COMPARTMENTALIZED PUBLIC ACCOMMODATIONSPage 1 of 4
COMPARTMENTALIZED PUBLIC ACCOMMODATIONS UNDER THE ADA
Title III of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA)[1] applies to public accommodations and services operated by public entities.
The following public entities are considered public accommodations for purposes of Title III of the ADAif the operations affect commerce:[2]
(A) an inn, hotel, motel, or other place of lodging, except for an establishment located within a building that contains not more than five rooms for rent or hire and that is actually occupied by the proprietor of such establishment as the residence of such proprietor;
(B) a restaurant, bar, or other establishment serving food or drink;
(C) a motion picture house, theater, concert hall, stadium, or other place of exhibition or entertainment;
(D) an auditorium, convention center, lecture hall, or other place of public gathering;
(E) a bakery, grocery store, clothing store, hardware store, shopping center, or other sales or rental establishment;
(F) a laundromat, dry-cleaner, bank, barber shop, beauty shop, travel service, shoe repair service, funeral parlor, gas station, office of an accountant or lawyer, pharmacy, insurance office, professional office of a health care provider, hospital, or other service establishment;
(G) a terminal, depot, or other station used for specified public transportation;
(H)a museum, library, gallery, or other place of public display or collection;
(I) a park, zoo, amusement park, or other place of recreation;
(J) a nursery, elementary, secondary, undergraduate, or postgraduate private school, or other place of education;
(K) a day care center, senior citizen center, homeless shelter, food bank, adoption agency, or other social service center establishment; and(L) a gymnasium, health spa, bowling alley, golf course, or other place of exercise or recreation.
The term “commerce”[3] means travel, trade, traffic, commerce, transportation, or communication—
(A) among the several States;
(B) between any foreign country or any territory or possession and any State; or
(C) between points in the same State but through another State or foreign country.
The term “commercial facilities”[4] means facilities—
(A) that are intended for nonresidential use; and
(B) whose operations will affect commerce.
Under Title III of the ADA, the federal courts and the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) have held that a public accommodation cannot be compartmentalized into zones of ADA compliance and noncompliance in a case involving Casey Martin, a professional golfer.
Casey Martin is afflicted with Klippel-Trenaunay-Weber Syndrome, a degenerative circulatory disorder that obstructs the flow of blood from his right leg back to his heart. The disease is progressive; it causes severe pain and it has atrophied his right leg. During the later part of his college career, because of the progress of the disease, Martin could no longer walk an 18-hole golf course. Walking not only caused him pain, fatigue, and anxiety, but also created a significant risk of hemorrhaging, developing blood clots, and fracturing his tibia so badly that an amputation might be required. For these reasons StanfordUniversity made written requests to the Pacific 10 Conference and the NCAA to waive for Martin their rules requiring players to walk and carry their own clubs. The requests were granted.[5]
When Martin turned pro and entered PGA Tour’s Q-School, the hard card permitted him to use a cart during his successful progress through the first two stages. He made a request, supported by detailed medical records, for permission to use a golf cart during the third stage. PGA Tour refused to review those records or to waive its walking rule for the third stage. Martin therefore filed suit against PGA Tour in the United States District Court for the District of Oregon.[6]
In District Court, PGA Tour argued that its courses are only places of public accommodation in those areas actually accessed by the public at large. It contended that since the public gallery is not allowed inside the playing area, the fairways and greens are not places of public accommodation.[7]
The District Court held that the statutes and regulations for Title III of the ADA do not support the concept that places of public accommodation can have zones of ADA application. Also, the District Court held that a public entity could not create private enclaves within the facility and thus relegate the ADA to hop-scotch areas.[8]
PGA Tour, Inc. appealed the district court’s decision to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit and the Ninth Circuit held that:
The district court held that a public accommodation could not be compartmentalized in the fashion PGA Tour desired. At least in the present context we agree.[9]
PGA Tour, Inc. appealed the appellate court’s decision to the U.S. Supreme Court and the Supreme Court reviewed the district court’s decision without comment:[10]
In the District Court, the petitioner [PGA Tour] moved for summary judgment on the ground that it is exempt from coverage under Title III of the ADA as a “private club or establishment,” or alternatively, that the play areas of its tour competitions do not constitute places of “public accommodation” within the scope of that Title. The Magistrate Judge concluded that petitioner should be viewed as a commercial enterprise operating in the entertainment industry for the economic benefit of its members rather than as a private club. Furthermore, after noting that the statutory definition of a public accommodation included a “golf course,” he rejected petitioner’s argument that its competitions are only places of public accommodations in the areas open to spectators. The operator of a public accommodation could not, in his view, “create private enclaves within the facility … and thus relegate the ADA to hopscotch areas.”[11](citations omitted and emphasis added).
