The Background Papers Should Also Not Be Too Long (E

The Background Papers Should Also Not Be Too Long (E

RECAP OF PROPOSED RSS REFORMS

In November 2011 UNRWA Relief and Social Services Department (RSS) proposed a plan a reform plan to improve UNRWA’s ability to positively impact poverty amongst Palestine refugees. Three major areas of work were proposed: (1) improve targeting in order to most efficiently use resources available and build UNRWA’s understanding of poverty in its constituency; (2) gradually shift UNRWA’s primary social transfer modality from food to cash, and: (3) strengthen and expand UNRWA’s development work.

PROGRESS TO DATE

The work to improve targeting is complex, requiring the followings steps:

  1. Construct a proxy means test formula (PMTF) for each field based on most recent and reliable household expenditure and consumption data.
  2. Test the formula to assure its targeting accuracy
  3. Train social workers who do the household-level data collection with a six-page question.
  4. Administer the six-page questionnaire to all households in the Special Hardship Caseload and to any new applicants seeking assistance.

UNRWA’s goal is to reach a point where poverty is being reliably measured in all fields and we are able to effectively target those most in need. In addition, UNRWA anticipates that through universal and thorough data collection from poor households, UNRWA will be in a position to speak authoritatively on what drives and maintains refugee poverty and thereby advocate and programme effectively.

Substantial progress towards this goal has been achieved. Three fields are coming up to running speed with a unified, but customized, targeting mechanism and data entry into a common database, the Refugee Registration Information System (RRIS). Two are working on separate systems but moving towards the ultimate goal of a unified system.

  • Jordan Field is fully employing the PMTF and has restudied all families, entering their data on the RRIS, using the analytic outcomes to make decisions regarding eligibility for benefits.
  • Syria Field is fully prepared with its Field-customized PMTF ready and staff trained. The staff are beginning to restudy the current Special Hardship Case (SHC)caseload and enter data into the system for analysis.
  • Gaza Field has been using the PMTF, but with a modified ‘short form’ questionnaire because of the size of the caseload. RSS/Gaza has been provided with an updated PMTF, staff training, and are collecting data and entering it on the system. RSS/Headquarters (HQ) is working with the Gaza Field as the field begins to harmonize its benefits, approach, and targeting system so that instead of two systems (Emergency and RSS) there is only one.
  • Lebanon Field has supported the development of a more accurate targeting system through the data collection of the American University of Beirut survey. LFO and RSS/HQ have been working closely for several months to develop a much simplified targeting system. While Lebanon is not ready to use the PMTF, it is a step in the right direction in terms of being able to target the poor.
  • West Bank field has, for the Emergency Programme, been using a PMTF for several years but needs to update it on the basis of more recent Expenditure and Consumption data. In addition, West Bank is, like Gaza, seeking to harmonize the benefits and approaches of the Emergency and RSS programmes. This work is informed by the necessity to assure that UNRWA’s poverty targeting mechanism must be seamless with the Ministry of Social Affairs own targeting system. RSS in the West Bank is still relying on the categorical targeting system of the Special Hardship Cases.

It is worth noting that UNRWA’s capacity to develop poverty targeting has been supported by the European Commission (EC). UNRWA is now institutionalizing that capacity to assure its sustainability.

Moving the primary social transfer from food to cash requires a sustainable indexed funding resource which UNRWA lacks. Of course there has been suggestion that this resource is the General Fund (GF), but with the GF inadequate to meet the needs of the current programmes, this is not presently realistic.

UNRWA currently does employ cash transfers in its RSS program, but they are too small of have impact and not indexed to inflation or cost of living. In addition, over the past few years, UNRWA has, with the generous support of the European Commission, provided cash social transfers in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. These transfers, Family Income Supplement, have bridged the gap to get abject poor families up to the poverty line and have been in addition of the traditional RSS assistance package of food and a small amount of cash. RSS research this year demonstrates this assistance (along with other international assistance) has been effective in bridging the poverty gap, but unfortunately the funding is not sustainable and the program has ended in Gaza and will end in the West Bank in July. In Syria, UNRWA has used cash transfers to meet the needs of Palestinian refugees from Iraq, and more recently to help mitigate the impact of the severe economic circumstances there over the past year. In the West Bank, supported by SDC, UNRWA is exploring specific modalities for a pilot cash transfer programme.

In sum, UNRWA is able and ready to move to a cash transfer system but there are no resources for such a system. It is important to bear in mind that while the administration of a cash system is likely to be less expensive than the procurement and distribution of food commodities and that the impact on poverty is likely to be better, a cash transfer system will require significant resources to be (a) politically feasible and (b) have positive impact. One of the current problems of the UNRWA assistance package is it is so spare it provides no leverage out of poverty. The modality of the transfer is an issue, but so is its overall value.

UNRWA is heavily engaged in community development work through its Emergency, RSS, and Microfinance Programmes. In RSS, the focus on development has been through the vehicle of the Community Based Organizations (CBOs) and the impact is largely unmeasured and anecdotal. It is important to bear in mind that CBOs are, for the most part, independent organizations affiliated with UNRWA. Their energy and accomplishments are primarily their own. Ongoing work to harmonize Emergency Programme and RSS is a good first step to bolstering more RSS focus on development as opposed to purely humanitarian assistance. Anticipated closer work in RSS on cross-cutting themes such as gender, disability, and youth should also encourage a more robust development approach.

CHALLENGES

The primary challenge to RSS implementation of reforms is resources in two forms; funds and capacity. In terms of capacity, RSS has proposed major shifts from traditional programmes and these shifts will require new skills that can be acquired on the job through mentoring, coaching, and training or, alternatively, through recruitment of staff with the requisite skills. Both tracks require resources, management time and attention in the former case, and funding in the latter. In addition, key staff to the reform are the front-line social workers who are currently trying to do to much for too many.

Therefore, an urgent challenge ahead is re-visiting and building consensus around a refined understanding of the role of the social workers and building capacities in senior management, particularly at the headquarters level.

As noted above, funds availability is defining and constraining. As noted in the RSS ADCOM presentation in November 2011 and as demanded by ‘do no harm’, UNRWA cannot shift from food to cash without assurance of a sustainable resource. While funding for food is precarious, at best, host governments and refugee representatives will not agree a change in modality unless they are assured it is a better deal and it is sustainable. In fact, UNRWA could severely damage fragile household coping systems by ceasing food and then not sustaining cash at an adequate level.

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