Supplementary Materials for How climate change impacted the collapse of the Ming Dynasty

Supplementary Table S1

Supplementary Table S1Frequency of occurrence (% of years) of droughts and floods during the Ming dynasty overall (1368–1644) and during the late Ming (1581–1644) (cited from Ge 2011).

Sub-region of eastern China / Occurrence / 1368–1644 / 1581–1644 / Increase of frequency in 1581–1644 as compared with 1368–1644
North China Plain / Severe drought
Heavy flood / 12.3
4.3 / 21.7
4.7 / 76.4
9.3
Jiang-Huai area / Severe drought
Heavy flood / 8.7
7.9 / 14.1
9.3 / 62.1
17.7
Jiang-Nan area / Severe drought
Heavy flood / 7.9
7.9 / 9.3
11.0 / 17.7
39.2

SupplementaryText S1

Text S1Summary on the features of late Ming society recorded in generalhistory books

The Ming dynasty wasroughly divided into the early (1368-1435), middle (1436-1566) and late (1567-1644) stages by historians according to the political and social developments, as well ascomprehensive national power (Bai, 2004). As illustrated in general history books (e.g., Bai, 2004; Twitchett and Fairbank, 1998; Fan and Cai, 1994), the late Ming was in a socially and economicallyvulnerablecondition mainlycharacterized bypolitical corruption, border crises, poor financial capacity, and societal turbulence,though the revenue of central government in the first decade (1570s) of this stage appeared to become better than that in end of middle Ming due to the reforms initiated by governmentgrand secretary of Zhang Juzheng.

The historians have exampled many facts to state the political corruptionin the late Ming. For instance, the first misacts included the Wanli Emperor’s indolence and irresponsibility from late 1580s to 1610s, as well as Wei Zhongxian’s abuses of eunuch power in the Tianqi Reign (1621-1627). The second faults was long-term debate on enthronement of crown prince between Emperor andcouncil of ministers in Wanli Reign and incessant power struggle by different parties, e.g., northern Party (assembled by functionaries from northern provinces) versus southern Party (assembled by functionaries from southern provinces), Donglin Party (a clique formed from Donglin Academy) versusEunuch Party (a clique leading by the eunuchs)through all over late Ming. The third evildoingswere malpractice, malversation, amassing wealth by unfair means for most of officeholderin central and local governmentand land grab by peers from farmers, and so on. All these faults led to the government malfunction, especially the ineffective administration for social and economical system (Bai, 2004; Twitchett and Fairbank, 1998; Fan and Cai, 1994).

The border criseswere reported by the high frequent military conflicts mainly brought about by Mongols in the north andManchuin the northeast of China, together with Burmesein southwest; and the scale expending of the power campaigns, decline of victory for Ming troops and lose of salted military leader and soldier more and more. During the end of 15th century, the Mongolian hordes began to group by a new leader, Batu Mongke.Between 1508 and 1510, Mongke conquered the Ordos regionwhich located at the north of ShaanxiProvince, in the bend of the Yellow River. From Ordos region, the Mongolian hordes began to raid Mingadministrative areaagain and led to the rapid increase of the military conflictsbetween Ming and Mongols since the Jiajing Reign (1522-1566). In 1540s, the number of wars in north frontier increased to 16 times. Especially in June 1548, the Mongolsattacked Xuanfu and defeated Ming imperial army and made successively pillaging and slaughtering on many places (including the capitalarea) till to Oct. 1550. This event forced Ming to upgrade the defenseagainstMongols and intensified the military conflict further. The total wars in north frontier reached 32 times in 1550s-1560s. Although this situation became to abate slightly since the trade agreement between Mingand Mongols were recovered in 1571, large scale of power campaign happened again due to Ordos Mongols rebellion from 1592. Together with the wars between Ming and Japan on the KoreanPeninsula in 1592-1598 and the campaignagainst the rebellionin the southwest in 1599-1600, Ming troops lostmany salted military leaders and soldiers. Meanwhile, Manchutribes flourishedrapidly under the leadership of Nurhachi and became a crucial challenge to Mingin northeast. Especially in 1618, Nurhaci publicizedhis seven grievances (e.g., killingof his father and grandfather; aid and encouragementhis tribal rivals; encroachmenton his territory; and so on) to Ming, led his troops to invadeadministrative area of Ming and defeated Ming troops in the campaigns. After that, Ming troops lost most of wars against to Manchutroops and resulted inthe border crisesincreasingly.

