RAA Comments to the Department of Homeland Security

RAA Comments to the Department of Homeland Security

US-Visit Office

RE:Collection of Alien Biometric DataUpon Exit From the United States at

Air and Sea Ports of Departure; UnitedStates Visitor and Immigrant Status

Indicator Technology Program (‘‘US–VISIT’’)

BY: Mr. Roger Cohen, President

Mr. Michael Hardin,

Senior Policy Advisor, US–VISIT

Department of Homeland Security

1616 North Fort Myer Drive,

18th Floor, Arlington, VA22209

Mr. Hardin, and Members of the US-Visit Policy Team:

I appear today to represent the 40 members of the Regional Airline Association in opposition to the proposed rule. Regional airlines operate one half of the nation’s scheduled flights and our more than 2700 aircraft represents nearly 40% of the US commercial passenger fleet.

In 2007 nearly 160 million people – more than one out of every five airline passengers – flew on regional airlines, and most importantly, 70% of the US airports are served exclusively by regional airlines.

Many of these passengers and communities would be adversely affected by this proposed rule. We submitthe DHS proposed US-Exit program is an ill-interpreted version of what Congress intended. In the Federal Register NPRM DHS asked industry to analyze important data and respond in order to create more effective policy. But when industry stakeholders requested an extension of the comment period so we could provide the most accurate data,DHS denied the extension of the comment period -- making clear that DHS is simply checking a box to meet a deadline, rather than making sound policy that actually provides for the safety and security of the traveling public and all Americans.

Clearly this rule is simply DHS trying to pawn off its responsibilities and duties onto an industry that is already burdened with insane fuel prices – resulting in dropped flights to dozens of communities, thousands of layoffs, and all too common Chapter 11 announcements. Protecting and safeguarding of our borders has always, and should always be a function of the US Customs and Border Patrol. Congress never intended for DHS to put a national security program such as this into the hands of airline employees. In addition, DHS proposes to expand this program to provide for real time pre-screening of foreign travelers against criminal databases, and terrorist watch lists, which would place airline employees squarely in the arrest and apprehension process. Our nation’s airline employees are not, nor should they be, trained as law enforcement officers.

The NPRM as drafted raises a number of technical, business, legal and privacy issues, all of which require careful analysis. These issues require extensive research not only in the US, but also within our members’ particular jurisdictions. The allotted timeframe from publishing in the Federal Register to today’s hearing was not nearly enough time to examine these issues in any depth, and we certainly will not have this analysis done prior to the June 23rd close of the comment period. As such, in the notice for this hearing you asked us to focus on financial, operational, and economic impacts of the proposed rule on the industry, as well as any alternatives that would reduce the burden on travelers and the travel industry. I will attempt to address these points in the short time I have left.

The NPRM suggests that this U.S. Exit system would cost the airlines between $3.6 and $6.1B. RAA strongly believes this is an unrealistically low estimate of the true cost of the program as envisioned. This number does not even come close to representing the money that would have to be spent by the airlines in order to purchase the machinery, the additional personnel that would be needed, as well as obtain the additional bandwith necessary to make this program work. Making matters worse, these estimates do not include the dozens of non-gateway airports, from which many regional airlines operate international flights. These non-gateway airports lack the infrastructure necessary to support the physical and technical requirements of this rule, making it impossible for eht local governments operating these airports.

DHS argues that airlines, and not DHS, should perform this task since the air carriers already are required to send APIS data on a regular basis. However, the pilot program run by DHS from October 2004 to March of 2005 found“An alien’s electronic fingerprint file is substantially larger than an alien’s biographic (text) file of manifest information. For this reason, carriersmay need to create or enhance systemsto handle the larger amount of datainherent in biometric (image)transmissions.” For DHS to pawn off both the responsibility and costs of these inherently government functions is clearly not what Congress intended.

Also the proposed US-Visit rule would also result in significant travel delays for the end user – the passenger. By placing a biometric collection point at either the ticket counter check in, or at the gate of departure there will be increased delays for all passengers as the airlines collect the required biometric data. Longer lines, flight delays and missed connections are the only result from the rule as it stands right now. With airlines flying at record load factors and an antiquated air traffic system creating delays that have dominated the headlines for the past year, it is inconceivable that the DHS would further inconvenience and expose the US citizens to longer than usual lines, delays and missed flights because the airlines had to process the biometric data of a few passengers on an international flight. Additionally, if there is a biometric equipment failure would the person attempting to fly not be able to make their flight? The US Exit program asks too many questions and does not supply nearly enough answers.

For example, there is no clear guidance on what leg of a flight the data must be collected. Let me provide an example where the proposed rule falls short:

Example: A businessman from Toronto, Canada is coming to Greenville, MS, a city of less than 50,000 people but with several new manufacturing plants, for a two day trip. He has one carry on bag. His itinerary has him going from Toronto, to Atlanta, and then Atlanta to Greenville. Return is via the same itinerary in the opposite direction.

Per the US-visit program he is fingerprinted and documented on his inbound flight by US Customs and Border Patrol/DHS employees.

Some 24 hours later that same businessman checks in online and confirms his trip, and prints a boarding pass from Greenville all the way back to Toronto via Atlanta. The next morning he heads to GreenvilleAirport with his e-ticket, so he bypasses check in with his carry on bag. According to the rule, the air carrier in Greenville is supposed to collect the biometric data for transfer. If the passenger never comes in contact with an air carrier representative until after they are in the sterile area, how is the air carrier supposed to collect this biometric data? Does this mean the sole air carrier at Greenville will have to install biometric devices at both the check in counter and all gates? If so the cost estimated by the government way underestimates the true costs of this program by hundreds of millions, if not billions considering that some 635 U.S. airports have scheduled commercial service.

We recognize that DHS is facing a congressionally mandated timeframe for instituting the next phase of the US-Visit program. However, by denying an extension to the comment period with this perfunctory hearing as the sole substitute tells us that DHS not only doesn’t understand the safe, efficient transportation of passengers, it also tells us that DHS may not care about working with the stakeholders to create sound public policy.

We respectfully request that DHS re-consider the rule as proposed, and go back to the drawing board and work with industry in order to create a rule that will work for DHS, the travel industry, and most importantly the traveling public.

Sincerely,

Roger Cohen

President, RAA