A SOUTH ASIAN REALITY
A book by Shoaib Khan
Published by ALFAAZ Centre for Studies in International Relations and Social Sciences on 14th October 2013
Former Editor for International Relations in Zeal Times, a local newspaper in Mumbai,
Has been writing articles and research papers on
International Relations in various magazines, newspapers and periodicals in India and abroad.
Attented many Seminars and Councils on International Relations
Member of many National and International Organisations
S U M M A R Y
Democracy seems to be only to a certain extent in India when the media is concerned the policies of the ruling Government had always been to control the media in its favor. Unlike other democracies of the world the one like those of the westerners where media is free of the ruling regime and where the opposition are given equal opportunities to express their views, criticize and voice their concern over the ill effects about the hasty decisions taken so as to keep the pressure on the ruling parties to avoid any further stalemate whose burden may have to be borne by the citizens of that particular nation.
Here is an attempt to put forward the policies and the administration of this largest democracy in the world in the last five decades where only achievements have been focused and the ill effects and misjudgments have been ignored particularly in the context of its strategic concern. The country for which many experts consider to be one of the power of the region and was predicted to be the emerging as economically and militarily strong enough. But the very power seems to be a wooden elephant whose strength is as hollow as its size.
To be one of the power as proclaimed by its politicians very often is a far sighted thing, it is a bitter reality to swallow that the seventh largest in size and the most powerful developing nation has lost its pressure and its presence in the region not only among the asian tigers but also in the neighboring region.
This was visible during the chaos of military standoff in 2001 and even during Kargil and the Bombay attack of 26 November 2007. Though the peace initiative was welcomed by both Pakistan and India, behind the wall preparations are still on from both sides for a possible round in the future if not near, a remote one. The Hot Pursuit option opened by the then NDA Government is also considered by Congress, the day BJP sweeps clear majority in the elections this action may be implemented without taking into account its implications.
The Indian excitement to go for war was for three main reasons:
1).The past success in the 1971 war.
2). Rise of Hindu fundamentalists forces whose grip in the Indian political scene is
Increasing day by day and
3). Following the footsteps of the American action in Afghanistan and Israelis against the
Palestinians, in the myth that they too are a regional power.
If the policy of hot pursuit is followed in the future, there may be many hurdles ahead. First there is a vast difference in the political environment as well as the military gap between Pakistan and India since 1971. In these years Pakistan had made preparations conventionally and on nuclear front, keeping in view of the balance policy between the West and the Muslim world. On the other hand India though big in size has pressure both from economic as well on its military preparations as it has lost vital support in the form of former U.S.S.R. after its collapse. Besides the threat from Pakistan also highlighted is the danger internally as well as from China on both economic and military front. Also taken into consideration is the role of the lone super power and of the other countries nearby and their possible reaction in the event of a war.
SHOAIB KHAN
Lecturer
Mahim Social Workers’ College
Former Editor for International Relations
ZEAL TIMES, Bombay.
Participated in many Seminars, workshops and Conferences on the topics related to International Affairs, also presented Research Papers on International Relations.
CHAPTER 1
Lack of Judgement
When the Indian parliament was attacked on 13th December 2002, the immediate reaction was the build up of the armed forces on its Western front. Many thought that it was an all out signal of a large scale conflict with Pakistan, but it did not go as predicted. Then again after the Kaluchak incident on 16th May 2003 in the Jammu region of strife torn Kashmir, it was decided to attack the training camps of the militants across LOC (Line of Control) and it was also expected a retaliatory answer from across the border in the form of a full scale war. On both occasions the armed forces were sent to across the LOC and International border but after some hesitation and succumbing to the US and International pressure, the men in uniform were asked to return back to their previous positions and finally after a long ten month stand off they were send back to their barracks. Similarly after the Bombay attack on 26th November 2008, the Indians began to shout in the war tone, but after press release in the Chinese newspapers of that country’s support to Pakistan in the event of a war, the Indians immediately changed their stand from that of an aggressive one to that of a peaceful negotiation.
