The multi-level institutional setting
of Germany, Italy, France and of the U.K.
in a comparative overview
Hellmut Wollmann/Balboni, Enzo/
Gaudin, Jean Pierre, Marcou, Gérard
To be published in:
Wollmann, Hellmut / Gérard Marcou (eds.) 2010,
Provision of Social and Public Services in Europe, Between State, Local Government and Market, Cheltenham: Edward Elgar (forthcoming)
This overview article[1] aims at sketching the multi-level institutional architecture of Germany, France, Italy and the U.K. Such “mapping” should provide institutional orientation and guidance for the analyses presented in the subsequent (“sectoral”) chapters on the provision of some key and exemplary public and social services in the four countries under discussion. .
1. Germany
Federal level
Germany’s (two tier) federal system consists of the federal level and (16) Länder, three of them are so called City States (Berlin, Hamburg, Bremen). The Länder have an average demographic size of 5.2 million inhabitants, ranging from 18 million (Nordrhein-Westfalen) to 550.000 (Bremen) (see table 1, line 1).
Under the Federal Constitution (Grundgesetz) of 1949 the “social state” (Sozialstaat) revolves around the “human dignity” (“Würde des Menschen”) and “equality” (Gleichheit) of every citizen and is at the core of the “democratic and social federal state” (article 20)[2]. Federal legislation is constitutionally mandated (article 72 II) to “ensure equal living conditions (gleichwertige Lebensbedingungen) on the territory of the Republic”. This has been widely interpreted as laying the ground for what has been termed a “unitary federal State” (unitarischer Bundesstaat) (Konrad Hesse 1967).
Under the complicated constitutional distinction between between “exclusive” legislative competences (assigned to the federal level and the Länder respectively) and “shared” (“konkurrierende”) legislative powers (which the federal level has come, as a rule, to exercise) the federal level has attained and held the primacy in legislation and policy-making in Germany’s federal system. The implied federal overweight is somewhat “tamed”, though, by a vertical division of power and “checks and balance” as, in a constitutional peculiarity of Germany’s federal system, the Länder, that is the individual Länder governments are directly in the decision-making and control of federal legislation and policy-making through the Federal Council (Bundesrat) whose seats and votes, as the Upper Chamber, are controlled by the Länder governments. (see Wachendorfer 2002, Wollmann/ Bouckaert 2006)..
While the federal level, thus, dominates legislation (and national policy-making), it is constitutionally barred (as another speciality of the German federal system) almost entirely
table 1: intergovernmental structure (data for 2006-2009)
county / Levels / Number / populationÆ
1 / Germany / federal / Federal States (Länder) / 161 (of which 3 City States: Berlin, Hamburg, Bremen) / average 5.2 million
(two-tier) counties (=Kreise) / 323 / 170.000
local / municipalities (within counties)
(=kreisangehörige Gemeinden) / 12.1962 / 6.6903
(single-tier) cities (=kreisfreie Städte / 116
intercommunal / intercommunal bodies / 1.708 "administrative unions" (= "Verwaltungsgemeinschaften", "Ämter" etc.4
2 / France / Local / Régions / 21+ Corsica + 4 (d’outre-mer) / 2,3 Mio.
Départements / 96 + 4 (d’outre-mer) / 550.000
Communes / 36.5695 / 1.560
intercommunal / Intercommunalité / 12.840 syndicats6
2.601 communautés
(à fiscalité propre)7
3 / Italy / "quasi-federal” / Regioni / 20 (15 statuto ordinario +
5 statuto speciale / 2,9 mio8
local / Province / 103 / 570.000
Comuni / 8.101 / 7.270
intercommunal / Intercommunal bodies / 356 comunità montane (made up of 4.201 comuni)
278 unioni di comuni (made up of 1.240 comuni)
numerous consorzi and conveni / 32.700
16.700
4 / U.K. / "quasi-federal" / Regions / Scotland, Wales, Northern Ireland / Scotland 9 %,
Wales 5 %.
England 85 % of total UK population
(two-tier) counties / 34 . / 720.000
local / districts/boroughs (within counties)
London boroughs (within Greater London Authority / 238
33 + Corporation of London / 140.000
single-tier authorities / 36 metropolitan councils
47 unitary authorities / 170.000
1 Varying in size between Land of Nordrhein-Westfalen with 18 mio inhabitants and Land of Bremen ("City State”) with 550.000 inhabitants
2 of which over 75 percent have less than 5.000 inhabitants
3 in Land of Nordrhein-Westfalen: Æ 45.000 inhabitants, in Land of Rheinland-Pfalz: Æ 1.700 inhabitants
4 in Land of Rheinland-Pfalz 95% of the municipalities are affiliated with an intercommunal body (such as Verwaltungsgemeinschaft), in Land of Bayern 62 percent, but in Land of Nordhein-Westfalen and Hessen none
5 of which 93% have less than 3.500 inhabitants
6 as of January 1, 2009. comprising syndicats à vocation unique, SIVU; syndicats à vocation multiple, SIVOM, syndicats mixtes or syndicats "à la carte”
7 as of January 1, 2009: 16 communautés urbaines, 174 communautés d’agglomération, 2.406 communautés de communes, 5 syndicats d’agglomération nouvelle
8 varying in size between 124.000 (Valle Aosta) and 9,5 mio inhabitants (Lombardie)
Source: mainly Dexia 2008, own compilation + calculation, own table (H.Wollmann)
from having any federal field offices in the subnational space.[3] Consequently, only 12 percent of the entire public sector workforce is federal personnel while almost 90 percent are employed by the sub-national levels, to wit 53 percent by the Länder and 35 percent by the local authorities (see table 2, line 1 ).
