Separation of Powers – Peterson – Fall 2011
Introduction
- Formalist approach
- Rules that regulate the behavior and powers of the branches are fixed at the time of Framing and do not vary over time
- Text is determinate and can be clearly understood
- Emphasizes separation of power between branches: Branches shouldn’t interfere with each other & the only checks/balances are already written in the constitution
- Pessimistic about legislative motives—Congress should not have the power to alter constitutional power allocation
- Functionalist approach
- Constitution doesn’t create rules, it creates basic principles that may result in different rules over time as context changes
- Language is indeterminate because Constitutional rules change over time
- Constitution is subject to multiple interpretations
- Founders wanted balanced branches, so rules might change
- Checks and balances more important than separation of powers
- Congress can tinker with the structure of government if need be
- Power of each branch
- 3 zones of executive power (J. Jackson)
- Most authority with explicit statutory power
- Intermediate authority (inherent power)
- Least authority statute take away power
- Generally, for statutory enhancements of power, the Court is more formalist
- Generally, for statutory restrictions of power, the Court is more functionalist (Does statute prevent the branch from accomplishing its constitutional function?)
Executive / Legislative / Judicial
Statutory Authority / Congress can delegate, box can grow indefinitely / Congress passes statutes to give itself more authority
Limited by bicameralism and presentment / Limited by case or controversy
No statute / President’s inherent power: In Re Neagle / Appropriations power
Statutory Restriction / Congress passes statutes to limit the president’s power
The Executive and the Courts
- Marbury v. Madison
- Facts: Marbury filed writ of mandamus under original S.C. jurisdiction to compel Madison to deliver his commission (last minute Adams appt)
- Madison’s Argument—court has no power to order executive to do something
- Strict separation of power: there is no judicial power over executive
- Problem with strict separation
- Congress has appropriations power over executive
- English common law: court could order king to do things
- Court
- Marbury has right to the commission b/c it is vested upon signing
- Statute authorizes original mandamus in S.C.
- Statute granting original jurisdiction is unconstitutional
- Article 3 jurisdiction is a ceiling, not a floor for the S.C.
- Congress can’t give S.C. more power than they would have under the constitution (no court explanation)
- Jurisdiction of the federal court system should be tiered and original jurisdiction of S.C. is an exception to system
- Trial courts authority checked by appellate courts
- Case or controversy for primary jurisdiction
- Courts have to follow precedent
- Primary vs. Secondary vs. Tertiary discretion
- Primary discretion—limited by rules
- Secondary discretion—limited by appellate courts
- Tertiary discretion—limited by juries
- Courts have the power to review the constitutionality of statutes
- Marshall asserted authority over the executive branch while not having to enforce it because the statute didn’t allow it—S.C. lacks jurisdiction
- Executive branch is subject to what the court says
- Court can hold executive in contempt of court and send marshals to imprison the president, but the executive has more guns
- Congress can impeach the president, and if she resists, this is a coup
- Marbury Dictum: Limitations on judicial power
- Procedural constraints in Constitution
- Case or controversy requirement (injury, proximate causation, remedy)
- Marbury injured by not receiving commission and court can redress
- Textual limitations
- E.g. veto power is textually committed to President, court won’t step in
- Practical limitations
- E.g. Courts may be ill-equipped to decide who has priority where executive is trying to withhold confidential documents from Congress
- Prudential limitations (political question doctrine)
- Non-discretionary actions are reviewable
- Internal restrictions—in power granting clause
- E.g. can’t veto a year later, procedural restrictions
- External restrictions
- E.g. pardon in racist way is against 5th amendment
- Is there someone with a concrete injury?
- Discretionary political actions are non-reviewable political questions
- E.g. veto, sensitive foreign affairs
- Judicial review of separation of powers questions
- War powers clause has mandatory power sharing to make both President and Congress accountable for war, should court intervene if President sends troops?
