Knowing Things-in-Themselves:
Bridging the Gap Between Knowledge and Reality
Chienchih Chi (冀劍制)
StateUniversity of New York at Buffalo
Abstract
Knowledge is structured through our cognitive frameworks (or cognitive forms). This seems to mean that we do not directly know reality. What we know about the world is not necessarily the world-in-itself. In Kant’s words, we can know the real world only by knowing things-in-themselves, but it is impossible for human beings to possess knowledge of things-in-themselves because we cannot know things through a God’s-eye view. Thus, according to Kant, there is a gap between knowledge and reality, or between epistemology and ontology.
For Kant, if we want to know things-in-themselves, we have to know them through a God’s-eye view, or, in Nagel’s words, we have to know things-in-themselves through a view from nowhere. Since we do not (and can never) possess these views to see things, it is impossible for us to know the ontological world. As long as we believe that one of these views is necessary for knowing reality, the gap between knowledge and reality can never be bridged. However, Searle does not agree that we have to apply a God’s-eye view (or a view from nowhere) to know things-in-themselves. Based on Searle’s argument, we may find a way to bridge or avoid the gap between knowledge and reality.
The unbridgeable gap
We do not possess a God’s-eye view or a view from nowhere to see the world. We use the so-called third-person point of view to understand objective concepts and believe that these concepts describe things that are supposed to exist in the world objectively and independently. For example, the computer in front of me may be seen as exactly the same thing by me and other people from a third-person point of view. In addition, even without being recognized by any cognitive agent, we believe that those objective entities still exist. The third-person point of view is supposed to see something objective. When we deal with things in our daily life, these objective entities or properties may be thought of as things-in-themselves. This terminology was invented by Kant, but Kant does not believe that we really possess knowledge of things-in-themselves (Kant1781; 1965). Thus, things-in-themselves may not be a good term for describing entities that are understood through the third-person point of view.
According to Thomas Nagel’s explanation, the third-person viewpoint is still a kind of point of view, which is somewhat related to the cognitive agent. Things-in-themselves are not supposed to be known through the third-person point of view, but rather through a God’s-eye view or a view from nowhere, which seems totally irrelevant to any cognitive agent (Nagel 1986).
In order to discuss this issue clearly, let’s use absolutely objective to express properties (of things-in-themselves) that are supposed to be known through a view from nowhere, but use objective to express properties known through the third-person point of view. This means that cognitive agents do not use any specific viewpoint to understand these absolutely objective properties, and through a view from nowhere (or a God’s-eye view), different cognitive agents (including other animals, aliens, and computer beings) will see exactly the same things. Thus, if these cognitive agents have concepts about these properties or things, then these concepts will also be the same.
However, Nagel argues that we can never possess these types of concepts. All human concepts are more or less subjective and we can never get outside of ourselves completely to know something absolutely objective. He says,
“The ambition to get outside of ourselves has obvious limits, but it is not always easy to know where they are or when they have been transgressed. We rightly think that the pursuit of detachment from our initial standpoint is an indispensable method of advancing our understanding of the world and of ourselves, increasing our freedom in thought and action, and becoming better. But since we are who we are, we can’t get outside of ourselves completely. Whatever we do, we remain subparts of the world with limited access to the real nature of the rest of it and of ourselves. There is no way of telling how much of reality lies beyond the reach of present or future objectivity or any other conceivable form of human understanding (Nagel 1986, p.6).
For Nagel, we can never possess absolutely objective knowledge because we can’t get outside of ourselves completely. If we consider the absolutely objective world as the ontological world (the world of reality), then the epistemological world (the world we know or understand) is different from the ontological world. In addition, no matter how far we can go to see things more objectively, there is no way we will arrive at an absolutely objective understanding of the world. This also means that we can never know reality. Thus, there is an unbridgeable gap between our knowledge and reality.
Searle’s view of reality
If the explanation of the Kantian conception of things-in-themselves correctly describes the ontological world, then the gap is unbridgeable. However, Searle does not believe that the explanation or definition of things-in-themselves is correct.
