The Hangman and the Surprise Test, Dealing with a Paradox Bibliographie
The Hangman and the Surprise Test, Dealing with a Paradox – Bibliographie
Alexander P. (1950) Pragmatic Paradoxes (in Mind, vol.59(236), p536-538)
Anderson A.C. (1983) The Paradox of the Knower (in Journal of Philosophy, vol.80, p338-355)
Abstract: The paradox of the knower is a formalized version of the hangman paradox. It uses Gödel numbering to produce self reference and results in an inconsistency between apparently evident principles about knowledge and inference and Robinson’s arithmetic Q. The author examines a number of possible solutions and concludes that the predicates expressing the knowing and inference relations must be sorted into hierarchies analogous to Tarsi’s hierarchy for the truth predicate.
Blau U. (1983) Vom Henker, vom Lügner und von ihrem Ende (in Erkenntnis, vol.19, p27-44)
Abstract: The hangman paradox has a simple solution. The amazing refutation of the judge’s decree rests on the axiom of ‘knowledge conservation’. This axiom is false under unfavourable conditions. You can have a perfect piece of knowledge in the ordinary sense, i.e., a true justified conviction, and yet be unable to conserve it. More interesting than its solution is the element of self-reference connecting the hangman via Moore’s paradox and Buridan’s epistemic paradox with the liar. This one, I think, has also a natural solution, but less simple. The basic idea is given here, but the technical treatment goes far beyond this paper. It requires a strong, but conservative extension of classical and three-valued logic to a six-valued logic with infinitely many ‘levels of reflection’
Blau U. & Blau J. (1995) Epistemische Paradoxien, Teil 1 (in Dialectica, vol. 49(2-4), p169-193)
Abstract: A satisfactory analysis of the well-known Hangman Paradox is not known to us. Two theses: 1) The logical solution of the Hangman Paradox(es) is easy and disappointing. 2) The origins of the(se) paradox(es) are manyfold and inexhaustible. We analyse particularly perspicuous timeless version of the paradox due to Hollis (1986). In a sequel which is to appear in Dialectica we analyse two version of the original Hangman Paradox.
Cargile J. (1967) The Surprise Test Paradox (in Journal of Philosophy, vol.64, p550-563)
Chapman J.M. & Butler R.J. (1965) On Quine’s ‘So-called Paradox’ (in Mind, vol.74(295), p424-425)
Cohen L.J. (1950) Mr O’Connor’s ‘Pragmatic Paradoxes’ (in Mind, vol.59(233), p85-87)
Galle P. (1981) More on the Surprise Test Puzzle (in Informal Logic, vol.3, p21-22)
Abstract: In Informal Logic vol.2(2), H. Nielsen outlined a version of the surprise test puzzle and presented his analysis. In this note, it is argued that in Nielsen’s version of the puzzle, the students’ argument that no test can occur involves a variation of ‘begging the question’.
Halpern J. & Moses Y. (1986) Taken by Surprise: the Paradox of the Surprise Test Revisited (in Journal of Philosophical Logic, vol.15, p281-304)
Abstract: We re-examine the surprise test paradox (also called the hangman paradox) and translate it into formal logic with a fixed-point operator and a provability operator. We consider four possible translations. The first is contradictory, the second is consistent with the test being given any day of the week, the third rules out the last day (but no other), while the fourth is paradoxical in that it is consistent if and only it is inconsistent!
Jongeling B. & Koetsier T. (1993) A Reappraisal of the Hangman Paradox (in Philosophia, vol.22(3-4), p299-311)
Abstract: The hangman paradox or unexpected examination paradox is usually solved by construing it as a form of Liar's paradox. A different solution is proposed, based on the idea that a reference shift occurs. The proposed solution is claimed to do more justice to the spirit of the original. The relationship between informal and formalized versions of logical paradoxes is discussed.
Kiefer J. & Ellison J. (1965) The Prediction Paradox Again (in Mind, vol.74, p426-427)
Lyon A. (1959) The Prediction Paradox (in Mind, vol.68, p510-517)
Meltzer B. & Good I.J. (1965) Two Forms of the Prediction Paradox (in British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, vol.16, p50)
Abstract: Two forms of the prediction paradox are here resolved and thus correcting a previous article by Meltzer in Mind (vol.73, 1974).
Meschl U. (1989) Ein klein Uberraschung für Gehirne im Tank: eine skeptische Notiz zu einem antiskeptischen Argument (in Zeitschrift für philosophische Forschung, vol.43, p519-527)
Abstract: The paper is concerned with Pr. Putnam’s recent argument that ‘we’ cannot be brains in a vat. It is argued that brains in a vat are in a situation parallel to that of the prisoner of the Hangman Paradox. In addition, some remarks are made concerning metaphysical realism and the idea of consistency.
Nielsen H.A. (1979) A Note on the Surprise Test Puzzle (in Informal Logic, vol.2, p6-7)
Abstract: A promised surprise test is one whose date a student could not reasonably predict on his way to class. Friday seems to be out, for if no test came in by Thursday, Friday would be no surprise, and the same reasoning seems to hold for Thursday, Wednesday and so forth. The fallacy: a human cannot reason himself forward to the end of the week, but must live through the intervening days one by one.
