Research Methodology And

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CHAPTER 2

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY AND

REVIEW OF LITERATURE

India has been combating terrorism since independence, yet terrorist strikes are continuing unabated. Infact, it has spread to areas other than Jammu & Kashmir and the Northeastern states. In spite of India’s vast experience of combating terrorism, nothing much has been written about the Response Mechanism for Combating Terrorism and specifically so by adopting ‘Good Governance’ based response mechanism. Researchinga subject which is very common not only in India but in the world was very challenging. Though sufficient literature on the subject as regards the Spectrum of Terrorism is available, but very less literature is available on the methodology to combat terrorism and specifically on ‘Good Governance’ based response mechanism. Thus, in effect it was unexplored subject and some gaps existed as regards response mechanism as none dwells at any length on the subject of researcher’s thesis.

REVIEW OF LITERATURE

The study entailed examination of relevant literature available on the subject. In connection with the study of the pertinent literature a number of libraries were visited, a large number of books and periodicals were consulted (Bibliography refers) and those relevant have been reviewed. This review of study is limited to certain countries which are victims of scourge of terrorism.

1.Major General Afsir Karim, (1991), Counter Terrorism: The Pakistan Factor, (First Published by Lancer International, B-3 GulmoharParkNew Delhi).

Author has candidly expressed in his study that our response to combating terrorism has so far been on conventional lines mixed with political rhetoric. That this approach has not succeeded is obvious enough. Unfortunately it has, on the other hand, fostered further alienation. Unless we fully realise that we are facing a new kind of situation and condition, the problem of our response will continue to grow. Major General Afsir Karim opines that the basic infrastructure to launch terrorist attacks is located in Pakistan or Pak occupied Kashmir(besides certain other world centres). Therefore sealing of borders, killing of terrorists in encounter, body count, capture of arms inside our own country have little impact on the overall situation. These are defensive actions which have no direct effect on the training centres, sources of finance and weapons or bases of operations across the borders. He has highlighted that our administrative machinery, Para Military Forces or Armed Forces are neither trained nor organized to take on the challenge sponsored terrorism poses. Terrorism in J&K is NOT an ordinary Law and Order problem which can be tackled by the existing administrative machinery or ‘Police Methods’ alone. The deployment, arming, harbouring and launching of terrorists from across the border or Line of Control are acts of belligerence and indirect aggression by Pakistan and unless we develop a proper counter - organization and techniques to combat this, terrorism will remain rampant.

In this book, author examines and discusses political , economic, social and military measures required to hit at the roots of terrorism in J&K wherein he has suggested theories with practical means and methods based on ample experience, and also of other countries where relevant. In this kind of war, terrorists and innocent citizens are co-sufferers and mere pawns in the game. The only gainer is Pakistan, the sponsoring state in the case, when harsh or highly repressive measures are taken against our own population. It has been a matter of speculation and debate if a conventional war against Pakistan can solve the problem. As things stand, ‘another’ war is unlikely to solve the current problems between India and Pakistan. There are however many alternatives short of a conventional war which can make sponsoring and support of terrorism a difficult proposition for Pakistan. A conventional war at this juncture is not likely to be decisive and it would not therefore provide permanent solutions; on the other hand an appropriate strategy and organisation with sound operational concepts can adequately deal with the situation. Presently we should aim to paralyse the hand which holds the dagger and need not attempt to cut it off as this could lead to many undesirable side effects.

2.Gill KPS and Sahni Ajai, (2001), Terror Containment - Perspectives on India’s Internal Security, (Gyan Publishing House- New Delhi).

Consequent to carrying out review of India’s internal security with reference to terrorism, the authors have recommended to set up a central agency for the co-ordination of all counter-terrorism efforts, initiatives and policies, so that the national interest and policy are realized through the vast multiplicity of discrete and apparently unrelated actions of the numerous divisions, departments and jurisdictions that currently exist. Such an agency would also be tasked to carry out a continuous assessment and analysis of existing and emerging threats, to coordinate flows and maximize utilization of available intelligence from a multiplicity of sources, and to continuously define policies and protocols for response to each new area or pattern of terrorist activity, and to ensure that these are translated into action by the appropriate division and department of government. This agency should also be statutorily required to periodically apprise both the government and Parliament of prevailing threat perceptions, and the actions required to meet these. This central agency would not be the executive agency for counter-terrorism response, nor would it have the authority to intervene at the tactical and operational level. It would, however, define the strategic framework of counter-terrorism operations, devise protocols for response to a wide variety of possible threat situations, produce the training materials and structures for the creation of requisite proficiency in the execution of these protocols in concerned agencies and personnel, and generally put into place the systems that are required to safeguard the nation and its people against terrorism. The agency would also act as a clearing house for a great deal of inter-departmental and inter-agency dissemination of information, and as a pressure group to bring the policies and practice of various branches and departments of government into conformity with national counter-terrorism perspectives and policy. Crucially, this agency must not be constituted along the pattern of existing ‘security advisory’as these have no powers of independent access to information, intelligence, or other resources for effective action.

