Understanding Warfare in the 21st Century
By James Turitto
Volume XVIII, No. 3: Winter 2010
The 21st century has witnessed faster communication times and closer international networks, increasing the number of people engaged in warfare and complicating the dynamics of it. In turn, the battlefield has expanded. Technological developments over the past two decades have driven this change, and have done so in several ways.
First, different actors engaged in a conflict have adopted the use of cutting-edge tools in warfare. The United States has led the pack in developing conventional military weaponry. As Andrew Callam discusses in his article “Drone Wars: Armed Unmanned Aerial Vehicles and Modern Warfare”, the U.S. military relies heavily on drones to target al-Qaeda and Taliban leaders in ungoverned areas of Pakistan, Yemen, and Somalia. Through DARPA, the Defense Department’s Advanced Research Projects Agency, the military is designing new models of drones, some that resemble hummingbirds and spiders, which will be used for surveillance against enemy targets.
Non-state actors, groups like al-Qaeda and Hezbollah that operate outside the territorial boundaries of the nation-state system, have also exploited new technologies for their tactical and strategic effects in warfare. Because non-state actors must be nimble and operate in the shadows, these tools go well beyond conventional military implements. They include not only the use of improvised explosive devices and suicide bombers, but also activities on the Internet to recruit members, raise money, transfer information, and generate public awareness.
Second, there has been a proliferation of real-time war reporting. The way that warfare is visualized on television and the Internet, in newspapers, or through daily communication, has a direct affect on how it is understood. Diligent attention to the news might cause someone to think that war is rampant. But just because pictures of war appear on CNN or BBC more frequently today does not mean that conflict is on the rise. Quite the opposite. Armed conflict is declining and there have been fewer deaths in war since the time of WWII than there were in both world wars.[1] It could be there is a positive correlation between increased knowledge of ongoing wars and the decline of war. As people become more aware of the horrors of war from images of death and disease they see in the news, perhaps they lose the romance for war, or begin to doubt its advocates.
The next generation of real-time conflict reporting is already starting to emerge. With the rise of user-generated content and Web 2.0 technologies—Youtube/Facebook/Twitter—witnesses to warfare are emerging not just as bystanders, or victims, but also as reporters. Youtube has shown itself to be a particularly powerful tool for documenting incidents of violence. The world watched in horror last June as the Iranian Revolutionary Guard trounced the opposition movement. Independent reporting led to the viral video of a young Iranian girl, Neda, seen graphically shot dead on camera. Pictures and videos such as these provide dramatic confirmation of the atrocities taking place, just as CNN’s reporters verified the genocide in Rwanda more than 15 years ago.
Finally, the instantaneous transfer of information via the Internet has increased the number of participants in war. Unarmed actors thousands of miles away can participate in a conflict even by sitting at their computer. In the span of a millisecond, satellite images depicting population migrations can be transferred from the office of Refugees International in Washington, D.C. to a remote computer in El Fashir, Sudan; video files from Darfur refugee camps can be uploaded to the internet for the entire world to view; and, a student studying war and conflict at George Washington University can communicate directly with members of the Sudan Liberation Movement. In the same time span, a disaffected Somali-American living in St. Paul, Minnesota can send remittances to Mogadishu, Somalia to support the cause of Al Shabab insurgents. The battlefield has become virtual. It is no longer fought on the ground but also on the web. Any willing person can become a belligerent in war, not just by fighting, but also by instantaneously transferring information, money, or technology.
As new tools enter battle, the battlefield continues to expand. It is both real and virtual, it is urban and rural. As 21st century warfare continues to evolve, it will become more complex. Understanding the way technology has changed warfare and the way it is viewed is important to the wars of the future: how they will be waged, and how they will be resolved.
------
[1] Human Security Center, University of British Columbia. Human Security Report 2005: War and Peace in the 21st Century (Oxford University Press: Oxford, 2005).
In January 2012 theU.S. Department of Defense released its strategic defense guidance, titledSustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense, that foresaw a greater need for unconventionalmilitary actions undertaken by specially designated, selected, trained, equipped, and supported units known as special forces (SF) or special operations forces (SOF). In the following monthsU.S. Army commanders outlined a new concept of operations in which a larger number of conventional units would train with SOF, and units from both forces would be placed under the same command to conduct joint military operations. By following a model that had worked well on a smaller scale in Iraq and Afghanistan, this new structure would hopefully enable a smaller U.S. military to act effectively against the types of threats likely to arise around the world in the future.
Special Operations Warfare and ConventionalWarfare
Some special operations are spectacular raids that garner wide publicity, such as the strike by U.S. Navy SEALs into Abbottabad, Pak., that targeted Osama bin Laden in 2011. Other operations are long-term, sometimes clandestine efforts that are barely acknowledged or are never made known at all. One such example would be support given by the U.S. Army’s Green Berets and the Royal Navy’s Special Boat Service to anti-Taliban forces in Afghanistan in 2001.