Table 2: Public employment by levels of government (in %)
country / central/federal / regional/
Land / local / special
sector / distribution within local level (100%)
85 / 94 / 05 / 85 / 94 / 05 / 85 / 94 / 05 / 85 / 94 / 05
1 / Germany / 9,9 / 11,6 / 12,0 / 55,6 / 51,0 / 53,0 / 34,5 / 38,1 / 35,0 / municipalities / 37,2
county free cities / 32,8
counties / 25,6
intercommunal / 4,7
2 / France / 54,9 / 48,7 / 51,0 / 27,1 / 30,7 / 30,0 / hôpitaux / régions / 0,7
18,0 / 20,6 / 19,0 / départements / 16,3
communes / 68,7
intermunicipal / 10,3
3 / Italy / 63,0 / 54,7 / 3,8 / 14,0 / 13,6 / aziende / province / 13,0
sanitarie locali / comuni / 87,0
17,0 / 19,0 / 20,3
enti pubblici
7,6
5 / U. K. / 21,9 / 21,4 / 16,8 / 55,0 / 53,0 / 56,0 / National Health / counties / 36,0
Service / metropolitan / 25,6
17,6 / 20,8 / 26,0 / councils
London
boroughs / 12,0
unitaries / 19,0
1 including municipios + comunidados
sources: data from Dexia 2006: 202, 167, Dexia 2008: 64; data for 1985: Lorenz/Wollmann1999: 505; for Italy 2007: Ministero dell’economia e delle finanze, conto annuale 2008, for distribution between province and comuni courtesy Luigi Bobbio, data for distribution between counties etc. for England 2004, Wilson/Game 2006: 280 own compilation + calculation, own table: H. Wollmann
Länder
The Länder hold exclusive legislative powers particularly in education policy, police and local government, including local level territorial reform. In a recent reform of federalism (labelled “federalism reform I”) which was meant to “disentangle” intergovernmental decision-making the Länder gave up some of their Federal Council-based veto powers in the federal legislative process and “traded in” a significant extension of their exclusive Land legislation powers, for instance, on universities, on the Land and local government personnel systems, but also in practical every day matters such as such as shop opening hours. This constitutional changes have been hailed by some and criticised by others as a departure from the traditional “homogeneous” and as an overture to a “heterogeneous” or “competitive” federalism (Wettbewerbsföderalismus) (see Wollmann/Bouckaert 2006: 29).
Due to the vertical functional division between legislation, predominantly exercised by the federal level, on the one side, and administration, almost exclusively in the hands of the Länder (and the local authorities), on the other, a significant degree of functional “interlocking” and interdependence of the federal and the Länder levels has ensued (see Benz 2005) which has been identified as “cooperative federalism” (kooperativer Föderalismus) and in which manifold “negotiations” (Verhandlungsföderalismus) between multiple vertical and horizontal actor networks have become typical. Critically this institutionally “untidy” system reigning in the federal/Länder interface has been characterised as “co-financing” (Mischfinanzierung) and “co-administration” (Mischverwaltung) and conceptualised as “policy-interlocking” (Politikverflechtung, Scharpf/ Reissert/ Schnabel 1976).
Local government levels
Germany’s two-tier local government structure is made up of (in 2006) (see table 1)
· 12.312 (two-tier) municipalities (kreisangehörige Gemeinden, that is, municipalities “within counties”), with an average of 6.690 inhabitants,
· 323 (two tier) counties (Kreise)- averaging some 200.000 inhabitants) .
· and 116 (single-tier) “county-free” (kreisfreie Städte) being not “within” a county, combing, in a analogy with the English single-tier county boroughs) county and municipal functions.
Territorial reforms and intercommunal bodies
During the 1960s and 1970s the German Länder embarked upon territorial reforms on the county and municipal levels in line with the contemporary upsurge of territorial reforms particularly in England and Sweden. The German Länder, being each solely responsible for local government matters, shared a common “carrot and stick” approach in that the reform drive was opened up with a “participatory” and “voluntary” phase during which the local authorities’ voice, co-operation and agreement were sought, were given voice and cooperation, while, if their consent was achieved, the Land government enforced its reform scheme by, as it were, coercive legislation.
Two different strategies were embarked upon by the Länder. (see Wollmann 2004b with references).
