Summary of Binyan Tziyyon

A. Rav Schick sought to prove that autopsy to save lives is permitted from the case of post-mortem Caeserean section to save the unborn, which the Talmus explicitly permits. R. Ettlinger offers 3 ways to say that autopsies to save lives – even directly – are nonetheless forbidden.

Lines 6-10 = “Marring” is defined as something that would make onlookers recoil from a live body and that have no medical purpose

Lines 11-21 = A person can forgive violations of the dignity of their corpse, such as “marring”, in advance, and we can even presume that a person would forgive “marring” in a situation where a reasonable person would. However, the dead cannot forgive violations of their dignity, and therefore one cannot perform an autopsy unless the dead person can reasonably be supposed to have thought of the possibility of autopsy, and them reasonably be supposed to have forgiven the resultant loss of dignity through “marring”.

Lines 22-27 –A fetus whose mother has died in labor has a “right of way” through her body, but even an immediately endangered patient has no claim on the dead.

B. R. Ettlinger contends that one cannot steal to save a life, and that anything which one cannot steal to do, one also cannot humiliate to do.

Line 29 – R. Schick argued that theft is compared to bloodshedding, and therefore just as one cannot commit bloodshedding to save a life, so too theft – but “marring” should nonetheless be permitted to save a life

Lines 30–31 - R. Ettlinger responds that humiliation is also compared to bloodshedding

Lines 32-35 – R. Ettlinger responds that hyperbolic statements should not be taken as rigorous halakhah, in other words that the comparison between theft and bloodshedding is not absolute

Lines 37-38 – R. Ettlinger argues that R. Akiva derives the ability of lifesaving to override “don’ts” from the rule that the Temple service (which is intended to extend human life) overrides Shabbat – but the Temple service does not override theft, i.e. one may not steal so as to enable that service! Therefore lifesaving does not override theft either.

Line 39 – R. Ettlinger argues that the standard sources for the ability of life saving to override “don’ts” is a Biblical verse that is preceded by the statement “and you must do My statutes and My regulations”; therefore lifesaving may only overrule obligations toward G-d, not interpersonal obligations.

Line 40 – the derivation that lifesaving does not override idolatry includes an additional verse to tell us that we must also surrender all our possessions rather than commit idolatry, because some value money more than their lives. Therefore, just as one cannot take another’s life to save a life, so too one may not take someone else’s possessions for that purpose.

Line 42-43 – R. Schick argued that the Talmudic statement that “It is forbidden to save oneself at someone else’s cost” means only that one cannot deliberately put oneself in a position that will require one to use someone else’s possessions to suvive

Line 44 – R. Ettlinger rejects this proof on the ground that it is always forbidden to endanger oneself/

Line 48-49 – R. Ettlinger argues that even if that statement is not taken at face value, it ca only mean that one may not save oneself with at another’s cost unless one intends to repay the other, but loss-of-dignity can never be repaid.

Line 50-55 – R. Schick argued that if “marring” overrode lifesaving, it should follow that burial of a met mitzvah equally overrides all “don’ts”, but that is not so! R. Ettlinger responds that there is a difference between failure-to-honor, which is not comparable to theft, and deprivation-of-honor, which is.

Line 56-57 – R. Ettlinger argues that he is entitled to disagree with Noda b’Yehudah and Chatam Sofer because they never addresses his basic argument from theft, and would have changed their mind had someone raised it to them.

