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Meeting Notes – July 2012
Spencer Jones started by announcing that this talk had been eight months in the making, and that he would be talking about the 2nd Anglo-Boer War of 1899-1902. South African historians refer to it as the Anglo-Boer War, with the first being in 1880-81, which had resulted in a defeat for GB. He would be talking about the war in general, rather than taking a specific look at it.
By 1899 the situation had changed abruptly, with the Boer states of the Transvaal, Natal and Orange Free State now richer than ever before, from mainly gold and diamonds. They were surrounded by British territories, with only Portuguese East Africa allowing them access to the sea. The Boers declared war in October 1899, and invaded British territory. The statement ‘over by Christmas’ was applied to the war by the Spectator newspaper. The war turned out to be hard, due to the nature of the opposition – well-armed, tough fighters. The main British force then managed to get itself trapped in Ladysmith.
The term ‘Boer’ meant farmer and was mainly used in a derogatory sense, and their forces were largely organised in a commando system – the man would bring a gun, a horse or horses, and enough food for seven days campaigning. The Boer government gave them a Mauser rifle, which was magazine fed, and the fact they were horse-based made them very mobile- this was important in such a large country. They also had the Maxim gun, which was a pom-pom weapon, not a machine-gun, and which was very disturbing to face.
The tactics they employed were simple: if they felt threatened they withdrew, and they had no tradition of hand-to-hand fighting, and no bayonets. They also knew the lie of the land, as they were native to the country, and their horses could eat the veldt grass- unlike the horses used by the British.
The Boer fighters were all volunteers, therefore the contact between the government and its forces was very loose – which was the weakness of the system. Numbers varied: the British thought the Boers numbered 50,000; the Boers estimated they had 60,000, but in reality it was closer to 54,000; and the numbers fluctuated widely between 10,000 and 30,000 at any one time.
Distances were surprising – the horizon could be 50 miles away, not the 20 miles you might imagine so, therefore, the Boers could see you coming. British officers tended to get the range wrong, which meant the men would not alter their sights unless told to do so. The Boers also used smokeless powder, not black powder, so they could not be seen when they fired.
Spencer felt that the British did not expect this level of expertise and resistance. The Boer tactics were simple- kill the officers first and then the NCOs. Attritional rates were some 30-40 per cent for officers, compared to 6-10 per cent for men; which meant that when the officers and NCOs were put down then invariably the attack faltered as the men were unsure of what next to do.
At the start of the war there were five regiments of cavalry – though four had been surrounded at Ladysmith, and the fifth was surrounded and wiped out! A new cavalry division was then formed, with 9,000 men/horses, under the command of John French. They soon ran out of horses, as they had come from an English winter into a hot South African summer. 67 per cent was the horse attrition rate, and the average time they lasted was some six weeks.
Gradually the British stopped being so stupid, and both sides started using trenches. Gradually, it seemed, that Britain was about to win the war: Ladysmith had been relieved, OFS was captured and the British had advanced to Pretoria – the Transvaal capital. And all this within six months. Pretoria was then captured, and many Boers had surrendered by June 1900. As a result many regular troops were reduced, to be replaced by yeomanry and militia. This tended to contribute to the problem, and the war dragged on for another two years, resulting in a vicious guerrilla campaign.
There were still some 20,000 Boers in the field – in a big country, and these started raiding railway lines, which were an essential communications link for the British. So how to fight them? Brutal methods were introduced – farms were burned, which denied sources of food to the Boers, and the families were thrown out onto the veldt, so if they joined the Boer forces it would, by necessity, slow them down. This policy did not work, and instead created a refugee problem.
‘Concentration camps’ were then established, where refugees could be housed. These were controlled by incompetent officers, who were not trusted to do anything else. Epidemics ravaged the camps, and c28,000 civilians died – more than the Boers in actual fighting.
‘Sweeps’ were sent out, comprising all arms – infantry, cavalry and artillery. Spencer compared the tactic to looking for a needle in a haystack, and considered them very inefficient tactics.
So how did the British manage to win? Attrition – food and forage wee denied to the Boers; blockhouses were easy and simple to erect, and were practically bulletproof. Some 8-10,000 were built, and housed between 6-8 troops. They were strung out within sight of each other, with barbed wire strung out between them. This contained the Boer units, and sweep columns started to sweep the Boers onto the blockhouse line. It worked, though it took a year to do so.
A peace treaty came at the end of 1902, with 9,000 surrendering at the end of the war – ‘the bitter enders’. Casualties were 100,000 British; 9,000 Boers; and 28,000 civilians.
Spencer thought that the legacy was a fine brand of tobacco –‘British Pluck’, a rich, dark flake Virginia tobacco! There was also delight in France, Germany and Russian circles at seeing the British empire in trouble. The British Army copied lots of Boer tactics and the use of the rifle, and introduced many changes, which turned it into an efficient colonial fighting force.
Finally, Spencer recommended his book: ‘From Boer War to World War’, due out in October 2012.
A fine, well crafted talk which utilised PowerPoint. Varied questions followed: was there night fighting? Yes, and night marches, which the British got better at. Bad leadership amongst the British started early, and largely continued throughout. Australian forces were the largest Empire contingent, and these brought better horses from the Antipodes.