The Ukrainian Crisis: The Role of and Implications for Sub-State and Non-State Actors
The conflict in eastern Ukraine is approaching its third year with little sign of a negotiated resolution. Crimea has been absorbed into the Russian Federation and will celebrate the second anniversary of its ‘integration’ in March 2016. The ongoing nature of the conflict contrasts with a lack of academic exploration of the issues surrounding it. To date, most analyses have focused on the geopolitical implications of the Ukrainian crisis, such as the impact on NATO-Russia relations, and foreign policy responses to the crisis from a variety of state and supranational actors including the EU and Russia. The role of sub-state and non-state actors has been largely overlooked. This Special Issue seeks to rectify this by examining their role in the evolution of the conflict, looking at topics such as the popularity of the separatist movement in Donbass, the perception of local political elites, the involvement of private armies and the implications for regional security across the post-Soviet space: how has the annexation of Crimea affected the separatist territories of South Ossetia, Abkhazia and Transnistria?
In the post-Cold War era, there has been a change in the distribution of power throughout the international system with the emergence of a range of non-state actors who are threatening to fundamentally alter the basis of traditional state-based power. Many scholars would argue that there has been an erosion of state sovereignty brought about by the relative empowerment of supra-national institutions such as the UN and EU, and by the growing influence of non-state actors. Pearlman and Cunningham define non-state actors as ‘an organised political actornot directly connected to the state but pursing aims that affect vital state interests’.[1] They can be individuals or organisations with economic, political, social, or sometimes military, power that are able to influence at the state, sub-state and sometimes regional and international levels. Josselin and Wallace’s definition of a non-state actor highlights the diversity both in terms of interest and influence:
Largely or entirely autonomous from central government funding and control: emanating from civil society, or form the market economy, or from political impulses beyond state control and direction;operating as or participating in network which extend across the boundaries of two or more states- thus engaging in ‘transnational’ relations, linking political systems, economies, societies;acting in ways which affect political outcomes, either within one or more states or within international institutions-either purposefully or semi-purposefully, either as their primary objective or as one aspect of their activities.[2]
The impact and influence of non-state actors is dependent upon the political, economic and social context within which they exist. In a conflict situation where state structures are not as effective as they could be, non-state actors can exert a disproportionate amount of influence on a situation, as has been seen in eastern Ukraine. From the Russian diaspora, non-governmental organisations,paramilitary groups and volunteer militias, there are a diverse range of non-state actors involved in the crisis, which is also having an impact on sub-state actors in other parts of the post-Soviet space, notably the separatist territories of Georgia and Moldova.
This Special Issue examines a wide array of non-state and sub-state actors that have both played a role in the conflict in Ukraine and been indirectly impacted by it. Laura Cleary looks at the role of civil society in Ukraine, arguing that, despite periodic and dramatic demonstrations of outrage over the corrupt and authoritarian practices of the political elites, it has generally been classed as apathetic, weak and ineffectual. Her article traces the evolution of the space within which Ukrainian civil society has operated since 1991 and identifies four consistent and interlocking themes: limited constitutional reform, elite power struggles, corruption and periodic public revolts. In the 1990s civil society came to be seen as a key enabler for both democratisation and conflict resolution because it was deemed to have the ability to question and challenge undemocratic practices and values, set political agendas and generate a broad consensus on the legitimacy of the constitutional order.Over time, however, that received wisdom has been challenged, with critics arguing that the fundamental assumptions that civil society is organised, coherent, inherently democratic, and external to the political process are flawed. Cleary identifies what she terms a ‘hybrid’ civil society, once which does not have the capacity to truly hold government to account, but, in the absence of an effective government, is increasingly performing the functions of government, drafting policy, providing material to combatants and social services to citizens. She notes that this behaviour is typical of conflict situations and describes civil society organisations in modern-day Ukraine as ‘pseudo-plenipotentiaries’. Since the commencement of demonstrations in November 2013 and the subsequent outbreak of war in February 2014 the vast majority of CSOs have redirected their activities in order to provide humanitarian assistance to IDPs or to support combatants by raising funds to support the military or their dependants, collecting and transporting food and clothes to the front, and assisting the wounded in gaining access to medical and psychological treatments.
