The Political and Economic
Fallout of the Syrian Refugee Crisis in Jordan
Nicolas Reeves, The Eurasia Center April, 2017
Introduction
Since 2011, an estimated 660,000 refugees have fled Syria to seek asylum in Jordan. When Syrians first started crossing the Jordanian border to escape the civil war that was unfolding in their home country, the Jordanian government welcomed them. This was nothing out of the ordinary for Jordan; the country has welcomed refugee populations since its inception, from large groups of Palestinian migrants in 1948 to 500,000 Iraqis fleeing the Iraq War in the early 2000’s. Jordan’s open-door policy with refugees stems from its status as a resource-poor country. As such, it relies heavily on international aid to remain economically stable.Jordan dedicates the aid it typically receives for hosting refugee populations to increasing and ameliorating the provision of public goods. Jordanian citizens thus benefit from the presence of refugees in their countryalongside the asylum seekers themselves.
In contrast to previous refugee populations, however, Jordanian citizens have reacted overwhelmingly negatively to the Syrian presence in their country. According to an April 2013 survey, “71 percent of Jordanians want the border with Syria to be closed to further arrivals.”[1]A 2015 survey found that 95 percent of Jordanians believe that Syrians are taking away their jobs.[2] Further, 93 percent believed that Syrians are suppressing Jordanians’ wages.[3]This widespread, Jordanian political backlash against Syrian refugees has shrouded the positive effects this population has had on Jordan, painting an unrealistically negative picture of Syrians in Jordan. I postulate that Jordan’s welcoming attitude toward refugees has turned hostile because it has not received enough international aid to simultaneously provide for the needs of both Syrians and Jordanians, and because the presence of Syrians has led to increased competition for jobs in the country’s poor, northern regions.
Image 1: The majority of Syrian refugees have settled in Jordan’s northern governorates of Irbid, Zarqa, and Mafraq, the poorest regions of the country.[4]
Lack of Aid leads to Fiscal Troubles
According to the International Labor Organization, over 500,000 of Jordan’s 660,000 refugees live in Jordanian communities outside camps.[5] Seventy-six percent of these live in the poor, northern regions of the country, a development that has significantly changed the demographic composition of these host communities. In Mafraq governorate, for example, Syrian refugees now constitute 52 percent of the total population. The population shock Syrian refugees have caused in these poorer areas has led to a large increase in demand for services, significantly straining the education, waste management, water, and healthcare systems of Mafraq, Irbid, and Amman governorates.[6]This has caused the Jordanian government, which struggled to provide these public goods even before the Syrian refugee influx, to come under severe fiscal strain, especially as funding shortages due to the widespread fallout of the Syrian civil war have led the international community to finance only 23 percent of UNHCR’s Regional Refugee and Resilience Plan.[7]As a result,73 percent of Jordanians have questioned the wisdom of the government’s open policies toward asylum seekers, linking them to their dissatisfaction with the country’s economic direction.[8]
Increased Informal Sector Competition
Syrians’ refugee status does not include the right to work in Jordan. The International Labor Organization estimates that therefore only “10 percent of employed Syrians have obtained formal work permits, and practically all Syrian refugees working outside camps do not have work permits and are as such employed in the informal economy and outside the bounds of Jordanian labor law.”[9]This indicates that the complaint of the vast majority of Jordanians, that Syrian refugees are taking their jobs, is false. The rise in Jordan’s unemployment rate from 14.5 percent before the Syrian crisis to 22.1 percent in 2015 can thus predominantly be explained by preexisting conditions that have impeded the growth of the Jordanian formal labor market, such as the 2008 global economic recession.The Jordanian government has used Syrian refugees as a convenient scapegoat to mask its inability to create jobs in the formal sector; while Jordan has experienced employment loss in the formal sector, which employs predominantly Jordanians, the informal sector, where most Syrians work, has achieved employment growth.[10]
Although Syrian refugees, in general, are not responsible for Jordanians’ labor market woes, it must be mentioned that a higher proportion of Jordanians work in the informal sector in the country’s northern regions, where most of the Syrian population has settled. Turner points out that the increased supply of informal labor in the Mafraq and Irbid governorates, in particular, has led to downward pressure on wages, which has driven poor Jordanians living in these areas out of the informal labor market.[11] The presence of Syrian refugees in Jordan has thus disproportionately disadvantaged poor Jordanians, while Jordanian employers of informal workers have enjoyed having to pay less for laborers.
Image 2: Syrian refugees trapped at the border wait to be let in to Jordan.[12]
Conclusion
The lack of international aid to Jordan following its acceptance of 660,000 refugees over the past six years has made it impossible for the government to provide for the welfare needs of both Syrians and Jordanians. While Jordanians’ complaints about Syrians taking their jobs are largely unfounded, the situation of the poorest Jordanians, who have had to compete with Syrians in the informal market, has undoubtedly worsened since the refugees’ arrival, as their employment problems have been compounded by shortages arising from the government’s fiscal struggles. Jordan can still benefit from the presence of Syrians in the future.This would, however, be contingent on the country receiving enough fiscal help from the international community to adequately integrate the Syrian refugee population into the country’s economy.
Bibliography
Francis, Alexandra. “Jordan’s Refugee Crisis.” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace (2015).
“Growing Restrictions, Tough Conditions: The Plight of those Fleeing Syria to Jordan.” Amnesty International (2013).
Hillesund, Solveig and Svein Erik Stave. “Impact of Syrian refugees on the Jordanian labour market.” International Labor Organization (2015).
Raned, Muhammad. Syrian refugees stuck between the Jordanian and Syrian borders wait to cross into Jordan, 2016. Source: Aaron Majid, Jordan blocks 50,000 Syrian refugees near border. 2016, Digital Image. Available from: Al Monitor, monitor.com/pulse/originals/2016/04/jordan-syria-refugees-border-blocks-medical-care- unhcr.html (Accessed 28 April 2017).
Turner, Lewis. “Explaining the (Non-)Encampment of SyrianRefugees: Security, Class and the Labour Market inLebanon and Jordan.” Mediterranean Politics 20, no. 3 (2015): 386- 404.
UNHCR,Syrian Refugees in Jordan- by Locality, 2016. Available from: Relief Web, _A3L_0.pdf (Accessed 28 April 2017).
[1]“Growing Restrictions, Tough Conditions: The Plight of those Fleeing Syria to Jordan,” Amnesty International (2013).
[2]Alexandra Francis, “Jordan’s Refugee Crisis,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace (2015).
[3]Ibid.
[4]UNHCR,Syrian Refugees in Jordan- by Locality, 2016. Available from: Relief Web,
[5]Solveig Hillesund et al, “Impact of Syrian refugees on the Jordanian labour market,” International Labor Organization (2015).
[6]“Growing Restrictions, Tough Conditions: The Plight of those Fleeing Syria to Jordan,” Amnesty International (2013).
[7] Ibid.
[8]Ibid.
[9]Solveig Hillesund et al, “Impact of Syrian refugees on the Jordanian labour market,” International Labor Organization (2015).
[10]“Growing Restrictions, Tough Conditions: The Plight of those Fleeing Syria to Jordan,” Amnesty International (2013).
[11]Lewis Turner, “Explaining the (Non-)Encampment of SyrianRefugees: Security, Class and the Labour Market inLebanon and Jordan,” Mediterranean Politics 20, no. 3 (2015): 386-404.