Seals 1

Tova Seals

Bruce Lusignan

EDGE

The 1954 CIA Coup in Guatemala

The 1954 coup that deposed the democratically elected government of Guatemala has long been acknowledged to have been the result of CIA covert action. Recently declassified documents have shown a new, and more sinister light, on the CIA's involvement in an action that gave birth to some of the most brutally dictatorial regimes in modern history. No one at this point will dispute the original involvement, but there are still those who maintain that this is all water over the dam of history and that the US has not had direct responsibility for the actions of a Guatemalan government since the 1954 coup. (Evans-Pritchard)

I intend to outline the background of the political circumstances that lead to the coup. This will include Guatemala, the US and the world scene at the time, when anti-communism contended with communism as state ideologies. I will contend that the coup was all but inevitable in the prevailing political climate of 1954. But that still doesn't make it right. We have been finding out for nearly half a century how wrong it was. Opinions have always varied with the positions of their adherents, but I believe there is one thing that can no longer be disputed: the CIA catalyzed a turn for the worse, even to the inhuman, for many Latin American governments by its actions in managing the Guatemalan coup. They provided the essential weapon for the modern national security state, the knowledge of how to organize an efficient apparatus of state repression and terror.

‘The wink and the nod’ that was all somehow acceptable to your primary sponsor caused many a dictator to adopt these methods to take and maintain power. Only recently have internal CIA documents become available, allowing researchers to begin to look inside the CIA itself. Partial as these releases are, they supply valuable insight into the machinations of this secretive organization. These documents outline the beginning of the Terror; let's hope we are seeing the end of it.

The early 1950s was a time of tension and uncertainty in the world. The Cold War replaced ‘hot’ war. Humankind had gone from the terror of actual war to the terror of the potential of nuclear war. The situation was aggravated by the ongoing conflict in Korea which pitted the forces of the ‘Free World’ against the specter of international Communism. Anticommunist hysteria gripped the US political scene, mirroring many of the excesses of the Stalinist enemy that it was in struggle with in the international arena. The New York Times of the era carried news about a newly discovered Communist threat almost daily. Sen Joseph McCarthy would even accuse (although he could never prove) the CIA and other units of the Federal government of harboring 130 Communist infiltrators in their midst. (NYT, 6/3/54) J. Robert Oppenheimer, a leader of the US effort to build nuclear weapons, was accused of holding back the development of the hydrogen bomb and being insufficiently loyal. (NYT, 6/17/54) Subversive literature from Russia was said to be "clogging" the Customs Service. (NYT, 6/6/54) An ominous headline in the wake of Memorial Day 1954 read "Memorial Events Made More Somber By Soviet Menace". (NYT, 6/1/54) The dissenting voices were few, with only the muted protest of warnings about an “anti-intellectual fervor impeding” US scientists, as if the only criticism allowed of McCarthyism was that sometimes its wild accusations might slow down defense preparations. (NYT, 6/8/54)

The day after the Times reported the coup in Guatemala, it ran a notice that signs ordering civilians off the roads in the event of an air attack were to be taken down. Now that the Soviets had the hydrogen bomb the only hope for city dwellers was to flee to the countryside as quickly as possible. The editorial section had a cartoon, depicting Communism as a rabid dog in the manger of Peace, baring its fangs at the Free World, which was a frightened looking horse. (NYT, 6/20/54) As the coup wound to its quick conclusion the next week, an air raid test was announced for the lower East Side that posited an atomic weapon dropped within New York City. (NYT, 6/24/54) Nearly every aspect of American culture was penetrated by this fear of ‘Reds under every bed’ and it particularly influenced how we viewed developments in the area of international relations. Our views of other countries were almost wholly defined by our perception of whether they were ‘with us or against us’ in the struggle against Communism.

Guatemala had experienced a revolution in 1944, which overthrew General Jorge Ubico, a corrupt, brutal dictator. Democracy took root there, but the country as a whole suffered from severely unequal development and was dominated by the US company, United Fruit (UFCO). UFCO sought to maintain the position of privilege that it had enjoyed under Ubico, who had gifted the company with large tracts of land and vigorously suppressed labor organizations. (CIAPBS, pg. 11) Indeed, the company viewed any change as a direct "assault on free enterprise." (CIAPBS, )pg. 16

UFCO was supported in this view by an arm of the CIA called the Office of Policy Coordination (OPC). The OPC was directed by Frank Wisner and was formed in 1948 to undertake “covert propaganda and antisubversive operations.” As early as August 1950, the OPC warned “that Guatemala may become a central point for the dissemination of anti-US propaganda.” (CIAPBS, pg. 18) Wisner would later be appointed to head the 1954 PBSUCCESS plan that would solve the problem of knocking down the ‘straw man’ he had set up in Guatemala. Wisner's involvement in the creation and definition of the ‘problem’, and then in its ‘solution’, illustrates the enormous possibilities for abuse built into the CIA's charter. (CQ) Its abuse of this rather self-serving system is a recurrent theme in US politics.