Anna Matveeva explores the development of conflict in eastern Ukraine from the perspective of polarised identities and conflict escalation prompted by collective insecurities, arguing that that the grounds for the conflict in Donbass were prepared when different sections of Ukraine’s population developed conflicting perspectives of the past, the role of Russia in Ukraine’s history, and of how relations with the West should evolve. These differences lay the foundations for what became polarised identities and mutually-exclusive ideologies. According to her analysis, the events of 2014 resulted in an extra-constitutional power change that triggered, rather than caused, an explosion of deep societal rifts that had been growing over years. She examines the changing political landscape of a leaderless uprising and the process of formation of the protest movement. The article goes on to explore a changing political landscape of a leaderless uprising and formation of a protest movement out of locally-available ingredients, the emergence of armed militias in unfolding security vacuum and the developments on the battlefield. As the rebel-held territories drifted away from the control of the authorities in Kiev, their new identity was formed by the war. The paper assesses Kiev’s fluctuating war and peace responses, and argues that understanding the internal dynamic of the guerrilla war and population’s survival is key to the resolution.
Stelios Sotiriou examines how enduring regional political preferences, embedded in a fragmented and porous national identity framework, have acted as destabilising factors in eastern Ukraine. His paper juxtaposes two critical periods of post-Soviet Ukraine, the post-independence period of the early 1990s and the crisis of 2013-2015, and identifies a range of ‘sources of change’, including the impact of economic crisis, military conflict, ideas and political preferences. He argues that while his conclusions offer an understanding of the 2013-2015 crisis, they can also be extrapolated to other regions of the post-Soviet space. Decentralisation in Ukraine could be the key for an effective and auspicious nation-building process, which, in the long-term, could alleviate the (lasting) regional political preferences. The devolution of power to local communities could smooth the absence of social trust, allowing for local democracy and regional development to advance. Sotiriou argues that such a policy path volte face could be of major assistance to Ukraine, which, in turn, could also serve as a paradigm for other states in the post-Soviet space like Moldova.
Ivan Loshkariov and Andrey Sushentsov examine the role of the Russian diaspora in Ukraine, arguing that the country’s post-independence political institutional design was unfavourable for Russians, particularly those living in the eastern and southern regions, and hindered the development of their post-Soviet identity. They conclude that the Euromaidan protests of 2013 prompted the Russian diaspora to explore their identity, as well as their social and political goals, which became radicalised in response to the actions of the Ukrainian government during the crisis of 2013/4. This led to the establishment of alternative authorities in regions of the country where the government no longer had a monopoly on the use of force. Loshkariov and Sushentsov argue that the critical juncture was not the Euromaidan protests nor the overthrow off Yanukovych, but the fire in Odessa in May 2014, which led to the deaths of 40 ‘anti-Maidan’ activists.
Vladimir Rautafocuses on the role of non-state armed actors in the Ukrainian conflict, comparatively evaluating the types of military interventions in Crimea and south-eastern Ukraine. His paper seeks to provide a theoretical framework that will facilitate distinction between events in the two areas on the basis of the armed groups involved and their external support. He argues that the use of political violence by Russia in Ukraine has the objective of stimulating ‘sovereign defection’ (break-away from an existing state),both outward, with the annexation of Crimea, and inward, through the external sponsorship of the secessionist rebels in south-eastern Ukraine with the purpose of creating a political buffer-zone in the shape of an unresolved conflict. The article examines the literature on non-state armed actors, noting that a clear demarcation has developed between those actors acting on behalf of a state and those acting in conjunction with a state’s armed forces. Rauta concludes by arguing that Russia’s instrumental usage of pro-Russian separatist as proxy forces is part of its objective to create a de facto state, a significant control mechanism that it has used for years in regions such as Transnistria or South Ossetia.
