Virginia Review of Asian Studies

THE ROLE OF EMPEROR HIROHITO IN THE PACIFIC WAR 1941-1945: THE VIEWS OF THE REVISIONISTS

KAZUO YAGAMI

SAVANNAH STATE UNIVERSITY

Abstract

More than a half century after the end of the Pacific War, the scholarly debate on the role of Emperor Hirohito in the war shows no sign of ending. The driving force for this debate stems from the revisionist scholars who contend that the image of Hirohito as a pacifist and mere figurehead during the war had been distortion and falsification of the true personality and role of Hirohito by those who engaged in the reconstruction of Japan. As discussed in this article, such contention by the revisionists is hardly supported by any of the primary sources available today. It is an irony that distortion and falsification took place, not by those responsible for the reconstruction of Japan but by the revisionists.

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Today, more than six and half decades since the end of the Pacific War, the historians continue to debate the question of the true role of Emperor Hirohito (1901-1989) in Japan’s war efforts. In the aftermath of the war, despite the growing demand from the Western public to see Hirohito be indicted as a war criminal, Hirohito managed to keep himself free from taking any responsibility for Japan’s “war crime.” Although he was stripped of his divinity and constitutionality as Emperor and the supreme commander and became a mere symbolical figure, he remained until his death in 1989 well respected, and handled well his new image of being an “icon” of postwar Japan, where peace and tranquility, not aggression and uproar, prevailed.

This pacifist image of Hirohito has been well established throughout the postwar era of Japan. There have been, however, the ceaseless efforts from people who firmly believe that such image of Hirohito as a pacifist is nothing but the deliberate falsification and distortion of the true personality of Hirohito and his role in the Pacific War by those who engaged in the reconstruction of Japan.[1] Among those who take this revisionist view against Hirohito, the most vociferous is Herbert P. Bix. He has won the Pulitzer Prize over his 2000 book Hirohito and Making of Modern Japan. In the book, Bix portrays Hirohito as someone who was completely opposite from his prewar image of a powerless figurehead. He says, “Hirohito and his key advisers participated directly and decisively as independent forces in policy making. Acting energetically behind the scenes, Hirohito influenced the conduct of his first three prime ministers, hastened the collapse of political party cabinets, and sanctioned opposition to strengthening the peace machinery of the League of Nations. When resistance to his interventions provoked open defiance from the army, he and his advisers drew back and connived at military aggression.”[2]

As discerned from the above quotation, according to Bix, contrary to his generally accepted image of being docile, tacit, and lonely, Hirohito was energetic, shrewd, calculative, and manipulative; he was an active participant, taking a leadership role in decision-making and war planning.[3] So Hirohito, Bix argues, was the main architect of Japan’s war of aggression and territorial acquisitions and, instead of a “puppet” of militarism of Japan, he became actively involved in promoting it.[4]

This view of Bix on Hirohito’s personality and role in the Pacific War, shared by other revisionists such as Edward Behr, continues to provoke scholarly debates. While contentious, Bix and other revisionists are correct in one thing in their arguments. That is, contrary to the generally accepted image of Hirohito as a mere figurehead, Hirohito was by no means just a by-stander regarding the unfolding events and mounting problems Japan faced internally and externally in the 1930s and early 40s. He showed strong concerns and actively engaged in expressing his opinion and even outrage from time to time over the political and military decisions, giving an impression that Hirohito was far from the generally accepted image of mere figurehead and pacifist.

There is truth regarding such active involvement of Hirohito in expressing his concerns and views over the national affairs. It does not, however, constitute what the revisionists claim – the Emperor as an “architect” of Japanese aggressions.[5]

Bix argues that the kodo (the imperial way) became the catalyst for Japan’s execution of “holy war” against things Western.[6] Here the connotation of the imperial way is the Emperor as a divine figure. It was used as a means for justification and rationalization of the acts of Japan in the name of helping and leading the rest of the world to the benevolence of divine Emperor of Japan. Bix calls it Japanese version of “Manifest Destiny.”[7] Utilizing this setting of the imperial way, Bix argues, the Emperor actively engaged in decision-making and manipulation behind scenes. Although it sounds convincing, this argument of Bix has almost no substance.

