UMKC SDI 2007 China Disadvantage

Louie & Todd

China Disadvantage

China 1nc-3

***Uniqueness***

Relations Good\High-6

Now Key Time

Relations Are On The Brink

Sphere Of Influence UQ

***Links\Internals***

Africa Key

China-Africa Relations High

China Gaining At Us Expense

China Increases Influence In Africa

Africa Is In China Sphere of Influence

Zero Sum Links

Perception Link

African Policies Decrease Relations

Containment Links

Aid Links

Decrease Relations Spillover

Taiwan Lashout Internal Link Magnifier

Encirclement Internals- Taiwan Lashout

Containment Internals- Taiwan Lashout

***Impacts***

Cooperation Key Stop Taiwan War

Taiwan War Goes Nuclear

North Korea Module

Indo\Pak Module

Africa Key China Soft Power

Impact- Regime Collapse

***Answers***

Relations Bad

No Link- No Competition

Increase China-Africa Relations Causes US-China Conflict

***More Answers to come- I swear…. DO NOT BUG ME ABOUT IT--- I WILL HAVE A 30 PAGE Addendum By Sunday night****

China 1nc

China is increasing its sphere of influence throughout Africa by locking in a grand strategy of political warfare, which includes development assistance and economic aid as its centerpiece, in a move to counter US influence in Africa. Chinese political leaders believe their plan to be leading to less US influence in Africa

Donovan C. Chau (Adjunct Faculty Department of Defense and Strategic Studies at MissouriStateUniversity) March 2007, “Political Warfare in Sub-Saharan Africa: US Capabilities and Chinese Operations in Ethiopia, Kenya, Nigeria and South Africa”,

Africatoday has emerged as a continent of strategic consequence. Domestic and international terrorism aside,the two great powersof our time,the United States and the People’s Republic ofChina (PRC), are vying for influence over African governmentsand people.Not unlike the Cold War, the primary means of exerting influence in Africa is through the use of non-violent instruments of grand strategy.In this monograph, Dr. Donovan Chau considersone nonviolent instrument of grand strategy in particular, political warfare. Retracing the origins and mischaracterizations of political warfare, Dr. Chau suggests that the PRC has used political warfare as its leading grand strategic instrument in Africa. The monograph offers a concise, detailed overview of U.S. capabilities to conduct political warfare in Africa. It then examines PRC political warfare operations in four regional “anchor” states—Ethiopia, Kenya, Nigeria, and South Africa.What emerges from Dr. Chau’s analyses is the Chinese use of political warfare intentionally targeting U.S. interests in Africa. Unless the U.S. Government recognizes the utility of political warfare and reorients the federal bureaucracy to employ it effectively, he intimates that future U.S. influence in Africa will wane—to the benefit of a country that understands political warfare and uses it seriously. Today, as in the past, the People’s Republic of China(PRC)exerts influence on the African continent. Unlike the United States, which also attempts to sway African nations and people, the PRC uses an instrument of grand strategy called political warfare as its primary means of influence. What is political warfare, and how is it being employed in Africa today? How do U.S. capabilities compare to PRC operations and capabilities in Africa? The monograph answers these and other questions to inform the current national se-curity debate among U.S. policy and decisionmakers. For while the struggle against international terrorism will continue indefinitely, the U.S. Government must not overlook other grand strategic challenges currently taking place around the world. The monograph explains political warfare in its historic context and offers a current definition. Simply,political warfare is a nonviolent instrument of grand strategy, involves coordinated activities, and results in tangible effects on intended targets. In operational terms, political warfare includes economic aid and development assistance, as well as training, equipping, and arming military and security forces. Exchange visits and public pronouncements are secondary political warfare operations, supporting and facilitating prim-ry operations.Political warfare offers distinct advantages to other instruments of grand strategy, making it a desirable means of exerting influence. Vis-à-vis other instruments—particularly military power—political warfare is economical. Though results may not appear immediately, using political warfare has grand strate-gic benefits, from information-gathering to relationship-building. Moreover,political warfaremay poten-tiallygarner prestige and a positive reputation around the world.

