The Current State and Prospect of Inter-Korean Arms Control

The CurrentState and Prospect of Inter-Korean Arms Control

Brigadier General Lee, Sang Chul

(Deputy Director General for Arms Control MND)

Ⅰ. Introduction

The modern denotation of arms control is the concept which aims for reducing risks of military threat and war between two hostile sides by taking measures of military stabilization at the relatively lower level. This concept of arms control has been developed through European arms control processes since 1970s. Since 1973, all European nations have participated in the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) to develop measures for military confidence-building and force employment control. NATO and Warsaw Pact countries started negotiations for the Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions (MBFR) in the Central Europe. At last, with the end of the Cold War, NATO and the Warsaw Pact signed the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces (CFE), which mandated the reduction of five major weapons, within the framework of the CSCE. The arms control in Europe, which turned out to be fairly successful, focused on reducing risks of large-scale surprise attack by maintaining military balance at the relatively lower level.

The European conventional arms control experiences during the Cold War period provided valuable lessons-learned to the arms control on the Korean peninsula. However, the inter-Korean arms control is bounded by the distinct characteristics of the Korean peninsula and therefore, it is difficult to follow the exact path of the European arms control.

Since the Korean War, which broke out in 1950 in the midst of the Cold War, did not completely end, the Korean peninsula is now at the state of armistice. As the Cold War between the east and west came to an end in early 1990s, the risks of large-scale war at the global level significantly decreased. Yet, after 20 years from the end of the Cold War, the Korean peninsula still remains to be an isolated island. The situation on the Korean peninsula can be described neither by peace nor war, but by the continuous and unstable armistice.

In early 1990s, the inter-Korean talks have begun under the influence of the collapse of the East-European bloc and the end of the Cold War. Since the Inter-Korean Summit in June 2000, many changes have occurred in the inter-Korean relations as to making progresses in exchange and cooperation in both social and economic areas including the construction of Kaesong Industrial Complex and commencement of Mt.Kumgang tourism. Despite of the changes in the international situation as well as inter-Korean relations, North Korean military threats tend to be increasingly intensified. North Korea has started developing nuclear weapons and long-range ballistic missiles since 1990s while maintaining large-scale conventional forces, and repeatedly committed provocations in the WestSea. In particular, for the past several years, North Korea has committed military provocations such as long-range missile tests, two rounds of nuclear tests, murder of a tourist in Mt.Kumgang, sinking of the Republic of Korea Ship Cheonan, and shelling of YeonpyeongIsland, which heightened military tension on the Korean peninsula more than ever. In short, the situation on the Korean peninsula is twofold in that exchange, cooperation, confrontation and conflict all coexist under the armistice regime.

Considering current situation where the military adventurism of North Korea continues, it may be too early to talk about inter-Korean arms control at this stage. However, as military tension increases, arms control which is aimed at decreasing such tension and enhancing military stability, becomes more necessary. The two Koreas have negotiated on military tension mitigation and confidence-building since 1990s and even signed a significant agreement. Nonetheless, due to failure in implementing such measures for confidence-building and arms control that were agreed upon, it exposed the limitation of establishing peace in a practical manner.

The purposes of this discussion to reaffirm the current address of inter-Korean arms control and foresee what could happen in the future. To achieve these, we will review how the inter-Korean arms control negotiations went down, what the results were, why actual military confidence-building and arms control were not accomplished, and lastly how will inter-Korean arms control unfold in the future.

Ⅱ. Inter-Korean Arms Control Experiences

• The Korean War Armistice Agreement (1953)

In 1953, United Nations Command (UNC) and the Communist side have signed the Korean Military Armistice Agreement which ensured a complete cessation of hostilities in Korea to end the Korean War. In the modern denotation, the Armistice Agreement was the first case of arms control on the Korean peninsula. As a specific measure, in paragraph 13 of the Armistice Agreement, it stipulated the terms to cease the introduction into Korea of reinforcing military personnel, combat aircraft, armored vehicles, weapons and ammunition. Furthermore, it specified that the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission (NNSC), through its Neutral Nations Inspection Teams in each side, should conduct supervision and inspection.

However, the Neutral Nations Inspection Team of the Communist side (Poland and Slovakia) intentionally impeded the inspection activities in North Korea by the Neutral Nations Inspection Team of the UNC side while conducting irrelevant activities such as espionage activities. Moreover, North Korea violated the terms of the Armistice Agreement, and introduced a large quantity of military equipments as well as impeded regular discussions and reports on introduction of military equipments and materials by the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission. Paragraph 13 of the Armistice Agreement has ended up a dead letter due to illegal activities and violations of North Korea.

