9. January 2004
Our Ref.: GAK-10556/11288
The Current Status of ISPS Preparation by the Global Tanker Market
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Introduction
Ladies and gentlemen,
Let me first of all thank you for the kind introduction and for the invitation for INTERTANKO to speak here today and thereby share with you some views and experiences on this extremely important project.
INTERTANKO has some 260 members who are well into their security work in order to conform with the new security regime in time for 1 July 2004. This is a monumental task called for by a new regime of maritime security regulations which were established by IMO at record speed and lead upto a signature by 109 Contracting Governments in December 2002. During the ensuing months, the ship owners and operators were largely on their own to make their way through the maze of new regulations in the short 18 months remaining before 1 July 2004. Subsequently maritime security providers and administrations entered the field offering external courses and guidelines on establishing Ship Security Assessments and Ship Security Plans.
Cooperation through the IMO
INTERTANKO has taken active part throughout the IMO process together with its industry partners ICS, BIMCO and INTERCARGO. This cooperation ensured that the industry all through the legislative process spoke with one voice in the common effort of protecting the ship operators’ interests and to guide the processes and the developments of the new IMO regulations to become relevant, effective, commercially viable, and last but not least – it should not delay international trade.
The new regulatory regime on Maritime Security
Although this presentation places focus on the International Ship and Port Facility Security Code (the ISPS Code), the international shipping industry currently has to deal with are the following, ass applicable:
- the amendments to SOLAS 1974
- the International Ship and Port Facility Security (ISPS) Code itself, i.e. the mandatory Part A and “relevant parts” of Part B, i.e. Paragraphs 8.1-13.8.
- the U.S. Maritime Transportation Security Act (MTSA) of October 2002 together with
its implementing regulations.
Finally we do have
- the European Commission Proposed Regulations of 2 May 2003.
The above regulations are fundamentally overlapping, although with variations, with particular regard to which parts of the regime that has been made mandatory and what has been published for guidance. Deadlines do also vary. For instance UK-flag tonnage were required to submit their SSP for approval by 31 January 2004 and US flag ships subject to the MTSA were to submit their Vessel Security Plan no later than 31 December 2003.
In order to achieve compliance with the applicable requirements the following list of tasks needs to be observed. Seeing the list one will soon realise that this is a monumental task and that there is no easy way out as there is no room for non-compliance in part or fullunless one is prepared to see the vessel losing its ticket to trade..
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The list of implementation work
All operators need to fulfil the following work items which is based on a combination of in-house efforts and the professional assistance by external providers:
-Prepare a time line identifying activities to be accomplished.
-Appoint CSO(s) and SSO(s). (The reason for using CSO in plural is that operators with large fleets may find the appointment of one single CSO to be inadequate in order to handle all ships alone. Furthermore, even a CSO might need a vacation some time. (Under the new regime they will probably need a holiday more than ever!)
-Conduct a ship-specific Ship Security Assessment (SSA) which includes: To identify potential threats, Consequence Assessment, Vulnerability Assessment, Mitigation and Implementation; plus finally an on-scene security survey. Before this can be done the persons assigned with carrying out the SSA must receive training. The same will apply to Internal Ship Security Auditors and shipboard personnel.
-There is a need to develop the SSP,
-Issue and implement the SSP
-Establish a budget for the cost involved in the process.
-Train CSOs and SSOs
-Security awareness training for all shipboard personnel. Many operators started by conducting in-house training. Many later accepted external assistance.
-There is a need to conduct a review of the SSP and adapt it to the Navigation and Vessel Inspection Circular, or NVIC 10-02 which is a document issued by the U.S. Administration providing guidelines on the implementation work for ships. Similarly NVIC 11-02 was issues for ports.
-Then submit SSP to the Flag Administration or one of the delegated RSOs for approval
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-Implement SSP onboard the ship,
-conduct internal Verification audit onboard.
-Arrange Certification audit onboard and
-Plan the installations under the amended SOLAS of the Automatic Identification System (AIS) by first Safety Equipment Survey after 1 July 2004 but before 31 December 2004. The Ship Security Alert System (SSAS) has an installation deadline by the first Radio Equipment Survey after 1 July 2004. There is the permanent marking of the Ship Identification number i.e. the IMO number which is a Licence Plate if you like .plus the Continuous Synopsis Record which aims to place onboard a complete record covering all vital information on the vessel and its trading record from cradle to grave. Shipowners will be requested to complete the initial CSR draft in the near future and return it to the FlagState.
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So where are we now?
Let us look a bit at the progress made so far and which experiences our members have made on the way. Statistical information on the achievements made by ship operators and ports to datehas been no more than sketchy for a long time but has recently picked up. INTERTANKO was informed 3 weeks ago by the USCG that after a very slow start now some 90% of US ports and US flag vessels have submitted their security plans and that the USCG HQ are confident that all will be certified by 1 July. Note has been given that out of the 5,000 terminals in the US, a significant number are small and simple units. The USCG uses contractors for Verification of PFSPs and VSPs but they do not delegate the final assessment to any RSO.