שו"תחתםסופרחלקב (יו"ד) סימןשלו

נתעוררמעלתועמ"שבנב"יתנינאחי"דסי' ר"י
עיינתישם
הנהלכאורההו"מלאסורבפשיטותמטעםמתישראלאסורבהנאהמןהתורהוהואאיסורדאורייתאממש. . .
אלאשלפיהס"דשלהשואלההואבנב"יהוהזהפקוחנפששילמדוהרופאיםללמודממנושורשהמכהההיאכדישידעולהזהרולהמציאתרופהבכיוצאבו
ואםכןאפילויהיהשאסורבהנאהמ"מהאמתרפאיםבאי' הנאה
ע"כהאריךהגאוןזצ"לשאיןזהבכללהצלתנפשותכיוןשאיןחולהלפנינוהצריךלזה
ושובממילאגםבליטעםדאיסורהנאהאסורלךולאלזה
ולפ"זאיהיהלפנינוחולהשישלומכהכיוצאבהורוציםלנתחהמתהלזלרפואתושלזהקרובלודאידמותר
אמנםנידוןשלפנינומישרוצהלמכורעצמובחיותולרופאיםשינתחוהואחרמותוללמודממנוהלכותהרופאיםהנהזהאיננונכנסבגדרפקוחנפשכללוכלל–
אםכןכללימודיהרופאיםידחהשבת- ויעייןבשאילתיעב"ץח"אתשובהנפלאה–
וכיוןשאיןכאןפ"נאיכאמשוםאי' הנאהוגםמשוםניוול- אםעלניוולשלעצמולאחסכלשלאחסעלכבודקונוראוילושלאבאלעולם- . . .
והאישפחהדנתחייבהשריפהלמלכותושלקוהובמס' בכורותמ"הע"א . . .

Responsa Chatam Sofer 2:336

Your Honor was aroused with regard to what is written in Noda b’Yehuda 2:YD:210 –
I investigated there.
Now seemingly it would have been easy to forbid on the ground that it is Biblically forbidden to derive benefit from a Jewish corpse – a genuine Biblical prohibition . . . except that the initial thought of the questioner there was that this was a case of lifesaving, that the doctors would learn from this the source of that illness so as to know how to be cautious and to find a cure for similar cases,
and as a result, even if it were to be forbidden to derive benefit, nonetheless one can heal via things that it is forbidden to derive benefit from,
so as a result that great gaon wrote at length that this is not in the category of lifesaving since there is no choleh lefaneinu who needs this,
so it turns out that even without the prohibition of deriving benefit it is forbidden, not for that reason,
and according to this, if there were a choleh lefaneinu with a similar illness and they wish to dissect this one for the sake of healing that one, it is almost certain that it would be permitted,
however the case before us is of someone who wishes to sell himself while alive to the doctors to dissect him after death so as to learn the rules of medicine – this does not enter the boundaries of lifesaving at all –
if it did, medical education would push aside Shabbat! – see the wonderful responsum on this in Sh’eilot Yaavetz –
so as there is not lifesaving here, it is prohibited on the ground of benefit, and also on the ground of marring -
as if he has no concern for his own marring, anyone who has no concern for the honor of his Creator would have been better not to enter the world – . . .
But as to that maidservant whom the government sentenced to execution, whom they boiled as reported on Bekhorot 45a . . .

שו"תבניןציוןסימןקעא

ב"האלטאנא, יוםה' כ"זאדרתרי"בלפ"ק. להרה"גוכו' מ"המשהשיקנ"יהגאב"דדק"קיערגןיע"א.

מעכ"תנ"יהשיבעלמהשכתבתילאסורלנוולהמתלצורךפקוחנפש
והביאראיותשעלפיהםלפידעתומבוארומוכרחדבמקוםפקוחנפששריניוולהמת
ולענ"דלאמבוארולאמוכרחואשיבעלראיותיו:
מהשהביאראי' ממהדאמרינןערכין (דףז') בישבהעלהמשבר /ומתה/ ומחהמביאיןסכיןוקורעיןבטנהכדילהצילהולדהרידמשוםהצלתעוברמותרלנוולהמת- לפענ"דג' תשובותבדבר:

(א') ניוולהמתלאיקרארקמהשמשקץומתעבהמתבעינירואיו,
ובפרטמהשנקראניוולגםגביהחי,
אבללהוציאהעוברע"יחתיכתבטנה,מאןלימאלןדזהניווליקרא,אחרישידועשע"פדרכיהרפואהגםבחי' לפעמיםנעשהכן?
והרבהפעמיםמצאנובדברירז"ליוצאדופן,הרישהי' ידועדרךרפואהזואצלםואיןזהניוול,
משא"כלפתוחבטןהמתולנתחבנימיעיו, כאשרצריךלעשותמישרוצהללמודעניןהחולי,זהודאיניווליקרא.

