1
TWO VISIONS OF LIBERTY: BERLIN AND HAYEK
I
[Sir] Isaiah Berlin and Friedrich August Hayek -– the two most powerful contributors to modern liberal philosophy– have marked their participation in contemporary discussion in the most different ways. Berlin’s single essay, having produced vast and passionate argument, though published over a quarter of a century ago, still draws attracts considerable comment. Hayek’s great system of ideas, expressed in many volumes and papers, is still in process of elaboration. The dDifferent intellectual backgrounds of the two theorists have shaped the character of their achievements. Berlin, being a philosopher, has concentrated upon the purely philosophical aspect of liberty. Hayek, as an economist with a deep knowledge of legal and political issues, has mainly developed the economic dimension of freedom. Dissimilarities between the two contributions makes it particularly tempting to search for common ground.
II
One may ask whether it is at all possible to compare such different achievements. The task is more complex than might appear at the first sight. For it is not only the disparity of the preoccupations of the two authors that makes their approaches so distinct. It is my interpretation that the main difference lies in the levels of theorizing. While Hayek remains mostly on the theoretical level, building up his own body of doctrine, Berlin formulates a meta-theory of liberty, i.e. a theory of theories. Let me now elaborate on the latter remark. Ascription to Berlin by his critics of an assumed liberal doctrine of freedom has long been a source of serious misinterpretations. Berlin’s analysis of the two concepts of liberty, and his thesis that the negative one gives better safeguards for individual freedom, is essentially a discussion, rather than a body of doctrine.[1].
However, some part of Hayek’s reflections, pertaining to the philosophical dimension of freedom, also belongs to the meta-theoretical level. The following provisions would make a comparison between Berlin’s and Hayek’s approaches possible. First, what can be considered, is the philosophical aspect of liberty, which has been developed by both authors. The basic sources of their views, then, would include: Berlin’s “Two Concepts of Liberty,” with the Introduction to the later edition, and Hayek’s The Constitution of Liberty, which contains the fullest presentation of this topic. Only occasionally will I rely on other writings. Second, the legal and the economic dimensions of liberty, so fully developed in Hayek’s doctrine, will receive only brief comment. Though Berlin does not, in principle, take up these problems, his standpoint can be derived, to a certain extent, from his writings. I shall draw a comparison between the legal and economic views of the authors within the limits set by Berlin’s preoccupations.
III
Despite his strong grounding in economics, Hayek appreciates the great importance of political philosophy:
“though I still regard myself as mainly an economist, I have come to feel more and more that the answers to many of the pressing social questions of our time are to be found ultimately in the recognition of principles that lie outside the scope of technical economics or of any other single discipline. Though it was from an original concern with problems of economic policy that I started, I have been slowly led to the ambitious and perhaps presumptuous task of approaching them through a comprehensive restatement of the basic principles of philosophy of freedom.”[2]
Hayek ends where Berlin starts, with his warning against [the] diminution[HH1] of political thought:
“when ideas are neglected by those who ought to attend them -– that is to say, those who have been trained to think critically about ideas -– they sometimes acquire an unchecked momentum and an irresistible power over multitudes of men that may grow too violent to be affected by rational criticism.”[3]
Both authors ascribe special status to liberty within their systems of ideas. They justify their positions, however, in different ways. For Berlin, the value of liberty flows from his recognition of the plurality of human aims and the indispensability of making choices:
“The world we encounter in ordinary experience is one in which we are faced with choices between ends equally ultimate, and claims equally absolute, the realisation of some of which must inevitably involve the sacrifice of others.”[4]
“If, as I believe, the ends of men are many, and not all of them in principle compatible with each other, then the possibility of conflict —– and of tragedy —– can never wholly be eliminated from human life, either personal or social.”[5]
It is Berlin’s thesis that men put such high value on liberty just because of this “inescapable characteristic of the human condition.”[6]
Hayek puts forward a quite different justification for the special position of liberty. His contention flows straight from the idea of spontaneous order in society, that forms the central core of his political philosophy: “the case for individual freedom rests chiefly on the recognition of the inevitable ignorance of all of us concerning a great many of the factors on which the achievement of our ends and welfare depends.”[7]
According to Hayek the level of our ignorance increases with the scientific advance, for:
“The more men know, the smaller the share of all that knowledge becomes that any one mind can absorb. The more civilized we become, the more relatively ignorant must each individual be of the facts on which the working of his civilization depends.”[8]