Paragraph 13 of the Armistice Agreement was a kind of arms control measures in that it stipulated to cease introduction of armaments into Korea. However, the very existence of the provisions have lost their meanings as North Korea introduced military equipments and impeded supervision and inspection by the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission. Afterwards two sides continued on with arms race without any limitations since mid 1950s.

• Inter-Korean High-level Talks and Inter-Korean Basic Agreement (1990-1992)

The collapse of the East-European bloc and the end of the Cold War in early 1990s had implications on the Korean peninsula. At that time, the Republic of Korea Government carried out a northward policy and proposed inter-Korean dialogues. The North Korean Government, shocked by the collapse of the Communist bloc in Eastern Europe, also became interested in improving inter-Korean relations.

From 1990 to 1992, the South and North have adopted the Inter-Korean Basic Agreement through 8 times of High-level Talks with Prime Minister as the head of delegation. The Inter-Korean Basic Agreement comprised political reconciliation, military non-aggression, and social-economic exchange and cooperation. Under the inter-Korean senior-level talks, Politics Subcommittee, Military Subcommittee, and Exchange and Cooperation Subcommittee were formed and they adopted Annex which included specific implementation measures for each area. In addition, they have agreed to establish and operate Joint Reconciliation Committee, Joint Military Commission and the Joint Committee for Social and Cultural Cooperation and Exchanges in order to consult and implement the Basic Agreement and Annex at the working level.

In the Inter-Korean Basic Agreement which is like the Bill of Rights for inter-Korean relations, for political reconciliation, two sides have agreed to recognize each other's regime, stop slandering, and abide by the Armistice Agreement until the condition for disuse of forces, non-encroachment and peace was achieved. For military non-aggression, they have agreed upon military confidence-building measures such as peaceful use of demilitarized zone and exchange of military personnel and information, along with operational arms control measures including notification and control of large-scale unit movement and military exercise as well as phased arms control measures including elimination of weapons of mass destruction by establishing and operating Joint Military Commission. Indeed, the Inter-Korean Basic Agreement had similar implications as the main agreements of CSCE such as the 1973 Helsinki Final Act and the 1986 Stockholm Agreement. In the past North Korea had insisted on unrealistically radical arms control, whereas it took and agreed with suggestions of the South for military confidence-building measures and arms control.

However, after adopting the Inter-Korean Basic Agreement and Annex in 1992, North Korea severed inter-Korean relations and refused to have dialogues. Even after the Inter-Korean Summit in June 2000, which significantly changed the relations between the two, North Korea has completely ignored the Basic Agreement. While North Korea insists on implementations of the June 15 Inter-Korean Joint Declaration and October 4 Declaration, it is not paying attention to the Inter-Korean Basic Agreement. The Inter-Korean Basic Agreement still remains to be the one without implementations up to this day.

Meanwhile, two Koreas have adopted the Joint Declaration of the Denuclearization of the KoreanPeninsula along with the Basic Agreement. In the Joint Declaration of the Denuclearization of the KoreanPeninsula, two sides have agreed to prohibit test, manufacturing, production, receiving, possession, storage, placement, and use of nuclear weapons as well as possession of nuclear reprocessing facilities and Uranium enrichment facilities. Also, they have held the Inter-Korean Joint Committee for Nuclear Control to discuss about implementation and verification of denuclearization agreement, but it ended without result.

Despite of the denuclearization agreement between the two sides, it was found during the IAEA inspection which was conducted from May 1992 to February 1993 that North Korea has secretly continued on with its nuclear program. In response to this, IAEA has requested for special investigation, but North Korea declared to disaffiliate from NPT and revealed nuclear development activities, resulting in a crisis on the Korean peninsula. In efforts to deal with North Korean nuclear issue and challenging actions of North Korea against the international nonproliferation system, US-North Korea senior-level talks have been held since 1993. After many twists and turns, such as the death of Kim, Il Sung, the US-North Korea senior-level talks have adopted the Agreed Framework in October 1994, with the objective of freezing nuclear facilities of North Korea. With the signing the Agreed Framework between the US and North Korea, it achieved results of temporarily discontinuing North Korean nuclear activities in Yeongbyun area. Yet, after the Agreed Framework, North Korea has maintained a position that it would only consult and resolve nuclear issues through the US-North Korea channel. North Korea faced each other with the US while completely ignoring the Joint Declaration of the Denuclearization of the KoreanPeninsula, and the Republic of Korea Government which was one of the directly involved parties, ended up not participating in the negotiations for North Korean nuclear issues.