Chinese leaders have placed all confidence in a foreign policy to develop relations to counter US gains- Any perception of US gains will indicate Chinese losses

Agence France Presse, September 23, 1999

China's Communist leadership, once just a ragged band of soldiers,is struggling after 50 years in power to find its place on a world stage dominated by the United States. Regarded with suspicion in the early days of the People's Republic when many countries still recognised the nationalist government of Chiang Kai-shek on Taiwan,China is hoping to use its anniversary celebrations on October 1to prove it has a rightful place in the international community. "China's biggest problem is the United States. US power faces them wherever they look: east, west, north, south," said Andrew Nathan, of ColumbiaUniversity's East Asian Institute. "(But)they've committed themselves to an economic development policythat depends on good relations with the West." Since late supreme leader Deng Xiaoping threw open China's doors to foreign investors in 1979, ending almost two decades of political turmoil and isolation, China has been gradually building up its confidence in foreign affairs. "The rest of the world views China as one of the world's most dynamic economies and a respectable and responsible power," ran an editorial in a recent edition of the China Daily newspaper, of a kind that peppers the official press. Sino-US ties, formally established in 1979 after a landmark visit by US President Richard Nixon in 1972, have formed the backbone of China's foreign policy in the post-Deng era. But the bilateral relationship has been far from smooth, with China seeing itself in the post-Cold War world as one of the few large countries willing to stand up to US "hegemonism." Since the bloody crackdown on the 1989 Tiananmen Square pro-democracy movement earned international condemnation, Beijing has made it clear it sees pressure on human rights as an excuse used by rich Western countries to interfere in the internal affairs of poorer ones. Sino-US ties reached a high point with a 1998 visit by US President Bill Clinton during which he discussed human rights and democracy with President Jiang Zemin on live television. But the honeymoon period was soon over, marred by wrangling over human rights, allegations that China stole US nuclear secrets, and the war in Kosovo. Beijing strongly opposed NATO's bombing campaign in Yugoslavia even before its Belgrade embassy was hit by NATO missiles, saying it constituted "gunboat diplomacy." The bombing, which killed three Chinese journalists, sparked a backlash of anti-foreign sentiment in Beijing. "China has been extremely weak in the past and is very sensitive on that issue -- we have been invaded and suffered foreign interference on a number of occasions," said Jia Qingguo, professor at BeijingUniversity's school of international relations. "But globalisation is an objective reality. China must accept this reality and go with the tide of history," he said. Some analysts say, however, that China's foreign policy thinking still has a longway to go to meet the challenges of the post-Cold War era. Concepts like globalisation are still relatively new amongChina'sveteran leaders. "They pretend a lot of that stuff but they don't really mean it," said a Western diplomat. "They have a very realpolitik zero-sum game approach -- if someone is gaining we must be losing."

China 1nc

US encroachment upon Chinese spheres of influence will cause direct military confrontation through miscalculations, this is empirically true with rising powers

Susan Shirk (served as deputy assistant secretary for China at the U.S. State Department from 1997 to 2000) 2007CHINA: FRAGILE SUPERPOWER p. 261

We cannot control whether China's leaders heed our advice to them. But we can control how we ourselves think about and behave toward China, which is all the more important becausewe can't count on China always to act responsibly or in its own best interest. Everything Americans say and do regarding China reverberates through Chinese domestic politics. Just as Americans are wondering if a rising China will threaten us,the Chinese are wondering about America's intentions toward China. Can America learn to live with rising China? Or as the number one power in the world, is America bound to try to keep China weak to maintain its own position?China's people, and itsleaders, arelistening to what we say and watching what we do. Historically, rising powers cause war not necessarily because they are innately belligerent, but because the reigning powers mishandle those who challenge the status quo in one way or another.Based on history, the prognosis for relations between rising powers like China and reigning powers like the United States is poor.It could produce direct conflict between two nuclear powers. The costs of such a conflict would be devastating not just for the two societies but for the rest of Asia and the entire world.

