The Nordic Africa Institute

THE NORDIC AFRICA INSTITUTE

CONFERENCE ON POST-CONFLCT ELECTIONS IN WEST AFRICA:
CHALLENGES FOR DEMOCRACY AND RECONSTRUCTION

ACCRA, GHANA, 15-17 MAY 2006

DILEMMAS OF POST-CONFLICT ELECTIONS:

AN ANALYSIS LIBERIA’S 1997 AND 2005 ELECTIONS

Alexander K. D. Frempong[1]

ABSTRACT

An outstanding feature of post-conflict transitions is the inherent dilemmas in the immediate post-violence elections which often form part of the peace settlement. On the one hand, elections mark an important milestone in any peace process; a primary vehicle for transforming conflict-ridden polities to peaceful ones and for providing former warring factions with a constructive terrain in which to play out their differences. They are also a necessary part of the process of building new democratic institutions. At the same time, elections, if rushed, can produce political conflict, disturb the emergent processes of political representation and aggravate rather than heal societal divisions. Above all, amidst the great expectations of the war-weary people, there is always the temptation to declare a post-war election as a historic one when in fact it may turn out to be controversial.

None of the post-conflict transitions in Africa captures these dilemmas better than the Liberian experience. In 1997, the international community hurriedly supervised elections which only succeeded in legitimizing the abuses of war. Charles Taylor bullied himself into the presidency which gave him firm control of the legislature. The Taylor government engaged in a winner-takes-all politics that excluded his political opponents from governance. Not surprisingly, a new rebellion soon emerged which eventually led to the exit of Taylor from power and another round of transition culminating in another post-conflict election on October11 2005; and a presidential run-off on November 8.

Against a brief background analysis of the Liberian crisis, this paper examines the dilemmas that led to the failure of the 1997 Elections as a conflict resolution mechanism and the lessons the 2005 Elections drew from that experience. It concludes by examining the prospect for peace in Liberia.

INTRODUCTION

Elections are a key and critical part of the political processes in the transformation from conflict to peace. They are the primary vehicle for transforming conflict-ridden polities to peaceful ones and for providing former warring factions with a constructive terrain in which to settle their differences (Kumar et al 2002:6). They also are a necessary part of the process of building new democratic institutions (Ottaway 2003). More significantly, elections are visible, public, symbolic events with a clear start and finish, around which a time-bound and schedule-driven peace operation might be built. Elections judged free and fair by international monitors imply a return to normal life and an end of the politics of the gun (Durch et al 2003).

At the same time post-war elections can have serious limitations. This is because elections are inherently conflictive since they involve competition; a situation worsened in a post-conflict context by the dilemmas of the war. If post-conflict elections are held without adequate preparation, they can produce conflict, disturb the emergent processes of political representation and aggravate societal divisions (Ottaway 2003). Since such elections merely determine who governs and not how they govern they could produce a façade of democracy and largely legitimize the abuses of the war (Durch et al 2003).

Lopez-Pintor (1997:43-66) outlines the inherent paradoxes of post-war elections further: Unlike routine elections held to change governments by pre-established constitutional agenda, post-conflict elections have the unpleasant task of incorporating into a democratic political system antagonists who had related to each other by the use of sheer force. While such non-routine elections are by nature full of uncertainties and irregularities, the war-affected people tend to place great hope on them. Also, there is always the temptation to declare a post-war election as a historic one when it may turn out to be controversial. Post-conflict elections are at best a small, early step in the lengthy reconstruction process (International Crisis Group, 2005); and at worst, provide only a temporary relief, a recess before another round of violent conflict (Nordic African Institute, 2005).

