What Can We Expect of Europe?

1

October 5, 2007

What Can We Expect Of Europe?

Speaking notes for presentation at a meeting sponsored by the

Cold War Studies Program and the Center for European Studies

HarvardUniversity

Center for Government and International Studies, 1730 Cambridge Street, Room S 354

Tuesday, October 9, 2007

12:15 - 2:00 p.m.

My visits to Harvard have never failed to be exciting. In my freshman year at Yale Law School, when I was on a visit to Cambridge to attend the Harvard-Yale game, my Yale college classmate Bert Walker offered me his seat in the class on future interests, taught by the legendary Barton Leach at Harvard Law School. Professor Leach had a reputation of taking no prisoners in his use of the Socratic method. And Bert probably sensed what was coming. So you can imagine my consternation when Leach called on me. I left class with burn marks, even though I was just a visitor from New Haven. This time I come prepared.

Introduction

Before I start, I want to declare myself. I am a convinced believer in the importance of the transatlantic relationship. Experiencing World War II in occupied Holland, I came to appreciateprofoundly the leading role of the United States in bringing the war to a successful conclusion. Rescue from the misery of occupation came in the form of the Canadian First Army Corps. HopkinsSchool in New Haven and Yale provided a safe haven for the completion of my education. Then, my career path in the State Department put me into the thick of US-European relations, during the Cold War, and afterwards. I shared with many of my professional colleagues a deep satisfaction with the successes of Western policy in coping with the Soviet threat, in the unification of Germany, and in opening the way toward a Europe whole and free. Not long ago, I could fairly say that I had spent equal time on both sides of the Atlantic. By my count, I have now crossed it 199 times. Someone observed that all these hours in airplane seats probably dulled my thinking. But I am clear in my mind that the central theme of my career and, indeed, of my life, has been the transatlantic relationship

Setting

I want to start with some points that are so obvious that they tend to be overlooked.

First, Europe today is mostly democratic, prosperous, and at peace. This is a historic achievement. The United States can justifiably claim a good share of the credit. The major credit, however, goes to the Europeans themselves, and to enlightened European leaders who pointed the way to this historic result. This outcome serves American interests.

Second, Europe is no longer the principal concern of the United States. For nearly a century, America’s major interests were in Europe. Europe spawned the major threats to these interests. The action was in Europe.

Now, American interests have shifted to the Greater Middle East and to East Asia. The United States will seek to protect these interests in those parts of the world. For Washington, European help will be important. But the action will be elsewhere.

Third, right after World War II, the transatlantic relationship consisted mostly of government-to-government relations. The information revolution and globalization have changed all that. Government-to-government relations, while in some cases decisive, now make up only a small portion of the overall relationship.

Fourth, after 9/11, the transatlantic relationship has experienced large shocks. Repairs to this relationship will not take us back to where we were before. Instead, they will take us into a new relationship.

Key judgments

Europe will be preoccupied with matters internal to the European Union (EU). France has a new government. So does the United Kingdom. Italy has returned to the familiar pattern of unstable government. Poland is struggling with its past as it seeks to realign its present. The future of Kosovo casts a shadow over Serbia and the Eastern Balkans. The threat of armed conflict in that area remains. Turkey is seeking to redefine itself, with uncertain effects on its role in the region. The transformation of the EU continues.

Europeans face two key issues: The state of the economy and immigration. Decisions on those issues will be made in capitals, not in Brussels.

The EU has abandoned the grand project of a European constitution. The result will be more a union of European states than a united states of Europe. With 27 member states, the EU has now come close to geographical and institutional limits. Countries to the East have no reasonable prospect of membership any time soon. The EU remains unconvinced that Turkish membership is in its interest.

It remains an underlying fact that Europe is a continent of immense and persistent diversity. Integration is not around the corner. Fissiparous tendencies are visible in the east, as in the continuing fractioning of the former Yugoslavia, and in the west, where Flemish nationalists are pursuing greater independence from Brussels. Leadership in Europe will continue to have a mostly national base.

Russia has made its reentry onto the European scene as a discordant if not threatening element, but the EU seems not to have a Russian policy worth the name. In Berlin, some Social Democrats are suggesting a policy of “equidistance,” opening a possible new chapter of the German question.

European leaders expect, even as they regret, that the EU is unlikely to provide leadership on global issues. There is no more talk of the EU as a counterweight to the United States. The EU will not be an equal partner of the United States. Claims to leadership on energy and climate control are at present just statements of intent.

If the transatlantic community is to function, a leading US role will remain essential. The challenge for the US will be to provide such leadership. A serious obstacle is the present low degree of truston the part of Europeans in the capacity of the United States to play a global role they would regard as constructive. Regaining credibility will take a long time.

European mistrust is compounded by a sense among the European publics that, on the issue of values, the US has strayed from the principles that Europeans consider the bedrock of the transatlantic relationship.

