Selected Lessons Learned fromHumanitarian Action and Post-Crisis Recovery

Supply and Logistics

  • Supply and logistics staff should be fully involved in programme planning and response. When supply staff are involved in response they can extend their responsibilities to moving ahead with incomplete or later orders, being more innovative in “working out” specifications. This will improve the quality and specs check of the required supplies, allow smoother delivery/distribution schedules at the implementation phase, and ultimately speed up response. (Lesson from multiple emergencies) (Brown, 2005, p.90; UNICEF 2005, p.6-7)
  • Transport can be as important as supplies: it is essential for providing fast relief. Poor infrastructure such as roads, communication and transportation can hamper many aspects of relief and recovery work and must be factored in as a major logistical consideration. (Lesson from the tsunami) (UNICEF, 2006; UNICEF, 2007)
  • Programme planning must incorporate necessary specialists to help with the management and logistical tasks of ensuring effective implementation..Education and child-protection programmes are highly supplies-oriented, requiring substantial logistical as well as technical capacity. Logistical expertise can be required for effective programming, especially in terms of knowledge of the whole logistics chain from the production to distribution to the end-user so that planning can be realistic. (Lesson from Pakistan) (Kirk, 2008, p.88)
  • National staff insight on local supply preference and viability of supplies can be extremely valuable. Although decisions must be made quickly and there is no time for full participatory decision-making, it is always possible to include national staff in decisions about equipment purchases. They can provide invaluable insights into local preferences and the viability of particular technologies.(Lesson from the tsunami) (Baumann, et al., 2006, p.18)
  • Ensure quality of locally procured items for a recreational/educational kit. The quality of locally procured items is paramount to the kit’s effectiveness. The low quality of sports materials included in the Indonesian Recreation kit meant that many of the materials were rapidly damaged. (Lesson from Tsunami) (Abrioux, 2006, p.16)
  • For distribution of some supplies, like educational kits, it is necessary to train facilitators how to use kits. In order to maximize the content of the educational kits and to ensure they are used to their full potential, information dissemination and demonstration sessions to facilitators/educators on their use is crucial and, ideally, should come prior to the distribution of these. Such sessions are important in introducing each of the individual items within the kit to teachers and ensuring they understand how these can be used. Sessions could easily be given by UNICEF logistical staff or Ministry of Education personnel. The monitoring of the kits as well as the replenishment of these would also be made easier through an initial information session, as responsibility would more clearly lie with the individual teacher who would sign upon receipt of the kits. (Lesson from Tsunami) (Abrioux, 2006, p.22)
  • Where supply support entails a significant amount of equipment, e.g. for newborn care, the programme must include assessment of/support to capacity for equipment maintenance.It is necessary to have in place an effective maintenance mechanism, to ensure future operational efficiency, so that the equipment is utilized fully and well maintained for future usage. (Lesson from the tsunami) (Goyder, 2007, p.52; Goyder, 2008, p.57)
  • Clarify which supplies should be used at what phase. Having three sets of kits in Aceh (the School in a Box kits / recreation kits; the individual student packs (as part of the Back to School Campaign) and the primary textbook distribution) was confusing; there was little clarity on which kit should be used when. If multiple supplies are distributed, it is strategic to seek to make a packaging distinction in the materials to emphasize a transition beyond the immediate post-emergency phase. There is a need for programmes to set deadlines, where possible, by which they plan to end the distribution of pre-packaged materials and shift to more sustainable support. (Lesson from Tsunami)(Abrioux, 2006, p.17-18)
  • Beware of tensions over different standards of kits. In the Programme of Extended Assistance to Returns (PEAR) in the DRC, kits of non-food items (NFIs) and primary school rehabilitation and education material were distributed. Since the IDP/refugee repatriation kit was more generous than the NFI kit, there was a fear that tensions could escalate. It was felt that rather than harmonise the kits, sensitization sessions would help to mitigate any tension. (Davies, 2008, p.46)
  • The utility of supplies provided by UNICEF and their partners can be enhanced through follow up and monitoring. Effective emergency intervention measures require the right supplies used appropriately. This could be achieved through providing sufficient follow-up monitoring and action, especially where supplies are distributed by or in tandem with partners.
  • In the Maldives, it was discovered that WASH equipment provided UNICEF and partners was not being used for several reasons. Insufficient communication between partners seemed to be the main problem. Also, recipients did not express their needs fully nor did suppliers provide adequate instructions. (UNICEF, 2006, p.37)

Bibliography

Abrioux, E., (2006) “The Use of Emergency Education and Recreational Kits in Aceh: A Review” United Nations Children’s Fund. p.17, p.18

Acacia Consultants Ltd. (2005) "End of Project Evaluation on the ECHO funded GOK/UNICEF Response to the Kenya Drought Emergency 2004-2005" United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF). p.27

Baumann, Erich., Loveless, Jeremy and Talbot, Rupert., “Technical Assessment of Emergency Water and Sanitation Supply Assistance Final Report.” 2006. SKAT. Swiss Resource Centre and Consultancies for Development. p.18

Brown, Maggie. (2005) "Evaluation of DFID-UNICEF Programme of Cooperation to Strengthen UNICEF Programming as it Applies to Humanitarian Response, 2000-2005". United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF). p.90

Freedman, Jim. (2001) “DESK REVIEW ON UNICEF HUMANITARIAN RESPONSE CAPACITY.” 2001. United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF). P.59

Goyder, Hugh et al., (2007) “Evaluation of the Programme of Co-operation between the Government of Sri Lanka and UNICEF, Final Report.” The Performance Assessment Resource Centre, Sheffield, UK. p.52

Goyder, Hugh. (2008) “Evaluation of UN Response to Tsunami in India.”United Nations Team for Tsunami Recovery Support (UNTRS). p.37

Grunewald, Francois. “Joint Unicef-DFID Evaluation of Unicef Preparedness and Early Response to the Darfur Emergency.” 2005. United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF). p.60

Grunewald, Francois (2006) “Somalia: Real Time Evaluation of the 2006 Emergency Response (Tsunami-Related).” United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF). p.29

Kirk, J. (2008) “Building back better: post-earthquake responses and educational challenges in Pakistan.” UNESCO. P.88

UNICEF (2003) “UNICEF Preparedness and Early Response in the Iraq Crisis: Results of the Iraq Sub-Regional Lessons Learned Workshop (Istanbul).” United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF). p.13

UNICEF (2005) "Lessons Learned from the Tsunami Response – Health and Nutrition (EMOPS, 2005).” United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF). p.6-7

UNICEF (2005) “Social Impact of Tsunami on Children.” United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF). p.10, p.12, p.34

UNICEF (2006) "The 2004 Indian Ocean Tsunami Disaster, Evaluation Of UNICEF’s Response (Emergency And Initial Recovery Phase) - Maldives.” United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF). p.35

EMOPS-HPS(KM) -- PD-HATIS – SD 2010-02-12