Searle does not agree that knowing reality directly as it is in itself requires that it be known through a view from nowhere or a God’s-eye view (Searle 1998, p.21). Searle argues that when we see a chair, we directly see the chair in itself – there is nothing behind it that must be viewed through a God’s-eye view. Searle indicates that we use a point of view to state facts or things, but we do not use a point of view to invent facts or things (Searle 1998, p.22). These facts and things that are viewed form a point of view refer to the ontological world, rather than only our epistemological world. Since Searle does not believe that there are ontological facts behind the facts that we see from a point of view, he claims that all we see from a point of view are ontological facts. If we claim that these facts are simply knowledge, based on Searle’s view, there is no ground for these facts, which means that we invent facts or things. This is absurd. Thus, Searle claims that what we see from a point of view are ontological facts.
Searle’s definition of ontology is reasonable and it implies that there is no absolute objectivity. However, for Kant and Nagel, things-in-themselves are absolutely objective, and cannot be known through any view. According to this definition of ontology, there exists a gap between the real world and our knowledge of the world.
This debate between Kant-Nagel and Searle is not really about how to bridge the gap originating from Kant’s explanation of things-in-themselves, but about whether there really is such a gap. According to Searle’s explanation of things-in-themselves, there is no such gap. Thus, the gap is not really bridged but rather avoided in Searle’s explanation of things-in-themselves. However, we have reasons to argue that Searle’s explanation is more plausible. In addition, we can also point out that the conception of absolute objectivity may originate from a mistaken thought.
Problems with Kant’s things-in-themselves
The conception of absolute objectivity originates from the distinction between subjectivity and objectivity. Based on this distinction, we are able to imagine that objects existing in the external world have their own (absolutely objective) properties. However, we have reasons to believe that the distinction between subjectivity and objectivity is problematic. In addition, we also have reasons to claim that the Kantian definition of things-in-themselves is bad in some respects.
First of all, suppose there is a property C that belongs to an object O, and C is absolutely objective. This means that C can never be known through any viewpoint.[1] Since any conceivable cognitive mechanism must recognize or understand something through a cognitive framework, which can be understood as a viewpoint, this fact implies that no conceivable cognitive mechanism can know what C is. If we believe that God knows what C is, then we must say that God does not know C through a conceivable cognitive mechanism. However, we do not have any idea about what kind of knowing process it (God’s cognitive mechanism) could be. Nor do we have any idea about why we can be assured that C must exist. In this situation, whether C exists or not is not an important issue for us to understand the world. This means that we do not have to define things-in-themselves this way.
Second, if it really happens that the property C exists, since no conceivable cognitive mechanism can really know it, any knowledge about its existence does not seem useful. In addition, we know that not all concepts can refer to something real in the world. Some concepts may be simply produced through a mistaken conceptual framework. If we have reasons to believe that the idea of absolute objectivity may be one of them, we should not insist on this kind of definition of the ontological world. Since the problem of the irreducibility of the mind may imply that the distinction between subjectivity and objectivity is a mistaken distinction and since the conception of absolute objectivity originates from the mistaken distinction, we have reasons to believe that absolute objectivity may be a mistaken concept.[2] Thus, we have reasons to claim that the Kantian definition of things-in-themselves may come from a mistaken thought.
Third, the Kantian conception of things-in-themselves presupposes that there is a God’s-eye view or a view from nowhere. However, as Searle indicates, if there is really such a thing as a God’s-eye view or a view from nowhere, there are many things we cannot see from these views. In Searle’s example, the views cannot see screwdrivers, cars, bathtubs, etc., because we must see them through a point of view (Searle 1995, p.12). This means that social reality cannot be seen as reality through these views.
To argue this, Searle distinguishes between intrinsic and observer-relative features of the world. For Searle, intrinsic features of reality are those that exist independently of all mental states, and observer-relative features are those that exist relative to the intentionality of observers, users, etc (Searle 1995, p.9-12). He adds,
“It is, for example, an intrinsic feature of the object in front of me that it has a certain mass and a certain chemical composition. It is made partly of wood, the cells of which are composed of cellulose fibers, and also partly of metal, which is itself composed of metal alloy molecules. All these features are intrinsic. But it is also true to say of the very same object that it is a screwdriver. When I describe it as a screwdriver, I am specifying a feature of the object that is observer or user relative. It is a screwdriver only because people use it as (or make it for the purpose of, or regard it as) a screwdriver” (Searle 1995, p.9-10).
After distinguishing these features, Searle indicates,
“From a God-eye view, from outside the world, all the features of the world would be intrinsic, including intrinsic relational features such as the feature that people in our culture regard such and such objects as screwdrivers. God could not see screwdrivers, cars, bathtubs, etc, because intrinsically speaking there are no such things” (Searle 1995, p.12).
