Philosophy of Language Reading Guide Part 1

Russell, “Descriptions” Professor Julie Yoo

Background

Suppose names are essentially referring expressions – that the meaning of a name is the object it applies to. This idea, as we saw, encounters trouble in the following cases:

  1. the meaningfulness of empty names: “Clark Kent”
  1. the informativeness of identity statements: “Clark Kent is Superman”
  1. the breakdown of the substitution of co-referring names in oblique contexts:

“Lois Lane wishes to date Superman.” T

“Lois Lane wishes to date Clark Kent.” F

In order to solve the problems these cases raise, Frege introduced his notion of sense. It needs to be kept in mind that Frege is a firm supporter of the idea that names are referring expressions. We can see this in the way Frege spelled out his notion of sense. The sense of a name is what determines its reference, and it determines its reference by offering a criterion of identification that uniquely describes the reference. In other words, Frege cashes out senses in terms of definite descriptions, and Frege assumes that definite descriptions are complex referring expressions.

Russell v Frege on DDs and PNs

Russell, a firm critic of sense, argued that we don’t need to appeal to senses to solve the problems raised by the three cases. And it’s not because Russell has another notion that improves upon Frege’s notion of sense. It’s because Russell denies that definite descriptions (DDs) and proper names (PNs) are referring expressions in the first place! According to Russell, we get into trouble with the three cases because we belabor under the mistaken idea that names get their meanings from the objects or people they denote.

Russell on Grammatical Form v Logical Form

This mistake is understandable, Russell notes, because names and definite descriptions grammatically look like referring expressions. But grammatical form is superficial. What we need is an analysis of logical form. Closer analysis of their logical form reveals that they are not referring expressions at all. Russell’s strategy consists of analyzing away singular terms – reducing them to expressions that don’t mention any specific individual. He accomplishes this through his Theory of Descriptions.


Brief Introduction to Russell’s Theory of Descriptions

According to this theory, a definite description, such as “the director of Jurrasic Park” is certainly meaningful, but not because it denotes an individual (which is what Frege would say). Instead, it is meaningful because it can be broken down into a conjunction of three meaningful quantified statements. These are statements that specify a quantity: “all …,” “at least one …,” “at most one.” Here are two examples:

SS) The director of Jurrasic Park wears glasses =

i.  At least one person directed Jurrasic Park, and

ii.  at most one person directed Jurrasic Park, and

iii.  whoever directed Jurrasic Part wears glasses.

CK) The mild-mannered reporter for the Daily Planet wears glasses =

i.  At least one person is mild mannered and reports for the Daily Planet, and

ii.  at most one person is mild mannered and reports for the Daily Planet, and

iii.  whoever is mild mannered and reports for the Daily Planet wears glasses.

(a) (b) and (c) are individually necessary for SS and they also happen to be jointly sufficient. Similarly, (d) (e) and (f) are individually necessary for CK and they also happen to be jointly sufficient. In other words, the general statements (a-c) and (d-e) furnish an analysis of the sentences containing the definite descriptions. And the analyses reveal that no singular terms are involved in the meaning of definite descriptions.

Russell isn’t suggesting that these general statements are what we have in mind when we use definite descriptions in our ordinary speech. We certainly don’t. Instead, Russell is trying to pin down the correct semantic interpretation of definite descriptions, which no speaker need to have any explicit understanding of to be a competent speaker.

Reading Guide Review Questions

1.  How does Russell depart from Frege on the referential nature of PNs and DDs?

2.  What is Russell’s distinction between grammatical form and logical form? Give examples.

3.  Symbolize these sentences:

a)  The mayor of Los Angeles wants to get re-elected.

Mx = x is the mayor of Los Angeles

Rx = x wants to get re-elected

b)  The youngest student in this class is brave.

Yx = x is the youngest student of this class

Bx = x is brave

Reading Guide to Russell’s “Descriptions” Part 1 Page 1 of 1