Tatyana Malyarenko and David J. Galbreath examine the role of paramilitaries in Ukraine, an overlooked unit of analysis for civil wars and their resolution. They argue that an understanding of the important role of paramilitaries on both sides (pro-government and pro-Russian) is key to understanding the conflict as a whole, but that they also pose the biggest threat to a sustainable peace. Their analysis shows that paramilitary troops have replaced regular armies, for different reasons on each side: pro-government paramilitaries in Ukraine were deployed as force multipliers, to boost the capacity of the Ukrainian regular army, while pro-Russian troops were deployed despite Russian operational capacity. However, paramilitary troops on both sides havesubsequently become an obstacle to effective and efficient military operations, resisting efforts to either integrate them into regular armed forces or disband them.Both sides are able to use paramilitaries to absolve themselves of responsibility for many of the actions carried out in their name, such as the killing of civilians, forced removal and the mistreatment of prisoners of war, all covered under the Geneva Conventions. Furthermore, Russia has sought to use paramilitaries, including the deployment of its own troops on the both sides of the border, as a way of provide disinformation in what has been referred to as hybrid warfare.
Tracey German explores the intensification of relations between South Ossetia and Russia, focusing on the extent to which South Ossetia exists as a functioning state entity, particularly in the wake of its signing of an integration treaty with Moscow that appears to delegate responsibility for the provision of the basic attributes of statehood to Russia. While this article focuses on relations between Russia and South Ossetia, it argues that the evolution of their relationship is indicative of the Russian approach to sub-state actors across the post-Soviet space: Moscow confers statehood with one hand, using the language and discourse of statehood, but takes it away with the other, manipulating its relations with these actors in order to achieve broader foreign policy objectives, notably the retention of its influence across the post-Soviet space.What has been happening in these territories is important, despite being overlooked and overshadowed by events in Ukraine. Moscow has been providing support for the two territories since the 1990s and has manipulated its position there to undermine Georgia’s autonomy. What has happened in Abkhazia and South Ossetia, Russian behaviour there, is indicative of what may well occur in eastern Ukraine: a simmering separatist conflict that is far more than a domestic territorial dispute, with both regional and international implications, preventing Ukraine’s closer integration with the West and retaining its influence over a post-Soviet neighbour. One of the major criticisms levelled at Putin in the wake of the March 2014 annexation of Crimea was the apparent ‘redrawing of international borders’ through the use of force and the disregard for international law. However, there was less of an international outcry when similar activity occurred in the South Caucasus and there has certainly been only a very muted response from the West to Russia’s increasing ‘absorption’ of South Ossetia.
Igor Istominanalyses the strategy of Moldova’s separatist region of Transnistra in the context of Russian-Ukrainian relations. He explores the challenges of Transnistran ‘foreign policy’ through the lenses of various realist perspectives, including the concept of bandwagoning and balancing, to identify different types of alignment. According to his analysis, Transnistra has sought to compensate for its resource limitations by aligning with external partners. As no single actor could provide all the support required, Tiraspol has developed relations with multiple partners, although, like other sub-state actors in the post-Soviet space, it has become increasingly reliant on Russia, as the primary source of both security and economic assistance.
The paper also examines how Transnistra has sought to use its relations with both Russia and Ukraine to protect its identity against the perceived threat from Moldova, arguing that this strategy of ‘dual alignment’ has failed twice over the past decade: after the Orange revolution of 2004 and following the Euromaidan crisis of 2013/4. It claims that recent attempts by the EU and Ukraine to undermine Russia’s influence in the region by isolating Transnistria has actually led to the strengthening of ties between Tiraspol and Moscow. Istomin concludes that the Transnistrian case demonstrates the limits of multilevel alignment under conditions when main potential partners are in controversial or conflict relations, which places the weakest actor in a vulnerable position and limits the scope of its external action.
[1]Wendy Pearlman & Kathleen Gallagher Cunningham, ‘Nonstate Actors, Fragmentation, and Conflict Processes’, Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol 56No. 1 (2012), p. 3.
[2] Daphne Josselin and William Wallace (eds.),Non-State Actors in World Politics (London: Palgrave, 2003), pp. 3-4.