US-China war will go nuclear, causing global conflagration ending human existence

Straits Times 6-25-2000

THE high-intensity scenario postulates a cross-strait war escalating into a full-scalewar between the US and China. If Washington were to conclude that splitting China would better serve its national interests, then a full-scale war becomes unavoidable. Conflicton such a scalewould embroil other countries far and nearand -horror of horrors -raise the possibility of a nuclear war. Beijing has already told the US and Japan privately that it considers any country providingbases and logisticssupport to any US forcesattacking China as belligerent partiesopen to its retaliation. In the region, this means South Korea, Japan, the Philippines and, to a lesser extent, Singapore. If China were to retaliate, east Asia will be set on fire. And the conflagrationmay not end there as opportunistic powers elsewheremay try tooverturn the existing world order. With the US distracted, Russia may seek to redefine Europe's political landscape.The balance of power in the Middle East may be similarly upset by the likes of Iraq. In south Asia, hostilities between India and Pakistan, each armed with its own nuclear arsenal, could enter a new and dangerous phase. Will a full-scale Sino-US war lead to a nuclear war? According to General Matthew Ridgeway, commander of the US Eighth Army which fought against the Chinese in the Korean War, the US had at the time thought of using nuclear weapons against China to save the US from military defeat. In his book The Korean War, a personal account of the military and political aspects of the conflict and its implications on future US foreign policy, Gen Ridgeway said that US was confronted with two choices in Korea -truce or a broadened war, which could have led to the use of nuclear weapons. If the US had to resort to nuclear weaponry to defeat China long before the latter acquired a similar capability, there is little hope of winning a war against China 50 years later, short of using nuclear weapons. The US estimates that China possesses about 20 nuclear warheads that can destroy major American cities. Beijing also seems prepared to go for the nuclear option. A Chinese military officer disclosed recently that Beijing was considering a review of its "non first use" principle regarding nuclear weapons. Major-General Pan Zhangqiang, president of the military-funded Institute for Strategic Studies, told a gathering at the Woodrow Wilson International Centre for Scholars in Washington that although the government still abided by that principle, there were strong pressures from the military to drop it. He saidmilitary leaders considered the use of nuclear weapons mandatory if the country risked dismembermentas a result of foreign intervention. Gen Ridgeway said thatshould that come to pass, we would see the destruction of civilisation.

***Uniqueness***

Relations Good\High

Dialogue and cooperation now between the u.s. & china

Carla Hills(former trade negotiator) April 2007 “u.s.-china relations: an affirmative agenda, a responsible course”, Council on Foreign Relations,

For nearly two decades, U.S. policy toward China (and Taiwan) remained rooted in the strategic interests that led Nixon to Beijing during the Cold War. This policy has commonly been known as ‘‘engagement.’’ Through engagement, China’s relationship with the United States has been transformed from one characterized by near-constant antagonism to one in which dialogue and cooperation have become common.

Us / China Relations Being Built Back Up

Jing Li (candidate at the USC Rossier School of Education and a Holmes Scholar) 02/25/2007, 7/25/07

There are many suspicions, misunderstandings, and misassumptions in the area of U.S. – China relations. Relations between these two countries have never been easy. With China’s rise in the 21st century, many fear another extended period of tension between the U.S. and China. Some Americans talk about China’s threat to U.S. security and interests and believe U.S. policy should try to restrain China. Chinese leaders are also concerned the U.S. will do everything to prevent China from gaining equal status with the U.S. However, Professor Zhao believes the conflict is navigable, because the world now is much more pluralized than in the past. It is necessary to build institutions to facilitate the U.S. - China relationship by creating and encouraging dialogue and conversation. Leaders in both China and the U.S. have made efforts to foster a candid, cooperative and constructive relationship.

