DBQ: FDR & the New Deal
By John A. Braithwaite
DIRECTIONS:
The following DBQ is based upon the accompanying documents and your knowledge of the time period involved. This question tests your ability to work with historical documents. Your answer should be derived mainly from the documents, however, you may refer to historical facts, materials, and developments NOT mentioned in the documents. You should assess the reliability of the documents as historical sources where relevant to your answer.
QUESTION FOR ANALYSIS:
Was the “New Deal” of Franklin Roosevelt a conservative, a liberal, or a socialist program to deal with the problems of depression and war? Consider with reference to at least FOUR of the following agencies: NYA, CCC, TVA, SEC, AAA, FHA, NLRB, WPA, GI Bill, or Social Security Act in order to fulfill the constitutional mandate of “…Providing for the General Welfare of the people”
PROMPT:
· Formulate a thesis statement
· Use documents as well as your own outside knowledge of the period.
· Deal evenly with all aspects of the questions
· Be sure to cover the time period given
· Assess the validity of the documents
· Draw effective and specific conclusions whenever possible
TEXTBOOK RECOMMENDATIONS
Gillon & Matson The American Experiment
Boydston & McGerr Making A Nation
Murrin, et.al Liberty, Equality, Power
Norton, et.al. A People & A Nation
Brinkley American History
Bailey & Kennedy The American Pageant
Boyer, et.al. Enduring Visions
Davidson, et.al. Nation of Nations
Cherny & Berkin The Making of a Nation
Document A:
Despairing people in these pre-New Deal years feared President Herbert Hoover had forgotten them. . . As a matter of fact he had, more than any other depression president in American history, taken steps to try to bring recovery. But he had functioned largely through giving aid at the top to prevent the further collapse of banks and industries, and the concentric rings of further collapse of banks and industries, and the concentric rings of further collapses and unemployment which would then ensue. He felt that too great federal intervention would undermine the self-reliance, destroy the "rugged individualism" of the American people, and that it would create federal centralization, thus paving the way for socialism
President Hoover was consistent in his thinking, and he was humane. But it would have been hard to explain to people like those grubbing on the Chicago garbage heap, why, when the Reconstruction Finance Corporation was loaning $90,000,000 to a single Chicago Bank, the President would veto a bill to provide federal relief for the unemployed, asserting, "never before has so dangerous a suggestion been seriously made in this country". . .Roosevelt and most of his contemporaries. . .were basically conservative men who unquestioningly believed in the American free enterprise system. On the whole, they were suspicious of strong government, and would indulge in it only as a last resort to try to save the system . . . Roosevelt as governor had repeatedly demonstrated . . . inconsistency in his public statements and recommendations. He had ardently endorsed states rights and small government in a truly Jeffersonian way. Then in quite contrary fashion (but still in keeping with Jeffersonian spirit applied to twentieth century society) he had pointed out one or another area, such as old age security, in which he believed the government, must intervene to protect the individual.
At this time, what distinguished Governor Roosevelt from his fellows were two remarkable characteristics. The first was his willingness to experiment, to try one or another improvisation to stop the slow economic drift downward toward ruin . . .the second was his brilliant political skill. During the campaign of 1932, many a man who had observed Roosevelt felt as did Harry Hopkins that he would make a better president than Hoover, "chiefly because he is not afraid of a new idea."
Frank Freidel, THE NEW DEAL IN HISTORICAL
PERSPECTIVE, Publication No. 25, Service Center for Teachers of History, American Historical Association, Washington, 1959, 2-5.
Document B:
So first of all let me assert my firm belief that the only thing we have to fear is fear itself--nameless, unreasoning, unjustified terror which paralyzes needed efforts to convert retreat into advance. . .
More important, a host of unemployed citizens face the grim problem of existence, and an equally great number toil with little return. Only a foolish optimist can deny the dark realities of the moment.
. . .Plenty is at our doorstep, but a generous use of it languishes in the very sight of the supply.
Primarily, this is because the rulers of the exchange of mankind's goods have failed through their own stubbornness and their own incompetence, have admitted their failure and abdicated. . .
The money changers have fled from their high seats in the temple of our civilization. We may now restore that temple to the ancient truths. . .
Our greatest primary task is to put people to work. This is no unsolvable problem if we face it wisely and courageously.
It can be helped by the unifying of relief activities which today are often scattered, uneconomical and unequal.
Finally, in our progress toward a resumption of work we require two safeguards against a return of the evils of the old order; there must be a strict supervision of all banking and credits and investments; there must be an end to speculation with other people's money, and there must be provision for an adequate but sound currency.
CONGRESSIONAL RECORD, 73rd Congress, Special Session (March 4, 1933), Part I, 5-6.
Document C:
. . .the present acute economic emergency. . .(is) in part the consequence of a severe and increasing disparity (gap) between the prices of agricultural and other commodities, which disparity has largely destroyed the purchasing power of farmers for industrial products. . .
Sec. 2. It is hereby declared to be the policy of Congress:
(1) To. . .re-establish prices to farmers at a level that will give agricultural commodities a purchasing power with respect to articles that farmers buy, equivalent to the purchasing power of agricultural commodities in the base period. . .(which) shall be the pre-war period, August 1909-July
1914. . .
Sec. 8. In order to effectuate the declared policy, the Secretary of Agriculture shall have power:
(1) To provide for reduction in the acreage or. . .in the production for market. . .of any basic agricultural commodity. . .The making of any such agreement shall not be held to be in violation of any of the anti-trust laws of the United States. . .