In February 26, 1936, by mobilizing more than 14,000 men of the infantry regiments of the First Division and the Imperial Guards Division, the young military officers known as the Kodo-ha (the imperial way-faction) carried out the massive uprising. They attacked and occupied the key government buildings and killed a number of senior statesmen. Their aim was “purification” of Japan from Western influence to restore “old” Japan under Yamato (Japanese) spirit. They expected the Emperor to be on their side. After all, they were carrying out the uprising in his name. It turned out that they were wrong in their assumption. The Emperor had no intention to be part of it. Instead, despite the plea from the top military officers for lenience to the rebels, he expressed his desire to see those young military officers punished promptly and harshly. Not having the Emperor‘s support, this quest of the Kodo-ha, later known to be the Showa Restoration, was doomed.

The Emperor’s cold and apathetic response to the Kodo-ha contradicts Bix’s assertion that the Emperor utilizing the imperial way as prerogatives was a driving force of Japanese aggressions. One may argue that the Emperor did not quite agree to the scheme of the Showa Restoration and therefore he had no intention to associate himself with it; it did not mean the Emperor’s indifference to the imperial way. It does not quite explain, however, his desire to see such harsh punishment against the Kodo-ha if, as Bix and other revisionists claim, the Emperor truly believed in an idea of imperial way as the catalyst of his prerogative and prestige, creating common theme between the Emperor’s scheme of using imperial way as justification of his holy war to establish his quest, “greater Asian empire” in his name and that of the Kodo-ha, the purification of Japanese society from the Western influence to revive Yamato spirit by utilizing the Emperor’s divinity and prestige.

So, it is a tough argument that the Emperor acted upon his conviction of his divinity as prerogative to achieve his quest. It is true that his prerogatives were used as a driving force to achieve political and military objectives, as shown repeatedly in the history of Japan, but not for the Emperor but for his “surrounding figures.” The above-mentioned Showa Restoration is a typical paradigm of such use of legacy and divinity of Emperor as prerogative to achieve political goals. The young military officers, lamenting the decadence of Japanese society by things Western as they saw, tried to restore “Yamato” spirit by utilizing Emperor’s divinity as prerogatives. That was “their” vision, not Hirohito’s.

Yet Bix and other revisionists argue otherwise. Bix contends, “Though the time span of his great Asian empire was brief, its potential was enormous. He [the Emperor] had presided over its expansion and had led his nation in a war that cost nearly 20 million Asian lives, more than 3.1 million Japanese lives, and more than sixty thousand Western Allied lives.”[8] This was quite a charge against Hirohito, suggesting that he was primarily responsible for Japan’s war and aggression; it was this quest of his, an “establishment of the greater Asian empire in his name by deliberately and manipulatively utilizing his prerogatives as divine Emperor,” that brought Japan into the path of war of aggression.

As Bix points out, today there are a great number of sources, which provide excellent accounts of Hirohito’s personality and role in the war, such as The Memoir of Prince Konoe, The Sugiyama Memorandum, The Diary of Harada Kumao: Prince Saionji and Political Situation, The Diary of Kido Koichi, or The Diary of Ogura Kuraji. Contrary to Bix’s and other revisionists’ assertion, close examinations of these primary sources refute the revisionists’ view of Hirohito.

For example, Bix points out that Hirohito favored Japan’s territorial expansion in China and provided direct leadership to promote it.[9] There is absolutely no collaborating source that even slightly supports this assertion. Numerous sources suggest otherwise. In the entry of Ogura Kuraji’s diary dated January 9, 1941 the following Emperor’s remark was quoted: “Japan has underestimated China. It is wise to end the war as soon as possible and make effort for next ten years to restore national strength.”[10] A similar remark is also found in the diary of Harada Kumao, Prince Saionji and Political Situation. According to the entry of the diary dated on July 4, 1938, when the Emperor asked the Minister of Army and the chief of the Army General Staff about their view over his thought of ending the war against China as promptly as possible, both the Minister of Army and the chief of the Army General Staff responded by saying, “We will continue to fight until we achieve the downfall of Chiang Kai-shek,” the Emperor was vividly dismayed by their response.[11] This was only a year after the outbreak of the war against China in August 1937. These are clear indications that the Emperor was consistently against Japan’s territorial expansion in China and apprehensive about it and critical toward the military officers who repeatedly expressed their optimistic views to him over Japan’s involvement in China.