As America proceeds into primaries and toward the next presidential election, future American leaders need to be equipped to chart, and ready to pursue, a course to deal with an array of global challenges.

How to define Europe?

In the American foreign policy world, the word “Europe” rolls off the tongue rather easily, but its meaning is not always clear.

Historian Norman Davies begins his magisterial history of Europe with a laconic observation: “[I]n the beginning, there was no Europe.” (Norman Davies, EUROPE, AHistory, Harper, 1998, p. xvii).

Then, after the last ice age, immigrants arrived. According to legend, Europe was a princess, beguiled by the Father of Gods, who appeared in the guise of a snow-white bull, and carried her off the Phoenician beach, westward, into the sea toward Crete, her fluttering tunic floating in the breeze. (Ovid, Metamorphoses, ii, lines 862, as cited in Davies).

Davies observes that, while other civilizations were stagnant, the civilization of the Mediterranean Sea was stimulated by constant movement. Uncertainty and insecurity produced a constant ferment of ideas. Thus, Davies concludes, Europe rode in the path of the sun, from East to West. With the enlargement of the European Union (EU) eastward, we may now be seeing an opposite trend.

It is hard to speak of a geographic Europe. How far east does Europe go? Politically, the term EUis often used to indicate Europe, but non-members Norway and Switzerland are beyond any doubt European countries. Strategically, Russia and Turkey are in Europe, and so is the United States.

Over twenty years ago, historian Hugh Seton-Watson probed the question “What is Europe, Where is Europe?” (Encounter,July-August 1985, pp. 9-17). He observed that the growth of an increasingly homogeneous European culture, and also the belief among thinking men and women that they belong to a single, even if diverse European cultural community, are ”facts of history and facts of this present time.” Seton-Watson notes that the idea of Christendom, as a higher ideal transcending narrow territorial and feudal loyalties, was maintained by the reality of conflict, on sea and land, with Islam. He then traces the dichotomy between Christendom and infidel to something more ancient, namely the dichotomy between the civilized world and barbarians.

Seton-Watson concludes that ”[T]he two dichotomies – civilization and barbarism, and true faith and infidel – were fused in the later Roman Empire.The one word which combined true faith with civilization was ‘Christendom,’ which became coextensive with Europe, a geographical, not cultural term.”

One can speculate about the validity of these views. But now there are new facts of the present time. One is globalization. Another is immigration. In 1989, historian Fritz Stern talked about Europe “as if it existed or might again exist, as if its great political and historical divisions were disappearing,” with a future ”blessedly, dangerously open.”However, it remains a fact of the present timethat Europe today remains marked by profound national and regional differences. Czech author Milan Kundera emphasizes that “cultural diversity is the great European value.” “Die Weltliteratur,”, The New Yorker, January 8, 2007, p. 28.)

Another issue is whether the term Christendom captures the essence of Europe today. As I see it, the historical fact of conflict between Christians and Islam needs to give way to the imperative that Europe get along with Islam. (Kristy Hughes, “Turkey and Europe,” International Herald Tribune, August 24, 2007, p. 6).

Europe’s economy: The perennial challenge

Two drivers are shaping Europe today. First, the economy. Led by Germany, European economies have shown signs of picking up. In 2006, the German economy grew at 2.7%, unemployment dropped to 9.8%, and consumer spending rose by 0.6% (Frances G. Burwell and Jan Neutze, “The German Locomotive: Can It Drive The European Economy?” Issue Brief, The Atlantic Council of the United States, April 2007). But the economic problems of Europe have not gone away. The 2000 EU Lisbon Agenda of economic reforms failed, as did British plans for economic liberalizationduring the UK presidency of the EU in 2005. ( Reginald Dale and Robin Niblett, “2006 Will Provide Clues to Europe’s Future,”CSIS-EURO-FOCUS, Vol. 12, No.1, April 5, 2006).

As the EU has expanded, action in the economic field has remained with national capitals and large industries, though the EU Commission is playing a strong regulatory role. The Growth and Stability Pact is not being observed by Germany, France, and Italy. Protectionist tendencies to favor national industries are alive and well (“The curse of the Habsburgs,” The Economist, March 31, 2007, p.15). National squabbles about jobs and financing are affecting European enterprises such as Airbus and Galileo. Services remain governed by closed markets. Growth is modest. Unemployment remains high and affects young, unskilled and nonnative persons disproportionally.

There are also encouraging signs. The EURO is strong, though this is not an unmixed blessing for European exports. Social care in many European countries is well established, and expected. Medical care is good and available, particularly in France. Western Europeans have become used to – and count on – liberal vacation and leave policies.

Many of these features of European economies do not affect the United States directly. But a Europe that lives below its economic potential exercises a downward pull on the US economy. Tight budgets also restrict the ability of EU countries to fund national programs, such as NATO defense expenditures, another key US interest.