In some, for instance in Land of Nordrhein-Westfalen, large-scale amalgamation of the existing municipalities resulted in municipalities with an average of some 40.000 inhabitants. In opting for large-size municipalities these Länder fell in line with what, in comparative terms, has been labelled the “North European” pattern (see Norton 1994: 40 ff.). By contrast, most Länder set on a “two-pronged” strategy which settled on no or a low rate of amalgamation of the existing (small) municipalities, while, at the same time a new layer of intercommunal bodies (called Verwaltungsgemeinschaften, Ämter etc.) which, again in a “carrot and stick” approach, small municipalities were induced to join in order to be provided with the otherwise lacking administrative resources. Of this Land of Rheinland-Pfalz exemplary with municipalities averaging 2.800 inhabitants and 97 percent of them being members of an intercommunal body. When, following German Unification in 1990, four out of five of the newly established East German Länder, too, opted for the “two-pronged” strategy of leaving the small-size municipalities territorially unimpaired and of, instead, putting in place a layer of intercommunal bodies, again in the “carrot and stick” fashion.
Recently, in some (East German) Länder a new territorial reform wave has gained momentum which typically aims at undoing the previous two-pronged reform strategy by abolishing the intercommunal bodies and by, instead, arriving at territorially enlarged and “unified” municipalities (Einheitsgemeinden). The new territorial reform drive has been triggered and promoted by growing concerns about the failing political and operational viability of the intercommunal bodies; their operational deficiency has been seen in an “institutional overcrowding” and in economically undue co-ordination and transaction costs, while the persisting small member municipalities continuously are politically and demographically bleeding out. Thus, in the German Länder the reform sails appear to be set towards further local government amalgamation. (for details and further references see Wollmann 2009a with references).
Functions
German local government is traditionally marked by a “dual task” model according to which the local authorities, besides attending their local self-government responsibilities, are put in charge to carry out tasks that are “delegated” to them by the State (that is, the Land).
On the one hand, the “delegation” modality has widened the functional scope of the local authorities and actually encouraged the Länder to reduce the number their local field offices and to retreat, to some extent from the local administrative space by transferring further public functions upon the local authorities (see Kuhlmann 2009a: 119 ff., 2009b). On the other hand, it has had the problematic effect of making the local authorities, in the conduct of “delegated” business, subject to a comprehensive (merits/opportunity) supervision (Fachaufsicht) – and only merely legality review (Rechtsaufsicht) by the State authorities, thus almost “integrating” them into State administration and, thus, to a certain degree “statelise” them (verstaatlichen) (see Wollmann 2008a: 33 ff. , 2008b; 38 ff. with references).
Regarding the local government functions on which are in the focus of the sectoral articles of this volume the provisions of social services has traditionally been writ large (see table 3, line 2 for a somewhat gross indicator)
. table 3: Subnational public expenditure in 2005 by economic functions in %
country / Germany1 / France / Italy2 / U.K.3Function
1 / General public services / 11,4 / 19,2 / 14,6 / 8,1
2 / social protection / 32,2 / 15,8 / 4,6 / 29,0
3 / Education / 11,0 / 16,2 / 8,3 / 30,0
4 / Health / 1,8 / 0,6 / 43,0 / 0,0
5 / economic affairs / 21,0 / 13,0 / 14,0 / 8,2
6 / culture, recreation / 8,9 / 10,2 / 3,0 / 3,3
7 / Housing / 12,1 / 15,2 / 4,7 / 5,9
8 / public order / 6,2 / 2,8 / 1,5 / 10,0
9 / environmental protection / 0,0 / 6,9 / 4,6 / 4,5
Total 100% / 100,0 / 100.0 / 100,0 / 100,0
1 Germany: municipalities + counties (without Länder)
2 Italy: comuni, province and regioni
source: data from Dexia 2008, own compilation + calculation, own table (H. Wolllmann)
3. UK: two-tier county and district/borough levels as well as single-tier unitary authorities
The provision of social services has traditionally been a prime responsibility of local government that historically can be traced back to medieval times. Under the so called “subsidiarity principle” which is rooted in 19th century Catholic social teaching and which was confirmed in the Federal Social Assistance Act of 1961, the local authorities are largely in charge of (to use current NPM terminology) an “enabling” responsibility, while the personal social services (elderly care, kindergartens etc.) are meant to rendered primarily by non-profit organisations (so called “free welfare organisations”, freie Wohlfahrtsverbände (see Bönker/Wollmann 2006, 2008, Bönker/Marzanati et. al. in this volume). In a consequential policy shift, through the Federal Care Insurance Act of 1994, the provision of care for frail and disabled persons has been opened to market competition with private/commercial providers now increasing entering this market.
In the provision of health services the role of the local authorities is all but minimal as Germany’s health care system is premised on a (“Bismarckian”) contribution-based insurance scheme under which “primary” (“out-patient) health care is essentially rendered by “private” general practitioners, while “secondary” (“in-patient”) health care is provided by hospitals that are operated by a pluralist array of institutions, also including (large) cities and counties. For the rest, local authorities, particularly counties and “county-free” cities, are the site of “health offices” (Gesundheitsämter) which have responsibilities in epidemic disease prevention, food control and preventive health measures. Yet, by and large, the operational and financial involvement of the local authorities is rather small (see table 3, line 4) (see Grunow/Longo et al. in this volume)..