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Aug. 25, 2009 About 1,980 words

SPECIAL to Agora Magazine

Central America: An Emerging Role in the Drug Trade

By Stephen Meiners

While the United States remains the top destination for South American-produced cocaine, and Mexico continues to serve as the primary transshipment route, the path between Mexico and South America is clearly changing, especially in Central America -- a development that could pose problems for some nations ill-equipped to combat the smugglers.

In that region, because several countries have cracked down on air and sea smuggling operations, Mexican drug cartels are relying more heavily on land-based smuggling routes. The shift to land routes has been extraordinary. A December 2008 report from the U.S. National Drug Intelligence Center estimated that less than 1 percent of the 600 to 700 tons of cocaine that departed South America for the United States in 2007 transited Central America. The rest, for the most part, passed through the Caribbean Sea or Pacific Ocean en route to Mexico. Since then, land-based shipment of cocaine through Central America appears to have ballooned. In early 2009, U.S. Ambassador to Guatemala Stephen McFarland estimated that cocaine now passes through that country at a rate of approximately 300 to 400 tons per year.

Notwithstanding the difficulty associated with estimating drug flows, it is clear that Central America has evolved into a significant transshipment route for drugs, and that the changes have taken place rapidly.

Some Background

Drug shipment routes between Peru and Colombia -- where the vast majority of cocaine is cultivated and produced -- and the United States historically have been flexible, evolving in response to interdiction efforts or changing markets. For example, Colombian drug traffickers used to smuggle the bulk of cocaine shipments through the Caribbean, directly to the United States. However, by the 1990s increased surveillance and arrests by the United States and other nations forced the flow of U.S.-bound drugs into Mexico, which remains the main transshipment route for the overwhelming majority of cocaine entering the United States.

A similar situation has been occurring over the past few years in Central America. From the 1990s until as recently as 2007, traffickers in Mexico received multi-ton shipments of cocaine from South America via air or sea. There was ample evidence of this, including occasional discoveries of bulk cocaine shipments on everything from small propeller aircraft and Gulfstream jets to self-propelled semisubmersible vessels, fishing trawlers and cargo ships. These vehicles had sufficient range and capacity to bypass Central America, allowing smugglers to ship bulk drugs directly to Mexico.

By early 2008, however, a series of developments in several Central American countries suggested that drug-trafficking organizations -- Mexican cartels in particular -- were increasingly trying to establish new land-based smuggling routes through Central America.

While small quantities of drugs had certainly transited the region in the past, the routes presented an assortment of risks. A combination of poorly maintained highways, frequent border crossings, volatile security conditions and unpredictable local criminal organizations apparently presented such great logistical challenges that traffickers opted to send the majority of their shipments via well-established maritime and airborne platforms.

Then several countries in the region stepped up monitoring and interdiction of such shipments. The Colombian government, for one, increased monitoring of aircraft operating in its airspace. The Mexican government installed updated radar systems and reduced the number of airports authorized to receive flights originating in Central and South America. The Colombian government estimates that aerial trafficking of cocaine from Colombia has dropped as much as 90 percent since 2003.

Maritime trafficking also appears to have suffered over the past few years, most likely due to greater cooperation and information-sharing between Mexico and the United States. The United States has an immense capability to collect maritime technical intelligence, and an increasing degree of awareness regarding drug trafficking at sea. The Mexican navy estimated in 2008 that maritime drug trafficking had decreased some 60 percent over the last two years.

To make up for losses in maritime and aerial trafficking, land-based smuggling routes are increasingly being used -- not by Colombian cocaine producers or even Central American drug gangs but by the now much more powerful Mexican drug-trafficking organizations.

Central American Drug Trafficking

It is important to clarify that what we are defining as land-based trafficking is not limited to overland smuggling. The methods associated with land-based trafficking fall into three categories: overland smuggling, littoral maritime trafficking and short-range aerial trafficking.

The most straightforward of these is simple overland smuggling. As a series of investigations in Panama, Costa Rica and Nicaragua demonstrated, overland smuggling operations use a wide variety of approaches. In one case, authorities pieced together a portion of a route being used by the Sinaloa cartel in which small quantities of drugs entered Costa Rica from Panama via the Pan-American Highway. The cocaine was often held for several days in a storage facility before being loaded onto another vehicle to be driven across the country on major highways. Upon approaching the Nicaraguan border, traffickers avoided the official port of entry, sending the shipments into Nicaragua on foot or on horseback along a remote part of the border. Once across, the cocaine was taken to the shores of the large inland Lake Nicaragua, where it was put on boats and taken north, then loaded into vehicles and driven toward the Honduran border. In one case in Nicaragua, authorities uncovered another Sinaloa-linked route that passed through Managua and is believed to have followed the Pan-American Highway through Honduras and into El Salvador.

