“Prospecting for War:9/11 and the Selling of Operation Iraqi Freedom”
Abstract
Scholars have learned a great deal about how citizens make decisions. Prospect theory, in particular, has offered a number of insights that have helped our understanding of decision-making relative to foreign policy. We consider these insights in our examination of the public sale of Operation Iraqi Freedom. A great deal of research has been devoted to understanding how the Bush Administration was able to persuade Americans to engage in a preemptive war against a nation that did not partake in the 9/11 terrorist attacks. However, very little scholarship has examined why Americans were receptive to the administration’s rhetoric regarding the Iraqi threat. While it would be difficult to prove the Bush Administration knowingly sought to employ the findings of prospect theory to publicly sell a war in Iraq, we contend that in effect, such an understanding explains a great deal as to why the public was willing to accept an ostensibly offensive war. In short, we suggest that that issue framing may explain how the public was sold the war, but it is through framing effects that we can understand why the public was willing to accept the war.
Much has been said regarding the Bush Administration’s selling of Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) in 2002-2003. Popular accounts suggest that the push toward OIF was couched as an extension of the war on terrorism more broadly, and specifically linked to the events of 9/11 (see Gershkoff & Kushner, 2004 for discussion). Given the extent to which this link was made we cannot ignore its importance to the public sale of the war. In fact, scholars must account for this feature of public opinion manipulation to more fully understand how the framing of issues led the public to accept a preemptive war.
It is clear that the public campaign for OIF involved a process of issue framing. Issue framing is best described as a manner by which elites emphasize…“a subset of potentially relevant considerations when constructing their opinions” (Druckman, 2004 p. 672). It involves weaving exogenous circumstances into a separate problem in order to advance a preferred perspective regarding the issue. By linking 9/11 to OIF, the prospect of a discrete offensive warwould take on characteristics of a defensive operation that was part of a larger war on terrorism, initiated because of the 9/11 attacks. As the argument goes, through OIF the United Stateswill better secure itself from the growing threat of terrorism. While this albeit simplistic synopsis may explain the issue frame from the perspective of the Bush administration, it fails to account as to why the public was so willing to accept the frame. We argue that the dynamics underlying the march toward war can best be understood by examining the impact of perceived losses caused by the 9/11 attacks.
Framing effects are derived from prospect theory; a model of decision making that suggests people are more inclined to accept risks they would otherwise reject when the perceived structure of options is a choice between competing losses. Linking OIF to 9/11 inflates preexisting feelings of insecurity within the general population caused by the 9/11 attacks. In this context, OIF becomes a choice between competing losses: Accept the existing post-9/11 conditions as they were (accept the sure loss of security caused by 9/11) or engage in an offensive war against Iraq (gamble to improve security after 9/11).
We first set out to examine how scholars have explained the onset of OIF. We then lay out a prospect theory model of decision-making and explain how this model can advance an explanation for mass support for war. Next, we examine public opinion data on threat perception, support for the Iraq war, and popular beliefs about the likelihood of terrorism if the United States failed to take action against Iraq. We find strong linkages between the rhetoric of the Bush Administration and support for OIF during the 9/11-OIF interregnum.This is particularly true from October, 2002 to March, 2003. The data suggest that as the sale of the war progressed,overall threat perception remained higher than in the pre-9/11 period, and support for the war rose or remainedconsistent in regard to threat perception. We suggest this occurred in part because of the lack of a normal functioning marketplace of ideas. The prevailing monologue fed a public that that was disposed to perceive threat and thus ready to engage in risk-acceptant behavior (a preemptive war).
Background
A great deal has been written about the Bush administration’s mobilization of public opinion prior to OIF. Academic treatments have centered particularly on agenda-setting, the “rally around the flag” effects and the framing of the Iraqi regime as one that was tied to the larger war on terror. In each instance, the very real loss of security encountered through the 9/11 attacks are important to consider. Similarly, the lack of competition over the administration’s claims against Iraq as being central to the war on terror is significant.
Mazaar (2007) provides a compelling case for the use of Kingdon’s model of agenda-setting in relation to foreign policymaking. He weaves a comprehensive case study linking the onset of war with Iraq to many concepts found in the agenda-setting literature. Many key actors in the Bush administration had advocated removing Saddam Hussein from power prior to Bush’s ascendancy to the presidency. Mazaar asserts that 9/11 provided the “policy window” for the Bush administration to carry out a long-awaited plan to depose Saddam Hussein. He notes that such “focusing events” provide the catalyst for action that enables policy entrepreneurs to more feasibly sell their desired courses of action.