No matter what form it takes, however, special operations warfare is conducted by uniformed military forces. This is an important distinction, as it helps to differentiate special operations warfare from sabotage and subversion conducted byintelligence agencies or from internal security operations conducted by special weapons and tactics (SWAT) teams. Sometimes the dividing line between special operations conducted by intelligence agencies and those conducted by military units is not clear, and often the only difference is organizational: special forces fall under military chains of command and its operators wear uniforms, whereas those from intelligence agencies do not. In addition, there are legal differences between the two: national laws authorizing overt and clandestine military actions may be entirely separate from laws authorizing covert actions by civilian intelligence agencies, and certainly there is a great difference around the world in the legal protections afforded to military as opposed to intelligence personnel. (Intelligence personnel have no legal standing internationally, whereas military personnel ostensibly receive some protection under the laws of war.)
Given its unorthodox nature, special operations warfare is directly related to other well-known forms of unconventional warfare such asterrorism, guerrilla warfare, and insurgency. Most often, however, special forces are trained to counter these forms of aggression, using superior tactics, equipment, supply, and mobility to defeat terrorists, guerrillas, and insurgents who adopt unconventional tactics out of necessity. Special forces seek to deprive irregular opponents of the few tactical advantages they possess by denying them mobility, sanctuary, surprise, and initiative. In other cases, though, special forces may actually conduct guerrilla warfare or insurgency against conventional state-based adversaries, for example, by harrying or harassing supplying lines, raising partisan forces, or distracting enemy forces from conventional operations and forcing them to deal with threats in areas thought to be pacified or secure.
Special operations also must be distinguished from operations conducted by “specialized” conventional military forces—for instance, airborne and amphibious units. Those forces are organized, equipped, and trained to perform one specific task (for instance, airborne assault, airfield seizure, or amphibious landing), and they would require significant time, retraining, and reequipping to conduct another task. Often such specialized units receive the moniker ofcorps d’elite, reflecting their unique purpose, traditions, and past achievements in combat. The most significant differences between special operations forces and specialized forces lie in two broad areas. First is the scale of their operations: special operations are relatively small-scale, being conducted by companies, platoons, teams, or squadrons, whereas specialized operations are mounted by large units such as regiments, brigades, or even divisions. The second area is orthodoxy: special operations feature improvised and often indirect approaches, whereas specialized military operations feature orthodox approaches in a relatively direct assault.
Economy and Risk
Special operations warfare is the ultimate realization of the military principle of “economy of force,” in that small numbers of special operators often can achieve far greater results than conventional military operations. For example, in 1977 paramilitary special operators of the West German Grenzschutzgruppe-9 (GSG-9; Border Force Group 9) were able to free 90 hostages from a hijacked airliner in Mogadishu, Som., at a cost of only one friendly casualty.A comparable attempt by conventional military or paramilitary forces might not have been possible for political reasons, and doubtless it would have led to considerably higher casualties among both the hostages and the rescuers. Given their disproportionately high return on investment, special operations have value to political and military decision makers, at both the strategic and the operational level, as a low-cost method of addressing vexing problems with a high probability of success.
Special operations may be economical, but they are not without risk. One risk involves the disproportionate return on investment mentioned above. Success is not guaranteed in any military operation, and one very important strategic risk associated with a high-payoff special operation is humiliation should the operation fail to achieve its intended results. Humiliation after such a failure can have severe consequences, both politically and militarily. One example is the failed attempt by U.S. forces to rescue American hostages from Iran in 1980, images of which seemed to confirm to the world that the United States could not perform effectively militarily in the wake of the Vietnam War. Another example is the slow response and lacklustre performance of paramilitary special operators from India’s National Security Guard during the Mumbai terrorist attacks of 2008. In both cases, outright failure or failure to perform as expected led to highly critical reports in the media, official inquiries, and a certain level of domestic and international political crisis.
In addition to political and strategic fallout, another form of risk is associated with the danger inherent in special operations themselves. Given the fact that most special operations take place in denied or hostile territory, using small numbers of personnel in comparison with the enemy, the risk associated with tactical failure can be death for those involved.
Special Designation, Training, and Equipment
One difference between contemporary and historical special operations warfare is in the creating and sustaining of permanent special forces units. Modern special operations warfare had its genesis in World War II, but during that conflict military forces that conducted unorthodox actions were often created as the need arose and then disbanded once the actions had been completed. Famous examples include the joint U.S.-Canadian First Special Service Force, specially trained for mountain warfare; the German Kleinkampfmittelverband (or K-Verband) combat swimmers; and the Italian DecimaFlottigliaMezzid’Assalto (or XaMAS) naval assault teams. Nowadays, special forces are maintained on a permanent basis, which gives them greater capabilities than their historical predecessors.