- Court is anti-majoritarian branch of government
- Result—legitimacy is tenuous, so it is prudentially important that court should stay out of cases where their legitimacy is unnecessarily questioned
- Court should save power to protect individual liberties
- Purpose of separation of powers
- Preventing government from abusing authority to detriment of the people
- Courts can enforce sep. of powers to protect the people
- Branches have incentives to give away power to avoid accountability
- Role of lawyer in executive branch (wire-tap legality hypothetical)
- Self interested lawyer, the president’s advocate
- Find a legal argument to allow the president to do something
- President is your boss and could remove you, so you should care about his/her policy goals; political accountability—president represents people
- Run risk of losing ability of OLC to issue credible decisions
- Sound legal advice/independent lawyer
- President wants to cover himself, and will be reluctant if OLC doesn’t ok
- E.g. people resigned rather than firing special prosecutor during Watergate
- Protecting president from himself—telling president what really is legal
- If president wants to ensure a certain opinion:
- Ask sympathetic attorney, potentially bypassing asst. attorney general
- Ensure confidentiality/consult with interested agencies confidentially
The Executive and Congress
- In Re Neagle
- Facts: Neagle arrested for murder under CA law for killing Terry who assaulted a S.C. Justice
- Court: Neagle acted within the law and can’t be guilty under CA law
- Protection of judges, despite lack of specific statute, is part of president’s inherent authority/duty to “take care that laws be faithfully executed”
- Inherent powers include explicit powers from constitution and implicit authority to go along w/grants of explicit authority
- Power to protect federal officers must exist & executive has power to enforce the law and protect others to ensure laws are faithfully executed
- A2S1 vests executive power in the President, but doesn’t say “all executive powers herein delegated” like A1S1 for Congress
- Power to make sure laws are enforced is potentially sweeping
- In Re Debs
- Facts: Debs (union leader in Pullman strike) violated a gov’t injunction (without a statute) preventing him from talking to strikers
- Court: Executive branch has the power to seek this injunction
- Statutes requires gov’t to carry mail; to carry mail, need RRs; statutes allow gov’t to protect transport of mail; gov’t can get injunction preventing obstruction of commerce
- Gov’t wanted injunction over arrest b/c jury would be pro-Debs
- Debs seems clearly wrong—gov’t saying if they can’t get injunction, jury could prevent conviction; but, right to jury trial, nullification possibility is on gov’t
- Restrictions on inherent executive power: issues of law, policy, politics, and practicality
- External restrictions: restrictions outside of power granting clauses
- e.g. Takings clause (5th Amendment), 1st Amendment, etc…
- Explicit adjacent powers: e.g. authority granted to another branch (Congress’s Article 1 appropriations power)
- Implicit adjacent powers: e.g. Executive can’t raise money and spend it
- Iran Contra—can’t sell weapons to get money without Congressional approval b/c Congress has appropriations power
- Miscellaneous Receipts Act: money earned by gov’tgeneral treasury
- Anti-deficiency Act prevents executive augmentation
- Appropriations power has an implicit anti-augmentation power
- U.S. v. Midwest Oil
- Facts: President suspended oil claims in CA and WY, despite statute saying “all public lands w/oil are free and open” to prevent US from having to repurchase oil
- President’s argument—executive power is so important that if Congress wants to restrict it, they have to make a clear statement
- Congressional argument—want accountable legislature; inaction is less clear than a statute, hard to assume inaction means agreement w/president
- Court: Congressional acquiescence in historic executive practice of withdrawing land makes president’s actions okay (implicit exception to statute)
- Functionalist opinion—law must be interpreted practically
- Ways Congress could possibly not acquiesce to executive practice
- Pass a reinforcing statute (with risk of presidential veto)
- Impeachment, concurrent resolution, testimony about compliance
- Youngstown Sheet and Tube
- Facts: President seized steel mills before strike b/c steel was essential in Korea
- President notified Congress and Congress did nothing
- Black’s opinion (Formalist)
- Commander in chief power doesn’t extend to taking over private property
- President has the obligation to conduct war, not legislate
- Congress has the power to regulate labor disputes through law
- “Take Care” power doesn’t give president the power to legislate
- This case belongs in Box 2 or 5 b/c there is no statutory authority
- Congress already specified a way to resolve labor disputes
- Power to legislate doesn’t fit in box 2
- But, nondelegation says line between executive and legislative powers is blurry, so explanation not great
- Frankfurter’s opinion (Functionalist)
- Distinguishes from Midwest Oil: no congressional acquiescence
- President only did this 3X, Congress rejected conferring power
- But, Midwest Oil deals w/statute, this deals w/constitution
- Hypothetical of president taking military action w/o Congress over time
- Frankfurter: In 1790, president couldn’t do this, but now he could b/c this power vests in commander in chief
- Scalia: agrees b/c military is different (inconsistent w/originalist)
- Congress has disincentive to protecting war power & acquiescence for political reasons is a problem
- Pres.: signing statements avoid acquiescence in impingement on authority
- Jackson’s opinion (Functionalist)
- 3 categories of presidential authority
- 1) W/express or implied Congressional authority
- President acts with his rights + all Congress can delegate
- 2) Concurrent authority w/o Congressional action or prohibition
- President can use his inherent power (between box 2 & 5)
- There’s zone of twilight where Pres. and Congress have concurrent authority and distribution is uncertain
- Congressional inertia, indifferent, quiescence may change distribution of power
- 3) Congress has restricted president (situation here)
- Ask if restriction impinges on President’s ability to do job
- President can only rely upon own constitution powers – Congressional powers over the matter
- Congressional restriction of the president (box 23) requires a statute
- Clear statement rule?