The second method associated with land-based trafficking involves littoral maritime operations. Whereas long-range maritime trafficking involves large cargo ships and self-propelled semisubmersible vessels capable of delivering multi-ton shipments of drugs without having to refuel, littoral trafficking tends to involve “go-fast boats” to carry smaller quantities of drugs at higher speeds over shorter distances. This is useful to traffickers who might want to avoid a certain stretch of highway or perhaps even an entire country. According to Nicaraguan military officials, several go-fast boats are suspected of operating off the country’s coasts and of sailing outside Nicaraguan territorial waters to avoid authorities, though such boats can now be found all along Central America’s coasts. While it is possible to make the entire trip from South America to Mexico using only this method -- and making frequent refueling stops -- it is believed that littoral trafficking is often combined with an overland network.

The third method associated with land-based drug smuggling involves short-range flights. In these cases, clandestine planes make stops in Central America before either transferring their cargo to a land vehicle or making another short flight toward Mexico. Over the past year, several small planes loaded with drugs or cash have crashed or been seized in Honduras, Mexico and other countries in the region. In addition, authorities in Guatemala have uncovered several clandestine airstrips allegedly managed by the Mexican drug trafficking organization Los Zetas. These examples suggest that even as overall aerial trafficking appears to have decreased dramatically, the practice continues in Central American countries, which lack the resources to adequately monitor their airspace.

Each of these three methods has two things in common. For one, the vehicles involved -- speedboats, small aircraft or private vehicles -- have limited cargo capacities, generally no greater than a few hundred pounds. While smaller quantities in more frequent shipments require more handling, they also mean that less product is lost if a shipment is seized. More important, each of these methods requires that a drug-trafficking organization maintain a presence inside Central America.

Actors Involved

There are a variety of drug-trafficking organizations operating inside Central America. In addition to some of the notorious transnational gangs with local roots -- such as Calle 18 and MS-13 -- there is also a healthy presence of foreign criminal organizations. However, it is the more powerful Mexican cartels that appear to be overwhelmingly responsible for the recent upticks in land-based narcotics smuggling in Central America.

Based on reports of arrests and drug seizures in the region, it is clear that no single Mexican cartel maintains a monopoly on land-based drug trafficking in Central America. The operators of the Mexican cartel-managed routes also do not match a single profile. At times, Mexican cartel members themselves have been found to be operating in Central America. More common is the involvement of locals in various phases of smuggling operations. One exception is Guatemala, where Mexican cartels appear to operate much more extensively than in any other Central American country. This may be due, at least in part, to the relationship between Los Zetas and deserters from Guatemalan special forces, known as Kaibiles. Beyond the apparently more-established Los Zetas smuggling operations there, several recent drug seizures -- including an 1,800-acre poppy plantation attributed to the Sinaloa cartel -- make it clear that other Mexican cartels are currently active in Guatemala.

Security Implications

Despite these concerns and the growing presence of Mexican traffickers in the region, there apparently have been no significant spikes in drug-related violence in Central America outside of Guatemala. Several factors may explain this relative lack of violence. First, most governments in Central America have yet to launch large-scale counternarcotics campaigns. The quantities of drugs seized probably amount to just a drop in the bucket, and because those seizures have remained low, Mexican cartels have yet to launch significant reprisal attacks against government officials in any country outside Guatemala. In that country, even the president has received death threats and had his office bugged, allegedly by drug traffickers.

The second factor, which is related to the first, is that drug traffickers operating in Central America likely rely more heavily on bribes than on intimidation. This assessment follows from the region’s reputation for official corruption and the economic disadvantage that many of these countries face compared to the Mexican cartels. For example, the gross domestic product of Honduras is $12 billion, while the estimated share of the drug trade controlled by Mexican cartels is $20 billion.

Finally, Mexican cartels have their hands full in a two-front war at home against the Mexican government and rival cartels. As long as this war continues, the cartels may be reluctant to divert significant resources far from their home turf.

Looking Ahead

That said, there is no guarantee that Central America will continue to escape the wrath of Mexican drug traffickers. On the contrary, there is reason for concern that the region will increasingly become a battleground in the Mexican cartel war.

For one thing, the Merida Initiative, a U.S. anti-drug aid program that supplies millions of dollars to Mexico and Central American nations, could be perceived as a meaningful threat to the cartels. If Central American governments step up counternarcotics operations, either at the request of the United States or to qualify for more Merida money, they risk disrupting smuggling operations enough to draw retaliation.

Also, even though Mexican cartels may be reluctant to divert major resources from the more important war at home, a large-scale reassignment of cartel operatives may not be necessary. Given the rampant corruption and relatively poor protective security for political leaders in the region, very few cartel operatives or resources would actually be needed if the Mexican cartels chose to conduct an assassination campaign against high-ranking government officials -- something they have extensive experience with in Mexico.

Governments are not the only potential threat to drug traffickers in Central America. The increases in land-based smuggling could trigger sharper competition over trafficking routes. Such turf battles could occur either among the Mexican cartels or between the Mexicans and local criminal organizations, a scenario that could contribute to a significant deterioration in the region’s security environment.

If the example of Mexico is any guide, the drug-related violence that could be unleashed in Central America would easily overwhelm the capabilities of the region’s governments.

______Mr. Meiners is senior tactical analyst for Latin America at Austin-based STRATFOR, a private intelligence company that analyzes and provides forecasts on geopolitical, economic, security and public policy issues. In this position he manages STRATFOR’s coverage of the security situation in Mexico and other countries in the region.

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