Elsewhere in the world, Hong Kong and Singapore are reported to be well organised and Rotterdam already has a Security Plan in place.
UK requires 800 Port Facility Security Plans (PFSPs) to be submitted but ports are working to a slightly different timetable, and have been asked to submit plans within two months of receipt of a formal security assessment from TRANSEC, the security team at the DOT. UK’s Maritime and Coastguard Agency have dropped charging ports and shipping companies for security plan approvals, a service which is being billed for in other countries. IMO has budgeted GBP 1.5 million for helping developing countries to comply. This will be spent on expertise rather than on hardware.
The Oil Companies’ International Marine Forum (OCIMF) has quite recently issued a document on Terminal Security Guidance in which it has taken the Port Facility elements of the ISPS Code and reorganised the text into a more procedural manual style and taken a Port Facility Security Plan template and provided it as a basis for a user to develop his own. This will no doubt provide welcome assistance for ports which are battling with a host of problems to secure maximum security for each individual Port Facility. We may just begin to considerwhat miles of fencing, lighting, cameras, patrols ashore and seaside may involve in terms of administration and cost.
On the ships’ side wehave for instance learned that DnV, as RSO for various administrations had recently issued 20 ISSCs. Their expected volume was in the order of 3,000 ships; confirmed agreements for more than 1350 ships and more than 260 SSPs have been approved. Liberia has received 600 plans whereof 300 are approved, or 40% and 20% respectively. 15 Audits/Certificates have been issued = a mere 1%!. The International Association of Classification Societies (IACS) informed late January that 1026 plans had been received and approved which is 3.4%. 163 Audits/Certificates are issued, which is no more than 0.5%! These figures will of course already have changed somewhat for the better. The Liberian register has completed more than 250 of the 570-plus security plan approvals as well as a significant number of the audits called for by the ISPS Code. In light of the above widely varying figures it is quite clear that there is still a long way to go to get the approximately 50,000 vessels and 15,000 ports certificated within the deadline.
You may have seen that the UK Marine and Coastguard Agency (MCA) issued a reminder one month ago of the 31 January 2004 deadline for UK-flagged ships for submission of their SSP. This deadline was intended to allow time for approval of the plans and their putting into place before Verification audits take place and the ISSCs are issued in accordance with the ISPS Code requirements. Several shipping companies missed that deadline. Some 250 ship operators for 650/700 affected UK-flagged ships will be served by an assigned staff of 15 of the MCA, which also provides interesting food for thought. The report has it that approximately 15% of the plans had been received, a figure which was expected to rise fast. INTERTANKO notes that the UK fully aims to meet the 1 July 2004 deadline for the affected fleet of UK-flagged ships. Not surprising with its substantial seaborne trade with the U.S.
Despite the occasionally alarming news of slow implementation, it is on the other hand encouraging to find that a vast majority of the ships still uncertified are making good progessin the above mentioned work process and that the remaining work is mostly under control with a strong commitment on achieving compliance in time.
Experiences made by INTERTANKO members:
Training:
At the early stages owners were pretty much on their own and several tanker operators provided internal training not only to their designated CSO and SSOs but also to all shipboard personnel prior to their joining the vessel. External courses became gradually more available from Classification societies and other service providers, but it is noteworthy that no mandatory training courses were made available. The result is that shipboard personnel at large has received training with differing content and that operators of multi-flag fleet will find themselves in a confusing situation where the useof seafarers on ships under different flags can present a practical problem including lack of acceptance of their training by certain flag states. It should be mentioned that IMO have made available Model Courses for CSO, SSO and Port Facility Security Officers (PFSO) available to the industry.INTERTANKO’S Working Group on Maritime Security provided input to these Model Courses. Shipboard personnel should receive their security awareness training from the SSO according to a curriculum developed by the CSOand through Computer Based Training courses.
Our members have experienced that Administrations require CSOs and SSOs to be trained through approved courses and even to some extent by approved service providers. Due to the limited time now available upto the deadline this requirement will become compulsory as per STCW but only after the 1 July 2004 deadline. The availability of approved courses has increased sharply but we have seen price tags of GBP 1,100 per capita which will quickly add up in the owners’ budget.
Ship Security Assessment (SSA) and Ship Security Plan (SSP):
From documents delivered it has become evident that the conducted SSAs do not tend to aim to lift the SSP above measures proposed in the ISPS Code Part B. SSAs are from time to time received as uncontrolled documents without clear reference and based on no on-scene survey and more or less as a copy of the SSP. Proper definition of assessment criteria maybe lacking including a summary of what should be transferred to the SSP.There is evidence of a lack of good understanding of operation procedures and that procedures are made more complicated than necessary. Without a security expert the focus often proves to be inadequate. An active involvement of the company and ship’s personnel is some time overlooked and some may have neglected following a guideline which will affect the structure and the quality of the final document.