• The South-North-US-China Four-party Talks (1997-1999)

After the transformation of the East-European bloc in early 1990s, North Korea suddenly faced with international isolation and started to concern about the collapse of its own regime. As a result, North Korea has attempted to get a guarantee of regime security by preparing a non-aggression instrument through inter-Korean dialogues and on the other hand signing the peace treaty with the US to disrupt the armistice on the Korean peninsula. From 1991 to 1996, North Korea has withdrawn the Military Armistice Commission and the representatives of Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission(NNSC) from its territories and taken provocative actions such as violating provisions of the Armistice Agreement related to Military Demarcation Line(MDL) and Demilitarized Zone(DMZ). North Korea insists on switching from the armistice regime to peace regime through agreeing upon the 1992 Inter-Korean Basic Agreement on mutual non-aggression followed by signing of the peace treaty between the US and North Korea.

In response to North Korea's attempt to disrupt the armistice, the South-North-US-China Four-party Talks as proposed by the summits of Korea and US were held six times from 1997 to 1999. In the four-party talks, they have discussed about establishing the peace regime on the Korean peninsula and mitigating military tension by establishing and operating the Peace Regime Subcommittee and Tension-reduction Subcommittee. However, North Korea persistently insisted on selecting the issue of USFK withdrawal as a topic for discussion as well as signing the US-North peace treaty, and refused to have practical discussion. In fact, North Korea was only interested in the US-North peace treaty and withdrawal of USFK, and had no intention or preparation for discussing about or pushing forward with inter-Korean arms control. The four-party talks eventually disappeared in history without reaching any agreement.

• Inter-Korean Military Talks and Arms Control (2000-present)

The inter-Korean relations after the Inter-Korean Summit in June 2000 has significantly changed compared to the past. Inter-Korean dialogues as well as exchange and cooperation have been enhanced in various areas including political, military, economic, and social areas. In particular in the economic area, the reconnection of railroads and roads, tourism in Mt.Kumgang and Kaesong, tall processing business in Kaesong Industrial Complex, and exchange of agricultural and marine products and mineral resources took place. In the humanitarian area, the reunion of separated families took place and food, fertilizer and medical supplies were handed over, and in the social and cultural areas, exchange and cooperation were enhanced.

The inter-Korean military talks were held in three channels, Defense Ministerial-level talks, General-level talks, and working-level talks. Firstly, the Inter-Korean Defense Ministerial-level talks with the Minister of National Defense from the South and Minister of Korean People's Army from the North as the chiefs of delegation, have played a role of implementing measures agreed upon at the summit meeting; presenting principles and direction for military tension-easing and peace establishment; and coordinating and controlling the entire military talks. The Inter-Korean Defense Ministerial-level Talks have been held twice in September 2000 and in November 2007.

In the June 15 Joint Declaration which was agreed upon at the Inter-Korean Summit in 2000, the issues of easing military tension and establishing peace were left out, the reason being that Kim, Jong Il, the Chairman of the National Defense Commission of North Korea, refused to discuss and agree on these issues. Therefore, the Republic of Korea Government strongly urged the North to hold the senior-level talks to consult and resolve the issues, and the Inter-Korean Defense Ministerial-level Talks were held accordingly.

At the first Defense Ministerial-level Talks held in Jeju Island in September 2000, two sides have agreed upon the principle that both sides would make joint efforts to ease military tension and eliminate risks of war, along with the issue of providing military supports to the construction of reconnecting railroad and roads between the South and North. At that time, the South has proposed to consult and resolve military confidence-building and arms control issues by establishing an appropriate system of military talks. However, while avoiding discussion about such issues, the North has only paid interests in the construction of railroads and roads. In the end, only the construction of railroads and roads between the South and North was actually implemented out of all agreements from the first Defense Ministerial-level Talks.

The second Defense Ministerial-level Talks were held in Pyeongyang in November 2007 in order to implement the terms agreed upon at the second Inter-Korean Summit. At the second Defense Ministerial-level Talks, two sides have agreed to arrange military supporting measures for inter-Korean exchange and cooperation including the establishment of the joint fishing area and the peace waters in the West Sea; joint use of the Han River estuary; railroad transportation; and transit, communication, and custom in the Joint Administration Area. Two sides have also agreed to consult and resolve the issues of military confidence-building and maritime non-aggression line by standing up the Joint Military Commission. At that time, the North has persistently insisted on nullifying the Northern Limit Line (NLL) in the WestSea, whereas the South has focused on arranging military support and security measures for the civilian-level exchange and cooperation. The agreements from the second Defense Ministerial-level Talks have died out due to a hard-line stance of North Korea since 2008 and series of military provocation.