Mazaar further notes that the problems of groupthink are especially potent during the very crises that stimulate policy windows. In regard to Iraq he argues that “when an option is worked out in advance and slipped into policy during a crisis, this case suggests, it will not be subject to sufficiently rigorous debate.”(p. 13). Much evidence suggests that the lack of debate found within the administration was echoed in the political arena as few leaders spoke out against the move to invade Iraq. Gershkoff and Kushner argue that the Bush administration’s tying of Iraq to the larger war on terror met very little opposition. They contend that “the public’s acceptance of the administration’s argument was considerably aided by the fact that it had little competition” (p. 528). In their examination of the New York Times’s coverage of President Bush’s speeches, Gershkoff and Kushner conclude that very little opposition was noted in the months immediately preceding OIF. They suggest that “the administration’s frame was not countered by intense, sustained criticism by either the press or the Democratic Party” (p. 529).
Another stream of research has focused on the significance of the “rally around the flag” effects in the wake of 9/11. Many have suggested that the large support President Bush enjoyed after 9/11 appeared to embolden his administration’s more hawkish stance toward not only Afghanistan but Iraq as well. As noted above, a great deal of evidence suggests that members of the Bush administration had been concerned with regime change in Iraq for over a decade. The 9/11 attacks served as a focusing event that provided the window to launch the long awaited offensive against Iraq. Prior to these attacks, Bush’s approval rating was around 50%. After the attacks, his rating soared to nearly 90%. Hetherington and Nelson (2003, p. 37) note that this increase nearly doubled the surge George. H. W. Bush received prior to Operation Desert Storm. They further note that in the wake of 9/11, Bush received the highest approval rating of any president in history and the rally effect he enjoyed seemed to last longer than any previous president.
When considering the significance of the rally effect in the public’s support for OIF, Gershkoff and Kushner conclude that “while the rally-around-the-flag phenomenon likely played a role in support for the war in Iraq, the levels of support for this war were so high and so largely unconditional that spontaneous patriotism alone cannot account for it” (p. 526). Consequently, they suggest that the administration’s rhetoric was responsible for the support of OIF. Through a content analysis of the president’s speeches they argue that Bush was successful in his framing of a preemptive war against Iraq as intimately related to the war on terror. We agree that issue framing likely contributed to the public’s acceptance of OIF, but we believe rhetorical analysis can only take us so far. Understanding why the rhetoric found support is critical if we are to understand the selling of any war. Thus, we look to the insights of prospect theory to help us understand why citizens were willing to accept a war of preemption.
Prospect Theory—the Basics
Prospect theory is a model of decision-making where people evaluate the desirability of various options with an eye to a reference point (which may or may not be the status quo condition). The reference point is important for decisions as it defines how people will interpret change. People generally assign value to change as either gains or losses. Defining change in this way matters as people overvalue losses relative to gains of equal value. Because losses are overvalued, reactions to losses and gains differ. The behavior reflects a general predisposition to avoid losses meaning that people will engage in more risk, exert more effort, and persist over longer periods of time to avoid losses than to secure gains. The different reactions to gains and losses means the value function that extends from the reference point is S-Shaped: concave in the direction of gains and convex in the direction of losses. Moreover, the value function for losses is drastically steeper compared to gains, suggesting people are loss-averse, not just risk-seeking in the face of losses (figure 1).
[Figure 1 About Here]
Overall, loss aversion suggests that “people that do not make peace with losses are likely to accept gambles that would be unacceptable otherwise” (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979 p. 287). Consequently, one’s reference point is critical as it determines how a decision or policy option is framed. The framing of options is important vis-à-vis the decision weights people attach to the outcomes. Decision weights are subjective probability assessments. Generally speaking, certain or impossible outcomes are weighted the heaviest. Outcomes that are unlikely receive more weight than they should, while likely outcomes receive less weight than they deserve (McDermott, 1998). Taken together, framing and decision weights suggest that when a choice is viewed as choosing certain losses versus gambling to avoid losses, people are inclined to accept the gamble because it offers the chance to avoid losses. The certainty of a positive payoff is not necessary to affect one’s decision.
A number of scholars have employed prospect theory as a means to make sense of foreign policy decision-making (see, for example, Berejikian, 2004; Levy, 2000; McDermott, 1998; & Nincic, 1997). Of particular interest is the claim that “prospect theory contours the domestic political incentive structure that leaders confront” (Berejikian, 2004 p. 26). Nincic (1997) finds that American Presidents are rewarded more through public support and Congressional compliance when military interventions are defined as protective in nature (loss avoidance) rather than promotive (gains seeking). Likewise, presidents are more inclined to frame foreign actions as protective over promotive, and try harder to sell protective actions (Nincic, 1997). Such behavioral tendencies imply some level of awareness that the public is apt to concede more for protective (loss avoidant) actions.
Prospect Theory and Support for the Iraq War
Applying prospect theory to public support OIF is challenging. In order to tease out the potential existence of framing effects requires establishing the following: that society in general perceived a definable loss from an established reference point and this condition is linked to Iraq; that one alternative (no war) was perceived as a certain loss (carrying the greatest weight in the decision calculus), and that the alternative (war) offered a chance (perceived or real) to escape the existing loss (regardless of the potential for even higher losses). Framing effects are not etched in stone. They can be negated through counter-framing by elites that challenge any particular policy position. Druckman (2004) has suggested that framing effects are more likely to dominate over normal issue framing when heterogeneous discussion among elites is noticeably absent. Such a condition allows a single position to exist in the marketplace which polarizes the discussion in favor of risky alternatives. We believe this condition dominated the march to war against Iraq.