(ב') כברכתבתיבתשובתיהנ"לדמסתמאאדםמוחלזילותאלגבייורשים,
כת"קפ"קדשקלים,
ומעכ"תנ"יכתבעלזהדלאידעמהאענהלש"סב"ב (דףקנ"ד) דמשםהוכיחהנב"ידאיןאדםמוחלניוולמשוםהנאתיורשים,
ותמהתי- אניהבאתיראי' ממהשפסקינןבטוש"עי"ד (סי' שנ"ו) בפי' דאדםמוחלזילותי' לגבייורשים,והואהשיבמראיתהנב"ימגמראדב"ב–ואדרבא,אשאלמהיענהמעכ"תנ"ילסתירהזו?!
אכן,לומרנ"ישםעיניועלמהשכתבתי,גםהי' יודעמהאענהעלראיתהש"סדב"ב,
כיכברעניתישםבמהשהבאתידברירש"יבסנהדרין (דףמ"ח) שכתבדת"קסברדמחייםאחלי' לזילותאוניחאלי' שיתבזהלאחרמיתתולהנאתיורשיםעכ"ל,
והיינומשוםדלאשייךמחילהלאחרמיתה,

וא"כלאנאמרדאדםמוחלזילותאלגבייורשיםאלאבדברשעלהעלדעתומחייםשיבאלידיכךומוחלזילותי',
כגוןדהךדשקליםשקבצומעותלעניוהותיר,דזוכרשאפשרשימותולאיצטרךומוחללגבייורשים,
מהשאיןכןבהךדב"בשם,דאיךשייךדעלהעלדעתומחייםשיצטרכולפתוחקברוולנוולומשוםהנאתיורשים,וא"כלאאפשרשמחלמחיים,ואיןמחילהלאחרמיתה,
ולפ"ז,ביושבתעלהמשברבסכנתמותבהקשותהבלדתה,מסתמאעולהעלדעתהשאםתמותיפתחובטנהלהציללולד,בפרטשזהידועבדינירפואהכנ"ל,וא"כשייךבזהכמובהךדשקליםדמסתמאמוחלתמחייםזילותאלגבייורשים,ומהגםאצלפריבטנהאשרנפשהקשורהבנפשו,וכיישדמיוןלזהשנאמרדאדםמוחלזילותי' גםלגביאחרבמקוםשלאעלהעלדעתומחייםשיבאלידיכך?!

(ג') אפילונאמרדלהוציאהולדע"יפתיחתבטנהניוולמקרי,ושאינהמוחלתעלבזיונה,עםכלזהאיןראי' משם,
דלפימהשכתבוהתוספ' בנדה (דףמ"ד) אףדביושבתעלהמשברומקשהלילדמותרלהרוגהולדלהצילה,מכ"מהיכאדמתההאםמישהורגהולדחייבדכמונחבקופסאדמי,
וכ"כג"כהרמב"ןהביאוהמג"א (סי' ש"ל) כיוןשמתההאםנחשבהולדכחיודלתנעולהבפניוע"ש,
וכיוןדאמרינןבב"בדאפילומשוםזוזידלקוחותשנתנויכוליםלטעוןשינוול,
כש"כשנאמרדמישתופסאתהחיבקופסאונועלדלתבפניושיתנוולכדילהצילאתהחי,
מהשאיןכןלנוולאתהמתבשבילפקוחנפששלאחרשאיןלותביעהעלהמת.

