Stability and Security on the Korean Peninsula
Stability and Security on the Korean Peninsula:
Unification and Beyond
A German Perspective
Dr. Heinrich Kreft[1]
Parallels between Germany and Korea
There are clear parallels between post-war developments in Germany and Korea essentially deriving from the partition of the two countries made permanent by the Cold War. The process of détente with the Soviet Union and East Germany, which the Federal Republic initiated through its Ostpolitik (policy of normalization of relations with Eastern Europe) at the end of the 60s has not been without influence on South Korea. From the 70s onwards, Seoul, on the basis of the economic strength it had by then acquired, sought a reduction of tension on the Korean peninsula. A basic agreement was only concluded in 1992, however, after Germany had already achieved national unity.
In the first years after unification of the two German states, the question of what lessons could be learned for the reunification of Korea has been asked repeatedly.
Unification on the German Model?
The conditions surrounding Korean unification are very different from those which accompanied German unification. In contrast to East Germany, which was never independent, either politically or economically, the founder of the North Korean state, Kim Il-Sung, managed to steer a clever course between Moscow and Beijing, as a result of which the country achieved and retained a high degree of political and economic independence. The disappearance of the Communist Soviet Union meant the loss of its most important ally, but not - as it did for East Germany - its own disappearance. The partition of Korea was a product of the Cold War, but it also developed its own dynamics, so that the end of Soviet-American hostility did not result in a similar development on the Korean peninsula to that of central Europe.
The most significant difference between the two German states and the two Koreas is the fact that the latter have been involved in a bitter war against each other with over one million Koreans who are separated from their families. Even after the conclusion of the Korean War there has not been a single year without armed clashes and attempts at infiltration, including the murder of members of the South Korean government by agents of the North.
All types of contact between the North and the South, including trade, continue to be highly restricted. But it is a very positive sign that last year more than 3.000 businessmen could travel to the North in comparison with only a few hundred during the previous decade. Mutual suspicion is predominant. North Korea's extensive measures to achieve self-sufficiency (Juche Doctrine) as well as its isolation can be seen both in the low level of foreign and in the almost complete lack of personal contacts between private individuals. In contrast, West Germany's Ostpolitik had made a considerable contribution to the relaxation of tension between the two Germanys; trade and traffic between them and, above all, exchanges on the personal level flourished in the eighties.[2]
Further on, there are also great structural differences between North and South Korea today and East and West Germany in 1989. The population of East Germany in 1989 was 25 % of West Germany's population while that of North Korea today is 50 % of South Korea's. In Germany the difference in economic resources was significantly smaller than in Korea. In addition, both parts of Germany had a considerably higher level of affluence, as measured by per-capita income. The differences in quality of life and the provision of consumer goods are considerably greater between North and South Korea than between the two German states at the end of the 1980s. Compared with other former Communist countries, North Korea was the most radical in bringing the economy under state control. In East Germany the private and cooperative economic sectors contributed almost one-third of the GNP.
North Korea's military expenditure in relation to its total economic resources is almost twice as high as that of East Germany. It is estimated at almost one third of the GNP. Compared with North Korea, East Germany was much more firmly integrated in international trade. Through its low level of involvement in foreign trade North Korea has cut itself off almost completely from international technology transfers. In most areas they are now over 20 years behind the world leaders.[3]
2
No "German Road to Unification" in the Korean Question
In the context of the considerable reduction in affluence the South Koreans have suffered because of the economic and financial crisis, their desire to see the country reunited soon has become even less pressing.[4] The collapse of North Korea and a consequent unification - with currency, economic and social union in one blow - would be more than the South could manage either economically or politically.
Estimates of the (public) funds necessary to finance the transformation of North Korea vary enormously, depending on the assumptions made. Assuming reunification in the year 2000, and assuming the intention would be to raise North Korean income to 60 % of that of South Korea within ten years, one study[5] estimates the amount needed over the first ten years (reckoned at 1996 prices) at 250 billion dollars, and at 3 thousand billion dollars overall. Due to the continued economic decline of the North, later unification would mean the amount required would be even greater. If one were to apply the net transfer from West to East Germany resulting from unification, then, because of the larger population of North Korea, that would produce a requirement of 140 billion dollars per year for the first five years, a sum that would be far beyond the economic capacity of South Korea. Even only taking mainly the investment transfer into account, the annual transfer would come to almost 70 billion dollars. That would amount to over two thirds of South Korea's government expenditure for 1995 and would correspond to 15 % of the gross national product, as compared to 5 % in the case of Germany.
Taking the current financial crisis into account, Park Jin, a Korean researcher, estimates the cost to be at least 7 % of South Korea's gross domestic product, which the South could not possibly afford. "Unification under the present circumstances would be a nightmare."[6]
Four Options for Developments on the Korean Peninsula
The logical conclusion of continued economic decline is the collapse of an economy. So far, however, the Korea specialists who prophesized the imminent collapse of North Korea have been wrong.[7] Even the fact that the very physical survival of large parts of the population is threatened has not led to any noticeable destabilization of the regime. Beyond that, by using the threat of its considerable potential for chaos and destruction, the unpredictable North has repeatedly managed to squeeze aid that is necessary for its survival out of the international community, especially the USA, Japan and South Korea. It is to be feared that North Korea will continue on this track and try to keep its head above water by these means for a few more years. The most it can hope to achieve by these actions, however, is to postpone its collapse, not prevent it.