The question still arise as of why the Indians did not take action like their US counterpart in Afghanistan. In reality it is not so, India did try to react but in the present circumstances its own position did not allowed it to go ahead. The Indian media in the past had always presented the achievements of its armed forces hiding any incident from those fronts where they were at the receiving ends.
Looking at the past records, Pakistan though smaller in size in area and men in numbers was not a pleasure ride for the Indians on the contrary it inflicted heavy casualties on the latter. According to a neutral view from the International observers in the 1965 war in which the Indian claim was of its victory but according to IISE (International Institute for Strategic Studies) London, there was no outright victory for either side. It was the former Soviet President Kosygin’s intervention which averted any further catastrophe. Among the Indian circles there was a common thinking that the then Prime Minister of India Lal Bahadur Shastri had been wrongly informed of the military hardware on the Indian side that the stock of which was only maximum to a further fortnight of action. That was the reason according to some Indian newspapers as to why Lal Bahadur Shastri succumbed to Kosygin’s pressure and entered into the Tashkent agreement with Pakistani President Ayub Khan.
But having a glance at the military picture of the 1965 war according to strategic studies conducted, the Indian claim of victory seemed to be only on the paper. The Indian attacks across the border were retaliated simultaneously in the form of Pakistani thrusts on Indian positions.
1965 War
Pakistan India
Army : 250,000 825,000
(180,000 Regular Army and (47,000 additional
70,000 Paramilitary forces). territorial Army).
Total: 872,000
6 Infantry divisions 20 Infantry & 1 armoured division
5 in West Pakistan 7 Infantry deployed on
1 in East Pakistan West Pakistan
Tanks : 924 724
(594 Patton; 330 Sherman) (270 Centurions; 472 Sherman)
Aircraft: 182 450
(170 on West & 12 on East) (300 in 16 squadrons on West;
9 squadrons on East).
Indian areas bombed by Pakistan Pakistani areas bombed by India.
Western Sector Western Sector
1). Ferozepur (Punjab) 1). Lahore (Punjab)
2). Amritsar (Punjab) 2). Pasrur (Punjab)
3). Jullunder (Punjab) 3). Sialkot (Punjab)
4). Ludhiana (Punjab) 4). Kharian (Punjab)
5). Pathankot (Punjab) 5). Rawalpindi (Punjab)
6). Jammu 6). Kohat (NWFP)
7). Srinagar (Kashmir) 7). Peshawar (NWFP)
8). Ambala (Punjab) 8). Sargodha (Punjab)
9). Jamnagar (Gujarat)
10).Jodhpur (Rajasthan)
11). Naval attack on Dwarka (Gujarat)
Eastern Sector
12). Agartala (Tripura)
13). Bagdogra (West Bengal)
14). Barrakpore (West Bengal)
15). Guahati (Assam)
Paratroopers dropped by Pakistan in
Ludhiana, Jullunder and Pathankot
Indian areas captured by Pakistan Pakistani areas captured by India.
1). Fazilka (Punjab) 1). Gadhra (Sind).
2). Munabao (Rajasthan) 2). Kasur (Opposite Lahore in Punjab)
3). Khemkaran (Punjab) 3). Phillora (Punjab).
4). Chhamb (Indian Kashmir) 4). Haji Pir pass (Pakistani Kashmir).
5). Akhnoor (Indian Kashmir) 5). Opposite Kargil (Pakistani Kashmir)
No record of any attack of IAF (Indian Air Force) in Eastern Sector or any record captured territory in the Eastern Sector by any side. (Source: the British Historical Atlas of South Asia).
In the 22 day of September 1965 war on both sides
Over 7,000 dead.
Over 11,000 wounded
Over 550 tanks destroyed
Over 100 aircrafts destroyed
Defense spending: Pakistan India
1965 – 66 Rs: 254 crores Rs: 884 Crores.
Pakistani claim of over 300 Indian tanks destroyed, 35 Indian aircrafts destroyed.
Indian claim of over 200 Pakistani tanks destroyed and 47 Pakistani aircrafts destroyed.
Source: (Illustrated Weekly of India, 6, September, 1970).
Figures published from the Institute of Strategic Studies, London and Washington military sources, as quoted by Russell Brines in “The Indo – Pakistani conflict” and authoritative publications.
The Indian thirst to go for war against Pakistan is for many reasons. It is true that one out of many reasons for the Indian leaders, similar to their counterparts in Pakistan is to divert the attention of their citizens from the domestic problems on economic front like increasing unemployment and poverty which is among the largest in the world, besides militancy in Kashmir, there are cases of insurgencies taking place in other parts of the country too like the secessionist groups in North Eastern states for which India blames Pakistan for its intelligence and China for supplying arms.
The other reasons for the Indian government especially the Hindu fundamentalist elements for its decision to attack its western neighbour are firstly because of India’s success in the eastern sector in 1971 war. Secondly the successful American attack against the ruling Taliban in Afghanistan in the war against terror. In these circumstances the Indian leaders do not really understand their position and strength and the consequences that will be created in the aftermath of the conflict. In both the reasons on the basis on which the Indians were anxious to cross the LoC is very hard to digest.
In the state of Bihar, Eastern Uttar Pradesh, West Bengal, Chattisgarh, Madhya Pradesh, Jharkand, the sudden rise of the naxalites is becoming a major problem for these economically backward states. The activity of these communist militancy is now spreading even to the southern and eastern parts of Maharashtra, the incidents has been reported in the past couple of years from the Marathwada region. In one of his speech the veteran BJP (Bhartiya Janata Party) leader did feared that the problem of naxalites controlling the central belt of India is more threatening than the Islamic militancy. With the Maoist gaining power in neighboring Nepal this fear may even turn into a nightmare for India for the alleged support given to these naxalites from across the border.
Another reason for the war cry is the resurrection of the Hindu fundamentalist forces in the last couple of decades. After the fall of the Rajiv Gandhi’s government in the centre in the 1989 election, no other party was strong enough to win a clear majority. Since then the election scenario in India has been dominated by multi – party led coalition government which gave further rise to the era of political instability and uncertainty. It is also blamed that being secular, the policies of Congress government was responsible for the rise of these Hindu fundamentalist forces. The secular Congress party when it was in full majority with no opposition strong enough to face it, did raise voices for the minority Muslims and Christians and for the backward castes but was almost nil in practical for the welfare of these minority groups.
The behavior of the Congress government created a feeling of insecurity among the majority Hindus, their fear of losing their identity gave way to the fundamentalist forces to take full advantage of the situation. Many of the minority leaders from time to time also blame the Congress government which ruled India for over forty years and was strong enough to suppress these forces within their wombs, was not only lineant but in some cases even aided and abetted these Hindu fundamentalist ideological hardline political parties by allowing them to flourish under the shadow of their secular umbrella.
During Operation Parakram the NDA (National Democratic Alliance) was in the centre lead by by BJP (Bhartiya Janata Party) whose vital decisions has always been controlled by the RSS (Rashtriya Swyam Sevak) a Hindu militant organization and the VHP (Vishwa Hindu Parishad) World Hindu Conference, an organization of Hindu clerics being supported financially by Hindus spread cross the world.
It was the pressure from these forces who after their successful genocide against the Muslims in Gujarat and attacks on Christian missionaries in order to cheer and gather support from the majority Hindus now direct the ruling party to cross the border of the Muslim state of Pakistan.
The Indians tried to imitate their American counterpart after the attack on Parliament as the US did after the September 11, attack on WTC (World Trade Centre) twin towers. The Indians while adopting the American approach had completely ignored the size and strength of their enemy and also their own position in the new world order in compared to US where the former is seen as a market but not as a big power like the latter.