- Legislative history?
- Implied occupation of the field? Have that here
- Congress set out 3 policies implying seizure is not allowed
- President told where he could act, can imply where he can’t
- Statutory restriction doesn’t impair president’s constitutional duties
- Vesting clause—power is limited (don’t want George III)
- Specific terms limit executive power (cut back on Neagle)
- Commander in chief authority
- Authority to support armies fails in box 5 with Congress
- Take care clause—operates only as far as there is law
- Possible Youngstown holdings
- Narrow: President’s power to seize property can be restricted by statute
- Broad: Neither take care not vesting clause grant president any power
- This would overrule Neagle—only have Congressional laws
- Intermediate: President’s inherent authority to seize property for military purposes must give way to Congress’s power to raise and support armies
Combining Powers in the Executive or in the Courts
- Nondelegation Doctrine (functionalist test)
- Concerns
- Aggrandizement
- Don’t want executor of laws making the lawspersonal rights violations, conflicts of interest, abuse of power
- Political accountability issue (Box 5)
- Schechter Poultry (1935): Congress can’t delegate power to make codes of “fair competition” to the industry w/ pres. approval
- Nondelegation Doctrine is toothless
- Delegation has not been struck down since Schechter Poultry in 1935
- Congress can’t be an expert on all issues
- Difficult for Congress to pass legislation, this is not efficient
- Congress can’t fill in all the details for the entire federal government
- Hard to draw line between what can and can’t be delegated
- Terms “legislative” and “executive” are too vague
- Wayman v. Southard: hard to say something is not executive power as executive implements a pieces of legislation
- Limitations on delegation
- Congress must put forth a standard for the agency (intelligible principle)
- Yakus: intelligible principle upon which exec. can exercise discretion
- Conditional legislation requiring presidential fact finding is okay
- Congress can’t delegate war powers, all appropriations, specific clauses, line-item veto
- No delegation to people outside the government (Schechter Poultry)
- Mistretta v. U.S.
- Facts: Sentencing Reform Act with policy statements has independent commission in judiciary set sentencing guidelines
- Court
- Sentencing Guidelines are constitutional, since Congress neither (1) delegated excessive legislative power to the commission nor (2) violated separation of powers principle by placing commission in the judicial branch
- Sentencing historically shared by three branches
- Scalia’s dissent:
- Accountability problem—delegation is to an independent commission
- Principles are intelligible and subject matter is sufficiently limited
- Delegation problem—Congress is delegating strictly legislative functions
- Sentencing commission not really in judiciary or executive
- Congress can’t delegate legislative power, but can give other branches discretion in enforcing and judging the laws
- Congress could’ve delegated this to a parole comm’n in executive
- Analysis of Scalia’s opinion
- Congress has not created other “JV Congresses”
- Sentencing comm’n is unique—judges have historically had discretion
- Few powerful interest groups are involved
- Power shared in all three branches
- Aggrandizement or diminished judicial authority (lose legitimacy)
- Arguments for improper aggrandizement
- Courts can make procedural rules, but this is purely substantive
- Policy can only be make in context of case or controversy (A3S2)
- Prevents judicial abuse of individual rights
- Case or controversy has s: juries, appeals, precedent
- Juries: outside 3 branches of government
- Appeals: limits secondary discretion
- Correction by higher courts on law, not fact
- Precedent: limits primary discretion
- Arguments against improper aggrandizement
- Judges are already writing regulations/deciding sentences
- Judges make policy through decisions, why not prospective regs?