והנהעלראיתימדגזלעומדבפניפקוחנפשה"הג"כבזיוןחבירו,
השיבמרנ"ידשאניגזלדאמרינןבב"קכלהגוזלחבירושו' פרוטהכאלונוטלאתנפשו,והויכמושפיכתדמים,מהשאיןכןבבזיוןחבירו,
ולאידעתי- אםפשיטאמזהלמעכ"תנ"ידהויגזלכמושפיכתדמים,למהלאדןג"כדהויבזיוןכמושפיכתדמים,

דהריאמרינןג"כב"מ (דףנ"ח /ע"ב/) כלהמלביןפניחבירוברביםכאלושופךדמיםדאזילסומקאואתיחוורא,
ולאזובלבד,אלאדלפיטעםזהנאמרג"כדחלולמועדותעומדבפניפקוחנפש,שהריאמרינןמכות (דףכ"ג) כלהמבזהאתהמועדותכאילועובדע"ז,והריע"זעומדבפניפ"נ?!
אכןעלכיוצאבזהכבראמרהרבר' יונתןז"ל"אםאמרתיאספרהכמוהנהדורבניךבגדתי" –
אםנפרשכלכמושאמרורז"לבדרךהיקש,"כלהכועסכאלועובדע"ז","כלהמספרלשה"רכאלוכפרבעיקר"וכדומה,ח"ויהיורובישראלעובדיעבודהזרהוכופרים!?
אלאודאיכלכאלושאמרורז"לאינורקשבעניןא' דומהלזה,אבללאשנאמרשהיקשהואלדוןשמהשנוהגבזהנוהגבזה.
ולכןלענ"דאיןלנוטעםלומרבגזלשעומדבפניפ"נאלאאו
הטעםשכתבתי (סי' קס"ז) שהריר"עלמדפ"נשדוחהל"תמעבודהשדוחהשבת,וראינוגזלשחמורמשבתשהריעבודהדוחהשבתואינודוחהגזל,
ואףשזהלאשייךרקלטעםדר"ע,מכ"ממהיכיתיתינעשהפלוגתאחדשהביןטעםדר"עלשארהטעמים?
אושנאמרגםאםילפינןמ”וחיבהם" -ולאשימותבהם,הרישםכתוב"ועשיתאתכלחקותיואתכלמשפטי",ובזהלאהתירהקב"השלאלמותרקמהשנוגעאליו,דהיינוחקותיוומשפטיו,אבללאמהשהואלאחרים,ולהיותגםרעלבריותלמעןהצילעצמוממיתה,
אושנאמראחרדילפינןשע"זעומדבפניפ"נמואהבתאתה' אלקיךוגו' בכלנפשךכדאמרינןבסנהדרין (דףע"ד),ואמרינןשם"ישלךאדםשממונוחביבעליומגופו- לכךנאמר'בכלמאודך'",ולכןכמודילפינןשםדשפיכותדמיםעומדבפניפ"נ,ה"הג"כגזל,כיוןדישאדםשממונוחביבעליומגופו,
ולכלהטעמיםהאלהגםביזויחבירועומדבפניפקוחנפש.

אכןמעכ"תנ"ירצהלומרדגםלהצילעצמובממוןחבירומותר,
ומהדאמרינןבב"קאסור,הפי' דאסורלסבבולעמודעצמובמקוםשיגרםעלעצמוסכנהויהי' צריךלהצילעצמובממוןחבירו,
ואניתמה- איךיעלהעלהדעתלומרכן?!וכימותרלעמודבמקוםסכנהאפילואיןצריךלהצילעצמובממוןחבירו?!הריעוברב"ושמורנפשומאוד"!?
ולכןאניאומרשכלמישמפרשדברירש"ישדעתושמותרלהצילעצמובממוןחבירוהואיוצאמגדרהאמת,
וכמושהוכחתיג"כמדברירש"יבאבות (פ"ה) שכ' שאסורלהצילעצמובאבריהמערכה,והיינושלאגרעממוןגבו' מממוןהדיוט,
וודאילשוןאסורלהצילעצמובממוןחבירואיאפשרלפרשאלאאוכפי' רש"ידאסו' להצילכלל,
אוכמושפירשוהתוספ' והרא"שוהטורשאסורלהצילעצמובממוןחבירואםלאעלדעתלשלםלבסוף,
אבלבנדוןזה,שבאלגזולכבודהמת,שאיאפשרשישלםלו,לכלהשיטותאסורלהצילעצמובשלחבירו,כיוןשיודעודאיבשעתהצלהשאיאפשרלהשיב.

