#5-174

To General of the Army Douglas MacArthur and Admiral of the Fleet Chester W. Nimitz

[July 21(?), 1945]1 Radio. [Babelsberg, Germany]

Top Secret

Coordination of plans for the procedure to be followed in the event of Japanese governmental surrender is now a pressing necessity.2 Early information is desired regarding the conference reported to be in progress at Guam on this subject.3

It appears to JCS that immediate naval occupation of critical parts of Japan is desirable to include in each case, if practical, an operational airfield to facilitate communication and permit airborne landings.

It also appears to JCS that it would be highly desirable for similar procedure to be followed on the Asiatic mainland in following order of priority: Shanghai, Fusan [Pusan] in Korea, Chefoo, Chingwangtao on the Manchurian border. Also that preliminary landings on Asiatic continent might best be carried out by Marines. A landing at Taku to permit the blocking of the critical communication points of Peiking-Tsintsein [Tientsin] would be more desirable than at Chingwangtoo but probably is impractical from the viewpoint of naval craft. It is not the desire of the JCS to become involved in the campaign in China on the mainland other than by air, but it is considered highly desirable to seize the ports in order better to facilitate the reoccupation of the country by the Chinese forces. The occupation of north tip of Formosa would be great aid to air operation and communication to Japan and China.

There appears to be a necessity for an early decision as to the movement of the First Army divisions now in the United States, particularly as concerns complication regarding their equipment now en route to Philippines.4 It might be desirable to route some of those divisions directly to Japan as follow up units, thus avoiding the shipment of divisions from the Philippines for the same purpose.

The formal surrender or enforced submission of the Japanese government will be received jointly by ______and ______. But in order to pursue a continuity of policy of procedure in dealing with the Japanese Imperial Headquarters or its Ministries a representative of General MacArthur will be designated to perform this function until General MacArthur has actually landed in Japan and personally assumed this responsibility. The foregoing provisions will not be allowed to interfere with conduct of local surrenders by Naval or other U.S. commanders concerned.

Document Copy Text Source: Records of the War Department General and Special Staffs (RG 165), Records of the Operations Division (OPD), 387.4, Case 10/6, National Archives and Records Administration, College Park, Maryland.

Document Format: Typed radio message.

1. It is not clear from the records the editors have examined when or even whether this message was sent.

2. In mid-June, MacArthur and Nimitz were told: “Although there is at present no evidence that sudden collapse or surrender of Japan is likely, the Joint Chiefs of Staff direct that plans be made to take immediate advantage of favorable circumstances, such as a sudden collapse or surrender, to effect an entry into Japan proper for occupational purposes.” (J.C.S. to Commander in Chief, Army Forces, Pacific Ocean Areas [MacArthur] and Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet [Nimitz], Radio No. WARX-17064, June 14, 1945, NA/RG 165 [OPD, TS Message File, CM–OUT–17064].)

A select group of United States leaders knew from reading MAGIC intercepts that Japan’s foreign minister, Shingenori Togo, had been engaged in cautious negotiation feelers since May. These Japanese diplomats’ activities increased in mid-July with efforts in Moscow to get the Soviet Union to help end the war. At the Potsdam Conference, Marshall and others received background information and detailed extracts and explanations of this July correspondence. (See “‘MAGIC’ Diplomatic Extracts, July 1945: Selected Items Prepared by MIS [Military Intelligence Service], War Department for the Attention of General George C. Marshall,” SRH-040, NA/RG 457 [Records of the Predecessors of the National Security Agency].)

3. An army-navy conference to arrange the details of MacArthur’s taking command in Okinawa (see the previous document, Papers of George Catlett Marshall, #5-173 [5: 245–46]) was scheduled to convene on July 21. (Headquarters, U.S. Army Strategic Air Forces, Guam, to War Department, Radio No. VICTORY–IN–386, July 20, 1945, NA/RG 165 [OPD, Exec. 2, Item 17].)

4. First Army, commanded by General Courtney H. Hodges, was scheduled to effect the first assault landing in the Tokyo area as part of Operation CORONET, tentatively scheduled for March 1, 1946. Troops for the invasion of Japan had been accumulating in the Philippines, but the majority of First Army troops, then being redeployed from Europe, were in, or scheduled to be in, the United States. (Richard M. Leighton and Robert W. Coakley, Global Logistics and Strategy, 1943–1945, a volume in the United States Army in World War II [Washington: GPO, 1968], pp. 585–87.)

Recommended Citation: ThePapers of George Catlett Marshall, ed.Larry I. Bland and Sharon Ritenour Stevens (Lexington, Va.: The George C. Marshall Foundation, 1981– ). Electronic version based on The Papers of George Catlett Marshall, vol. 5, “The Finest Soldier,” January 1, 1945–January 7, 1947 (Baltimore and London: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2003), pp. 246–247.