The Guatemalan Revolutionary government, while acknowledged by the US Embassy as having “an unusual reputation for incorruptibility“, was a thorn in the side of UFCO continuing business as usual. Jacobo Arbenz Guzman, a leader in the Army, was elected president of Guatemala in 1951 and continued the Revolution's moderate course. Arbenz had made his fame in the army by helping to put down an abortive coup attempt in 1949 by old guard officers of the army. (CIAPBS, pg. 13) Among the plotters was Lt. Carlos Castillo Armas, who was captured, only to later escape to Honduras. The CIA would pick up his care and feeding and build the rebel army around his ‘leadership.’ (CIAPBS, pg. 13) Castillo Armas quickly became the CIA's favorite candidate to replace Arbenz. There were several contenders for leadership of the opposition forces that the CIA manipulated to its benefit. Although he lacked combat experience, his “readiness to take fullest advantage of future CIA aid and assistance” ensured that he would be their man. (CIAPBS, pg. 41)

When Arbenz was elected in 1950, the State Dept. saw him as an “opportunist”; in other words, someone they thought they could deal with.(Immerman, pg. 107) UFCO continued pressing the State Dept. and the CIA for action. Neither organization seemed much inclined initially to take action, but the CIA quickly came around based on the views of the OPC. The OPC viewpoint quickly became the official one of the CIA, which pressured those in the State Dept. to come around in its views on Guatemala.

The propaganda campaign against Guatemala had an unintended consequence. Instead of intimidating Arbenz, it simply strengthened his coalition and allowed him to face down the demands that the US had made to purge his government of elements they didn't approve of.

UFCO was pushing hard for action, perhaps unaware that powerful forces were already at work behind the scenes. The first fruits of the situation actually fell into its lap quickly. The US Justice Department had been investigating the company since 1919 (the wheels of justice turn slowly) for antitrust violations related to its Latin American operations. Ironically, these violations, relating to its ownership of all shipping and railroads in several countries in addition to Guatemala, dovetailed with the criticisms that the Guatemalans themselves had made. This legal action was put on hold because the National Security Council worried that it might weaken efforts to contain Communism. The case was pursued after the coup, suggesting that the US government clearly wanted to use UFCO as part of it strategy in the short term and that the benefit to UFCO was mostly coincidental. (CIAPBS, pg. 19)

Meanwhile, planning for action against Guatemala moved into high gear. It is clear that action against Guatemala was contemplated under President Truman. (see CIA documents dated 1952 in bibliography) As early as Jan. 26, 1952, the CIA was seeking a list from its operatives of the communist leaders that a new Guatemalan government would “eliminate” in the wake of a successful coup.(CIA#49) A list that the CIA had already made was included for confirmation. This was followed up with a request for a list of those to imprison (CIA#50) and an inquiry about additions to be made to lists already sent.(CIA#51) A $50,000 cash shipment is also detailed.(CIA#557) Tons of weapons were shipped to Nicaragua and [REDACTED] , which was most likely a location in Honduras. (CIA#559 and 560)

The plan the CIA had developed under Truman, codenamed PBFORTUNE, fell apart. This occurred after the plan, under the pressures of inadequate planning and the US Presidential election already, was undercut by dictator Anastasio Somoza of Nicaragua revealing the CIA's involvement. He bragged of their assistance to him, as the quid pro quo for his help, to other politicians in the region. This blew the cover of the operation as a “Latin American” movement.. (Immerman, pg. 120-122)

Rather than see its goals frustrated so easily, the CIA put the assets it controlled on ice until after the upcoming election. (CIAPBS, pg. 28) There is some controversy on the timing of the decision to act against Guatemala under the Eisenhower Administration. Some argue that no decision was made to carry out a coup until after a process of fact-finding and analysis resulted in a decision in late summer 1953.(Immerman, pg. 135) The official “General Plan of Action” is dated Sept. 11, 1953.(CIA#59)

I believe that the process was well underway in 1952 and it was the CIA's own institutional concerns that caused the cancellation of the action in 1952. In an era that condemned any perceived failure in the fight against Communism, I believe the CIA was loathe to take the chance of a failure which a new president could use as an excuse to clean house. Bureaucratic self preservation may well be why the coup was canceled, rather than the official excuse of Somoza's big mouth. (CIAPBS, pg. 27) It would be better for them to proceed with the plan under a new president whose own prestige would be tied to the portrayal of the operation, and whatever its outcome, as a success.