עודרצהמעכ"תנ"ילהוכיחדניוולהמתנדחהמפניפ"נדאל"כנילףבק"ודקבורתמתמצו' דוחהשבת,
ולאאאריךבתשובותשישלילהשיבעלזה,דלענ"דמעיקראדדינאליתא,
ואיןדמיונועולהיפהשמדמהאיסורניוולהמתלקבורתמתמצוה,וז"א- דלאמשוםכבודהמתנאמרדאסורלנוולו,אלאמשוםאיסורגזל,דאסורלגזולכבודו,דעדיףמממוןהחי,
אבלמישאינוקוברמתמצו' אינוגוזלממנו,אלאשלאחשלכבודו,
וכבודהמתודאילאדוחהפ"נ,דכייעלהעלהדעתמישבאלידוקבורתמ"מוהצלתהחיסכנהדעדיףלקבוראתהמתמלהצילאתהחי?!
ואנילאאמרתיאלאשאסורלגזולמןהמתאתכבודוולבזותוכדילהצילבואתהחי.

ואםהגאוניםבעלנב"יובעלחתםסופרזצ"ללאפסקוכן,
אניאומראלושמעוהגאוניםזצ"לאתטענותיוחלקועליודאיהייתימבטלדעתימפנידעתם,אבלאחרשהםלאנחתילעיקרראייתיממהדאמרינןאסורלהצילעצמובממוןחבירו,כאשרכברהזכרתי (סי' קס"ז) שלאראיתילאחדמןהפוסקיםשביארעניןזהשישעודדברחוץמג' דבריםשעומדבפניפקוחנפש,לאנסגתיאחורוהבוחריבחר.
כנלענ"ד, הקטןיעקב.

Responsa Binyan Tziyyon (R. Yaakov Ettlinger) 171

Altoona – Thursday, 27 Iyyar 5712 – to Rav Moshe Schick, the great Av Beit Din of Yergen:
Your Honor responded critically to that which I wrote prohibiting marring the dead for the sake of lifesaving,
and brought proofs on the basis of which, in his opinion, it is clear and compelling that in the context of lifesaving it is permitted to mar the dead.
But to my impoverished intellect it is neither clear nor compelling, and I will respond critically to his proofs:
That which he brought proof from the case in Arakhin (7) that if a woman died while in labor they bring a knife and tear her abdomen so as to save the fetus, demonstrating that for the sake of saving the fetus it is permitted to mar the dead – in my humble opinion there are three responses to this:

a) “Marring the dead” applies only to things that makes the dead disgusting and abominable to its beholders,
and specifically to things that would be called “marring” with regard to the living,
but to remove a fetus by tearing the abdomen - who will say to us that this is called marring, when it is known that the ways of healing require that this sometimes be done to the living as well?!
And many times we find in Chazal the term “one who emerged from the wall” (meaning one born via Caeserean section), which demonstrates that this mode of healing was known to them and this would not have been considered marring,
whereas opening the abdomen of the dead and dissecting his intestines, as is necessary for one who wishes to learn about illness, is certainly called marring.