The poor financial capacity was firstlycharacterized by the long-term fall trend of agricultural product andsequent price inflation, successivesevere default of central revenue. For example, thestate grain reserve in capital dropped from 1.3 million tons in 1583 to 0.3million tons in 1602, and the government had no any ability to provide faminerelief induced by natural disasters in the last decades of Ming[1]. There are 340 counties owing more than 50% taxation to central government in 1632, among which 134 counties did not turn in anything (Huang, 1974). Secondly, though the central revenue increasing trend from above 1.5 million taels of silver in 1520s to 6.5 million in the early 1620s induced by illogically upgrading duty ratio for people (Quan, 2011a), higher governmentexpenditures, especiallyrapid growth of military expense from central revenue, which driven by aggravating border crises, breakdown of the military farm system (the self-supportingagriculture system located around the northern border area, SeeSupplementary Fig S1 for location) since the earlier Wanli Reign, and “three major campaigns”of the later Wanli Reign(the campaign toput down a mutiny of Sino-Mongolian troops with direct expense of more than 2.0 millions taels of silver in the northwest in 1592, the wars with Japan on the Korean peninsula with direct expense of more than 7.0 millions taels of silver in 1592-1598,the campaignto eradicate an aboriginal chieftain with direct expense of about 3.0 millions taels of silver in the southwest in 1599-1600)[2], resulted in the fiscaldeteriorationthroughthe late Ming more and more.

The societal turbulence was recorded with rapid increasein popular unrests, especially the rapid upgrading of peasantry uprising started in 1628 inShaanxiprovince. As recorded in general history books (Bai, 2004; Twitchett and Fairbank, 1998; Fan and Cai, 1994), there were 102 times of popular unrest during 1520s-1620s, during which only 26 times (averagely 6.5 times per decade) occurred in 1520s-1550s but 76 times (10.9 times per decade) occurred in periods of 1560s-1620s. During the last decades of Ming, the area involved in peasantry uprising extended rapidly from Shaanxi in 1628 to the most of northern and central provinces in period of 1634-1638, and most parts of the country in 1640-1644. In 1628-1633, the rebels were loosely organized, and just struggled for survival; thenthe most powerful leadersestablished a military alliance, commanding more than 300,000 soldiers in 1634 and600,000 in 1635, and began to launch large-scale battles against government troops; in 1639-1644, more than1 million soldiers were well organized under the leadership of Li ZC and Zhang XZ, and the goal of them was to overthrow the Ming imperial and establish a new regime. The rapid outspread of peasantry uprisinghighlightedextreme vulnerability in the society and great military force on government.

Supplementary Table S2

Table S2Rapid spread of peasant uprisings from 1628 to 1644

Period / Areas involved / Size and organization / Goals and main activity
1628–1633 / More than 50 counties in Shaanxi, Shanxi, and HenanProvinces, North China. / 36 battalions of rebels (up to 200,000 personnel in total,includingca. 100,000 peasantry soldiers) were loosely organized. / Aim tosurvival. Peasantry troops robbed the rich to help the poor, but rarely fought against government troops directly.
1634–1638 / Most areas of Shaanxi, Shanxi, Henan, Anhui, Hubei, and parts of other provinces in North China, as well as Sichuan and Jiangxi in South China. / The most powerful leaders established a military alliance, commanding more than 300,000 peasantry soldiers in 1634 and 600,000 in 1635. / Aim to obtain more support from the common people to expand peasantry forces. Peasantry battalions began to launch large-scale battles against government troops with increasing political activity, e.g., killing senior officials, destroying imperial tombs.
1639–1644 / The whole of North China and most provinces in South China. / More than 1 million peasantry soldiers were well organized under the leadership of Li ZC and Zhang XZ since 1641. / Aim to establish a new regimeto replace the Ming Dynasty with activity of attacking of Ming troops,claiming political alliances,and building a new government.

Supplementary TableS3

Table S3Sample records of the breakdown of the military farm system in North China.

