Religion & Antidiscrimination Law
Week VI: Affirmative Claims of Religious Discrimination I
(A) Disparate Treatment & Accommodations: Burdens & Proof
Cases
- Shapolia v. Los Alamos National Lab, 992 F.2d 1033 (10th Cir. 1993)
- Lubetsky v. Applied Card Systems, 296 F. 3d 1301 (11th Cir. 2002)
- Lemmons v. Georgetown University Hosp., 431 F.Supp.2d 76 (D.D.C. 2006) (focus on religious discrimination claim in III.C.)
- Isse v. American University, 540 F.Supp.2d 9 (D.D.C. 2008)
Discussion Questions
9. Why does the Shapolia court reject the use of the traditional burden shift for the case it is deciding? Do you agree with its reasoning?
10. Shapolia draws a parallel to “reverse discrimination” race cases. Why are such cases problematic under the McDonnell Douglas framework? Does the court’s comparison to these cases make sense?
11. Shapolia and Isse employ different versions of the prima facie test for disparate treatment. What are the strengths and weaknesses of each?
12. Lubetsky adds a requirement to the prima facie case for religious discrimination claims that the decision-maker was aware of the claimant’s religion. Why might this be necessary? Are the reasons behind adding this requirement unique to claims based on religion?
13. In Lubetsky, in a parenthetical describing the Beasley case, the court lists several kinds of evidence that can be used to meet the new requirement. Can you think of other ways to do so?
14. Lemmons and Isse refer to a prima facie case for religious accommodations claims that has been adopted by several courts. What are the strengths and weaknesses of this prima facie case?
15. Lemmons states that it is often difficult to distinguish between treatment and accommodations claims. Why is this so? Can you articulate a reasonably clear test to distinguish the two types of claims?
16. Isse says that plaintiffs in accommodations cases must show adverse employment consequences, and not merely adverse consequences to exercise of their religious beliefs. Is this consistent with the language of Title VII? Is it good policy?
17. Do you agree with the court in Isse that Mr. Wyatt’s remarks are not sufficient to be considered “direct evidence” of discrimination? If so, how much more should be necessary?
18. Carefully examine the court’s discussion of the evidence in Shapolia and Isse. Do you agree with all of the courts’ conclusions in these cases? Do these cases provide any lessons about ways in which religious discrimination claims might be different than other kinds of discrimination claims?
(B) Religious Discrimination Claims in Specific Contexts I: Zoning
Cases
- LeBlanc-Sternberg v. Fletcher, 67 F.3d 412 (2d Cir. 1995)
- Lighthouse Institute for Evangelism v. City of Long Beach, 510 F.3d 253 (3d Cir. 2007)
Discussion Questions
19. Assuming that there is a ban on home worship of the type at issue in LeBlanc-Sternberg that is based on even-handed application of a long-existing ordinance passed without discriminatory intent. As a matter of policy, under what circumstances would it be appropriate for the municipality to create an exception to allow home worship as an accommodation to the residents’ religious beliefs?
20. The majority opinion in Lighthouse Institute rejects the approach to the Equal Terms provision in RLUIPA advocated by the dissent and adopted by the Eleventh Circuit in Midrash Sephardi. Which approach do you think is preferable as a matter of policy?
21. Do you think the majority opinion in Lighthouse Institute appropriately handles the N.J. statute limiting alcohol use within 200 feet of a church and the plaintiff’s offer to waive its rights under the statute?
22. Based on your impressions of Lighthouse Institute and the cases it discusses, as a matter of policy, under what circumstances should a municipality be required to create exceptions to use restrictions to allow houses of worship in neighborhoods where they would otherwise be banned?