Question: Was the Mao Regime Beneficial to China

Question: Was the Mao Regime beneficial to China?

Thesis: The Maoist regime failed to modernise China because of its centrally planned economic approach, rigid leadership, and pursuit of class struggle.

Counter-Argument:

1.  A centrally planned economic system provided stabilization to China’s economy.

2.  Mao’s leadership style allowed the Chinese Communist Party to survive through the Japanese invasion in 1931 and win the civil war against the Guomindang in 1949.

3.  Mao’s pursuit in class struggle enabled successful land reforms which eliminated the landlord class; it allowed land to be distributed evenly amongst the peasants.

Argument 1: Mao's goal of modernization failed to materialize because of the centrally planned economic strategies implemented during the regime.

Mao’s formation of the “people’s communes” proved ineffective in modernizing the economy of China.

·  “Individual provinces and even counties…to establish ‘independent and comprehensive industrial systems’ and rely on their own resources, capital, and experience,”[i] proved inadequate to build an industrialized economy.

Party officials failed to take into account of regional climate differences.

·  According to a production programme mapped out in October 1958, a region was required to plant 1,000 mow of cotton, to meet the consumption demand of commune; however, “the area had never grown any cotton and natural conditions were not favourable for the production of cotton.”[ii]

Over emphasis in the production of steel and iron led to unsustainable food outputs .

·  Under government propaganda and overall enthusiasm of the Chinese people, nearly 100 million labourers were diverted towards steel production by 1958, believing that agricultural collectivization would compensate for the absence of their work.[iii]

·  Meat altogether disappeared, as grain was scarce; it was barely viable to even feed the Chinese. [iv]

·  The death toll was approximately 30 million people, nearly 1 out of every 20 in the rural population.[v]

Argument 2: Mao held a definite perspective on his “Chinese Road to Socialism”; his refusal to accept

otherwise back-lashed on the party’s initial goal in modernizing China.

Mao’s attack on critics rendered great fear amongst the Chinese.

·  The Anti-Rightist Campaign was set up to obliterate, through means of force, the opposition, or critics of the party, otherwise known as the rightists or counterrevolutionaries.[vi]

·  A total of 550,000 were classified as educated, therefore condemned as “rightists”.[vii]

·  Over a million Party members were expelled, on probation, or officially dismissed; a numerous of them were sent to the countryside to take part in physical labour.[viii]

The fear that Mao had imposed in the minds of the Chinese drove China towards one failure after another.

·  The fear that remained in many of the Party Cadres contributed to the overly exaggerated reports of the production outcomes.[ix] (Great Leap Forward)

·  Nor were many members of the Party willing to criticise Mao, as those who dared voice out criticism were branded as traitors. Such is the case of China's defence minister, Peng Dehuai, which brought about his dismissal. By the Cultural Revolution, Mao was practically running an “one-man show”.[x]

Argument 3: The Mao regime’s constant drive to achieve class struggle resulted in the neglect of the social

well-being of China.

The Cultural Revolution, Mao's last attempt in class struggle, damaged many aspects of the Chinese society.

l  Under the influence to “smash to four olds”, Red Guards proceeded to deface the priceless relics that marked of China's two thousand year old history.[xi]

l  In fear of being purged by the Red Guards, many adolescence sought to prove their eagerness in revolutionary means through “trashing their own parents' apartments, beating up school teachers,” as children were persuaded to criticize their elders, and students their teachers.[xii]

A generation of the unskilled and uneducated resulted as of Mao's attempt to achieve class struggle.

l  On the December of 1958, numerous youth were headed to learn about “proletarian class consciousness “ from the peasants.[xiii]

l  Many schools were shut down; students who had the privilege to attend school could not learn anything applicable to reality or skipped school altogether.[xiv]

l  Since 1966, practically all forms of academic, scientific, and cultural materials have been suspended.[xv]

[i] Carl Riskin, “Neither Plan nor Market: Mao’s Political Economy,”in New Perspectives on the Cultural

Revolution. ed. William A. Joseph et al., (Cambridge: Harvard University Press. 1991). 141

[ii] Gargi Dutt, “Some Problems of China's Rural Communes,” in The China Quarterly: China Under Mao.

ed. Roderick MacFarquhar. (Massachusetts: Massachusetts Institute of Technology Press. 1966). 120

[iii] David Curtis Wright, “Agricultural Communes and the Great Leap Forward,” in Mao Zedong. ed. C.J

Shane. (Farmington Hills, MI: Greenhaven Press. 2004). 115

[iv] David Curtis Wright, “Agricultural Communes and the Great Leap Forward,” in Mao Zedong. ed. C.J

Shane. (Farmington Hills, MI: Greenhaven Press. 2004). 115

[v] Rana Mitter, A Bitter Revolution. (New York: Oxford University Press. 2004). 197

[vi] Franz Schurmann, “China’s ‘New Economic Policy’ – Transition or Beginning?” in The China Quarterly:

China Under Mao, ed. Roderick MacFarquhar. (Massachusetts: Massachusetts Institute of Technology Press. 1966). 230

[vii]Frederick C. Teiwes, “The establishment and consolidation of the new regime”, in The Politics of China. (New York: Cambridge University Press. 1993). 82

[viii] Maurice Meisner, Mao’s China and After. 3d ed. (New York: The Free Press. 1999). 213

[ix] Kenneth Lieberthal, “The Great Leap Forward and the split in the Yan'an leadership,” in The Politics of

China. (New York: Cambridge University Press. 1993). 87

[x] Kenneth Lieberthal, “The Great Leap Forward and the split in the Yan'an leadership,” in The Politics of

China. (New York: Cambridge University Press. 1993).

[xi] Rana Mitter, A Bitter Revolution. (New York: Oxford University Press. 2004). 212

[xii] Jonathan Spence, Mao Zedong. (New York: Penguin Group. 1999). 125

[xiii] Stuart Schram, The Thought of Mao Tse-Tung. (Great Britain: Cambridge University Press. 1989).175

[xiv] Maurice Meisner, Mao’s China and After. 3d ed. (New York: The Free Press. 1999). 367

[xv] Maurice Meisner, Mao’s China and After. 3d ed. (New York: The Free Press. 1999). 368-369