- Comm’ners are not acting as judges, power not to whole judiciary
- Potential diminution of Judiciary
- Respect for judges could diminish if they make political decisions
- But, here, judges are already making these decisions
- DOJ says judges serving other duties is unconstitutional
- Congress could not delegate this to S.C. b/c of case or controversy requirement
- Need a ; courts make procedural rules—binding only on courts
- Sentencing rules are clearly substantive
Congressional Aggrandizement
- INS v. Chadha
- Facts: Statute gives AG right to suspend deportation, but Congress reserved the right to reject the suspension (one-house veto)
- Issue: appropriateness of executive arguing that a statute is unconstitutional
- DOJ will defend the constitutionality of any statute unless:
- No good faith argument because law is so clear
- Statute treats on president’s constitutional prerogatives or statute violates separation of powers
- Court:
- When Congress acts legislatively, bicameralism and presentment
- By rejecting deportation suspension, House is legislating alone
- This is legislative action b/c it affects rights outside of legislature
- Problem: Why can Congress delegate legislative power to executive?
- White’s Dissent: (functionalist)
- If legislation when House votes, why not legislation when AG approves?
- Branches have agreed—both house and president must approve this
- Problem: inaction is not action (Midwest Oil not good law)
- Executive branch can still do its job well
- Legislative veto is on delegation of power to executive agency
- Problem: Congressional aggrandizement, binding effect to inaction
- Powell’s Concurrence:
- This is a judicial/executive act, so it is inappropriate for Congress
- Congress is not subject to any internal √s to prevent it from arbitrarily depriving Chadha of right to remain in the country
- Congress shouldn’t decide rights of specific people b/c tyranny of shifting majority
- Problem: Why can executive wield judicial power?
- Peterson’s Opinion
- Substantive laws must go through bicameralism and presentment
- Easy to distinguish substance and procedure in legislative branch: substance affects the rights of people outside the legislature
- This is legislative counterpart to case or controversy requirement
- Constitution lists where Congress can act outside bicameralism & presentment (impeachment, appointments, treaties)
- Problem: no similar restriction on executive branch
- Congress delegates to executive—need balance of power
- Potential solution—allow Congress to veto RM, not adjudications
- Congressional control thru APA (notice, comment, responses, judicial review for rulemaking, etc..)
- Procedural due process, 5th amendment
- Fast track legislation—report and wait period for all legislative veto provisions found to be severable
- Appropriations/political power
- Demise of the legislative veto
- 196 statutes have legislative veto provisions—executive adds signing statements
- Unenforceable political deals don’t violate Chadha
- E.g. Congress agreed w/president to fund contras in Nicaragua, but if a group in Congress decided funding was no longer useful, funding ends
- Formalist approach in prohibiting the legislative veto
- Rejects functionalist approach even through there aren’t procedural limitations on the president
- Congress can control the rebalancing of the authority of the branches
- Procedures, appropriations, non-mandatory legislative veto
- Bowsher v. Synar
- Facts: Comptroller General receives reports from directors and then reports his conclusions to the president under the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Act
- CG is an officer of Congress (GAO), removable for cause by Congress
- Court: Law unconstitutional
- Myers: Congress can’t reserve removal power of executive officer
- Chadha: to permit Congressional officer to execute would permit L veto
- CG is a member of the legislative branch
- Congressional removal, control, general DC understanding
- CG’s duties under the Act are executive
- CG is exercising independent judgment and evaluation of reports
- Steven’s concurrence (Peterson’s favorite)
- Congress can’t act substantively thru delegation to lesser rep. of legislative
- Congress can’t act substantively except thru bicameralism & presentment
- White’s dissent
- CG not controlled by Congress (removal only for cause w/pres. approval)
- Executive branch’s ability to perform constitutional duties not impeded
- MWAA v. Citizens
- Facts: DC/VA/MD compact controls Dulles airport; Board w/9 members of Congress has power to veto compacts action
- Court: Board is unconstitutional
- No legislative action (veto of compact’s action) w/o bicameralism & p.
- Congress vets itself or members w/executive or judicial power
- Changing statute to requires board members to be frequent airport users, registered to veto elsewhere, & w/aviation experience not okay fix!
- Congressional commissions
- Congress can form investigative commissions (w/Congressmen and executive officers) to make recommendations to Congress and White House so long as they don’t act substantively
President’s Veto Authority