UFCO continued its attacks, waging an intense public relations campaign to portray the Guatemalans as having come under control of Communists, simply because Arbenz, as the US Embassy noted, had refused to remove Communists who held posts in his coalition government. The ruling coalition was dominated by moderates, with the tiny Guatemalan Communist party, the PGT, holding just four of the 61 seats the congress. (CIAPBS, pg. 20) The Communists held only a few posts in the Guatemalan government and, while valued for their support and assistance of Arbenz' program, they served as lightning rods for US disapproval. (CIAPBS, pg. 16)

The struggles of the revolutionary government to provide a more secure economic future for the people of Guatemala resulted in Decree 900, of June 17, 1952. The objective of the decree was to distribute some of UFCO's ill-gotten lands into the hands of small farmers by providing the peasants with low-interest loans with which to purchase the land. Ironically, even though UFCO had obtained the land under questionable circumstances, it would be compensated with bonds to be valued based on UFCO's own assessment of its worth. (Immerman, pg. 79-82) The CIA's own history states that “Decree 900 [was seen] as a moderate, capitalist reform,” similar to other programs that the CIA itself was promoting in Latin America. What really counted to the CIA was the fact that this program was seen as being under the control of Communist-inspired forces. (CIAPBS, pg. 21 and 24)

Many have noted the very close connections between the US State Department, the CIA and UFCO that came about after the 1952 election resulted in the Republicans winning the White House. Newly elected Pres. Dwight Eisenhower appointed brothers John Foster Dulles, to Secretary of State, and Allen Dulles, to head the CIA, as key members of his foreign policy team. They shared intense feelings in favor of “free enterprise”, anti-communism and a background as attorneys for UFCO and other international corporations. John Foster Dulles had even drawn up one of the agreements that provided Jorge Ubico with legal cover for his “gift” to UFCO of hundreds of square miles of Guatemalan public lands. (Immerman, pg. 124)

Many have taken the simplistic view that the Dulles brothers simply acted as agents of UFCO when they advanced the US government policies that coincidentally served UFCO's interests. The real truth is that the company needed no special pleading to have its interests served. The CIA's own report on the operation opens with a quote from Manuel Fortuny, a leader of the Guatemalan Workers Party (PGT). “They [the US CIA] would have overthrown us even if we had grown no bananas.” (CIAPBS, pg. 9) Business and government interests have been seen as inextricably intertwined by most mainstream analysts of modern society, begging the question of the American people's interest. This is a trend which continues to today, as the World Trade Organization meets to consolidate corporate domination of the world's economy with the blessing and encouragement of the US government.

At least one source notes that Eisenhower actually approved the plan to overthrow the Guatemalan government, to be called PBSUCCESS, immediately after taking office in Jan. 1953.(Blum) It would appear that the CIA moved immediately to put Guatemala back on the front burner of covert operations and Eisenhower was already inclined to do so. This would put the internal machinations in the State Department and CIA in the following months more into the class of window dressing for a predetermined plan, than an actual decision-making process. Charles David (C.D.) Jackson, of the State Dept., headed up the Jackson Committee, which recommended a plan at the end of the first month of the Eisenhower Administration to roll back “Soviet aggression.” (Immerman, pg. 130-132) It is known with some certainty that Pres. Eisenhower had the expectation that covert action could take the place of direct military confrontation in the dangerous circumstances of the Nuclear Age. (CIAPBS, pg. 30-31) One danger that only gradually became apparent was the circumstances of the CIA's birth, when it was granted the twin responsibilities of intelligence and covert action. The US government as a whole has always relied on a system of checks and balances to insure accountability.

Yet the CIA has largely evaded these restrictions. It could make intelligence assessments that largely supported the aims of its covert action programs. The CIA could be both the prosecutor and judge of policy. During the 1950s and 1960s, the covert action department was clearly in charge of policy and manipulated the collection and analysis of intelligence to advance their aims. The temptation to see the world in self-serving terms would later lead the CIA astray and into disaster at the Bay of Pigs, but the roots of this flight from reality were in PBSUCCESS operation against Guatemala. (CIAPBS, Foreword)

A few in the State Dept. still counseled a policy of constructive engagement with the Arbenz government. Their arguments were quickly pushed aside by the Jackson Committee. It may be said that the CIA's targets for disinformation included the US government bureaucracy, by requiring them to persuade the State Dept. of the wisdom of a policy that they had already received permission for from the President. It is known that the ranks of ambassadors to Guatemala and the rest of Central America were rearranged to put a special team into place which would serve to assist the CIA, an effort which began as early as April 1953. The new group was hand-picked and had previous experience coordinating with the CIA in other State Dept. posts. (Immerman, pg. 136-138)

It should be noted here that Mr. Jackson was on leave from Time, Inc. to serve as a special adviser in charge of Cold War policy. This is a demonstration of the close ties between the US government and big business that fed the corporate group ethic that pervaded official US Government views throughout the Cold War and beyond. It didn't overthrow the Guatemalan government to serve UFCO's interest, but rather the general interest of international, corporate power. (Immerman, pg. 130)