Multi-level Governance in South East Europe (ESRC grant no. RES-062-23-0183 Project Paper CP/2 - Cohesion Policy and Multi-level Governance in Greece, Slovenia, Croatia and Macedonia: The Story So Far[i]
Ian Bache
Centre for International Policy Research
Department of Politics
University of Sheffield
January 2007
Cohesion Policy and Multi-level Governance in Greece, Slovenia, Croatia and Macedonia: The Story So Far[ii]
Introduction
As a starting point for understanding the domestic governance effects of cohesion policy in member and accession states, the framework of simple and compound polities developed by Schmidt (2006) is highlighted as a heuristic device…. In this framework, a distinction is drawn between EU effects in ‘compound’ and ‘simple’ polities. In the former, ‘power, influence and voice are diffused through multiple levels and modes of governance’ (e.g., Germany, Italy, Spain), while in the latter, ‘power, influence and voice are more concentrated in a single level and mode of governance’ (e.g., Britain, France, Greece) (Schmidt, 2003: 2).
Table 1. Key characteristics of compound and simple polities
Structures Power Authorities
______
Simple polities Unitary Concentrated Single
(Fr, UK)
Compound polities Regionalized Partially diffuse Somewhat multiple
(Sp, It)
Compound polities Federal Diffuse Multiple
(Ger, US)
Highly compound Quasi-federal Highly diffuse Highly multiple
(EU)
______
Source: Adapted from Schmidt 2006, 51
Schmidt’s schema links well with research on multi-level governance. In particular, it brings into focus the distinction between the vertical and horizontal dimensions of multi-level governance. Specifically, it highlights both structures of the state (and policy processes) and places these alongside analysis of the nature of politics. Changes in the former relate to changes in vertical relations as new state structures emerge or are strengthened at levels above and below the nation state, while changes to the latter relate to the sideways movement of power and influence to non-state actors that may demand different types of political interactions and interactions reflect horizontal rather than hierarchical relations.
The most obvious alternative candidate for organising the empirical material would be Lijphart’s (1984; 1999) continuum, which places majoritarianism on one extreme point of the axis and consensualism on the other. Here the two key dimensions are federal-unitary and executive-parties. This approach also has merit comparative analysis, but Schmidt’s (2006) approach has a number of advantages in studying multi-level governance. First, Schmidt includes a third category of (nation) state structures to the two identified by Lijphart, which is regionalized. A number of EU states now fit into this category (Spain and Italy being the most obvious), while others may follow. Second, she replaces the executive-parties dimension with two more nuanced categories of representative politics and policymaking processes. Third, Lijphart’s two-fold categorisation of policymaking processes as pluralist and corporatist is made three-fold to include statist processes (Schmidt 2006, 228) (Figure 1.1)
Figure 1 Member-states along a continuum from statist to corporatist processes
Fr Gr UK It Ger Sw NL
Statist Corporatist
Source: Schmidt 2006, 108.
In relation to politics, which for Lijphart is the overarching dichotomy between consensual and majoritarian systems, Schmidt includes this within the larger dichotomy between compound and simple polities. The politics dimension is separated from the systems dimension, because, as Schmidt (2006, 229) argues ‘Lijphart’s distinction implies that majoritarian democracies will always have confrontation and consensus ones the opposite. But in real life this is not the case’..
In short, the term compound polity refers to a state with a combination of a proportional representation system, corporatist policymaking processes and regionalized or federalized structures. The term simple polity refers to a state with a combination of a majoritarian system of representation, statist policymaking processes and a unitary state structure (Schmidt 2006, 227). Using these categories, the EU is defined as a highly compound regional polity, which places it at the extreme end of the continuum that includes its member states (Figure 1.2), and one which tends to pull all member states – irrespective of their place on the continuum - in this direction.
Figure 2 EU and member-states on a continuum between simple and compound polity
EU
UK Fr Ire Sw NL It Ger Sp B
Simple polity Compound polity
(Source: Schmidt 2006, 229).