Without a specific point of view, there are only intrinsic features and we cannot explain how people use these artifacts and why people need them. Without understanding these observer-relative features and facts, these artifacts lose their meanings. In addition, if we do not adopt a point of view, we know nothing of functions.When we say, “The function of the heart is to pump blood” from “The heart pumps blood,” we are doing something more than recording these intrinsic facts. We are situating these facts relative to a system of values that we hold (Searle 1995, p.14-15).
Thus, Searle does not think that it is good to use a God’s-eye view to define reality; otherwise, we must say that cars do not exist in the world. This is obviously not a proper result. Thus, the Kantian definition of ontology poorly explains some things in the world.
Based on these reasons, we can conclude that the Kantian conception of things-in-themselves should be abandoned. Since we have no idea about what a God’s-eye view or a view from nowhere could be, if we use these views to define ontological reality, then we simply make a claim that it is impossible for human beings to know reality. In addition, this definition of ontology will result in a far from acceptable conclusion that no conceivable cognitive mechanism (or even no possible cognitive mechanism) can know what ontological reality is because a cognitive mechanism is a cognitive system that uses certain ways to detect, explain, and understand facts or things, and this is a point of view from which to see something. If we adopt a definition of ontology that can only be viewed from a God’s-eye view or a view from nowhere, then we will fall into this embarrassing situation. Searle’s definition can avoid this problem.
However, there has to be a reason why Kant, Nagel, and many other philosophers prefer this explanation of things-in-themselves. I think the reason why many philosophers like using this definition is probably that it can be a foundation for realism. If we believe that the world objectively exists, then things-in-themselves are the real nature of objects that exist in the world. The real nature of objects can only be known through a God’s-eye view that is supposedly based on no subjective viewpoint. As Putnam indicates, the whole content of realism lies in the claim that it makes sense to think of a God’s-eye view or better a view from nowhere (Putnam 1990, p.23).
It seems that if we do not accept the Kantian conception of things-in-themselves, then we have a problem in accepting realism. However, this is not true. Based on Searle’s suggestion, we can define realism as the view that “there is a way that things are that is logically independent of all human representations” (Searle 1995, p.155). But how is it possible that we can adopt this definition without thinking about (absolutely objective) things-in-themselves? Searle explains, “Realism does not say how things are but only that there is a way that they are” (Searle 1995, p.155). We can admit that the world exists independently without any cognitive agent recognizing it. We do not have to accept that the real properties of the world are absolutely objective, needing to be known through a God’s-eye view or no point of view. This means that objects can exist independently but they have to be known through a point of view. However, this also means that different viewpoints can view the ontological world differently and they are all ontological properties. This seems a bad result from Searle’s explanation of things-in-themselves.
Discussions of Searle’s explanation of reality
Without the Kantian conception of things-in-themselves, we can still accept realism and the world can still objectively or independently exist. However, there is a problem in Searle’s definition. If all points of view can see something ontological, how can we explain illusions? How can we make a mistake in seeing things? Is Searle ready to deny the existence of illusions and mistaken views of the world?
We may adopt Searle’s explanation or definition of ontology to believe that we can see reality from a point of view, but we cannot simply claim that all features and facts viewed from every point of view show ontological reality. Otherwise, illusions and mistakes are impossible. In addition, some viewpoints may contradict to each other, how can we accept them all? Furthermore, a viewpoint may apply a conceptual framework to explain the world, but not all conceptual frameworks can correctly describe the world. For example, the Newtonian conceptual framework of the physical world is different from Einstein’s conceptual framework. We can also consider them different points of view to explain the physical world. However, it is not proper to claim that both of them correctly describe the ontological world.
In order to properly keep Searle’s explanation of things-in-themselves, it is better to claim that some points of view or conceptual frameworks may lead us to understand the ontological world, but some will not. This will explain why we may have illusions and mistaken views. However, the problem is how we can distinguish these points of view and conceptual frameworks. My suggestion is that, since Searle seems also to believe that a complete causal explanation of the world is possible, then all points of view and conceptual frameworks that are consistent with the complete causal explanation can be considered a view that can reveal (part of) the ontological reality. Those viewpoints or conceptual frameworks that are inconsistent with the complete causal explanation should be considered mistaken ways to see the world. This will remove the possibility that we think of illusions or mistaken views of the world as ontological realities because entities understood through mistaken perceptions will not possess exactly the same causal roles as the real things.