In view of the disastrous economic situation, Kim Jong Il has basically three options for the future, all of which ultimately come down to reunification on South Korean terms: a desperate armed attack on the South, collapse (implosion), political and economic opening up and rapprochement with Seoul ("soft landing"). In April of 1997 US Defense Secretary Cohen declared during a visit to US troops in the demilitarized zone between North and South Korea: "We are very close to the finish line of seeing a united and free Korea.[8]
Armed conflict, which would amount to a second Korean War, is unlikely, but the possibility cannot be excluded entirely. The North Korean leadership might decide that such a conflict represents the only way to avoid collapse, or at least to meet a "glorious end". North Korea's forces are in such poor condition that they would have no chance of winning such a war. Japan would probably be drawn into the conflict, along with the USA. The likelihood is that China would not intervene. She has made it quite clear that she would only come to North Korea's aid in a case of "imperialist aggression". Even if atomic, biological or chemical weapons were not used (North Korea possesses chemical, possibly also biological weapons), the loss of life and destruction of the economy would be devastating, especially since the capital, Seoul, the most important center of population, trade and industry in the South, is well within the range of North Korean artillery.
If the North does not introduce far-reaching reforms - and at the moment there are no signs of that - collapse is the logical conclusion of her economic decline. Given the unreliability of the data available, it is difficult to forecast how long North Korea can manage to survive. Economic collapse would inevitably lead to repercussions on the political level. Despite the Stalinist methods employed to keep the population under control and the fact that they are accustomed to deprivation, there would surely come a point where even their tolerance was exhausted, resulting in hunger riots, which are not unknown in Korean history. As in Romania in 1989, this unrest could set off a chain reaction, with parts of the army putting themselves at the forefront of the insurgents.
It is highly likely that such a collapse would involve considerable bloodshed and would probably trigger a mass exodus, both to the South and to Japan and China. The political and economic consequences could destabilize the entire region. The German experience in 1989/90 showed that the pressure for action on all concerned can become so great that only swift, radical solutions can keep the situation under control. Reunification would turn into a premature birth. In the span of on day the South would have to feed 24 million North Koreans and put a completely insolvent economy back on its feet.
Given Germany's experiences with the high costs of reunification and the unpredictable risks of a collapse, the South Korean government (the USA as well) is seeking - very understandably - a gradual political and economic rapprochement between the North and the South. This would mean peaceful rapprochement, or "soft landing". It implies a peace treaty at the end of the negotiations, as well as reforms to improve the economic situation in North Korea. Thereby, the danger of war would be averted and the North Korean economy rebuilt, with (considerable) infusions from the South (direct aid, investment). Complete reunification would only take place after the worst of the economic problems had been solved.
Given the alternatives, this scenario seems highly desirable, but the cooperation and opening-up of the North is essential. By now there must be at least some in the North Korean leadership to whom it is clear that their country will inevitably collapse if it is not opened up. However, by taking over the Party chairmanship in the autumn of 1997 Kim Jong Il consolidated his power base in an manner that was clear to all, and the little that is known about him does not suggest he is suddenly going to turn into a reformer. Tolerating private gardens, allotments and peasant markets, as well as the not very successful attempt since 1991 to promote the location of foreign firms in the Rajin-Sonbong free trade zone in the north of the country do not constitute proof of an increasing reform orientation some Western observers claim to see.[9]
The lesson the North Korean leadership may well have drawn from the end of the German Democratic Republic is probably that even opening up the country is unlikely to secure the survival of the regime; on the contrary, it would only hasten its disappearance. Opening up the country could develop its own momentum. As in Eastern Europe, it could seal the bankruptcy of the North Korean system. An independent, post-communist North Korea would have no genuine raison d'être, just as East Germany had no chance of survival as a democratic state based on a free market economy.
Under the present circumstances a soft landing and substantial rapprochement with South Korea are difficult to imagine. But do South Korea, the United States and other countries with an interest in stability on the Korean peninsula have any other alternative than to pursue this scenario?
A Korean Response to the Korean Question
While Korea can look back on a unified state with over a thousand years of history, the nearly complete separation for almost fifty years has meant that North and South Koreans have developed along different paths to a greater extent than the East and West Germans did. There is no external power stopping North and South Korea from reuniting today. At the same time, however, no external power is in a position to reunify the peninsula over the heads of the Koreans and thus defuse the tension endangering the entire Northeast Asian region. A lasting relaxation of tension on the Korean peninsula and a resolution of the partition can be achieved safely through direct cooperation between Seoul and Pyongyang alone.
Both sides must be brought closer together, through measures promoting trust and an active policy of détente. President Kim Dae Jung's sunshine policy is aiming exactly at this. The extension of trade relations and the stated will to separate them more clearly from the political development of the bilateral relationship are steps in the right direction. South Korea's policy towards Pyongyang is one of increasing pragmatism. Seoul's official inter-Korean agenda contains the following points: rejecting absorption of North Korea; continuation and extension of economic aid; the solution of urgent humanitarian questions (including the problem of divided families); the appointment of special envoys and, above all, the implementation of the basic treaty that was made with North Korea as long ago as 1992. In the multilateral framework of the Four-party-talks there has also been some progress, especially when North Korea accepted the formation of two working groups last January.