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Aristotle’s Theory of Actuality
(SUNY Press, 1995)
Introduction: The idea of anti-informationism
1. Tradition: forms into forces 1
2. Nonseparabiltiy and its consequences 2
3. A note on the translations 4
Chapter one: Aristotle’s explanation of natural motion
1.1. The natural motion puzzle and the two potentialities 5
1.1.1. Soul as first actuality 6
1.1.2. The definition of motion and the aspects of the potential 8
1.1.3. The two potentials 11
1.1.4. Genuine potentiality is one with actuality 12
1.1.5. Consistency-potentials are noneffectual and nonreal 18
1.1.6 A role for consistency-potentials: dispute with the Megarians 21
1.1.7. Plato’s Forms and the nature of consistency-potential 23
1.1.8. Aristotle’s principle of the priority of the actual 25
1.2. The explanation of natural motion
1.2.1. Is everything moved by another in Aristotle’s physics? 28
1.2.2. The official interpretation and the energizer theory 30
1.2.3. The natural motion of living creatures is uncaused motion 32
1.2.4. Is “nature” the mover in the natural motion of the elements? 34
1.2.5. How can potentiality be the mover in natural motion? 36
1.2.6. Practical syllogism and the necessity of action 39
1.2.7. Desire and motion 42
1.2.8. The mover in natural motion is a logical mover 44
1.3. Logical causality and teleology 47
1.3.1. Form and end are logical causes 47
1.3.2. Efficient causes and logical causality 50
1.3.3. Is causal necessity really different from teleological necessity? 52
1.3.4. Hypothetical and categorical necessities are the same 53
1.3.5. Means and ends are strictly convertible 55
1.3.6. Aristotle’s teleology “strictly speaking” 56
Chapter two: Logical causality and the priority of the actual:
consequences and illustrations
2.1. Coincidence, relationality and the ontology of potentiality 59
2.1.1. Coincidentality entails non-causality 59
2.1.2. Why is the coincidental necessarily causeless? 62
2.1.3. The nullity of the coincidental
2.1.4. Clustering, instantaneity and the relativity of the coincidental 65
2.1.5. The identity of the relative and the coincidental 68
2.1.6. Lack and the coincidental 69
2.1.7. The potentiality connection 73
2.2. The first mover fiasco
2.2.1. The ontology of Met 12 76
2.2.2. Redundancy: “why need we seek any further principles?” 77
2.2.3. Contradicting the priority of the actual 79
2.2.4. How, then, can separate form be possible? 81
2.3. Substance and causality 84
2.3.1. The unity of substance 84
2.3.2. The unity of causal action 89
2.3.3. The inconsistency of Aristotle’s actualism 92
2.3.4. The notion of particular-form: A.C. Lloyd 95
2.4. Logical determinism 102
2.4.1. Plenitude and the necessity of eternal motion 102
2.4.2. The necessity of all states 104
2.4.3. Necessity into contingency 107
2.4.4. The future sea-battle: physical indeterminism and logical determinism 109
2.5. The continuum 112
2.5.1. The instantaneity of actualization 112
2.5.2. The nature of the infinite 116
2.5.3. Potential infinity and Zeno’s Achilles 120
2.5.4. Homogeneous analysis and the impossibility of continuous change 122
2.5.5. Continuous motion and abrupt change 126
Chapter three: Necessity, syllogism and scientific knowledge 129
3.1. Two kinds of necessity 129
3.2. Deductive necessity and group inclusion 130
3.3. Propositional necessary truth 132
3.4. Deductive necessity and the circularity of the syllogism 134
3.5. Accepting circularity 1: syllogistic demonstration 135
3.6. Nominalism and Aristotle’s essentialism: seeing the universal 137
3.7. Aristotle’s demon: potentiality and the scientific syllogism 141
3.8. Accepting circularity 2: knowing that and what and why 143
3.9. Convertibility and noninformativity 146
3.10. Necessity by construction 148
3.11. Objective identity and noninformativity 151
3.12. Aristotle on noninformative questions 153
3.13. Noninformativity and error 155
3.14. Summary 157
Chapter four: Inconsistent potentials and the philosophy of mathematics 159
4.1. Some conditions for a philosophy of mathematics 159
4.2. The potentiality of mathematical objects 160
4.3. The puzzle of the exactness of mathematics 162
4.4. Qua and the relativity of the essence-matter distinction 164
4.5. Construction and absolute potentiality 166
4.6. Objections to a constructionist interpretation: (1) Annas 170
4.7. Objections to a constructionist interpretation: (2) Lear 171
4.8. Objections to a constructionist interpretation: (3) Hussey 175
4.9. Intelligible matter:
the triangle is neither a “this,” nor a triangle, nor triangular 177
4.10. The nondenotativity of mathematics according to
Aristotle’s philosophy: a short review 179
4.11. The a priority of Aristotle’s philosophy of essence and mathematics 181
4.12. The formality and emptiness of mathematics
according to Aristotle’s philosophy 183
4.13. The a priority of qua and the nature of mixed science 184
4.14. Aristotle’s concept of universal mathematics 186
Endnotes 190
Bibliography 231
Index of passages 259
General index 267