Us / China Relations Good

Yang Wenchang [president of the Chinese People's Institute of Foreign Affairs] 07/16/2007, 7/25/07

The Chinese and US governments signed the Shanghai Communique on February 28, 1972, expressing the shared desire to normalize bilateral relations and stating that "neither should seek hegemony in the Asia-Pacific region and each is opposed to efforts by any other country or group of countries to establish such hegemony"; and "The United States acknowledges that all Chinese on either side of the Taiwan Straits maintain there is but one China and that Taiwan is a part of China." The Shanghai Communique clearly defined the common security interests of China and the United States in opposing Soviet hegemonism and also expressed the disputes existing between the two sides in such a way that each side separately stated their positions on certain issues. This was the biggest benefit of the communique. After 23 years, Chinese-US relations began to thaw.

us-china relations high now

China View 20076/7/7. China, U.S. agree to deepen parliamentary exchanges. Online.

Sheng told Cheney thatthe Chinese side attaches great importance to the Sino-U.S. tiesand has always been treating bilateral relationship from strategic and long-term perspectives. Sheng, who led an NPC delegation to attend the fourth meeting with the U.S. Senate under a parliamentary exchange mechanism on Tuesday and Wednesday, said China is willing to continue to work with the U.S. to implement consensus reached between Chinese President Hu Jintao and U.S. President George W. Bush, and to make joint efforts to ensure a sound and steady development of constructive bilateral cooperation.Cheney,who is also president of the U.S. Senate,spoke highly of the outcome of the fourth meeting between the NPC and the U.S. Senate, saying that he will continue to support this important parliamentary exchange mechanism.The top Chinese lawmaker reaffirmed China's principled position on the Taiwan issue, noting that the current situation across the Taiwan Strait is very complicated and sensitive. He hoped that the U.S. would stick to its commitments to China on the issue and firmly oppose and contain "Taiwan independence" to safeguard the overall bilateral relationship and maintain peace and stability across the strait. Sheng also briefed Cheney on the positive outcome of the meeting between the lawmakers, saying that it is of great importance for the bilateral relationship to further consolidate and deepen substantial dialogues between lawmakers. Noting that the U.S.-China relations is one of the most important bilateral relations in the world, Cheney stressed that the continuous development of the relationship is not only significant to the prosperity and stability of the two countries, but also conducive to maintaining peace and stability in the world.He said that the U.S. side understands the importance and sensitivity of the Taiwan issue and will continue to handle it in accordance with the principles laid out in the three joint communiques between the U.S. and China.

Relations Good\High

relations are optimistic—gates is toning down us rhetoric

Reuters 2007US and China make concessions. 3/6/7.

US Defence Secretary RobertGates played down concerns about China's military build-upyesterday, signalling a shift in the Pentagon's tone intended to ease tensions and draw Beijing toward more transparency. China gave way too, agreeing to a defence hotline Washington has sought for more than five years. "I think it's an important start,"Gates said on the sidelines of the Shangri-La Dialogue, the pre-eminent security conference in the region. "There has clearly been greater transparency on the part of the Chinese," he told reporters in Singapore. Tensions have risen in recent years over China's military expansion and pursuit of capabilities that Washington believes could threaten not only Taiwan, but US interests in Asia as well. Beijing has said it would boost defence spending by 17.8 per cent to about $45 billion (Dh165.2 billion) in 2007. But Pentagon and US intelligence officials say China's total real military-related spending for 2007 could be between $85 billion (Dh312.1 billion) and $125 billion (Dh458.9 billion). US officials regularly call for Beijing to be more open about its intentions, and former US defence secretary Donald Rumsfeld used the International Institute for Strategic Studies' Shangri-La forum to criticise China for a lack of transparency. But this year,Gates eased the tone, saying there was reason for optimism about the US-China relationship.