Sensations, Recollection and Correctness

Prompt #3Luc Olsthoorn, TA: Babak Word Count: 553

In Philosophical investigations by Ludwig Wittgenstein, he concerns himself with private language and discusses whether or not it is even possible, and furthermore if it even exists. To counteract its possibility of existence, in section 258 he discusses one of the major problems with the ideologies of a private language by discussing the correctness of the recollection of sensations. Wittgenstein believes that due to a lack of criterion of a connection, it is impossible to accurately recollect the sensation that was originally attributed.

He begins his argument by discussing the connection between a sensation and a physical thing he can later recall: “I want to keep a diary about the recurrence of a certain sensation. To this end I associate it with the sign ‘S’ and write this sign in a calendar for every day on which I have the sensation.”This is straight forward, but he runs into the problem of how to represent this symbol in real life. A typical “ostensive definition” doesn’t work due to its inability to correctly portray the sensation. He then stumbles on the discovery of writing it down or speaking it will accurately symbolize the sensation for later recollection. “But I speak, or write the sign down, and at the same time I concentrate my attention on the sensation—and so, as it were, point to it inwardly.” This example is created to help visualize the process of the creation of a private language. The symbol “S” represents a singular sensation, which is a simplified version of the creation of a multi-sensation private language. Wittgenstein uses this simplified version to prove his point.

With the definition of the connection clearly drawn, he brings up his problem with recalling it. When the connection of the sensation is created, Wittgenstein describes that it needs to be impressed onto oneself: “I impress on myself the connexion between the sign and the sensation”. During this time of impression, the connection is clear and correct, because it is right in the current state of mind. However, Wittgenstein points out that as time moves on it is possible that the connection will be recalled incorrectly. Although this happens often in normal language, it is easily verifiable with the standard, however when the standard is completely subjective, it will always be assumed to be right: “whatever is going to seem right to me is right.” This is obviously problematic as it shows the connection has no reliably accurate way of being remembered.

As described in this excerpt,the inability to accurately recall the connections that are used to transform a representative symbol into a sensation plays a large roll in Wittgenstein’s argument against a private language. At is core, it undermines this basic ideal of private language by identifying that we cannot accurately recall such connections without having some external criteria to describe the connection. If external criteria are introduced it needs to be verified by another being that can understand its validity. This shows that although language can exist in a single person’s mind, it cannot mean anything of use unless it is shared with another person. This proves a large point for Wittgenstein’s theory of an absence of the possibility of a private language.