Briefing to

The Committee on Homeland Security and State Preparedness

The State of New Jersey

On

Initiative for Safety and Security of Drinking Sources and Distribution Networks

Rutgers University CIMIC

Newark, NJ

July 11, 2002 @10am

Outline

  1. Background

1.1  How did the idea evove

1.2  Objective of the overall initiative

2.  The Workshop

2.1  Objective:

2.2  Attendees: about 115 representatives from…

2.3  Some of the Organizations that Attended:

2.4  Summary of the findings & recommendations for the next steps…

2.4.1 Surface Source Water

2.4.2 Distribution System Vulnerabilities

2.4.3 Recommendations

3  The Regional Drinking Water Safety and Security Consortium (RDWSSC)

3.1  Members

4  Some suggestions to the committee

http://cimic.rutgers.edu/epa-workshop.html

D R A F T

1.  Background

1.1 How did the idea evolve

The idea to take advantage of new and advanced technologies for monitoring the safety of drinking water grew out of a meeting I attended last November in Europe, where I presented recent research and technology results on “Water and Air Quality” conducted at MERI – the Meadowland Environmental Research Institute – a scientific arm of the New Jersey Meadowlands Commission and a management collaboration between the NJMC and Rutgers CIMIC.

During this meeting, which shortly followed the 9/11 tragic event that we experienced here in NY and the Nation, many colleagues in Europe approached me to suggest and offer their latest technologies and modeling efforts to help ensure the safety and security of US drinking water.

Upon my return, together with my colleagues here at CIMIC, we had a series of brain storming sessions on what such technologies could offer and how we might put such systems to effective use. After a thorough analysis and examination of opportunities, we recognized that we need for New Jersey and New York an effort that goes beyond a single institution or a single project, and one that is multi-disciplinary and national.

We were fortunate to have the opportunity to meet and discuss our idea with Ms. Jane Kenny, the Administrator of EPA R2 and Mr. William Muszynski, the Deputy Administrator of EPA R2. They immediately invited us to share the concept with their colleagues at their HQ at a meeting in NYC. After our presentation, everyone was intrigued. They decided to provide their support and sponsorship, and they encouraged us to broaden our scope.

1.2  Objective of the overall initiative:

--Address the problem of drinking water resources and distribution network safety and security in a fundamental way that is of long-term nature.

--Develop an end-to-end real-time environmental monitoring and modeling pilot that:

. Consists of the state-of-the-art biochemical sensors, predictive modeling tools and

information infrastructure

• Provides decision makers and the public with reliable and timely assessments

. Enables us to ensure the safety and security of drinking water at the source and

distribution network within our region and within our nation for future generations

--Road Map:

(1) Convene workshops of relevant organizations (sponsorship of EPA)

(2) Identify, prioritize and recommend pilot projects

(3) Leverage existing systems and advanced technologies as elements of pilot systems

(4) Design and develop an operational prototype system

(5) Evaluate the technologies and the prototype system (time span: approximately 3years)

(6) Oversee the implementation of an operational system

(7) Develop the next generation prototype system by embracing new technologies and

models

2  The Workshop

2.1  Objective:

--Provide a forum where a highly talented group of scientists, water utilities

professionals, and leaders in the area of real time sensor and modeling

technologies get together to share their expertise and ideas on how these

evolving technologies may be used to monitor drinking water resources

and distribution network in order to better protect the public.

. June 27th-28th, 2002 – Hilton Gateway Hotel, Newark, NJ

·  A follow-up workshop to take place in early November, 2002

2.2  Attendees: about 115 representatives from…

-20 industries

-16 water utilities

-13 government agencies

-14 academic institutions

2.3  Some of the Organizations that Attended:

1) Industries…

--Aeration Industries International, Inc.

--ALCO Engineering

--Aqueous Solutions, Inc.

--Environmental Compliance, Inc.

--Fluid Imaging Technologies, Inc.