Nevertheless, the intention of the exercise is to emphasise that it is now imperative that India’s future responses to terrorism are far more scientific, systematic and consistent than they have been in the past, and comprehensive and radical institutional and procedural changes are needed if this is to be achieved. The importance of the personalised responses and charismatic leadership that have dominated the systems of crisis management in the past, needs to be minimized. Such responses and leadership have, of course, on occasion, contributed to the resolution of problems. But even where they succeed, they do great damage to the general systems of the institutional response, undermining the initiative and confidence of the large majority of officers, who then feel that a system solution is not possible, and that all crises demand the intervention of ‘higher authorities’ or high profile leaders. To the extent that such ‘higher’ intervention is usually not available in the immediate aftermath of a crisis, the state’s responses are inevitably delayed, and necessarily inefficient. More often than not, however, such ‘higher’ interventions, ordinarily exercised from a safe and comfortable distance from the actual crisis, and on the basis of severely inadequate and inaccurate information streams, have led to enormous failures, causing significant damage to the nation, and generating destructive processes. It is now clearly time that a meaningful, flexible and effective institutional response is devised to the mounting challenge of terrorism of India.

3.Paul M Maniscalco and Hank T. Chiristen (2002), Understanding Terrorism and Managing the Consequences (New Jersey).

The book, ‘Understanding Terrorism and Managing the Consequences’ offers a comprehensive outlook towards contemporary terrorism and deliberates upon the management of its consequences. Paul Masicalco and Hank Christen have covered the issue in great details and in a simplistic manner. Apart from covering the issues ranging from biological and nuclear terrorism to cyber terrorism, the authors specifically amplify on how to deal with the consequences of the same. The book is not only a learning tool but an operational reference. The vision and operational management tools that are imparted are invaluable to all levels of emergency responders, planners, Law enforcement, fire service, emergency managers, elected leaders and managers with simulations which are thought-provoking.

The authors opine that by providing important information to the responders, the functional areas can be handled effectively and any possible damage in a crisis situation be minimized. They have candidly conveyed the message of safe and effective response strategies and addressed the implementation and operational application issues effectively. The authors have done a remarkable job with synthesizing complex data and rendering it into a discussional and informational manner easily comprehended by all emergency planners and responders. The discussions of the incident management system as applied to terrorism/tactical violence response outlines procedures that will ensure a coordinated and effective response plan. The writers agree that one cannot discount the critical and vital role of the national defence forces, which help in protecting the citizens/victim of adverse forms of terrorism, however it remains important for the citizens to be aware of what they can do and help and protect themselves too.

4.Anthony H Cordesman (2002), Terrorism Asymmetric Warfare and Weapons of Mass Destruction, United States of America.

The author highlights that US being the ‘World’s super power’ makes it the primary target of terrorist attacks and the events of September 2001 has reinforced his belief. There is a wide spectrum of potential threats to the U.S. homeland that do not involve overt attacks by states using long-range missiles or conventional military forces. Such threats include covert attacks by state actors, state use of proxies, independent terrorist and extremist attacks by foreign groups or individuals, and independent terrorist and extremist attacks by residents of the United States. These threats are currently limited in scope and frequency, but are emerging as potentially significant issues for future U.S. security. In this comprehensive work, Cordesman argues that new threats require new thinking, and offers a range of recommendations, from expanding the understanding of what constitutes a threat and bolstering Homeland defense measures, to bettering resource allocation and improving intelligence gathering and analysis. New threats require new thinking -therefore, United States need to close the gap between counter-terrorism and asymmetric warfare in ways that go beyond narrowly defined defence and response efforts.

No pattern of actual attacks on U.S. territory has yet emerged that provides a clear basis for predicting how serious any given form of attack might be in the future, what means of attack might be used, or how lethal new forms of attack might be. As a result, there is a major ongoing debate over the seriousness of the threat and how the U.S. government should react. This work is an invaluable contribution to that debate.

