#3-307

To Lieutenant General Joseph W. Stilwell

September 1, 1942 Radio No. 5 [Washington, D.C.]

Secret

For General Stilwell's eyes alone.

A month ago I had a disagreeable scene with Soong about the conditions under which you have had to operate in China. He was engaged in his usual efforts to compromise matters and I turned on him with an extremely frank and forcible statement of what I thought of the Chinese attitude in relation to the United States in general and you in particular. He offered nothing more than apologetic statements to calm me down while I continued to make it brutally plain that I personally would not tolerate much more of the current attitude on their part.1 I also told him I would not talk to him further until I had seen Mr. Currie who was then about to leave Chungking.

Since then I have seen Currie and he has told me of conditions as he learnt them from you and the Generalissimo and others in Chungking.

The Secretary and I are very much concerned about your future in China. We both realize the extremely difficult position in which you have been placed and the smallness of the support we have been able to give you. However I am even more concerned because of the apparent necessities for the future.

The Combined Chiefs of Staff are now considering what we might be able to do after the monsoon towards the recapture of Burma. It is evident to the U.S. Chiefs of Staff that the Chinese would not accept British leadership and the British certainly would not accept Chinese leadership, therefore it would appear that the only hope is for their joint acceptance of a U.S. leader for this operation. Whether or not the British can muster any troops from India I do not know. Your information would be better than mine on this point. Whether or not the Generalissimo would permit sizeable Chinese forces to operate in Burma or on the frontier I do not know but it is clear to me that in any event no coordination can be achieved except through the medium of an American commander. The provision of U.S. ground troops other than for air units appears unlikely in the light of the present shipping situation.

I wish you would radio me very frankly, for my eyes alone, what you think the prospects are for such a coordinated effort and whether or not you think the Generalissimo would accord you his support.2 From your messages and from what Currie has told me both you and the Generalissimo have very strongly antagonistic feelings regarding the Burma campaign and your status in China. Is this feeling too strong or deep rooted to expect a favorable readjustment?3

Document Copy Text Source: George C. Marshall Papers, Pentagon Office Collection, Selected Materials, George C. Marshall Research Library, Lexington, Virginia.

Document Format: Typed radio message.

1. T. V. Soong, China's foreign minister, had visited Marshall on the afternoon of July 30. Soong had angered Marshall and others in Washington by failing to deliver or by altering to make more agreeable reading certain United States messages to Chiang Kai-shek relating to lend-lease policy and Stilwell's role in China. (Romanus and Sunderland, Stilwell's Mission to China, pp. 161, 175, 180. Stilwell's reaction to this practice is recorded in Stilwell Papers, p. 130.)

2. Stilwell's reply of September 4 noted that the British were more concerned with the Middle East, the possibility of civil unrest in India, and their naval weaknesses than with immediate counterstrokes in Burma. Chiang, however, had told him that he would supply twenty divisions for a combined offensive in Burma—"principally because he knows that is the only way to get supplies in quantity"—if the British demonstrated strong cooperation. "The Chinese show an increasing tendency to coast and let who will finish the war," Stilwell asserted. "They have their attention fixed on the post war period, and hoped to reach it with their arsenals stocked and armies fully equipped. . . . A success in Burma would be the strongest possible incentive to further efforts.” Neither the British nor the Chinese would accept direction by the other; the Chinese might accept a United States officer as supreme commander in Burma, but Stilwell suspected that the British would resist "unless pressure were brought to bear." (Riley Sunderland and Charles I. Romanus, Stilwell's Personal File: China-Burma-India, 1942–1944, 5 vols. [Wilmington, Del.: Scholarly Resources, 1976], 1: 339–40.)

3. Stilwell wrote that "Currie may have unwittingly created false impression. His report of 'strongly antagonistic feelings' not understood. CKS [Chiang Kai-shek] has guilty conscience about his actions during Burma campaign. We differed on matters of tactics, and conduct and direction of withdrawal, but he knows why we broke down as well as I do. If he still has any feeling about my status in China, it must be blamed on Soong, but my last conferences and meetings with CKS have been pleasant, and I have hopes that something can still be accomplished." (Ibid., p. 340.) Stilwell's views on the March-May defeat and withdrawal in Burma and Chiang's role are printed in Stilwell Papers, pp. 65–97.

Recommended Citation: The Papers of George Catlett Marshall, ed. Larry I. Bland and Sharon Ritenour Stevens (Lexington, Va.: The George C. Marshall Foundation, 1981– ). Electronic version based on The Papers of George Catlett Marshall, vol. 3, “The Right Man for the Job,” December 7, 1941-May 31, 1943 (Baltimore and London: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1991), pp. 334–336.