Reading 29. Richard Taylor, Freedom and Determinism
Outline with Study Questions
I.Introduction
1.What two basic beliefs does Taylor begin with as he reflects on the problem of freedom and determinism?
II.Soft Determinism
1.According to soft determinism, when is voluntary behavior free?
2.According to soft determinism, what are the causes of voluntary behavior?
III.The Refutation of This
1.What is soft determinism’s response to the question of whether one could have acted otherwise than one did?
2.Why does this response not, in fact, show that one could have acted otherwise?
IV.Examples
1.How does the example of being controlled by an ingenious physiologist refute soft determinism’s notion of freedom?
V.Simple Indeterminism
1.How does the theory of simple indeterminism (the simple denial of determinism) attempt to defend free will?
2.Why is this theory unsatisfactory?
VI.Determinism and Simple Indeterminism as Theories
1.Why is determinism a more plausible theory than simple indeterminism?
2.Why is it impossible for those who accept determinism to deliberate about what they are going to do?
3.Why is determinism incompatible with the belief that it is sometimes up to individuals what they are going to do?
4.Why is simple indeterminism incompatible with deliberation?
VII.The Theory of Agency
1.What does Taylor mean by a self-determining being?
2.What are the two requirements for an action to be free?
3.What is additionally required for free action to be rational?
4.Why is behavior caused by a psychological state (a volition, for example) not necessarily a free action? Under what condition would this behavior be a free action?
5.What does Taylor mean by a self (a person)?
6.How do the statements “My hand causes my pencil to move” and “I cause my hand to move” illustrate two different notions of causation? Why does Taylor suggest using a word other than “causation” for the latter?
7.How does Taylor’s theory of agency avoid the difficulties of simple indeterminism on the one hand and of determinism on the other?
8.How confident is Taylor about the truth of his theory of agency?
Questions for Reflection and Discussion
1.Can there be an exception to the principle that every event necessarily follows from antecedent sufficient conditions?
2.Is one’s behavior determined if it is caused by a desire, and not by something “identical to oneself”?
3.When agents act, is it possible for them not to act on their strongest desire at the time?
4.Can determinists satisfactorily explain the phenomenon of deliberation by holding that deliberation is the necessary result of antecedent sufficient conditions?
5Does a belief in free will justify postulating “rather strange metaphysical notions” to justify the belief?
For Further Reading
Chisholm, Roderick M. “Freedom and Action.” In Freedom and Determinism, ed. Keith Lehrer, pp. 11–44. New York: Random House, 1966.
The thesis of Section 1 (pp. 11–28) is that we have free will and moral responsibility because, even though actions are influenced by our desires and motives, they are not causally determined by them.
Chisholm, Roderick M. “Human Freedom and the Self.” In Free Will, 2nd ed., ed. Gary Watson, pp. 26–37. New York: Oxford University Press, 2003.
In this article (originally delivered as a lecture in 1964), Chisholm rejects both determinism and indeterminism, arguing that actions performed by an agent are performed with free will and moral responsibility.
Goetz, Stewart C. “A Noncausal Theory of Agency.” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 49 (December 1988): 303–16.
Like Taylor, Goetz defends libertarianism through a theory of agency; unlike Taylor, he holds that an agent is not a cause of his or her free actions.
Sartre, Jean-Paul. Existentialism Is a Humanism, trans. Carol Macomber. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2007. 108 pp.
In his 1945 lecture “Existentialism Is a Humanism” (pp. 17–54), Sartre rejects determinism and maintains that human beings are radically free to create their own “essence.” Reading 38 in Fifty Readings in Philosophy, 4th ed. (pp. 386–96), is an excerpt from this lecture.
Taylor, Richard. Action and Purpose. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1966. 269 pp.
This book contains a more detailed account of the theory of agency presented in our reading. See Chapter 8, “The Description of Human Action” (pp. 99–119); Chapter 9, “Causation by Agents and Causation by Things” (pp. 120–38); and Chapter 10, “Reasons and Causes” (pp.139–52).