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RANDEIS UNIVERSITY MR. ART
FALL 2017 POLITICS 174B
SEMINAR: NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY
This course deals with the today’s uses of military power and covers basic theories about using force, case studies exemplifying the theories, and the application of these theories to selected contemporary issues in U. S. national security policy.
Requirements and Grading. The course is run as a seminar. Students are therefore expected to have read the material before each class meeting and to take an active part in class discussions. The course requirements are: (1) one 8-page paper based on a case study that uses theories and methods developed in the course (30% of the course grade); (2) a 12-14 page policy prescription paper dealing with a contemporary issue (40% of the course grade); and (3) participation in weekly class discussions based on the reading (30% of the grade). Late papers with no valid excuse will be penalized. (Due dates for assignments are on page 2.)
Success in this 4 credit hour course is based on the expectation that students will spend a minimum of 9 hours of study time per week in preparation for class (readings, papers, discussion sections, preparation for exams, and so forth).
If you are a student who needs academic accommodations because of a documented disability, please contact me and present your letter of accommodation as soon as possible.
Learning Goals: learn how to think critically about arguments; learn how to present arguments clearly and convincingly both orally and in writing; appreciate how difficult well-reasoned and carefully-researched policy analysis and policy prescription are; understand the main concepts, constraints, and ethical dilemmas in the use of force.
All required books for purchase below are reserve, but if you can afford it, I suggest you purchase all or most of them (all are in paper).
Michael Walzer Just and Unjust Wars (Basic)
Barry Posen The Sources of Military Doctrine (Cornell)
Michael Barnhart Japan Prepares for Total War (Cornell)
Dale Copeland The Origins of Major War (Cornell)
Patrick Morgan Deterrence Now (Cambridge)
Robert Pape Bombing to Win (Cornell)
Joshua Rovner Fixing the Facts: National Security and the Politics of
Intelligence (Cornell)
Audrey Cronin How Terrorism Ends (Princeton)
Todd Sechser & Nuclear Weapons and Coercive Diplomacy (Cambridge)
Matthew Fuhrmann
COURSE OUTLINE AND SCHEDULE
A. CLASS SCHEDULE
September 5 Introductory Session – Course Overview
September 12 The Use of Force: Ethics, Fungibility, Limits (Waltzer)
September 19 Sources of Grand Strategy (Posen)
September 26 Misperception and Grand Strategy (Barnhart)
October 3 No Class – Brandeis Thursday
October 10 Causes of War – Preventive War (Copeland)
Offense/Defense Theory, Politics
October 17 Deterrence Theory (Morgan)
October 24 Conventional Compellence Theory (Pape)
October 31 Nuclear Coercive Diplomacy (Sechser/Fuhrmann)
November 7 Intelligence Failures and Strategic Surprise (Rovner)
November 14 Nuclear Proliferation; Bio and Chem Warfare
November 21 Terrorism and Counterterrorism (Cronin)
November 28 Cyber War: Offense, Defense, Deterrence
December 5 Student Presentations of Policy Paper Prescriptions
B. PROSPECTUS AND PAPER DEADLINES
September 25 First Paper Prospectus due
September 26 First Paper Prospectus Handed Back in Class
October 27 First Paper Due
November 3 Second Paper Prospectus Due
November 7 Second Paper Prospectus Returned in Class
December11 Second Paper Due
ASSIGNED READINGS
IMPORTANT NOTE ON THE ASSIGNED READINGS: Nearly all asterisked articles below are on the course LATTE website. Those that are not are either articles that you can access electronically yourself or other resources available online. Books I asked you to purchase are also on hard copy reserve. I will tell you each week which asterisked readings you are to do.
PLEASE NOTE: There are many, many more asterisked readings than you are required to read. Additional ones are there for further reading or for use in your papers.
1. THE USE OF FORCE: ETHICS, FUNGIBILITY, LIMITS
*Michael Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars, chaps. 2, 3, 5, 7, 8 (pp. 127-133), 9 (144-147), 151-154), 11 (176-188), 12 (197-206), 16, and 19.
*Robert Art, "American Foreign Policy and the Fungibility of Force," Security Studies, Summer 1996, pp. 7-42.
*Charles Krauthammer, “The Truth about Torture,” The Weekly Standard, 5 December 2005, and Andrew Sullivan, “The Abolition of Torture,” The New Republic, 19 December, 2005, html text LATTE.