Some classification societies may conduct a preliminary review of the SSPs and thereby provide very useful observations for further improvements, such as:
The SSP should be tailored to the SSA; documentary evidence is required to reflect the training of the personnel that conducted the SSAs . Ships’ security teams should be given crystal clear assigned duties (areas of control, timing, overlapping period etc.) Proposals for the onboard fitting and use of closed circuit TV should be prepared. Equipment such as rat guards, cargo clusters, padlocks, placards, illuminating light fixtures, identified in the SSA as recommendations, must be put on the critical list in the Planned Maintenance System (PMS), suitably marked, and sufficient spares carried.
SSP approvals and shipboard verification audits:
Normally the first SSP received from an operator is returned due as too incomplete. Itmay fail to reflect the conclusions of the SSA, they may have failed to be ship specific and too generic and may be repeating the Code text rather than address specific routines. Again the instructions may have disregarded user friendliness and have been made too cumbersome. Cross references to the Code is helpful for the approval process and for future updates. Redundancies of security equipment should be mentioned. The SSP should include such important issues as Access Control, Restricted Areas, Ship Security Alert System information, description of Security Equipment and Cargo/Storage control.
Once all the SSPs have been approved, either by the Flag or the RSOs, the company should appoint an organisation to carry out the shipboard verifications. The perception of the various RSOs involved in their approach to SSP review and approval varies,whichmay delay the process of getting the implementation underway onboard ships. One INTERTANKO member adds: (quote)“Many components of the Code are not really applicable at the initial stages and if we waste time trying to address them, then the process of preparation of plans will be delayed. For example, how many ports have a PFSO who can advise the CSO of particular threats today? How will a CSO know which PFSO's to talk to prior to assessing a ship that is tramping in world wide trade? How can an SSP become so ship-specific that each crewmember’s security duties are identified to the 'T' and every recommendation of the SSA incorporated rigidly?
Only time and experience after the implementation of the Code will provide satisfactory answers to a number of these requirements in the Code. We are all learning and the focus at this time should be to put the basic infrastructure on board and not spend time reading between the lines or behind them.” (end of quote)
A member comments that a lack of a common approach is delaying the implementation process and Administrations have taken an unduly long time to set into motion the approval process for SSPs.
Verification audits:
Can be undertaken when all elements of the approved SSP have been implemented onboard. Personnel with security tasks will be interviewed, onboard documentation checked and a complete check of all security equipment made.
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The Panamanian approval procedure:
The industry has noted that delegation to RSOs of the various elements of the process has varied quite a bit from one flag state to another. Panama caught world wide attention by delegating the SSP approval process to one exclusive commercial company only, and notably not to a Classification bureau. Combined with what was clearly regarded as very high prices for the job (upto USD 3,000 per vessel, depending on its size) brought reactions from its client base and ultimately led to reduced unit prices and an expansion of the number of companies allowed to provide approval service. INTERTANKO lobbied this matter through direct meetings with the said administration to remove the exclusivity, improve total capacity of the Panamanian approval process and reduce the cost for its members. Fresh pressure is brought to bear on the Panamanian Maritime Administration (PMA) to expand the SSP approval process to all RSOs to which they have already delegated the verification process. This will greatly enhance total capacity and probably also bring down the price per ship to have the job done.
Other Flag States which have not delegated any part of the security work are UK, US, Canada, Australia, Italy, Sweden, Bermuda and France (?).
Seafarers’ concerns
Seafarers have expressed concern with their added security responsibilities and are worried that they will have to bear the brunt of the demand for extra documentation and in particular if the ship has called at a non-compliant in its recent trading history. USCG will expect that the ship follows MARSEC Level 2 at “the contaminated port”, records this, but should lower the security procedures to MARSEC 1 in the US port, should that be the local level required. The ISPS Code is not clear on a crew member’s right to challenge the ID of unaccompanied persons he might meet onboard, an issue which is a rather central element in an effective SSP. The needs for onboard watch to prevent unwanted persons gaining access to the ship are not specified in detail and are furthermore likely to violate work and rest requirements for crew.The USCG has announced that it will pay particular attention to given procedures for onboard access. 9/11 has furthermore led to a strong focus on the nationalities and background of the crew members, introduced the need for personal visas and a mandatory personal appearance for purposes of application. We can all imagine the substantial administrative problems and extra cost caused by a need for a seafarer sailing the high seas to appear at a visa office. The fear of terrorist strikes against US ports has furthermore caused seafarers to be regarded more or less as a permanent security hazard and thus almost totally deprived of shore leave in US ports. Thus lack of contact with family and friends plus the lack of access to necessary services including medical consultations have changed the living and working conditions of the seafarer in a most negative sense and may threaten future recruitment to this line of work. INTERTANKO has on several occasions addressed these problems with U.S. authorities.