Sec. 9. (a) To obtain revenue for extraordinary expenses incurred by reason of the national economic emergency, there shall be levied processing taxes. . .upon the first domestic processing of the commodity. . .(which) shall be paid by the processor. . .
U.S. STATUTES AT LARGE, XLVIII (1933), 31.
Document D:
SECTION 1. . .
The inequality of bargaining power between employees who do not possess full freedom of association or actual liberty of contract, and employers who are organized in the corporate or other forms of ownership association. . . .tend to aggravate recurrent business depressions by depressing wage rates and the purchasing power of wage earners in industry and by preventing the stabilization of competitive wage rates and working conditions within and between industries.
SEC. 7. Employees shall have the right of self-organization, to form, join, or assist labor organization, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in concerted activities, for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection.
SEC. 8. It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer:
(1) To interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in section 7.
(2) To dominate or interfere with the formation or administration of any labor organization or contribute financial or other support to it. . .
(5) To refuse to bargain collectively with the representatives of his employees. . .
U.S. STATUTES AT LARGE, XLIX. (1935), 449.
Document E:
To us, strong vital government action was. . .a prerequisite in any program for material recovery. . .those who seek inconsistencies will find them. There were inconsistencies of methods, inconsistencies caused by ceaseless efforts to find ways to solve problems for the future as well as for the present. There were inconsistencies born of insufficient knowledge. There were inconsistencies springing from the need of experimentation. But through them all, I trust that there also will be found a consistency and continuity of broad purpose.
Consistently, I have sought to maintain a comprehensive and efficient functioning of the representative from of democratic government in its modern sense. Consistently, I have sought through that form of government to help our people to gain a larger social justice.
Rosenman, ed., THE PUBLIC PAPERS AND ADDRESSES OF FRANKLIN DELANO ROOSEVELT, I, xii-xiii.
Document F:
. . .One need only recall what conditions were in 1932 to realize the amazing change in our national thinking that has taken place in eight years. . .
As a nation we have agreed, once and forever, that the individual must not bear the sole responsibility for his failure to dope with economic problems of unemployment or old age which are, quite obviously, beyond his powers, and that society as a whole must take over a substantial part of the burden.
We have at last learned that laissez-faire has been dead for years; that the unguided lust of the business man for profit does not infallibly produce Utopia.
And finally, we have reaffirmed in these past eight years an early American doctrine that had been all but forgotten preceding decades: that the country exists for the welfare and happiness of all its inhabitants; and that when this condition is not met, reformation is in order no matter how drastic it may be or how much it may be disliked by existing privileged minorities.
The New Deal, even in its second term has clearly done far more for the general welfare of the country and its citizens than any administration in the history of the nation.
"THE NEW DEAL IN REVIEW, 1936-1940, "New Republic, 102, May 20, 1940, p.707.
Document G:
. . .the present Administration, elected upon a Democratic Party platform, has in the so-called "New Deal" adopted the policies of the Socialist Party platform.
These policies follow very closely the Communistic philosophy of Karl Marx, prophet of Soviet Russia.
Shocking as this realization is to the people of the United States, the vital fact remains that the New Deal is a dangerous and tragic error on the part of the Administration, not because it is Socialistic, but because it has failed, and will continue to fail, to bring recovery and re-employment. . .
That failure is measurable in terms of jobs. Unemployment was 9,920,000 in September 1922. Today it is 10,015,000. . .
The failure of the New Deal is measurable also in terms of industrial activity. Out "production index" showed an increase of only 2.5% in twelve months. This, certainly, is not Recovery. . .
As this is written the organizational set-up of "Social Security" also is being planned. The aged and needy must be cared for, but it would have been wiser government to bring about such prosperity as would hold need at a minimum which can be cared for by the community. The future implications of this measure are not understood. . .
We are approaching a day when individual liberty will vanish, in which citizens will be at the back and call of government bureau autocrats. . .
Individual liberty and complete economic security are not compatible. Our people have had the courage and enterprise to carve their own fortunes. It would be a tragedy to make of them bureaucratic serfs.
The little-understood, Socialistic experimentation which is called the "New Deal" leads toward just that. It is pertinent to ask Americans, "Do You Like It?"
Robert L. Lund, "Truth About the New Deal," in Earl Reeves, ed, TRUST ABOUT THE NEW DEAL. New York Longmans, Green, 1936, 75-80 passim
Document H:
It was hard to understate the need for action. The national income was less than half of what it had been four short years before. Nearly thirteen million Americans - about one quarter of the Labor force - were desperately seeking jobs. The machinery for sheltering and feeding the unemployed was breaking down everywhere under the growing burden. And a few hours before, in the early morning before the inauguration, every bank in America had locked its doors. It was now not just a matter of staving off hunger. It was a matter of seeing whether a representative democracy could conquer economic collapse. It was a matter of staving off violence, even (at least some so thought) revolution.
Whether revolution was a real possibility or not, faith in a free system was plainly waning. Capitalism, it seemed to many, had spent its force; democracy could not rise to economic crisis. The only hope lay in governmental leadership of a power and will which representative institutions seemed impotent to produce. Some looked enviously on Moscow, others on Berlin and Rome; abroad there seemed fervor, dedication, a steel determination. Could America match this spirit of sacrifice and unity?. . .
"At the beginning of March," as Walter Lippmann summed it up, "the country was in such a state of confused desperation that it would have followed almost any leader anywhere he chose to go. . .In one week, the nation, which had lost confidence in everything and everybody, has regained confidence in the government and in itself."