--Hach Company

--Malcolm Pirnie

--Science Applications International Corporation

2) Utilities…

--American Water Works Company

--Passaic Valley Water Commission

--Delaware River Basin Commission

--East Bay Municipal Utility District

--Elizabethtown Water Company

--New York City DEP

--NJ Water Association

--Trenton Water Works

--United Water NJ

3) Government Agencies…

--NASA Ames Research Center

--NASA GSFC

--National Science Foundation

--NJDEP – Bureau of Safe Drinking Water

--US EPA

--NY State Dept. of Health

--US Army Center for Environmental Health Research

--US Geological Survey

4) Academic institutions

--Ben Gurion University, Israel

--Columbia University

--Cornell University

--Rutgers University

--UMBC

--University of Michigan

--University of Puerto Rico

--Upstate Freshwater Institute

--Georgia Institute of Technology

2.4  Summary of the findings & recommendations for the next steps (Preliminary)

--Potential Threats to Drinking Water Quality

. Deliberate dumping/injection of biological, chemical or radioactive toxins into

source waters or distribution systems

. Oil/chemical spills

. Sewage treatment plant failures

. Combined or sanitary sewer overflows

. Pathogens, sediment and other pollutants in runoff

. Hoaxes, false alarms

--Vulnerabilities to Deliberate Contamination

2.4.1 Surface Source Water

. Very large dilution factors are typical.

. Natural treatment processes can remove or neutralize contaminants.

. Contamination near the intake will minimize dilution and natural treatment.

. Off-stream storage is vulnerable to attack.

2.4.2 Distribution System Vulnerabilities

. More vulnerable than source waters

. Large, complex, and accessible: Commercial & residential service connections;

fire hydrants; finished water storage.

. Impossible to eliminate all access, but key system components can be hardened.

. Difficult to contaminate an entire city via the distribution system, but fairly easy

to impact small sections or individual buildings.

2.4.3 Recommendations

. Vulnerability assessments will help identify where/how monitoring/modeling is

most needed

. Need to develop baselines on water quality, so significant variations can be

identified

--Desired Components of an Early Water System using Real-time Monitoring &

Modeling

. Automated, periodic/continuous monitoring devices installed at strategic locations

in source waters, treatment plants and in distribution network

. Cannot place everywhere in distribution network, so need to identify strategic

locations and prioritize

. Automated telecommunications should communicate significant anomalies to water

officials

. Monitoring data should automatically feed into predictive simulation models

. Simulation models should predict future conditions, and present information in

easy-to-understand graphs, maps and animations

. Models should recommend mitigation actions

. Models should allow water managers to predict effects of different management

actions (eg, closing valves, flushing system)

3  The Regional Drinking Water Safety and Security Consortium (RDWSSC)

The goal of the consortium is to provide a framework where state and local government agencies representatives, highly talented scientists, water utilities professionals, and leaders in the area of real time sensor and modeling technologies get together to share their expertise and ideas on how these evolving technologies may be used to monitor drinking water resources and distribution networks in order to better protect the public.

An immediate objective toward achieving this goal is the development and implementation of an end-to-end real-time monitoring and modeling pilot early warning system that:

·  Consists of the state-of-the-art biochemical sensors, predictive modeling tools and information infrastructure

·  Provides decision makers and the public with reliable and timely assessments

·  Enables us to ensure the safety and security of drinking water at the source and distribution network within our region and within our nation for future generations

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3.1  Members

Rutgers CIMIC, USEPA, USGS, NSF, Passaic Valley Water Commission, American Water Works Company, The North Jersey District Water Supply Commission, NJDEP (in discussion)

4  Some suggestions to the committee

It is important to point out that, close involvement of and coordination with NJDEP with respect to all of the following is critical.

i) Quick response and evaluation

·  Consider establishing multi-disciplinary swat teams consisting of water toxicologists, water sensor technologists, chemists and health experts to quickly identify potential hazards and evaluate health risks.

·  Develop an information infrastructure that can bring together a wide area alert system that can characterize the distribution system populations at risk and is able to divert water flows and cut off various contaminated flows. (I assume that each water utility file plans to the NJDEP that can go into effect in case of an emergency)

·  A hierarchical code alert system for notifying and issuing public warnings.

(ii) Development and deployment of early warning detection systems.

·  Formation of a N.J. Federation consisting of highly talented scientists in related disciplines, water utilities professionals, leaders in the area of real time sensor and modeling technologies to formulate and oversee the development of prototype real time warning systems to monitor drinking water resources and distribution systems in order to better protect the public. This group could be responsible for establishing statewide interoperable standards that would enable the evolution of regional systems into a statewide system and recommend the implementation of an information infrastructure to monitor and coordinate statewide responses to acts of terrorism and define the

·  The committee may identify a representative to participate with the proposed Rutgers regional consortium and report to the N.J. Homeland Committee on progress and lessons learned.

·  Lend support to the development of proposed RDWSSC.

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