Location / Time / Description / Reference
Gansu / 1573– / Grain production on military farms distributed in the Gansu frontier region were reduced owing to the onset of the cold climate and soil degradation since the start of Wanli Reign. On barren land and in cold climates, the planting was irregular; … the farmers could only cultivate crops and produce yields every three or four years. / Ming Shilu: Shenzong Shilu,Vol. 133; recorded on 8 March 1583.
Northern Shaanxi / 1574–1609 / Desertification on the northern frontier in ShaanxiProvince became more and more severe since the 2nd year (1574) of the Wanli Reign. The forts along the frontier were threatened by rapid desertification. The sand dunes outside the wall had grown to a height of ca. 2–4 Zhang (ca. 6.22–12.44 m) during the Wanli Reign. Most of the land was covered by sand, the forts were also buried by sand dunes in some locations. / Huang Ming Jingshi Wenbian, Vol. 447: Memorial to the Throne on clearing sand and renovating the frontier walls; reported by the governor of Tu Zongjun in 1609
Northern Shaanxi / Early 16th century / Although the sand was cleared frequently, the sand dunes were as high as the wall along the frontier between Changle and Boluo. Especially in Yulin, many lakes which had been water sources for horses had dried up. / Essay on central Yulin, north of Shaanxi, written by Liu Minkuan in ca. 1615
Northern Shanxi / ca. 1594 / The arable land in northern Shanxi was barren and half of the land was mountainous or hilly. Since the droughts and floods occurred every year, the yields were less than the investments of seeds and money. / Ming Shilu: Shenzong Shilu, Vol. 278; recorded on 5 December 1594
Xuanfu and Datong / ca. 1638 / Most farms failed to produce yields sufficient to cover costs because of serious desertification of arable land. / Memos to the Throne by governor of Lu Xiangsheng, Vol. 9: On military farm system governance in 1638

Supplementary TableS4

Table S4 Estimated changes in grain rationsin North China from 1580 to the 1630s. The provincial population data are from Cao (2000); provincial cropland area and grain productivity data are from Fan (1984) and Guo (2001), respectively.

ca. 1580 / 1630s
Province / Total yield (106 kg) / Population (104) / Grain ration(kg) / Total yield (106 kg) / Population (104) / Grain ration(kg)
Hebei / 3535.9 / 915.1 / 386.4 / 1768.4–2829.5 / 1095.0 / 161.5–258.4
Shandong / 6698.5 / 1293.9 / 517.7 / 3349.3–5358.9 / 1482.0 / 226.0–361.6
Shanxi / 2439.1 / 842.8 / 289.4 / 1219.8–1951.3 / 950.0 / 128.4–205.4
Henan / 5769.7 / 1333.1 / 432.8 / 2884.3–4615.8 / 1673.0 / 172.4–275.9
Shaanxi / 2891.9 / 850.8 / 339.9 / 1446.0–2314.0 / 1000.0 / 144.6–231.4
Total / 21335.1 / 5235.7 / 393.3 / 10667.8–17069.5 / 6200.0 / 166.6–266.5

Supplementary Figure S1


Fig. S1Comparisons of drought-affected areas and regions of active peasantry uprisings during the period 1627–1643. (a) Area of the large-scale drought (shown in yellow, here and on the other plates) and the flooding (shown in blue) that occurred in 1627. (b) Area in which large-scale droughts occurred and the locations of popular unrest during 1628–1631 [shown by red dots; also in plate (c)]. (c) Same as plate (b) but for the time period 1632–1633, together with the locations at which Ming troops had trapped the beleagueredpeasantry troops at the end of 1633 [shown by circled blue crosses also in plates (d) and (e)]. (d) Area in which large-scale droughts occurred and routes of peasantry troop movements during 1634–1636 [shown by colored arrows; also in plate (e)], and area in which popular unrest was frequent during 1634–1635. (e) Same as plate (d), but for the time period 1637–1638. (f) Area in which large-scale drought occurred and the development of areas dominated by peasantry troops from 1639 to 1643 (area defined by colored lines), together with the locations of large battles between the Ming troops and the peasantry troops during 1641–1643 (shown by dark blue crosses).

[1]Ming Shilu: Shenzong Shilu (Annals in the Wanli Reign), Vol. 376

[2]Ming Shilu: Shenzong Shilu, Vol. 441