#3-263

To Lieutenant General Dwight D. Eisenhower

July 30, 1942 Washington, D.C.

Secret

Dear Eisenhower:

Sir John Dill leaves for London tomorrow morning so I am dictating this letter to be carried by him for you.

A radio went to you yesterday giving the details of the planning team to be sent from here to you immediately.1 Meanwhile the matter of command control remains undecided as the President has not yet indicated his intentions. Under these circumstances I consider it necessary that you take the bull by the horns and endeavor to push through the organizational set-up on the basis that you will be the Deputy for whoever is designated for supreme command. We cannot afford to drag along at this late date. Furthermore the President is extremely urgent that Torch be launched at the earliest possible date—which also indicates the necessity for aggressive action on your part.2

To what extent you can bring about an organization under these circumstances I do not know, but do your best to crystallize matters and get away from committees.

The more I think about it the more I am convinced that the quickest way to permit the proper concentration on preliminary Torch arrangements would be to get British acquiescence to the assignment of all Sledgehammer planning to Mountbatten and his staff.3 They are competent, they have their plans for Cherbourg and the Channel Islands, they are to handle the large Commando operations, so that we could feel that Sledgehammer was being followed through, and yet we would be free to put the maximum drive on Torch. Whether or not you can manage this I do not know but it certainly would be most helpful if you find it possible to do so.

To meet the President's desire for an early date for Torch would necessitate an earlier date for the final decision as to Torch which is now set for September 15th. This phase of the matter I think can be adjusted without great difficulty a little later. Meanwhile however we have to determine when the actual commitment must be made insofar as it pertains to the collection and preparation of shipping. Last evening Admiral Cooke,4 Handy and I had a lengthy conference on this matter. Cooke feels that 90 days prior to the initial landings will be required in order to rearrange the shipping and make special installations on certain boats. This is a tentative figure because we do not yet know just what the British will be able to furnish the First Division. Incidentally, I regard it of great importance that the First Division be thoroughly rehearsed with the ships, boats and boat crews to be involved. The lesson in Madagascar apparently was that a great familiarity is necessary between the crews of the various vessels and the troops they carry.5

Handy is to give me a preliminary report this morning as to what effect on Bolero and Sledgehammer shipments during August and September boat readjustments for Torch might have. This information will be sent to you.

The Secretary of War and Arnold are very much disturbed over the possible reductions in the bombing force to be built up in the United Kingdom for operations against Germany. The withdrawals from England for U.S. Torch and the list of possible withdrawals from the Bolero program which were included in the recent London agreement, in their opinion, particularly Arnold's, will produce a serious reduction in the power of the bombing attack on Germany, with the possible consequence of much heavier return blows against Great Britain.

For your personal and confidential information, I regarded the list of withdrawals for the Pacific as one which gave us liberty of action though not necessarily to be carried out in full, and no dates were mentioned. Of course Admiral King probably would like to have them all in the Pacific and we will have to settle that phase here. However, my intention is to make only the withdrawals that seem urgently required for the Pacific as the situation develops there. I am quite certain that an additional heavy bomber group must go into the Pacific in August. Additional withdrawals will depend on the development of the situation there.

Smith is getting Admiral Leahy established, and I have in mind next week bringing up the question of his transfer to England about August 10th.6

This is a very hastily dictated note, so treat it accordingly. You are generally familiar with my views and the circumstances under which the recent agreement was arrived at. I think with this as a basis you are in a position to use your own judgment without fear of committing me in some manner contrary to my desires.

Faithfully yours,

G. C. Marshall

Document Copy Text Source: Dwight D. Eisenhower Papers, Pre-Presidential, Dwight D. Eisenhower Library, Abilene, Kansas.

Document Format: Typed letter signed.

1. "I feel that initiation of overall planning for operations contemplated is urgent," Marshall had notified Eisenhower. Accordingly, he directed that two officers from the Operations Division, a shipping expert from Services of Supply, three airmen to be chosen by Arnold, and a military attaché recently returned from North Africa depart for Eisenhower's headquarters on the first available transport plane. The navy was also asked to send planners. (Marshall to Eisenhower, Radio No. 2744, July 29, 1942, NA/ RG 165 [OPD, TS Message File (CM-OUT-8628)].)

2. On July 31 Marshall informed Eisenhower that Major General George S. Patton, Jr., had been designated to command U.S. Army forces participating in the Moroccan landings and would soon arrive at Eisenhower's headquarters for a conference. (Marshall to Eisenhower, Radio No. 2818, July 31, 1942, ibid., CM-OUT-9255.)

3. In June 1940 Prime Minister Churchill had established the Directorate of Combined Operations to plan and conduct raids against Axis-occupied coasts. The organization was also responsible for devising all the special equipment needed for amphibious operations. (Ismay, Memoirs, p. 162.)

4. Rear Admiral Charles M. Cooke, Jr. (U.S.N.A., 1910), had been the navy's assistant chief of staff for Plans (OP-12) since May 1942.

5. The May 5–7 British attack and capture of the Vichy French naval facilities around Diego-Suarez Bay in northernmost Madagascar was, Churchill noted, "our first large-scale amphibious assault since the Dardanelles twenty-seven years before, and the whole technique of such events had meantime been completely revolutionised." (Churchill, Hinge of Fate, p. 230.)

6. Brigadier General Walter B. Smith was secretary of the Combined Chiefs of Staff and of the Joint Board. Admiral William D. Leahy, former ambassador to Vichy, had recently assumed his position as chief of staff to the commander in chief. He would deal with army and navy military matters on behalf of the president. In February, according to Secretary of War Stimson, Marshall had suggested "Leahy as a single Chief of Staff for the President to have over both Army and Navy." (February 25, 1942, Yale/H. L. Stimson Papers [Diary, 37: 157].) For more information on Smith's transfer, see Marshall to Eisenhower, August 5, 1942, Papers of George Catlett Marshall, #3-267 [3: 288–89].

Recommended Citation: ThePapers of George Catlett Marshall, ed.Larry I. Bland and Sharon Ritenour Stevens (Lexington, Va.: The George C. Marshall Foundation, 1981– ). Electronic version based on The Papers of George Catlett Marshall, vol. 3, “The Right Man for the Job,” December 7, 1941-May 31, 1943 (Baltimore and London: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1991), pp. 283–285.