Reference Point and the 9/11-Iraq Frame
According to prospect theory, the alternatives an individual choosesare determined by a value function in conjunction with the decision weights. Context will influence how weights are treated affecting the attractiveness of different options in different contexts, with risk acceptance attached to perceived losses. Risky options become attractive as they represent the potential to escape certain losses. The perception of options extends from the frame of reference people hold in regard to social conditions. Thus, the anchor for the decision (the reference point) affects the frame of reference impacting the attractiveness of certain alternatives (Masters, 2004).
Consider the America experience with foreign terrorist threats on the homeland. The United States has experienced minimal levels of terrorist violence inside its borders. From 1955 to 1998 there were 11 deaths related to foreign terrorist activity inside the U.S. homeland, accounting for only 2.2 percent of all domestic terrorism related deaths (Hewitt, 2000 p. 5). Terrorist threats on U.S. targets overseas were mounting during the 1990s with attacks by al-Qaeda in 1996 (KhobarTowers in Saudi Arabia), 1998 (U.S. Embassies in Eastern Africa), and 2000 (U.S.S. Cole in Yemen). While the increasing number of attacks indicated an emergent terrorist threat, no perception of that threat appeared to exist on the home front.
Based on this evidence we assume the perceived threat to homeland security is the reference point used to assess alternatives in decisions regarding the Iraq War. The core event affecting threat perception is the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. Despite growing external threats, 9/11 serves as the core demarcation point where external threats crash through to alter the public perception of national security.
A survey conducted pre and post-9/11 by Eidelson and Plummer (2005) indicatesan 18.25 percent increase in perceived American vulnerability following the 9/11 attacks. Similarly, Huddy, Khatib & Capelos (2002) report that in late September 2001, seventy-eight percent of Americans believed a future terrorist attack was likely. By February of 2002 threat perception remained robust with 62 percent of those surveyed continuing to believe another terrorist attack was likely (Huddy, Khatib & Capelos, 2002 p. 420). Over time threat perception fluctuates in public opinion polls conducted by The Roper Center for Public Opinion Research. Nonetheless, the average level of threat perception from May, 2002 through March, 2003 (the beginning of OIF) is 62 percent (See Figure 2). When compared to threat perception related to terrorist activities prior to 9/11 (49%, May 2000-Gallup Poll), we can see that there is a significant change in public attitude toward security—a change that is suggestive of a public in a losses frame. Consequently, we can see in Figure 2 that as threat perception increases, so does public support for war.
[Figure 2 here]
As we have explained, when decisions are evaluated through a losses frame there is an inclination toward risk. The general form of risky behavior following terrorist attacks is belligerence. Feelings of injustice increase as people react to their perceived status as a victim of mistreatment. We also observe increasing distrust in the form of presumed hostility and malicious intent by others, and superiority over others. Additionally there is a decline in helplessness as people come to believe they have an ability (or need) to influence or control events (Eidelson & Plummer, 2005 pp. 155-156).
Such a complex of emotions clearly dominate the United States following the 9/11 attacks. An initial militarized reaction to 9/11 was widely supported. Support for a war against Afghanistan ranged from 65 and 90 percent depending on the rate of anticipated civilian and U.S. military casualties (Huddy, Khatib & Capelos, 2002). Such a position is expected as Afghanistanis the country most directly linked to the 9/11 attacks. However, the American belligerency was widespread supporting extended military action to other countries that harbored or aided terrorists (Huddy, Khatib & Capelos, 2002 p. 424).
When we consider the prospect of removing Saddam Hussein from power, Americans have shown a significant commitment to his removal in the 56 to 78 percent range in the pre-9/11 era. However, public opinion surveys did not indicate the use of military forces to carry out such a policy. Following 9/11, survey questions began to include the use of U.S. military force to remove Saddam Hussein from power. From November 2001 to March 2002 public support for this goal was at about 72 percent (Huddy, Khatib & Capelos, 2002 p. 425). As distance from 9/11 grew throughout 2002, public opinion regarding military force against Iraqwas much more unstable with noticeable downward spirals (seeFigure2). However, by September 2002, public support for the ouster of Saddam began to recover and stabilize; showing only moderate erosion of support from November2002 to January 2003, rebounding in February 2003.
The surge in support for Saddam’s removal has been attributed to the Bush Administration’s public sale of OIF (Gershkoff and Kushner, 2005). This is important to consider as the public sale was tied to the lost security resulting from 9/11. Consequently, citizens were faced with a choice—accept sure losses in an insecure post-9/11 world or engage in the riskier option of ousting the Iraqi regime to recover losses in the wake of 9/11. The rhetoric of the administration required that citizens choose between these two options.