What Classical Pragmatism Is Not!
Classical pragmatism refers to the philosophy of Charles S. Peirce, William James and John Dewey and those who follow in this unique philosophical tradition. The latter would include George Herbert Mead, Sidney Hook, Ralph Sleeper, Richard Bernstein, Sandra Rosenthal, Larry Hickman, Susan Haack, David Hildebrand, John Shook, James Campbell, James Guoinlock and many others.
Neopragmatism is an outgrowth of analytic philosophy, in which analytic philosophers who have found themselves in intellectually untenable positions have partially re-invented, or partially rediscovered elements of classical pragmatism. Richard Rorty is the prime instigator of neopragmatism and is taken as an authority as to what pragmatism is and who pragmatists are. This group is taken to include Rorty, W. V. Quine, Donald Davidson, Ludwig Wittgenstein, Stanley Fish and many writing in the tradition of literary criticism and Postmodernist philosophy. To further confuse matters, Hilary Putnam who strenously disagrees with Rorty is taken an important neopragmatist.
Conflating classical pragmatism with neopragmatism (especially Rorty) results in a serious distortion of and truncation of the genuine novelty and insights in classical pragmatism. Hans Joas aptly points out why this is so when he says “Rorty omits completely a discussion of George Herbert Mead, the most important pragmatist with respect to this question [of the Postmodernist skepticism about values discourse]. It is generally the case that Rorty enlists pragmatism for his own purposes in spectacular fashion, but is at the same time often astonishingly unconcerned with the views and intentions of classic thinkers of this tradition. ( Hans Joas p.217 The Genesis of Values. University of Chicago Press, 2000.)
Further adding to the confusion is what might be called vulgar pragmatism (popular notions in press and elsewhere) and phantom/generic pragmatism (in mainstream philosophy, especially philosophy of science). Vulgar pragmatism and phantom/generic pragmatism are assertions about pragmatism made by individuals who have, at best, a very shallow acquaintance with classical pragmatism. This is compounded by supposedly authoritative voices in economic methodology. This group uncritically reiterates vulgar pragmatism and phantom/generic pragmatism, conflates classical pragmatism and neopragmatism, takes verbal coincidences as philosophical insight and generally has not read classical pragmatism at all or with an electronic scanner to find out-of-context gotcha quotations.
What Classical Pragmatism Is Not! (And Is)
Ontology: Classical pragmatism is not idealistic, not antirealistic, not naively realistic. (Classical pragmatism is realistic in common sense terms and classical pragmatism takes the realism side of realism/nominalism dichotomy.)
Epistemology: Classical pragmatism is not empiricist (in the traditional sense), not rationalist, does not reject the concept of truth, does not substitute something else for truth. classical pragmatism does not accept a priori epistemological criteria. Classical pragmatism is not epistemologically foundational. (Classical pragmatism is fallibilistic but is also antiskeptical.)
Logic: Classical pragmatism does not reject deductive reasoning or logic or substitute induction or abduction for deduction. Classical pragmatism does not see logic as existing a priori and does not see logic as limited to only deductive reasoning. (Peirce takes logic as including the full range of inference including abduction, deduction and induction as all interpenetrating parts of human inference.)
Ethical Theory: The moral theory in classical pragmatism doesnot endorse a morality in which “anything goes”; it is not unprincipled expediency or nihilistic moral relativism. (The moral theory in classical pragmatism does recognize that technological and other changing conditions can bring accepted moral principles into conflict, necessitating the modification of moral principles.)
Philosophy Of Science: Classical pragmatism does not include instrumentalism (in Popper’s sense); classical pragmatism does not connote convenience in computation, simplicity, or practical usefulness as theory evaluation criteria. Classical pragmatism does not “privilege” scientific knowledge. (Classical pragmatism has anticipated many of the results emerging in contemporary philosophy of science by nearly a century. The process of scientific inquiry as it actually functions closely resembles inquiry as described in classical pragmatism.)
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