However, and consistent with the ‘goodness of fit’ argument emanating from the literature on Europeanization (ref), the impact on states furthest away from the EU on this continuum is likely to be comparatively greater. This leads us on to the case studies here, which by any standards would all be categorised as ‘simple polities’ and, as such, should be subject to strong adaptational pressures from engaging with the compound polity of the EU. As was discussed in an earlier paper[iii], the requirements for EU cohesion policy resonate strongly with the image and conception of the EU as a compound polity.
What soon becomes evident from the summary below, as might be expected, is that while a substantial amount of research has been undertaken on the Greek case, there is relatively little to date on Slovenia that address the questions of concern here and none to speak of in relation to Macedonia and Croatia. We address each of these in turn.
Greece
Traditionally, government and politics Greece is seen to have a high degree of misfit with EU governance in general terms and in relation to the specific requirements of EU cohesion policy (specifically, regionalisation and partnership requirements). The political and administrative structure is hierarchical and centralized, civil society is weak, and there is an absence of a consensus-building approach amongst political elites. The country as a whole received Objective 1 structural funding[iv] from 1989 and, before that, faced similar governance requirements from the Integrated Mediterranean Programmes (IMPs). The scale of funding has remained high throughout the Greek period of membership[v]. In this context, significant adaptational pressures have been generated by structural fund requirements:
‘The introduction of the “subsidiarity” and “partnership” principles and the promotion of the integrated approach to planning totally misfit with the Greek centralized and interventionist administrative tradition, the predominance of the state and the limited participation of social and private actors’ (Getemis and Demetropoulou 2004, 358).
Not surprisingly therefore, the early period of membership witnessed some resistance to EU cohesion policy requirements. However, EU structural policy soon began to have effects on domestic governance.
On the vertical dimension, the most important effect of cohesion policy was the creation of a regional level of government, which followed the introduction of the IMPs into Greece in 1985. The IMPs pioneered the multi-annual, multi-sectoral approach (Hooghe and Keating 1994), which include requirements for regional partnerships to be created. In response to these requirements, Greece was initially divided into six regions, although the division was purely administrative and limited in institutional terms to the monitoring committees required to oversee the IMPs. Subsequent legislation in 1986 divided the country into 13 NUTS 2 regions, which were to provide the basis for Community Support Frameworks (CSFs). These regions had a centrally-appointed regional secretary supported by a small cohort of civil servants drawn from central government. In addition, regional councils were established that were made up of appointees from central and local government and chaired by the regional secretary (Andreou 2006, 244-5).
After this initial burst of activity, decentralization halted and in some areas regressed (Verney and Papageorgiou 1993). More specifically in relation to the structural funds, Kelleher, Batterbury and Stern (1999, 64) noted an ‘absence of decentralisation’ in the Greek Objective 1 programme and only a marginal role afforded to regional bodies. Generally, regional-level networks were slow to emerge and were ‘mostly fragmented and controlled by the state, despite impressions of relevant autonomy’ (Getemis and Demetropoulou 2004, 374). Beyond the creation of regional structures in 1986, the main features of decentralisation and territorial relations that have developed in Greece during the period of EU membership have been attributed primarily to domestic factors (Leontitsis 2006, 17-18). Andreou (2006, 246) concluded that ‘EU cohesion policy acted as a catalyst for the creation of new institutions at the regional level. However, the structure, functions and evolution of these new entities were shaped by domestic factors’.
In relation to the horizontal dimension, the legacy of authoritarian statism in Greece was a weak civil society and an abundance of political mistrust. Despite this, structural policy did stimulate horizontal partnerships by promoting the role of a number of non-state organisations (NGOs, social groups) at the regional level, even though the state retained a pivotal role (Kelleher, Batterbury and Stern 1996, 64). On the post-2000 period, Getemis and Demetropoulou (2004 374) said ‘It could be argued that the partnership trends of the 1990s are being re-placed by a pseudo-corporatism of state control… current trends do not leave much room for optimism about a more rapid adaptation at the regional level’. However, Andreou (2006, 250) suggested that the relative failure of meaningful partnerships to develop in Greece was partly a consequence of subnational and non-state actors lacking the necessary capacity to engage effectively. In this context, centralized programming and management of the funds was probably a ‘necessary evil’ in the short term at least: an argument that has resonance with developments in the accession states of central and eastern Europe (below).