*Robert Jervis, “The Torture Blame Game,” Foreign Affairs, May/June, 2015, pp. 120-128.
*Executive Summary” (pp. 172-204 and 216)”; “Findings and Conclusions” (all); and “Chairman Feinstein’s Foreword” (all); Committee Study of the Central Intelligence Agency’s Detention and Interrogation Program, U.S. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, 2014; on line at:
http://www.intelligence.senate.gov/press/committee-releases-study-cias-detention-and-interrogation-program
*Bell, Jeannine, "One Thousand Shades of Gray: The Effectiveness of Torture" (August 15, 2005). IU Law-Bloomington Research Paper No. 37 Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=820467
*Jerome Slater, “Tragic Choices in the War on Terrorism: Should We Try to Regulate and Control Torture?”, Political Science Quarterly (Summer 2006), pp. 191-217.
*Jerome Slater, “Just War Moral Philosophy and the 2008-09 Israeli Campaign in Gaza,” International Security, Fall 2012, pp. 44-81.
*Daniel Byman, “Why Drones Work”; and Audrey Kurth Cronin, “Why Drones Fail”; both in Foreign Affairs, July/August 2013, pp. 32-55; and President Obama’s Speech at the National Defense University on 23 May 2013 online at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2013/05/23/remarks-president-national-defense-university.
*Intelligence Science Board, Phase 1 Report, Educing Information: Interrogation – Science and Art, http://www.fas.org/irp/dni/educing.pdf.
*Ward Thomas, The Ethics of Destruction, chap. 2.
*Rupert Smith, The Utility of Force: The Art of War in the Modern World, chapter 7.
*Stephen Biddle, Military Power: Explaining Victory and Defeat in Modern Battle, chaps. 3, 4, and 10.
Seyom Brown, The Illusion of Control, chap. 5.
Martha Finnemore, The Purpose of Intervention.
Michael Walzer, Arguing About War, chap. 10.
Security Studies, Summer 1999, the exchange between Robert Art and David Baldwin.
Robert J. Art, "To What Ends Military Power," International Security, Spring 1980, pp. 3-35.
Barry M. Blechman and Stephen S. Kaplan, Force without War, chapter 11.
David Baldwin, Paradoxes of Power.
2. GRAND STRATEGY: SOURCES AND MISPERCEPTION
*Barry Posen, Sources of Military Doctrine, entire.
*Rosecrance & Stein, The Domestic Bases of Grand Strategy, Chapter 6.
*Robert Jervis, “Hypotheses on Misperception,” Vol. 30, World Politics (April 1968).
*Michael Barnhardt, Japan Prepares for Total War, entire.
Jack Snyder, Myths of Empire.
Charles Kupchan, The Vulnerability of Empire.
Edward Lutwak, The Grand Strategy of the Roman Empire.
Geoffrey Parker, The Grand Strategy of Philip II.
Robert Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International Relations.
James Crowley, Japan’s Quest for Autonomy.
3. THE CAUSES OF WAR
*Dale Copeland, The Origins of Major War, tba.
*Keir Lieber, War the Engineers: The Primacy of Politics over Technology, tba.
*Stephen Van Evera, “Offense, Defense, and the Causes of War,” International Security, Vol. 22 (Spring 1998), pp. 5-43/.
*Jennifer Mitzen and Randall Schweller, “Knowing the Unknowns: Misplaced Certainty and the Onset of War,” Security Studies, January-March 2011, pp. 2-36.
Stephen Van Evera, The Causes of War, entire.
*Karen Ruth Adams, “Attack and Conquer? International Anarchy and the Offense-Defense-Deterrence Balance,” International Security, Winter 2003/04, pp. 45-84.
*John Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, chap. 9.
*D. Reiter, "Exploding the Powder Keg Myth," International Security, Fall 1995, pp. 5-35.
*Charles Glaser and Chaim Kaufmann, "What is the Offense/Defense Balance and Can We Measure It?" International Security, Spring 1998, pp. 44-83.
T. Christensen and J. Snyder, "Chain Gangs and Passed Bucks: Predicting Alliance Patterns in Multipolarity," International Organization, Spring 1990, pp. 137-169.
“Taking Offense at Offense-Defense Theory," International Security, Winter 1998/99, pp. 179-206.
4. DETERRENCE AND REPUTATION
*Patrick Morgan, Deterrence Now, chaps. 1-5 and 7.
