of Aden, U.S. special forces are training Yemen's troops in counterinsurgency tactics to arrest a spreading insurgency in the country's northern belt along the border with Saudi Arabia. In Pakistan, American forces are engaged in training missions to help the Pakistani military confront a series of Taliban insurgent movements in the nation's northern zones. In these countries, as well as others, the Pentagon has deployed small U.S. units to train local armies in counterinsurgency techniques similar to those being instituted in Afghanistan.