Second Zagreb Executive Summary

SECOND ZAGREB EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

EUROPEAN SECURITY: FORMER YUGOSLAVIA

Executive Summary

1. In 1989 Yugoslavia was a respected non-aligned state, albeit one experiencing a debt crisis. Former Yugoslavia now consists of seven states. But five EU states have not recognised Kosovo’s independence, while Greece objects to a state calling itself “Macedonia”, and is blocking its integration in the EU and NATO. In Macedonia however, the EU and NATO did combine to prevent conflict in 2001. Paras 1-2.

2. While tensions mounted in Yugoslavia, international attention was focussed on: German unification; the new era of democracy, peace, and unity in Europe, proclaimed in the Charter of Paris at the second CSCE summit in November 1990; and Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait. European leaders believed that market reforms, elections, and EC assistance would hold the country together. The US stood aside. One year after the CSCE summit, Serb forces massacred Croats in the devastated town of Vukovar. Croatia and Slovenia secured international recognition. The Bosnian Muslims decided to follow suit, ignoring Serb objections, setting the stage for the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) that began in April 1992. Paras 3-9.

3. After the massacre of Muslims in Srebrenica in July 1995, force was successfully deployed against the Serbs, under US leadership. But the peace agreement (December 1995) endowed BiH with an unworkable constitution, which recognises not only one state, but also two entities, group rights of three constituent peoples, other citizens, and the European Convention on Human Rights. The process of violent disintegration of Yugoslavia finally ended, where it had begun over 30 years ago, with Kosovo’s declaration of independence in 2008. Paras 10-13.

4. EU leaders mishandled Yugoslavia initially, failing to understand the root causes of the conflicts. They were unwilling, before Srebrenica, to use force in BiH. There was tension with the US, which did want to use force on behalf of the Bosnjaks. British and French forces in BiH were deployed, until July 1995, with a UN mandate, only to protect humanitarian relief convoys. Paras 14-19.

5. The results of the international post conflict rehabilitation effort have been disappointing, except in Croatia. Premature elections entrenched aggressive nationalist politicians in BiH. Children are subjected to divisive ethnic identity education. Arrangements for protecting minority rights do not appeal to people who regard themselves as members of “constituent nations”. Inter ethnic grievances, and a sense of victim hood persist. The EU does however have the means, especially the membership incentive to reform, to solve these problems. Paras 20-27.

6. But Balkan problems are now regarded as second order issues compared with crises in Ukraine and Greece. The EU may come to regret even benign neglect of poor unstable successor states, especially the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. The prospect is one of trouble ahead. Paras 29-29.