Furthermore, in PGA Tour, Inc. v. Martin, the DOJ submitted a amicus curiae brief to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.[12]
In its brief, INTROCUCTION AND SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT, the DOJ states:
1. On appeal, the PGA first argues that Title III does not apply in these circumstances because the playing areas of the golf courses are not open to the general public and thus are not “places of public accommodation” under Title III. … Thus, even if the golf course is viewed as not being used for exercise and recreation during a golf tournament, it is certainly being used as a place of exhibition or stadium, and is covered as such. In either circumstance, there is no basis for carving out a “private zone” of a place of public accommodation that would fall outside the coverage of the ADA.[13] (emphasis added).
In its brief, ARGUMENT, the DOJ states:
The PGA thus argues that it is permissible for an entity operating a place of public accommodation to carve out a “private” area of the place of public accommodation, which it restricts to eligible persons under its own admissions criteria, where the statute does not apply. This argument is wrong.[14] (emphasis added).
Finally, the PGA’s argument that places of public accommodation may have public and private areas for purposes of ADA application has no basis.[15]
Also, in its brief, the DOJ cited United States v. Lansdowne Swim Club,713 F.Supp. 785, 791 (E.D.Pa. 1989), affirmed 894 F.2d 83 (3rd Cir. 1990).
Under Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 “once an establishment is determined to be a place of entertainment, the entire facility is identified as such.”[16]
In conclusion:
The case law in PGA Tour, Inc. v. Martin and its amicus curiae brief leave no doubt that Title III of the ADA prohibits a public accommodation from creating zones of noncompliance within the public accommodation.
Therefore, a public accommodation is prohibited from creating smoking and nonsmoking sections within the public accommodation.
Prepared by:
Billy Williams
Executive Director
GASP of Texas
The statutes and regulations cited above can be accessed at
Additional information is available at:
and also from the Northeastern University School of Law at:
DISCLAIMER: The content contained in this document has been prepared by GASP of Texas as a service to its readers. It is not intended to constitute legal advice. GASP of Texas has used reasonable efforts in collecting, preparing and providing quality information and commentary, but does not warrant or guarantee the accuracy, completeness, adequacy or currency of the information contained herein. Users of this information do so at their own risk.
[1] 42 U.S.C. §§ 12181-12188.
[2] 42 U.S.C. § 12181(7).
[3] 42 U.S.C. § 12181(1).
[4] 42 U.S.C. § 12181(2).
[5]PGA Tour, Inc. v. Martin, 532 U.S. 661, 668, 121 S.Ct. 1879 (2001).
[6] 532 U.S. 669.
[7]Martin v. PGA Tour, Inc., 984 F.Supp. 1320, 1326 (D.Ore. 1998).
[8]984 F.Supp. at 1326-27.
[9]PGA Tour, Inc. v. Martin, 204 F.3d 994, 997 (9th Cir. 2000).
[10]PGA Tour, Inc. v. Martin, 532 U.S. 661, 121 S.Ct. 1879 (2001).
[11] 532 U.S. at 669-70.
[12]
[13] DOJ amicus curiae brief, p. 11-12.
[14] DOJ amicus curiae brief, p. 18.
[15] DOJ amicus curiae brief, p. 22-23.
[16] DOJ amicus curiae brief, p. 24.