On John Gray’s interpretation, most of the knowledge, on which social life depends, is of a primordially practical character. Thus, it cannot be concentrated in a single brain, natural or mechanical, not because it is very complicated, but rather because it is embodied in habits and dispositions and governs our conduct via rules which are often inarticulate.[9] Our inevitable ignorance creates the need for providing conditions, in which the greatest variety of experiences and opportunities will be generated: “Liberty is essential in order to leave room for the unforeseeable and unpredictable (...)….”[10] In Hayek’s view the value of liberty stems from its indispensability to the further advance and preservation of civilization. Both authors point to hypothetical situations in which liberty would lose its value. Thus, for Berlin, this would be the moment of realization of the perfect stateState, abolishing all the conflicts between human aims, while for Hayek it would be the achievement of omniscience, embracing all future wants and desires. The counterContrafactuality of these two visions confers value on liberty. The status of freedom in Berlin’s and Hayek’s views, though similar, is not identical. Isaiah Berlin, in the Introduction to his essay, rejectsfutes the objection, that he makes liberty an absolute value:
“Nothing that I assert (...)… about the frontiers of individual liberty (and this applies to the liberty of groups and associations too) should be taken to mean that freedom in any of its meanings is either inviolable, or sufficient, in some absolute sense. It is not inviolable, because abnormal conditions may occur (...)….”[11]
Nevertheless, just because of the fact that freedom is “an inalienable ingredient in what makes human beings human,”[12] it could be curtailed only under exceptional circumstances. Thus, though not being an absolute value, it undoubtedly possesses a special status:
“precisely because we regard such situations as being wholly abnormal, and such measures as abhorrent, to be condoned only in emergencies so critical that the choice is between great evils, we recognize that under normal conditions, for the great majority of men, at most times, in most places, these frontiers are sacred, that is to say, that to overstep them leads to inhumanity.”[13]
Unlike Berlin, Hayek seems to ascribe an absolute character to liberty: “Like all moral principles, it demands that it be accepted as a value in itself, as a principle that must be respected without asking whether the consequences in the particular instance will be beneficial.”[14] Only such an understanding of liberty, in Hayek’s opinion, creates safeguards for its respectability: “freedom can be preserved only if it is treated as a supreme principle which must not be sacrificed for particular advantages (...)….”[15] For liberty is not merely one particular value, but the source and condition of most moral values.[16]
IV
In spite of some differences, Berlin’s and Hayek’s philosophical conceptions of liberty show general similarity. Both authors accept the negative approach and associate liberty with a respected sphere of independence. They ascribe the other interpretations to the efforts aimed at the protection of values distinct from liberty. But here the kinship between the two standpoints ends, and we encounter a serious difference. Isaiah Berlin approves of the two equally -valid understandings of the concept of liberty, namely the negative and the positive ones. He identifies the first interpretation with the lack of obstacles to the potential choices, and the second, with the wish on the part of the individual to be his own master. The two concepts may, to a certain extent, overlap, but they are not the same. While “freedom from” is a political ideal, “freedom to” provides[HH2] a moral demand. However, the positive concept, when connected with the idea of two selves and extended over some supra-individual entities, may threaten political liberty. Thus it is “freedom from,” that, according to Berlin, provides a “truer and more human ideal.”[17] Unlike Berlin, Hayek accepts only one understanding of liberty. He admits that several other long-established alternative uses[HH3] may also be employed, though not without care. Nevertheless, “in our sense freedom is one, varying in degree but not in kind.”[18]
Hayek’s approach can be represented by the following formula – “liberty means a state in which a man is not subject to coercion by the arbitrary will of another or others.”[19] This definition comprises several elements that demand further elaboration. In principle, only an individual can be a subject of liberty. Hayek’s terminology reflects this conviction through his frequent use of the phrase: “individual liberty.” He indicates, that the term “personal freedom” would also be legitimate. Berlin, too, relates “the “safer” and thus preferred understanding of liberty to the individual. Nevertheless, he is not as precise as Hayek in terminological questions. Usually he employs the phrases: “negative liberty” or “freedom from.” He happens, however, to use the following terms: “individual,” “social,” or “political” liberty”, as implicit synonyms. Incidentally, it is significant that Hayek understands “political liberty” quite differently. In his interpretation the term is much closer to Berlin’s "positive freedom." This point is elaborated later in the paper.