The practical problem is to decide exactly how to be deal with highly uncertain emerging threats in a world where the United States has limited resources and many other priorities. The United States cannot bet the lives and well being of its citizens on today’s threats and probabilities. There are many potentially hostile foreign and domestic sources of such threats, and some key threats like biological weapons involve rapidly changing technologies that will pose a steadily growing threat to the U.S. homeland. U.S. involvement in the world, the strength of U.S conventional and nuclear forces, and vulnerability at home are a dangerous combination, and unless the United States acts to improve deterrence and defense, the risk of major asymmetric and terrorist attacks involving CBRN weapons is likely to grow.

Finding the right mix of defense and response is extremely difficult, however, and it is far easier to call for dramatic action than to determine what actions will really succeed and be cost effective and then execute them. The federal government is making progress in many areas and is laying the groundwork for improved cooperation with states, localities, the private sector, and the public. There are many “true believers” who feel that a given threat will or will not materialize in a given form. Given the inherently uncertain nature of predictions as to who will be a threat, the means and effectiveness of attack, it is almost certain that some of these “true believers” will eventually prove to be right. The problem is that there is no sufficient evidence to say which threats are most important or to predict the means of attack and level of effectiveness.

The events of September 2001 have shown that federal programs are now forced to deal with an extremely broad spectrum of potential threats that some of these threats will emerge as threats to the U.S homeland. As a result, each agency and department tends to treat the threat in terms of its own mission and institutional bias, and this problem cannot be resolved by central direction. Having the NSC, a “terrorism” czar, or an interagency forum agree on a given threat or threats will not affect the laws of probability. Uncertainty is simply uncertainty. Effective homeland defense must be based on responding to the patterns of threats that actually emerge and to shifts in the most likely contingency reasoned requirements. It is virtually an iron law that any effort will fail if it is based on the current theories of that threat which may emerge in a given area. The guiding principle is that there is a timeline of at least a quarter of a century of uncertain risk.

No program on analysis made today can possibly be based on the correct priorities. The issue is rather how quickly and effectively programs can anticipate change and react to it. The key to a successful result is that sub optimization must be deliberate and subject to broad review, rather than simply evolve by accident. Whatever the federal government does, it must involve an explicit and well reasoned balance between:-

-Offense and defense. Actions overseas that are in concert with its friends and allies and measures actually taken in the United States.

-Defense and response. Threats in the spectrum of threats requiring special action by the federal government as part of homeland defense and the role played by conventional law enforcement.

5.AlexanderYonah (2003), Combating Terrorism: Strategies of Countries, Manas Publications New Delhi.

The tragic events of 11 September 2002, and the consequent “war on terrorism” have made the question of effective counterterrorism policy a growing public concern, not just in the United States but throughout the world. Yonah Alexander has assembled a fascinating collection of pre-and post 9/11 perceptions of terrorism and how it has been dealt within a number of nations. This book’s insights are derived from professional assessments of what has gone right and what has gone wrong in the struggles of the United States, Argentina, Colombia, Peru, Spain, Britain, Israel, Turkey, India, and Japan with a wide range of terrorist movements in recent years. Yonah addresses the same set of questions to allow for cross national comparisons of strategies and an assessment of counter terrorism practices.

• What is the governmental and public perception of the sources of terrorism?
• How successful have government and international terrorism been?
• What factors influence a government’s willingness or ability to cooperate with other countries in combating terrorism?
• To what degree are certain countries “ natural hosts” of either terrorist groups or propensities that target Western or closely allied interests?
• To what degree are terrorist organizations mainly concerned about winning political participation in their target countries?
• Which counterterrorism strategies work, and which do not?
• What are the lessons of past experiences for future counterterrorism responses at the national, regional and global levels?

He has recommended some common characteristics essential for successful antiterrorist campaigns: good intelligence ; being candid with one’s own people ; dealing with root causes where practical and firm resolve. In any war against terror – in addition to taking the fight to the enemy- it will be vital for government and industry to work together to fix major vulnerabilities in network and to restructure their incentives so that our societies and economies evolve in more decentralized, distributed, resilient directions. Also the tie between terrorists and states that support them needs to be ascertained discreetly and hard decisions need to be taken to drain the swamps from which terrorists come and where they find sustenance and support.