Overall, the picture of cohesion policy effects in Greece is one of some decentralisation occurring, but with a subsequent clawing back of control by the centre, leaving the regional level remaining weak within the Greek system. Similarly, horizontal partnerships were established in the regions, but central government retained a key role in decision-making. Clearly, the central state had to adjust to the new realities of multi-level governance generated by the structural funds, but did so in a strategic way. To the extent that there was learning, it was generally ‘thin’. Getemis and Demetropoulou (2004, 371) concluded that ‘‘the structure and the administrative tradition of the Greek state, the peculiarities of Greek centre–periphery relations and the traditional weakness of Greek civil society have considerably limited the capacity of the regional institutional infrastructure for learning and adaptation’. As such, the Greek case most closely approximates to the category of accommodation set out in the literature on Europeanization (Andreou 2006, 253) and it has not moved very far towards the compound end of the continuum as a result of Europeanization.
Slovenia
There is much less academic reflection on developments in Slovenia than on Greece, but there is some good material on the background to cohesion policy in both official (mainly EU) documents and in a small number of academic papers. Two academic papers on the pre-accession period are particularly useful (Faro 2004[vi] and Lajh 2003).
Slovenia’s first funding from the EU came in 1992 for a period running to 1995. The funding in this initial period came from the Phare programme, which plays a similar role to the Objective 1 programmes of the structural funds (see Paper CP1). In this first phase, funding was directed towards privatisation, public services and banking business (20%), infrastructure (20%), the TEMPUS programme and education (20%) and science and technology, the environment, energy and tourism (20%) (Lajh 2003, 7). Subsequently, the funding was re-directed to focus specifically on advancing the pre-accession strategy. In the second period of the Phare programme (1995-99), particular attention was given to: strengthening the public administration for the efficient co-ordination of EU affairs; informing the public about EU matters and Slovenia’s accession to the EU; and supporting the National Assembly in its pre-accession activities (Lajh 2003, 7). In the third phase of this funding (2000-06), which spanned the early accession period, these priorities continued alongside Phare funding for cross-border programmes (with Italy, Austria and Hungary) along with other initiatives (mainly funded by ISPA and SAPARD). In this period, the Phare programme was alongside the two other pre-accession instruments (ISPA and SAPARD) in an overall framework of multi-annual programming for the pre-accession funds that set the funding priorities (Figure 1 below).
Figure 3: Pre-accession assistance programming framework
Source: {http://www.gov.si/svez/}, April 2003 reproduced in Lajh 2003, 4.
In response to EU requirements for effective an implementation process, the structure established to implement pre-accession funds in Slovenia was one that would anticipate that required under the circumstances of accession and receipt of the structural funds (Figure 2 below).
Figure 4: Implementation of pre-accession assistance in Slovenia
Source: {http://www.gov.si/svez/}, April 2003, reproduced by Lajh 2003, 10.
The effects of the pre-accession aid requirements on the promotion of multi-level governance in Slovenia have not been substantial. The structures outlined above were established and new responsibilities allocated within central government ministries for coordination of aid, with, in 2003, the creation of a new Government Office for Structural Policy and Regional Development. However, short of mapping the structures, research is not evident on any significant change in horizontal interactions (between public, private and voluntary actors). On the vertical level, where more change might be expected, there is a story to tell – but it is one of support for regionalisation for cohesion policy purposes within Slovenia being stymied by the Commission’s desire to complete the preparations for accession. RDAs were created, but during the final months of accession negotiations over the regional policy chapter of the acquis, the Commission decided that it would be most efficient for Slovenia to be treated as a single region and for the centre to lead the process (Faro 2004, 4).
Croatia
The main policy framework guiding EU-Croatia relations (along with other countries of the Western Balkans) is the Stability and Accession Process (SAP). In the period 2001-2004, Croatia received £262 million under the CARDS programme, designed primarily to support SAP, which covered the following priorities:
- Return of refugees, sustainable development in return areas, reconstruction and civil society development (28.5% of total)