*Robert Art, “Review of Greenhill’s Weapons of Mass Migration,” H-Diplo Roundtable, May 2013.
*Joshua Kertzer, Resolve in International Politics.
Daryl Press, Calculating Credibility: How Leaders Assess Military Threats, entire.
*Dale C. Copeland, "Do Reputations Matter?"; Paul K. Huth, "Reputations and Deterrence"; and Jonathan Mercer, "Reputation and Rational Deterrence Theory"; all in Security Studies, Autumn 1977, pp. 33-114.
*Keren Yarhi-Milo and Alex Weisiger, “Revisiting Reputation: How Pat Actions Matter in International Politics,” forthcoming in International Organization.
*Gregory Miller, The Shadow of the Past, chaps. 2 & 7.
*Timothy Crawford, Pivotal Deterrence, chaps. 1 & 2.
*Austin Long, Deterrence: From Cold War to Long War, chap. 7 (RAND study, available at www.rand.org.)
*Huth and Russett, “What Makes Deterrence Work: Cases from 1900 to 1980,” World Politics, July 1984, pp. 496-526.
*R.N. Lebow & J. G. Stein, "Deterrence: The Elusive Dependent Variable," World Politics, April 1990, 336-369.
*Huth and Russett, "Testing Deterrence Theory: Rigor Makes a Difference," World Politics, July 1990, pp. 466-501.
*James Fearon, “Signaling versus the Balance of Power and Interests,” Journal of Conflict Resolution, June 1994, pp. 236-269.
*Lawrence Freedman, Deterrence (Themes for the 21st Century).
*Patrick Morgan, “Taking the Long View of Deterrence”; Richard Ned Lebow,”Deterrence: Then and Now”;and Lawrence Freedman, “Deterrence: A Reply.” All in The Journal of Strategic Studies, Vol. 28, No. 5 (October 2005), pp. 751-775 and 789-803.
Alexander George and Richard Smoke, Deterrence and American Foreign Policy, chapters 17 & 18.
Patrick Morgan, Deterrence -- A Conceptual Analysis.
5. COMPELLENCE
*Robert Art and Kelly Greenhill, “Coercion: What Do We Know?” Political Science Quarterly, Winter 2017/18, mimeo
*Thomas Schelling, Arms and Influence, pp. 68-91, and 166-176..
*Robert Pape, Bombing to Win, chaps. 1-5, 8-9.
*Todd Sechser, “Militarized Compellent Threats,” Conflict Management and Peace Science, Vol. 28 No. 4.
*Todd Sechser and Matthew Fuhrmann, Nuclear Weapons and Coercive Diplomacy, chps to be assigned.
*Ward Thomas, “Victory by Duress: Civilian Infrastructure as a Target in Air Campaigns,” Security Studies, Vol. 15 (January-March 2006), pp. 1-34.
*Daniel Lake, “The Limits of Coercive Airpower: NATO’s Victory in Kosovo Revisited,” International Security, Summer 2009, pp. 83-113.
*Barry M. Blechman and Tamara Cofman Wittes, "Defining Moment: The Threat and Use of Force in American Foreign Policy," Political Science Quarterly, Spring 1999, pp. 1-31.
S. T. Hosmer, Operations Against Enemy Leaders (RAND, 2001), on line.
Richard Overy, Why the Allies Won, chapter 4.
Janice Gross Stein, "Deterrence and Compellence in the Gulf, 1990-91: A Failed or Impossible Task?” International Security, Fall 1992, pp. 147-180.
Kelly Greenhill, Weapons of Mass Migration.
6. INTELLIGENCE FAILURE AND STRATEGIC SURPRISE
*Joshua Rovner, Fixing the Facts: National Security and the Politics of Intelligence, entire.
*Keren Yarhi-Milo, “In the Eye of the Beholder: How Leaders and Intelligence Communities Assess the Intentions of Adversaries,” International Security, Summer 2013, pp. 7-52.
Robert Jervis, Why Intelligence Fails, entire.
Richard Betts, Enemies of Intelligence, entire. Chapters tba.
*Richard K. Betts, “Analysis, War, and Decision: Why Intelligence Failures Are Inevitable,” World Politics, October 1978, pp. 61-90.
*Jim Wirtz, “A Theory of Surprise,” in Betts and Mahnken, Paradoxes of Strategic Intelligence, chap. 4.