Both authors place the negative, individual liberty in athe social context. This point is underlined within this remark of Hayek's reflection: “ ‘’freedom’ refers solely to a relation of men to other men, and the only infringement ofn it is coercion by men.”[20]Berlin’s viewpoint on this question seems to be similar, though less narrow -– he relates violations of liberty solely to the “interference of other human beings,” both direct or indirect, intentional or unintentional.[21] Let us now concentrate on the actual wording of the two approaches. While Hayek defines freedom by as the lack of coercion, Berlin employs for the same purpose the following phrase: the lack of obstacles to potential choices. Despite the difference in the definitions, freedom, in both cases, is identified with a certain sphere of independence. This understanding is strictly “negative,” for it includes neither “inner” nor “outer” conditions of realizing the liberty of the individual. Here we encounter another distinction between the two approaches. Berlin defines the sphere of non-interference very loosely, not tackling the question of its borders. He only remarks, that “the minimum area that men require if (...)… dehumanization is to be averted, a minimum which other men, or institutions created by them, are liable to invade, is no more than a minimum; its frontiers are not to be extended against sufficiently stringent claims on the part of other values, including those of positive liberty itself.”[22] He insists, however, that this minimum area must be respected if we are not to “degrade or deny our nature.”[23][HH4]
Hayek justifies the postulate of preserving an independent sphere in a different way: “The rationale of securing to each individual a known range within which he can decide on his actions is to enable him to make the fullest use of his knowledge, especially ofn his concrete and often unique knowledge of the particular circumstances of time and place.”[24] This argument is closely connected with his idea of spontaneous order in society. Unlike Berlin, Hayek provides a criterion for the delimitation of an independent private sphere. He contends that such borders should not be treated as fixed once for all. Moreover, they cannot be marked by the will of any man or group of men. The solution to the problem “rests on the recognition of general rules, governing the conditions under which objects and circumstances become part of the protected sphere of a person or persons. The acceptance of such rules enables each member of a society to shape the content of his protected sphere and all members to recognize what belongs to their sphere and what does not.”[25] It is not possible, then, to enumerate all the rights and protected interests that should be recognized as belonging to the respected area. Nevertheless, Hayek comments upon several of the most typical elements which, according to him, are inherent in thise sphere: private property, a right to privacy and secrecy, and the conception of a man’s house as his castle.
Finally, let me discuss the significant changes that have taken place in the views of both authors. What strikes the reader of Berlin and Hayek, the latter in particular, are the modifications introduced by them with reference to the character of individual liberty (namely its “subjectivity” or “objectivity”). Isaiah Berlin in the first edition of his essay defined freedom subjectively, as the lack of obstacles to realization of man’s desires. Thus, the scope of liberty depended on an individual’s own estimation. In his Introduction to the later edition Berlin changed the wording of his standpoint, putting forward a new understanding of freedom as the lack of obstacles to the potential human choices. In this way the notion acquired an objective character. Hayek’s formulations have evolved in the opposite direction. When compared with his older definition, the latter one, put forward in Studies in Philosophy, Politics and Economics and enriched by the following modification, has become openly subjective: “To constitute coercion it is (...)… necessary that the action of the coercer should put the coerced in a position which he regards as worse than that in which he would have been without that action.”[26] These shifts in the positions of both authors have been caused by the critical discussions of their ideas.
My own view is, however, that the “objective” understanding of freedom provides a “safer” definition, in so far as it secures better safeguards for protecting liberty. When an individual is conceived of as having a decisive voice on the scope of her liberty, the term becomes relative and thus opens the door to techniques of manipulation techniques.
V
Let us now briefly consider Hayek’s catalogue of other interpretations of the concept of liberty. It may be instructive to look for their counterparts in Berlin’s reflection work and to compare the attitudes of both authors. Hayek starts his analysis from the concept of “political freedom,” understood as “the participation of men in the choice of their government.”[27] In his opinion such an interpretation should not be confused with the notion of individual liberty, for “a free people in this sense is not necessarily a people of free men.”[28] What Hayek calls “political freedom” is, for Berlin, one of the forms of the positive freedom (i.e. that of collective self-direction). Though Berlin also employs this term, he understands it quite differently, namely as individual liberty. Despite this ambiguity, Berlin’s attitude towards the aforementioned form of the collective freedom seems to be very close to that of Hayek’s: “The desire to be governed by myself, or at any rate to participate in the process by which my life is to be controlled, may be as deep a wish as that of for a free area for action, and perhaps historically older. But it is not a desire for the same thing. So different is it, indeed, as to have led in the end to the great clash of ideologies that dominates our world.”[29] Another form of collective freedom is striving for national independence. Once again, Berlin and Hayek insist, that this interpretation should be differentiated from the notion of individual liberty. Berlin expands this understanding over to cover other social groups, such as classes, races, communities or professions. Thus both authors draw a distinction between individual and collective freedom, and warn against confusing them.
The next meaning discussed by Hayek is that of “inner,” “metaphysical,” or “subjective” freedom. In his interpretation such an understanding implies that a man should be guided in his actions by his own considered will, by his reason or lasting conviction, rather than by momentary impulse or circumstance. Besides, while choosing between alternatives, a person should not be subject to ignorance or superstition. According to Hayek, the “opposite of ‘«inner freedom’» is not coercion by others but the influence of temporary emotions, or moral or intellectual weakness.”[30] It follows then, that this meaning is different from that of “individual liberty,” and should not be confused with it. While Hayek merely confines himself to drawing the above distinction, Berlin devotes the major part of his essay to its discussion. His rough counterpart to Hayek’s “inner freedom” is “positive freedom” or “freedom to.” But the two understandings are not identical. For what can obstruct the “inner freedom” are, according to Hayek, emotions or moral or intellectual weakness, while the “positive freedom,” in Berlin’s interpretation, can be also curtailed by other people: