Realism and Idealism in South Africa's Foreign Policy

REALISM AND IDEALISM IN SOUTH AFRICA'S FOREIGN POLICY*

J.E.SPENCE OBE

Introduction

Before embarking on discussion of the specific impact of realism and idealism on South Africa's foreign policy, a brief discussion of the inter-action of these two fundamental theoretical concepts might be helpful.

First, some definition of terms: idealism has many guises (some would say sins!) but underpinning all - either implicitly or explicitly - is a bedrock of profound moral conviction. Thus, for example, nationalism and communism are examples of ideologies with an explicit idealistic content in that both are dynamic philosophies offering would-be supporters radical and often mythical interpretation of their past; analysis of present discontents; and a vision of a future free of injustice and oppression. Implicit in both is a programme of action designed to achieve the transformation of the human condition.

However, for the purposes of this analysis, idealism will be equated with one particular ideology, namely liberalism. This is essentially a Western philosophical construct concerned to promote the value of democratic self-determination, together with the economic and social goals derived from the organisation of a free market economy. More precisely in the realm of international relations, we shall be concerned with the notion of liberal internationalism principally associated with improving the prospects for global peace and security and at the same time securing justice for oppressed peoples. Orthodox liberals eschew revolutionary means to achieve such goals. Thus progressives believe that evolution is to be preferred to violent means except perhaps as a last resort when all else fails. Liberals traditionally emphasise the sanctity of human rights: for example, freedom of speech, association, religion, etc and the appropriate strategies for their enhancement and protection. In particular these rights are argued to be embodied, indeed enshrined, in the overarching concept of the rule of law manifesting itself via an independent judiciary guaranteeing equal legal provision for all citizens.

Liberalism, unlike its dynamic counterpart, is a relatively static doctrine eschewing transformational means to utopian ends, but nevertheless appealing to disenfranchised communities. It has - as we shall see - become increasingly powerful especially since the end of the Cold War and the discrediting of the theory and application of Communist ideology in the former Soviet Union, Eastern and Central Europe.

Conservatism, by contrast, is a sceptical ideology profoundly opposed to the ideal of a radical transformation of society - whether domestic or international - and acknowledging the sheer intractability of many of the problems that plague the political enterprise. Conservative practitioners pride themselves on their grasp of realism as a basis for policy making. They recognise, too, that human nature is fallible, that there are real and powerful constraints governing the formulation and conduct of policy, that the 'law' of unintended consequences can undo the search for preferred outcomes. Thus pragmatic judgement is to be preferred, acknowledging the harsh constraints of difficult circumstances. This is to accept as Harold Macmillan, British Prime Minister in the 1950's remarked that "events, dear boy, events" dictate what can be done, rather than what should be done according to some abstract moral/liberal calculus.

* For a fuller discussion of some of the issues raised in this paper on South Africa's foreign policy, historically considered, see D. Welsh & J.E. Spence, Ending Apartheid, London: Pearson, forthcoming.

Perhaps one way of distinguishing between realism and liberalism is to consider both the terminology employed in decisions on international relations: realists are concerned with 'order', 'power', and the 'national interest’, liberal internationalists by contrast discourse on 'peace' and how best to obtain it via, for example, collective security legitimised and co-ordinated by international institutions thereby underpinning and sanctifying the role of the values of co-operation and the interdependence of states. Thus realists are Westphalians fiercely attached to the principle of sovereignty, sceptical about the doctrine of liberal interventionism and defending the claim that the state is the key actor in international relations.

Liberals, on the other hand, are sceptical about the notion of absolute sovereignty; they regard it as an outdated doctrine to be brushed aside when gross dereliction of human rights occurs. Realists in support of the doctrine of state primacy point to its role in agenda setting in debate - whether on trade, multi-lateral intervention, or climate change - in international organisations. In its mature form, the state, it is argued, maintains a capacity for providing security, welfare and a sense of identity for its citizenry. By contrast, the liberal stresses the value and sheer necessity for the emergence of a system of global governance to regulate the complex relations of states at a variety of levels - political, economic, social, technological and legal. Indeed, in arguing this view, liberals often claim that the notion of autonomous statehood is a declining asset as governments increasingly have to contend with the ever-increasing pressure of globalisation.

Of course, I accept that by defining realism and liberalism in this way I am indulging in the creation of ideal types implicitly suggesting that there is a permanent unbridgeable gulf fixed between the two doctrines. Yet in both theoretical and practical terms they can and do interact, borrowing intellectual baggage from the other. After all, in mature democratic states (I exclude those which are ruled by corrupt autocrats out for what they can get) political debate is inevitably couched in moral terms: decisions - whether domestic or international - have to be justified according to some version of morality - liberal, socialist or conservative. Political debate is, therefore, essentially about the need to achieve outcomes which benefit the majority of the citizenry. (Minorities may lose out, but so liberal theory holds - their time will come - after the next swing of the electoral pendulum).

And the liberal has this advantage over his conservative counterpart that he is able to stress the moral incentive for change rather than the constraints that inhibit a 'good' outcome. To admit publicly - as the sceptical conservative might - that some problems have no short term solutions, that the best that can be hoped for is a rather unsatisfactory compromise between aspiration and achievement is hardly a message likely to win votes. Similarly, to offer the excuse that intervention in other countries often does more harm than good, is perceived as a confession of weakness and again one not likely to endure the politician to his/her electorate and especially if the counter-argument that such action is required to cope with terrorism acquires a degree of persuasive logic. The realist would stress that moral choices are not simple ones between right and wrong action but very often involve choosing between evil courses of action. The trick is to choose that course of action which does the least harm to the fewest acknowledging all the time that harm will be done to some individual or group or state for that matter.

The English School

The difficulty with the conservative view of moral behaviour is that it lacks the positive dramatic content which liberal and radical programmes of change can inspire. Yet it would be a mistake to think of realism as an unchanging doctrine, incapable of adapting to new circumstances and the emergence of new norms in international relations. Consider, too, the softer version of the doctrine promulgated by Charles Manning and Hedly Bull, two noticeable pioneers of the 'English School' of international theory. Both subscribe to what Manning called 'sophisticated realism' with its emphasis on a society rather than a system of states, sharing certain conventions of behaviour and acknowledging certain rules, norms and institutions to regulate that behaviour. Indeed, among the latter are diplomacy, war, international law, and the role of the great powers as well as a network of regional and international institutions that help to bind the international society of states together and prevent its complete fragmentation into a 'war of all against all'.

Thus, for example, the role of the great powers is accepted for regulating the affairs of international society; on the other hand diplomacy - a civilised and civilising enterprise - is crucial in producing at least the prospect of finding 'overlapping interests' and the emergence of consensus and compromise. Indeed, it could be argued that the emphasis placed on diplomacy and international law (notably the principle of pacta sunt servanda) results in an ever expanding network of agreements to regulate transnational affairs ranging from world trade to air traffic control and postal communications. What emerges is a complex spider web of linkages based on common values and their expression in multi-lateral institutions all serving the purpose of binding international society together.

Certainly, all states share a common attachment to the values of sovereignty, to the need to survive. To this extent, then, states are conservative creatures. On the other hand, the fact that states can and do co-operate in a multitude of ways especially in a globalised world is more than just because they share a common interest in security. It also suggests that many of the objectives of this co-operation are in fact liberal in aim and content designed to make the lot of the citizenry tolerable, meaningful and effective. And this co-operative thrust is based on more than just the need to survive in a hostile world.

What this analysis demonstrates is that realism and liberalism can and do interact and are not necessary ideological polar opposites. And this interaction has deepened since the end of the Cold War. Orthodox realism whether - expressed in academe or a foreign office – with its traditional emphasis on the values of pragmatism, scepticism, (at best) situational ethics together with the constraints that inevitably beset decision makers has had to contend with a post Cold War world. This – following the collapse of Communism – suggested that liberal values, for example, democracy and the free market had finally triumphed and would spread their influence world wide. And this development was reinforced by the growth of a human rights culture and the overwhelming impact of real time ‘liberal’ media reporting symbolised by the cry that ‘something must be done’ to remedy blatant examples of oppression wherever and whenever these occurred.

Several examples from post 1945 practice can be cited demonstrating the interaction between realist constraints and liberal incentives to break free of those constraints. Before doing so, it must be stressed that this argument applies principally to mature democratic states rather than those which have collapsed or are ruled by corrupt wicked leaders bent of self-aggrandisement and aggression against weaker dependent neighbours.

A second qualification in this particular context is to acknowledge that politicians being all too human may indulge in liberal rhetoric but behave very differently. On the other hand, we must be fair to the political class and acknowledge that democratic leaders are not simply amoral computers neatly calculating costs and benefits regardless of their moral significance or lack of it. We have to recognise surely that for most of us in private life ethical considerations do help to constrain our behaviour. Why should such ethical imperatives desert us once we enter the public domain?

True, the constraints are greater and the choices very often unpalatable but even the notion of the national interest can have a moral dimension insofar as democratically elected politicians can fairly claim that defending and asserting a national interest is what their electorates expect them to do as a bare minimum of moral obligation. What ultimately matters in ethical terms is how that interest is defined – whether pragmatically or apocalyptically – and what means are employed to protect it.

The Role of 9/11

Finally, we must consider the impact of 9/11 on the relative strength of realism and liberalism as guides to political action. It could be argued that during the Bush Administration the neo-conservative movement hijacked the tenets of liberalism, emphasising the universal appeal and relevance of democratic government and the free market for countries labouring under oppressive rule in the Third World in particular. The United States – according to this doctrine – had a mission to spread these ideals and radically undercut the appeal of transitional theory and practice which emphasises waiting on time and circumstance, allowing for the impact of tradition and political culture in changing societies from within. Neo-conservatism re-defined America’s national interest in dynamic ideological terms and what is especially interesting in this context is its capacity to combine realism (in this case the projection of American power to, for example, Iraq and Afghanistan) with liberal idealism as a transformational strategy. To paraphrase Woodrow Wilson, this aspiration was designed to make the world ‘safe for democracy’.

By contrast, old fashioned realism might have dictated a more cautious strategy, recognising that liberal interventionism might stimulate the growth of radical Islamic hostility to the west; that terrorism might well increase its capacity to be home grown; what was required to secure national boundaries to keep terrorists out were networks of intelligence with like-minded states to forestall attempts to create mayhem in western societies. Nor can there be any doubt that academic and practical elites remain uncertain how best to counter the so-called ‘new’ security threats (of which terrorism is one): enforced migration; environmental degradation; international crime; money laundering; intra-state conflict on a massive scale; collapsed and failing states.

What, therefore, is the relevance of realism or liberalism as modes of explanation of these problems, let along providing effective strategies for coping with them? One possibility which does appear to command general assent is the attempt to revive the doctrine of collective security, the assumption being that multilateral co-operation is essential if the impact of these threats is to be reduced significantly. Interestingly, collective security does contain elements of both realism and liberalism: the former insofar as collaboration in a ‘coalition of the willing’ does presumably serve individual national interests; the latter insofar as mutual co-operation to deter and defend against aggression on a limited basis has long been recognised as a liberal aspiration reinforcing the notion of ‘enlightened’ self-interest. The multinational naval task force defending against piracy in the Indian Ocean is a relevant example in this context.

So much then for the evolution of realism and liberalism and their interaction at times in practice. Here are some examples of the impact of liberal ideals on the formulation and conduct of foreign policy in the post-Cold War world:

●Nelson Mandela's belief that the 'new' South Africa's foreign policy had to be primarily protection and assertion of human rights; that poorer neighbours had to be treated with 'sensitivity and respect'. This was hardly surprising in view of his experience at the hands of the Apartheid regime. Yet - as we shall see anon - a realist concern with military and economic capability and the national interest soon entered into the calculations of the new government.

●The Late Robin Cook's (Foreign Secretary in Tony Blair's first Labour Government) emphasis on the importance of an 'ethical dimension' in foreign policy making.

●Tony Blair's 1999 Doctrine of the International Community which allowed for the brushing aside of sovereignty when gross abrogations of human rights (genocide for instance) occurred. Blair set out a mixture of liberal and realist criteria which had to be met if such intervention was to occur: these included, inter alia, first 'exhausting all diplomatic options; prudent and achievable goals; long-term commitment including the task of re-building; and is the national interest truly engaged?' (1)

What is interesting about this doctrine is the combination of both realist and liberal

assumptions underpinning it, the most notable of which was the emphasis on the national

interest as the critical realist determinant of policy.

Similarly, the Charter of the United Nations combines liberal ideals with realist assumptions. The founding fathers were determined to devise structures which would avoid the failures of it predecessor, the League of Nations; hence the great powers were given the advantage of permanent membership of the Security Council on the assumption that with power (a realist notion) went ultimate responsibility for keeping the peace (a liberal aspiration) - a nice combination of liberal and realist principles of statecraft. Indeed, this was reflected in the fact that the peace makers were committed to a multi-lateral institution which in its Charter provided under Chapter Six for peaceful means for settling disputes (arbitration, mediation, good offices, etc) as well as the use of forcer under Chapter Seven. There is, too, running like a thread through the Charter an emphasis on human rights soon to be supplemented by a variety of Declarations. We should note the opening words of the Charter - 'we the peoples' - in contrast to the realist emphasis on statehood in the Covenant's opening phrase: 'the high contracting parties'.