Stedman and Lyons (2004:153) confirm that record of post-conflict elections in post-Cold War Africa is mixed; some have succeeded in promoting peacebuilding and state reconstruction over time, others served as a mechanism for war termination but with limited democratization, and yet others precipitated renewed or even more violent conflict. They attribute the mixed record to multiple and often contradictory goals of post-conflict elections. In their view, the goals relating to the political reconstruction of the war-torn state may be different from those of an international peacekeeping force in need of an exit strategy; success in relation to international peacekeeping may not coincide with success in local politics. While voters in post-conflict elections often choose to use the limited power of their franchise either to appease the most powerful faction in the hope of preventing a return to war, outside observers often regard such candidates as war criminals (Ibid:154)

None of the post-conflict transitions in Africa captures these dilemmas as vividly as the Liberian experience. In 1997, the international community hurriedly supervised elections which only succeeded in legitimizing the abuses of war. Charles Taylor, the initiator of the rebellion in 1989, bullied himself into the presidency which gave him firm control of the legislature. The Taylor government engaged in a winner-takes-all politics that excluded his political opponents from governance. Not surprisingly, a new rebellion soon emerged which eventually led to the exit of Taylor from power and another round of transition culminating in another post-conflict election on October11 2005; and a presidential run-off on November 8.

THE LIBERIAN CRISIS

On Christmas eve 1989, the National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL), Charles Taylor, incurred into Liberia with the avowed aim of ousting the then Samuel Doe from power. The incursion degenerated into a bloody civil war that lasted for seven years and paralysed the socio-economic and political fabric of Liberia. The crisis however had its deep roots in a history of nearly one and half centuries of exclusive politics by the Americo-Liberians and the repressive rule of Samuel Doe (Frempong 1999).

The war later spawned several warring factions with each warlord carving a colony of Liberian territory for itself. The seven-year peace process saw the involvement of ECOWAS, OAU, and UN in a task-sharing experiment with problems of its own. After a score of peace conferences and a dozen failed accords, Liberia returned to a fragile peace in 1997. The Abuja Peace Accord which clinched the peace deal called for internationally supervised elections.(Ibid) What was the electoral outcome; how successful was the peace settlement that over-relied on elections as an exit strategy; and how did that impinge of post-conflict peacebuilding?

THE 1997 ELECTIONS

By mid-1996, the ECOWAS and other international mediators, fatigued by the torturous peace process, had come to the conclusion that a solution - any solution - should finally be found to the Liberian problem. With this conclusion overshadowing all other considerations, the elections were rushed within months of the disarmament exercise and in a situation where most of the contesting parties had limited resources and time to campaign.[2]

Election Issues, Management and Contesting Parties

Liberians had to choose between two categories of contenders for power – the faction leaders and the civilian politicians. In support of the civilian leaders were the ‘idealists’ who doubted the warlords could win free and fair elections. In their view, the mental scars and the wreckages left behind by the war would remain in the minds on Liberians to the extent that very few would be forgiving enough to cast their ballot for the warlords (Sesay 1996: 409-413).

The ‘realists’ indicated that the situation on the ground pointed to a victory for a warlord, most probably, Charles Taylor. The civilian politicians had been traumatised by the war and further weakened by their own differences. More importantly, given the realities of the war, the warlords were in a better position to offer the needed patronage in terms of resources and money for campaigning and entertainment.

To overcome the difficulty of demarcating constituencies, the proportional representation method by which parties were to be represented on the strength of their national vote was adopted. A single ballot was used to elect the president, the 64-member House of Representatives and 26-member Senate.

Thirteen political parties contested the elections in the end; three were former war machines;[3] there were a number of parties from the second republic;[4] as well as new but fringe parties[5] Apart from the crowded field, the most significant false start for the civilian politicians was the break-up of the seven-party alliance in March 1997 following the choice of the lesser known Cletus Wotorson of Liberian Action Party (LAP) over two of Liberia’s veteran politicians, Gabriel Bacchus Matthews of United People’s Party (UPP) and Togba Nah Tipoteh of Liberian People’s Party (LPP) (West Africa, 21-27 April 1997, pp.633-635). The intense jockeying for the presidency among the civilian politicians prevented them from effectively articulating their theme of ‘a return to civil society devoid of threats from the gun’ (Sesay 1996:411).

In the end, Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf, who ran on the ticket of the Unity Party (UP), emerged as the strongest civilian candidate. She mounted a courageous campaign with the theme of experienced leadership, track record of efficiency, accountability and honesty and international credibility.[6] But her campaign was undermined by the perception that she was an outsider who did not understand the pain of war; by her initial support for Taylor’s rebellion; and by the fear that a woman would not be strong enough to stand up to Taylor or to face the difficult post-war years (West Africa, 14-20July 1997, p.1127).

This left the two main faction leaders, Taylor and Kromah as the main contenders; but. Taylor had more resources and better political organisation to wage a more effective campaign – control of the only nation-wide radio station, his own newspaper, a leased helicopter, and activists in most towns.

The Electoral Outcome and its Implications for Peace

The July 19 elections had a high turn out of 83 percent of registered voters and Taylor’s victory was nearly as complete as the turn out. He secured in the first ballot a whooping 75.3 percent of the valid votes cast. Johnson-Sirleaf came a far distant second with less than 10 percent and Kromah, third, with about 5 percent. The single presidential-legislative ballot accentuated Taylor’s dominance in the legislature as well. His NPP secured 49 out of the 64 seats in the House of Representatives, and 21 of the 26 in the Senate.[7].

Taylor’s overwhelming victory was endorsed by a host of local and international observers but it was also clear that that the victory had been determined more by fear- the possibility of Taylor going back to the bush Savimbi- style if he lost the election (African Agenda 1997: 32). It was also generally believed that most of those who were disarmed were not the factions’ most reliable troops. Again, most of the guns that were given up were in poor condition. And, in a situation where rebel camps had been turned into party offices they could be easily reverted to their previous roles. For most Liberians, therefore, the elections were a case of ‘your vote or your life’ and they chose their lives (Ibid). Ironically, Taylor also got the support of those who wanted to hold him responsible for the war. They wanted him ‘to rebuild what he has destroyed; to unite a people he has polarised; and to heal the wounds he has caused’ (Ibid).

Taylor’s victory made mockery of the proportional representation and power-sharing mechanisms built into the electoral system to ensure an all-inclusive government and convened the grin message that after all violence and criminality were rewarding. In the end, the elections ratified and institutionalized the political topography and imbalance of power created by seven years of war; did little to advance democratization and raised considerable concerns regarding long-term stability and peacebuilding in the country (Stedman & Lyons 2004: 154-155)

THE TAYLOR ADMINISTRATION

Taylor assumed office in August 1997 promising to be the leader of every Liberian and ensuring reconciliation, human rights, good governance and economic reconstruction; a promise he honoured at best within the first hundred days.[8] These initial efforts however turned out to be cosmetic. Taylor and his NPP government remained focussed on the past and their role in the conflict than the future and their role as a civilian political organization. Taylor rather operated what has been described as a ‘shot-gun’ democracy and continued to behave more like a warlord than a democratic president.[9]

Taylor denied the ECOWAS peacekeepers (ECOMOG) the chance to be involved in the restructuring of the country’s security and law enforcement agencies as prescribed by the Abuja Accord(Human Rights Watch, May 2002). The Taylor government then engaged in a campaign of retribution against some of the former warlords and their supporters.[10] It was these groups, who felt shut out of political and military power and citing evidence of witch hunt, which fled into neighbouring states and set the stage for a new rebellion.

The new rebel group, Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy (LURD), after a series of hit-and-run attacks in 1999, was in control of several parts of the country by 2003. Though Taylor was insistent on holding elections scheduled for October 2003, by that date he was out of power to pave the way for another transition and another post-conflict election.

Taylor had been indicted in June 2003 by the UN-backed Special Court of Sierra Leone (SCSL) for his alleged involvement in the Sierra Leonean war. This together with the military successes of the rebellion forced Taylor to agree to an ECOWAS-initiated negotiated settlement in which he resigned in August 2003 and accepted asylum in Nigeria. His vice president took over as caretaker president till mid-October 2003 when a transitional government assumed office.