*Robert Jervis, “Reports, Politics, and Intelligence Failures: The Case of Iraq,” Journal of Strategic Studies,
*Richard K. Betts, “Two Faces of Intelligence Failure: September 11 and Iraq’s Missing WMD,” Political Science Quarterly, Winter 2007-08, pp. 585-607.
*Kenneth Pollack, “Spies, Lies, and Weapons: What Went Wrong,” The Atlantic Monthly, January-February 2004, pp. 78-93.
*The 9/11 Commission Report, chaps. 1, 2, 7-11 on line at http://www.9-11commission.gov/report/911Report.pdf.
*Richard K. Betts, “The New Politics of Intelligence: Will Reform Work This Time?” Foreign Affairs, May/June 2004.
*Amy B. Zegart, “September 11 and the Adaptation Failure of U.S. Intelligence Agencies,” International Security, Vo. 29, No. 4 (Spring 2005), pp. 75-111.
*Richard K. Betts, “Politicization of Intelligence: Costs and Benefits,” in Richard K. Betts and Thomas G. Mahnken, eds. Paradoxes of Strategic Intelligence, chap. 2
*Kevin Woods et al., “Saddam’s Delusions: The View from the Inside,” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 85 (May/June 2006), pp. 2-28.
*Richard Clarke, Against All Enemies, chap. 10.
*Roberta Wohlstetter, Pearl Harbor: Warning and Decision, chap. 7.
*Richard K. Betts, Surprise Attack, chap. 10.
*John MacGaffin, “Clandestine Human Intelligence: Spies, Counterspies, and Covert Action, in Jennifer Sims and Burton Gerber, eds., Transforming U.S. Intelligence,
*Comprehensive Report of the Special Advisor to the DCI on Iraq’s WMD (The Duelfer Report), 30 September 2004, Vol. 1 (Regime Strategic Intent, pp. 1-68; available online at http://www.lib.umich.edu/govdocs/duelfer.html.
*Material on intelligence reorganization at http://www2.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB144/index.htm.
Report of the Joint Inquiry in the Terrorist Attacks of September 11, 2001 -- Joint House and Senate Committee on Intelligence, December 2002, pp. 3-127.
Robert Jervis, The Logic of Images in International Relations.
James Wirtz, The Tet Offensive: Intelligence Failure in War
Abram Shulsky and Gary Schmitt, Silent Warfare: Understanding the World of Intelligence
Mark Lowenthal, Intelligence: From Secrets to Policy.
7. NUCLEAR, CHEMICAL, AND BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS SPREAD: THREATS AND RESPONSE
Nuclear
* Michael Brown, et al, Going Nuclear: Nuclear Proliferation and International
Security in the 21st Century (MIT).
*Vipin Narang, “Strategies of Nuclear Proliferation,” International Security, Somter 20617, pp. 110-151.
*Keir Lieber and Daryl Press, “The New Era of Counterforce: Technological Change and the Future of Nuclear Deterrence,” International Security, Spring 2017, pp. 9-50
*Caitlin Talmadge, “Would China Go Nuclear?” International Security, Spring 2017, pp. 50-93.
*Charles Glaser and Steve Fetter, “Should the United States Reject MAD: Damage Limitation and U.S. Nuclear Strategyl toward China,” International Security, Summer 2016, pp. 49-99.
*Nuno Monteiro and Alexandre Debs, “The Strategic Logic of Nuclear Proliferation,” International Security, Fall 2014, pp. 7-52.
Francis Gavin, “Strategies of Inhibition: U.S. Grand Strategy, the Nuclear Revolution, and Nonproliferation,” International Security, Summer 2015, pp. 9-47.
*Matthew Bunn and Scott Sagan, “A Worst Practices Guide to Insider Threats: Lessons from Past Mistakes,” American Academy of Arts and Sciences, 2014, available online at http://www.amacad.org/gnf.
*Nicholas Miller, “Nuclear Dominoes: A Self-Defeating Prophecy?” Security Studies, January-March 2014, pp. 33-74
*Keir Lieber and Daryl Press, “Why States Won’t Give Nuclear Weapons to Terrorists,” International Security, Summer 2013, pp. 80-105.
*R. Scott Kemp, “The Nonproliferation Emperor Has No Clothes,” International Security, Spring 2014, pp. 39-79.