Immigration

The other driver shaping Europe today is immigration. This issue continues to bedevil Europe. Demographic projections strongly suggest the need for immigrants. But public aversion to large-scale immigration is widespread.

The problem is general, but it will play out in widely different contexts. Though not without its own problems, the United Kingdom presents a more favorable environment for people from Commonwealth and other countries, than does France, for its young Muslim population. German policy has adapted with some success to the flow of immigrants from Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union, as well as from Turkey. Italy continues to cope unsuccessfully with illegal arrivals by boat. The recent EU Commission ideas on immigration, under the opaquely namedpolicies of “circular integration” and “mobility partnerships” await further discussions (“In search of an immigration policy,” The Economist,June 2, 2007, p.54). There is no one-size-fits-all approach to Yugoslavs in Sweden, Poles in Ireland, Portugese in The Netherlands, and Turks in Germany. Attempts to shape a comprehensive EU immigration policy are boundto disappoint. However, EU countries are likely to be alert to best practices employed by their neighbors.

How Europe handles immigration – especially Muslim immigration – is not of direct interest to the United States. But American interests come into play if significant and persistent European problems with growing Muslim minorities begin to shapeEuropean policies with respect to the Muslim world.

Though a separate issue, terrorism is seen by some European publics as a problem related to immigration. Threat perception varies from country to country. But, on the whole, the European discussion treats terrorism as a phenomenon that demands vigilant attention by law enforcement. Europeans seek to cope with terrorism, rather than pursue an elusive victory. American interests are deeply affected by terrorist actions spawned in Europe and directed at the United States.

The EU Constitution

The idea of a European Constitution is dead. Instead, the EU has agreed on a mandate to produce, by the end of this year, a “Treaty on the Functioning of the Union.” It will need to be approved by the parliaments of all member states, except for Ireland, which will have a referendum. A President will be elected for a term of two and a half years. There will be new voting arrangements based on a “double majority” system of 55% of member states representing 65% of the EU population. This new system will not take effect until 2014, and may be postponed at the request of a member state until 2017. The Berlin Summit which agreed on these changes last June, was hardly an example of European harmony. The Economist termed it “a strikingly bad-tempered affair.” (The Economist, June 30, 2007, p. 61). Columnist John Vinocur described the Summit as an example of jostling for leadership among Britain, France and Germany (“In cohesive disunion, Europe stumbles on,” International Herald Tribune, June 26, 2007, p.2). The constitutional conundrum illustrates a fundamental problem: On this issue, Europe is practicing democracy from the top down.

The text of the new treaty will include the requirement for a commitment, on the part of future entrants, to promote European values. (Stephen Castle and Dan Bilefsky,” The new EU power broker: Sarkozy,”International Herald Tribune, June 25, 2007, p.3). Europeans are likely to discover how difficult it will be to put this requirement into practice. The requirement will also put into play the question to what extent European values differ from American values.

Enlargement

The issue of EU enlargement is divisive. The inclusion of Bulgaria and Romania is now afait accompli, creating an EU of 27 members. Other potential members – remnants of the former Yugoslavia – are on stage, and Ukraine looms in the wings. But these countries are a long way from being ready to join. Turkish membership remains a contentious issue.

The eastern Balkans will pose a major challenge. Serbia feels aggrieved by the loss of territories in Bosnia, Montenegro, and now Kosovo. Albanian Kosovars insist on full sovereignty for Kosovo. The presence of NATO forces and EU personnel will keep the lid on. Some Balkan experts are of the view that there will be no violence. Others believe that the potential for armed conflict remains (Richard Holbrooke, “Russia’s Test in Kosovo,” Washington Post, March 13, 2007, p. A 17). A European statesman with long and direct experience in the area worried to me recently about the explosive nature of the situation. I am inclined to agree with Dick Holbrooke: This part of Europe remains unstable.

Key members of the EU.

Inasmuch as political decisions will continue to be made in capitals, what is the outlook for key member states of the EU?

Having elected a new President, France will need time to redefine its role in Europe and reestablish its global credentials.

The election has changed the political landscape. Changes in political patterns will accelerate. The French public demands a government that responds to its needs. But this public is divided on major issues – unemployment, immigration, unassimilated Muslims, and education. Strong unions and other special interest groups constitute formidable hurdles to governing. The issue of what it means to be French will remain part of the debate even after the election.

The excitement about President Sarkozy is justified. He is a new face and he projects a new style. He is a smart political tactician. He has no hang-ups about America. Former US Ambassador to France Felix Rohatyn sees much promise for a rejuvenated France (“Sarkozy breaks the mold,” International Herald Tribune, August 31, 2007, p. 4). If France were to rejoin the NATO integrated command and obtain a key slot in the command structure, it would be a win-win situation for both France and the NATO alliance.