In the late 1930s, the quagmire of Japan’s involvement in China and increasingly deteriorating relation with the Western powers brought Japan closer to war against the United States and her allies. As a further supporting case for his assertion of Hirohito as a driving force for Japanese aggression, Bix argues that in this development no one played more pivotal role than Hirohito. According to Bix, it was Hirohito who manipulatively led decision-making over the crucial issues with regard to dealing with the United States and the Britain. Here Bix agues that, caught up in his passion of territorial expansion of Japan, Hirohito dared to go to war against the United States and Britain, if that was inevitable to achieve his “quest.”[12]

Once again this argument of Bix does not carry much substance. Contrary to Bix’s assertion, Hirohito was against an idea of bringing Japan into war against the United States and apprehensive about the unfolding events, which were edging Japan into that direction. Such apprehension of Hirohito is shown in his actions and thoughts, particularly in his conversations with the contemporary leading statesmen or military figures of Japan.

On September 16, 1940, when Hirohito met Prime Minister Konoe, he made the following remark with regard to the on-going ratification process of the Tripartite Pact: “After giving this matter deep consideration, I think the ratification of the Tripartite Pact today is unavoidable if there is nothing else to be done to come to peace terms with the United States. I wonder, however, how well the navy would do if Japan faces confrontation with the United States. I often hear that, according to maneuvers outlined on the map at the Naval Academy, Japan is always defeated by the United States.”[13] This remark of Hirohito manifests that he desired peace with the United States and he was opposed to the ratification of Tripartite Pact.[14] It also shows Hirohito’s apprehension about the outcome if the war indeed had to come.

A year later, on September 6, 1941, when Hirohito summoned the chief of the Army General Staff Sugiyama Hajime and the chief of the Naval General Staff Nagano Osami to see where the army and the navy stood regarding the imperial national policies over the increasingly deteriorating situation Japan faced in her relation with the United States, Hirohito asked Sugiyama, “If the war breaks out between the United States and Japan, how long does the army need to end the war?” Sugiyama responded, “Regarding the fight in the southern Pacific, we perhaps need three months.” Hirohito replied, “You were the Army Minister when the China Incident took place. I remember you saying to me at that time, ‘The incident will be solved within a month.’ It has been four years since then. It has not been solved yet.” When Sugiyama tried to defend himself by telling Hirohito about the vastness of the Chinese interior that made the military operation more difficult than anticipated, Hirohito responded by saying, “You say that the Chinese interior is vast. The Pacific is even vaster. So how can you say that you can end the war in three months?” Sugiyama absolutely had no word to respond.[15] This conversation also indicates Hirohito’s reluctance and apprehension about going to war against the United States.

In October 1941, after having failed in his last endeavor to restore peace with the United States by holding the summit meeting with Roosevelt, Konoe stepped down from his premiership. Home Minister Kido Koichi recommended General Tojo to Hirohito as a successor to Konoe. Hirohito sanctioned the recommendation. Tojo was formally appointed as Prime Minister. Seeing that Tojo was a militant and strong advocate for opening hostility against the United States, the West saw this appointment of Tojo as Prime Minister by Hirohito as Japan’s ultimate decision to go to war and, to Bix, it is “manifestation” of true color of Hirohito. Nothing, however, is farther from the truth. After the appointment Hirohito said to Kido, “You do not get a baby tiger unless you are brave enough to get into a tiger cave.” What Hirohito meant by saying this is that, knowing that Tojo was absolutely loyal to him as Emperor, he thought he was able to restrain Tojo from his advocacy of opening a confrontation with the United States by giving Tojo duty as Prime Minister.[16] Contrary to Bix’s assertion, it was a counter measure to “control” Tojo, indicating that, even at this late stage of Japan-the U.S. dispute shortly before the Japan’s Pearl Harbor assault, Hirohito hoped to avoid confrontation with the United States.