Standing special forces are built upon three foundational elements that give them their “special” characteristics and also differentiate them from their conventional counterparts. These three elements are special designation, specialized selection and training, and special equipment. Special designations reflect the unique qualities and demonstrated abilities of a special force. Most commonly, they are seen in the name of the unit and also in some part of the uniform that distinguishes members of special forces from members of other units. Members of Britain’s Special Air Service (SAS) sport a sand-coloured beret and “winged dagger” badge, while Russia’s Spetsialnoyenaznacheniye (Spetsnaz) can be distinguished by their berets and striped undershirts. Some countries take such distinctions farther; for many yearsIndonesianKopassus special operators wore not only a distinctive red beret but also a unique camouflage uniform.
Differences in uniform and unit designation are more than ceremonial; they are worn as a badge of honour by those who have completed the rigorous selection and training processes associated with special forces. Selection and training regimes perform a screening function that separates those who have specific qualities from those who do not. More specifically, they identify those with the physical and, above all else, psychological qualities necessary for special operations work, such as levelheadedness in times of exceptional stress, intelligence, maturity, and an ability to solve problems in unconventional ways. The selection process often occurs over several phases and often is overseen by experienced former operators.
The point of training is to develop special operators’ skills to an exceptional level, cross-train operators in several skills as a means of self-reliance and team building, and also continuously scrutinize candidates for their suitability. Examples of training and selection processes include the Qualification (or “Q”) course for the U.S. Army’s Special Forces (the “Green Berets”), the Basic Underwater Demolition/SEAL (BUD/S) course for the U.S. Navy’s SEALs, and the joint United Kingdom Special Forces (UKSF) selection program for Britain’s SAS and Special Boat Service (SBS).Training is not only demanding but also dangerous. It is designed to push against the boundaries of a candidate’s physical and psychological endurance, refine both individual and group approaches to problem solving, and hone tactical skills in order to make unconventional options possible, such as high-altitude low-opening (HALO) parachute jumps.
The third and final foundational element of special forces is their specialized equipment. Such equipment may include nonstandard clothing, eyewear, or weapons; inventory obtained outside traditional military lines of supply, such as light helicopters; equipment heavily modified from standard military issue—for example, by the addition of commercial sights and barrels; and equipment that technically is still in development, such as miniaturized and “burst transmission” radios and advanced unmanned aerial vehicles. In the most-specialized units, operators are often free to choose equipment that suits their personal preferences and needs. This freedom reflects confidence in the operators’ judgment and ability, and it highlights the primary emphasis in all special operations units: the mission must succeed.
Flexibility and Adaptability
Given unlimited time and resources, any military unit can be trained to conduct a specific task to a high standard. Training is often repeated over and over again until as many flaws as possible have been identified and corrected and each member’s job during the mission has become second nature. A number of specialized forces during World War II prepared for their assaults in this way, including the British airborne unit that seized Pegasus Bridge in France on D-Day in 1944. What sets special forces apart from conventional forces, or even some special forces from other special forces, is the wide variety of conditions under which they are expected to execute their tasks without compromising standards. As one special operator has noted, any force can be trained to capture a high-value target, such as a terrorist leader or a military facility, with a high likelihood of success, but some special forces are able to conduct multiple missions over a single period of time and across a wide variety of space with almost no reduction in their standard of execution. Even at nighttime, in adverse weather, and under great fatigue, special operators are expected to remember vast quantities of detail and carry out missions beyond the ability of other units. In addition, as techniques evolve and the enemy adapts, special forces must also continually adapt and innovate as what was once “special” becomes the norm or is no longer effective against an enemy.
Direct and Indirect Force
The tasks that special forces perform fall under two broad categories, known as direct and indirect.Direct operations often involve the destruction, killing, or capture of people, equipment, and facilities. One famous example (cited above) would be the U.S. mission against Osama bin Laden in 2011; others from the past include the Italian targeting and sinking of two British warships and a Norwegian tanker in Alexandria, Egypt, in 1941 and an Israeli operation against an Egyptian radar and electronic monitoring facility on the Suez Canal in 1969. Direct operations often become immortalized as “great raids,” capturing the imagination of the public and politicians for their daring and audacity, immediate results, and seeming decisiveness. Special operators often distinguish raids according to their target: direct action, the most generic type of raid; counterterrorism, specifically targeting terrorist leaders, organizers, followers, and infrastructure; and counterproliferation, in which weapons of mass destruction and their components are destroyed, neutralized, or seized and rendered safe. In order to mitigate risk and ensure success, direct special operations require exceptionally well-trained and well-equipped forces that have rehearsed missions exhaustively on the basis of long-term and incomparably detailed intelligence information.