O’Connor D.J. (1948) Pragmatic Paradoxes (in Mind, vol.57(227), p358-359)
O’Connor D.J. (1948) Pragmatic Paradoxes and Fugitive Propositions (in Mind, vol.60(240), p536-538)
Olin D. (1986) On a Paradoxical Train of Thought (in Analysis, vol.46, p18-20)
Abstract: A paradox presented by Martin Hollis (Analysis 44.4) is shown to be a new version of the familiar prediction paradox. What chiefly distinguishes Hollis’ version from the standard ones is that it is based on an arithmetic example and involves infinitely many possibilities.
Olin D. (1988) Predictions, Intentions and the Prisoner’s Dilemma (in Philosophical Quarterly, vol.38, p111-116)
Abstract: It has recently been argued by Roy Sorensen that Kavka’s intentional puzzle is a new version of the prediction paradox (the paradox of the surprise test). The first stage of this paper discredits Sorensen’s argument by showing that it can be extended to the prisoner’s dilemma, thereby reaching the conclusion that the prisoner’s dilemma and the prediction paradox are, at the core, one and the same. The second stage analyses the flaws in the argument.
Pitioni V. (1983) Das Vorhersageparadoxon (in Conceptus, Zeitschrift für Philosophie, vol.17, p88-92)
Abstract: The prediction paradox is shown to bet the consequence of two simple mistakes. First: concepts like ‘unexpected’ refer to at least binary relations and not to unary properties of events. Second, even if the meaning of a concept remains unchanging, its extension may change. At last it is shown that certain forms of self-reference cannot be excluded by logical means.
Scriven M. (1951) Paradoxical Announcements (in Mind, vol.60(239), p403-407)
Sorensen R. (1993) The Earliest Unexpected Class Inspection (in Analysis, vol.53(4), p252)
Abstract: This is a reverse version of the surprise test paradox--though one that goes "forward" in time. Suppose everybody knows that university regulations require the chairman to evaluate the performance of new faculty. The basis must be a surprise inspection and must be done as soon as possible. Here is an argument for its infeasibility. The inspection cannot take place on the first day because the teacher would know it was the first available day. Once this day is eliminated, we must also rule out the second day because it is now the first available day. This reasoning can be repeated for all the alternatives--apparently demonstrating that the earliest unexpected inspection is impossible.
Sorensen R. (1999) Infinite "Backward" Induction Arguments (in Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, vol.80(3), p278, 283)
Abstract: A large family of paradoxical arguments have been subsumed under the label "backward induction arguments". These include the iterated prisoner's dilemma, the centipede game, and the surprise test paradox. They are described as backward because they begin by considering a future hypothetical alternative, rule it out, and then rule out each predecessor. Thus, they go backward in time ruling out finitely many alternatives. I present examples that go forward in time and eliminate infinitely many alternatives. These pose problems for solutions that focus on common knowledge assumptions.
Sorensen R. (2002) Formal Problems about Knowledge (in The Oxford Handbook of Epistemology, Moser, Paul K (ed), p539-568)
Abstract: The hopes of the modal logicians who developed epistemic logic are illustrated with Fitch's proof for unknowables and the surprise test paradox. The epistemology of proof is covered with the help of the knower paradox. One of the solutions to this paradox is that knowledge is not closed under deduction. The broader history of this manoeuvre is reviewed along with the relevant alternatives model of knowledge. This model assumes that 'know' is an absolute term like 'flat'. I argue that epistemic absolute terms differ from extensional absolute terms by virtue of their sensitivity to the completeness of the alternatives. This asymmetry undermines recent claims that there is a structural parallel between the supervaluational and epistemicist theories of vagueness.
Sorensen R. (2004) Paradoxes of Rationality (in The Oxford Handbook of Rationality, Mele A.R.(ed), p257-275)
Abstract: This survey provides a bird's eye view of trouble spots for the theory of rational choice and rational belief. The troubles take the form of apparent counterexamples to attractive generalizations, such as the principle of charity, the transitivity of preferences, and the principle that utility should be maximized. The following paradoxes are discussed: fearing fiction, the surprise test paradox, Pascal's wager, Pollock's 'ever better wine', Newcomb's problem, the iterated prisoner's dilemma, Kavka's paradoxes of deterrence, backward inductions, the bottle imp, Moore's problem, weakness of will, the Ellsberg paradox, Allais's paradox, and Peter Cave's puzzle of self-fulling belief.
Weiss P. (1952) The Prediction Paradox (in Mind, vol.61(242), p265-269)
Windt P.Y. (1973) The Liar in the Prediction Paradox (in American Philosophical Quarterly, vol.10, p65-68)
Abstract: An argument schema is introduced which seems to offer a way to disprove any proposition whatever. It is shown to owe its apparent power to a self referential proposition of the sort involved in the liar paradox. It is argued that the prediction (surprise examination) paradox is a special version of this schema, and does not require different treatment than does the liar. Ways are suggested to make non paradoxical announcements about unpredictable future events.