b) I already wrote in my aforementioned responsum that one can legally presume that a person forgives his loss-of-honor with regard to his heirs,
as per the anonymous first opinion in Mishnah Shekalim[1],
and Your Honor wrote regarding this that you didn’t know how I would reply to Talmud Bava Basra 154, from which Noda B’Yehudah proved that a person does not forgive the marring of his body for the sake of his heirs.
I was astonished by this –I brought proof from Shulkhan Arukh YD 356:1’s explicit ruling that a person forgives being treated disgracefully with regard to his heirs, and he responded based on the proof of the Noda b’Yehudah from Talmud Bava Basra – when just the opposite, I could ask how Your Honor will respond to that contradiction?!
But had Sir looked at what I wrote, he would have known how I would respond to his proof from Talmud Bava Basra,
because I already replied there on the basis of a citation from Rashi Sanhedrin 48, that the anonymous first opinion held that “the person forgave his loss-of-honor while alive and said that he was fine with being treated disgracefully after his death for the benefit of his heirs”,
(Rashi said this) because forgiveness is not possible after death,
and therefore, it was not said that a person forgives his loss-of-honor with regard to his heirs except about something that he conceived of as possibly happening while he was alive and forgave the relevant loss-of-honor,
as in the case in Shekalim, where they gathered money for the poor person and he left some over, where he is aware of the possibility that he will die and not need the money and therefore forgives it in the interest of his heirs,
as opposed to that case in Bava Basra, as how is it possible that he would conceive while alive that they would need to open his grave and mar him for the benefit of his heirs? and therefore it is not possible that he forgave while alive, and there is no forgiveness after death.
And according to this, a woman in labor, at risk of death during a difficult childbirth, presumably did consider that if she died they would open her abdomen so as to save the fetus, especially as this a known medical technique as mentioned above, and therefore the principle (that one forgives loss-of-honor in the interest of heirs) applied there as it does in Shekalim, as presumably she forgives her loss-of honor while alive with regard to her heirs, and what are they relative to the fruit of her womb, to whose soul her soul is bound, and how can one compare this to saying that a person forgives his loss-of honor in the interest of another in a context where he never conceived while alive of coming to such a state?!

c) Even if we were to say that removing the fetus via opening her abdomen is called marring, and that she does not forgive her being treated disgracefully, there nonetheless is no proof from there,
as according to what Tosafot Niddah (44) wrote, that even though when a woman is in labor and having a difficult birth, it is permitted to kill the fetus to save her, nonetheless, when the mother dies one who kills the fetus is liable (for execution) as the fetus is considered as if (already born and placed in a box,
and so also wrote Ramban cited by Magen Avraham 330 that once the mother has died the fetus is considered as alive but with a door locked in his way,
and since we say in Bava Basra that even for the sake of the money that the buyers gave they can claim that he must be marred,
all the more so we will say that one who holds a live person in a box and locks the door in his way should be marred so as to save the living,
as opposed to a case of marring the dead for the sake of saving the life of another who has no claim on the dead.

Now as to my proof that since the prohibition against robbery holds its own against lifesaving, so too does the prohibition against treating another disgracefully,
Sir responded that robbery is different, since we say in Bava Kamma “Anyone who robs another a perutah’s worth is as if he took his life”, so it is like bloodshedding, as opposed to treating another disgracefully,
but I don’t know - if it is obvious to Your Honor from this that robbery is like bloodshedding, why do you not also reason that treating disgracefully is like bloodshedding,
as we also say in Bava Metzia (58b) “Anyone who whitens the face of another in public (by humiliating them) is as if he has shed blood, as the red (blood) leaves and the pallor comes”,
and not only this, but rather according to your reasoning we would also have to say that the prohibition against violating the festivals holds its own against lifesaving, as we say in Makkot (23) “Anyone who treats the festivals disgracefully is as if he has committed idolatry”, and the prohibition against idolatry holds its own against lifesaving?!
But it was about such reasoning that the Rav Rabbi Yonatan z”l applied the verse (Tehillim 73:15) “If I tell such things, behold I have declared a generation of Your children traitors” –
if we explain everything Chazal said by way of analogy, such as “anyone who gets angry is as if he has worshipped idols”, “anyone who speaks lashon hara is as if he has denied the essential beliefs of Judaism”, and their like, Heaven forfend we would declare most of Israel to be idol worshippers!?
Rather, all ‘as if’s in Chazal suggest an analogy with regard to one aspect, rather than arguing that what is practiced with regard to one should be practice with regard to the other.
Therefore, to my impoverished intellect we have no basis for saying that robbery holds its own against lifesaving other than
the one I wrote, that Rabbi Akiva derived that lifesaving pushes aside the Shabbat from the Temple service, and we have seen that robbery is more strict than Shabbat from the fact that the Temple service pushes aside Shabbat but does not push aside robbery,
and even though this reasoning applies only according to Rabbi Akiva, on what basis do we create a new dispute based on the reasoning of Rabbi Akiva as opposed to the other rationales?
or else we can say that even if we derive (that lifesaving overrides Shabbat) from “’and live by them’ – and not die by them”, Scripture writes there that “you must do all My statutes and regulations”, from which we can derive only that The Holy One Who is Blessed permitted us not to die only by violating what relates to Him, namely His statutes and principles, but not what applies to others, and to do wrong to other human beings so as to save oneself from death,
or we can say that once we have derived that the prohibition against idolatry holds its own against lifesaving from “and you must love Hashem your G-d etc. with all your nefesh”, as we say in Sanhedrin (74), and we say there “if there is a person whose money is more dear to them than his body – that’s why Scripture writes ‘with all your possessions’”, and therefore just as we derive there that bloodshedding holds its own against lifesaving, so too robbery, since there are people whose possessions are more precious to them and their bodies,
and according to all these rationales treating another disgracefully holds its own against lifesaving.

However, Your Honor wished to say that saving oneself at the expense of another’s property is also permitted,
and when we say in Bava Kamma that it is forbidden, the meaning is that it is forbidden to arrange things so that one stands in a place of danger where you will need to save yourself at the expense of another’s possessions,
But I am astonished – how could anyone conceive of saying this?! Is it permitted to stand in a dangerous place even if one will not be compelled to save oneself at the expense of another’s property?! One would be violating “and guard your nefesh very much”!?
Therefore I say that anyone who explains the words of Rashi as saying that it is permitted to save oneself at the expense of someone else’s property has left the boundary of truth,
as I have proven also from Rashi to Avot (5) where he wrote that it is forbidden to save oneself at the expense of the sacrificial limbs on the altar, which is because the money of Heaven is not worth less than the money of another,
so certainly the language “it is forbidden to save oneself at the expense of another’s property” can only be explained either as Rashi did, that it is completely forbidden to save oneself,
or as Tosafot and Rosh and Tur do, that it is forbidden to save oneself at the expense of another’s property unless one has the intention of eventually repaying,
but in this case, where he comes to steal the honor of the dead, which he cannot repay him, according to all positions it is forbidden to save himself at the expense of another, since he knows for certain at the time of saving that it is impossible to repay.

Your Honor further wished to prove that marring the dead is pushed aside by lifesaving as otherwise we should derive it by kal vachomer from the rule that burial of a met mitzvah (a body that has no relative to bury it) pushes aside Shabbat,
and I will not give my replies at length, as to my impoverished intellect this is fundamentally wrong,
and his comparison is poor when he compares marring the dead to the burial of a met mitzvah, as this is not so – as it is not for the honor of the dead that it is forbidden to mar him, but rather because of the prohibition of robbery, as it is forbidden to steal his honor, which is greater than the property of the living,
whereas one who fails to bury a met mitzvah has not robbed him of anything, but merely failed to be concerned for his honor,
and certainly the honor of the dead does not push aside lifesaving, as would anyone conceive that if one had to choose between burying a met mitzvah and lifesaving, that it would be more important to bury the dead than to rescue the living?!
Whereas I said only that it is forbidden to rob the dead of his honor and to treat him disgracefully so as to save the living.

And if the gaonim authors of Noda b’Yehudah and Chatam Sofer did not rule accordingly,
I say that if those gaonim of blessed memory had heard my arguments and disagreed with me, surely I would nullify my opinion before theirs, but as they never dealt with my essential proof from the principle that one cannot save oneself at the expense of another’s property, as I mentioned previously (167) that I have not seen any of the decisors who have explained this, that there is something other than the 3 that holds its own against lifesaving, I have not retreated and the chooser can choose,
Thus it seems to my impoverished intellect, the minor Yaakov.

Arakhin (7)