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Personality Structure and Moral Development
“Running head”: Personality Structure and Moral Development
Pivato, Emma. (2008) Personality Structure and Moral Development: Exploring the Interface. In
the International Journal of Interdisciplinary Social Sciences, Volume 3, Issue 9, pp. 195-200.
Emma Pivato, Ph. D., Registered Psychologist, Alberta
AthabascaUniversity
Abstract:
Philosophy and Psychology have both dealt independently with problems which fall under the general rubric of moral psychology, i.e. how predictable is moral behavior and what causes a particular individual to behave as he or she does. It is the thesis of this paper that a greater collaboration between the two disciplines might lead to some deeper and more satisfying answers in this area. One personality style is explored considering the questions above from the perspectives of the two disciplines to demonstrate the point.
Introduction:
How much does our basic personality determine our moral values? For example, are people who are ‘shy’, or who lack ‘self-confidence’ or who have ‘low self-esteem’ less likely to reach out if they hear signs of distress than others? Are people who are insecure, who have perhaps not received the nurturing they needed at a vulnerable age, more likely to be greedy about food or sex or possessions than others? Are people who seem inert really ‘lazy’ - or just less likely to have developed a sense of personal efficacy than others? Are people who tend to gossip not as happy and satisfied with their own lives as others?
Moral Psychology as an area of study has been approached independently by philosophy and psychology. Western studies in ethics and how to live the right life go back as far as Aristotle with his musings on character, and beyond. Psychologists, by contrast, have concerned themselves with moral issues only since the 20th century. Jean Piaget began publishing on child development including moral development in 1929 and Lawrence Kohlberg elaborated extensively on Piaget’s stages of moral development in his 1958 doctoral dissertation. The real turning point for psychological interest in Moral Psychology, came a decade later, however, with Stanley Milgram’s seminal social psychology experiments from the 1960’s and 1970’s. In these carefully controlled studies, participants were asked to obey an authority figure and administer electric shocks to others who were ostensibly fellow participants undergoing learning trials but were in fact paid collaborators whose task was to simulate pain and agony from the apparently increasing voltage the real participants were expected to administer. What Milgram was really raising in his research on moral issues was a question about personality. Can some individuals more readily subject their individual ideologies to a societal ideology or an outside authority figure than others? And can this societal ideology become so all- encompassing that it becomes virtually impossible to think outside it?
Several different approaches have been taken in an effort to come to terms with these questions and others of relevance to a study of moral psychology. Waller (2007), for example, has looked at whether or not the concepts of ‘virtue’ and ‘vice’ are meaningful outside of a framework of moral responsibility. Terzis (1994) has asked whether ‘virtue ethics’ is superfluous as a concept in terms of understanding character development because of the many possible permutations and combinations of character traits. He suggests that core traits determine basic personality structure, e.g. vigilant vs. adventurous personalities, and that these motivate character actions which, in turn, maintain and enhance them. Arpaly (2004) has rejected the very notion that our minds are comprehensible to us and therefore asks if we need a new model of moral agency before proceeding further with work in this area. Doris (1992) argues that situations have much more to do with how we act under particular circumstances than any inherent character qualities. Nichols (2007), on the other hand, argues from a psychological perspective that emotions play the critical role in basic moral judgment
These types of questions, posed independently by personality theorists and ethicists are frustrating in that they often have promising beginnings only to lead to dead ends on further analysis. The practitioners of the two respective disciplines set up different parameters and use different language so those coming from one side of the divide cannot seem to build on the work of those on the other side. To demonstrate this problem let us take one example: shame
Sense of shame as prerequisite to moral action:
. Without shame there could be no morality. Shame is defined as “a feeling of humiliation or distress arising from one’s awareness that one has done something wrong or foolish” (Compact Oxford English Dictionary, 3rd edition, 2005). Yet one can see from this definition that while shame may be a necessary condition for morality it is not a sufficient one. It is at the same time too encompassing (“…wrong or foolish”) and not encompassing enough (awareness of wrong action does not necessarily lead to the generation of right action). Still, it is a topic of direct relevance to the study of morality and therefore useful for further examination from both a philosophical and psychological perspective.
One author who has commented on shame from a philosopher’s standpoint is John Deigh (1983, 1992). He contrasts shame with guilt and shame with embarrassment and dismantles John Rawls’ thesis (1971) relating shame to loss of self-esteem.
Shame as other than lowered self-esteem:
Deigh begins with the general definition of self-esteem on which Rawls’ work is based, i.e. “…what one makes of oneself or does with one’s life.” (134). He recalls and acknowledges William James’ observation in The Principles of Psychology (1890, 1950) that “…self-esteem (is) equal to the ratio of one’s successes to one’s pretensions.” but then tackles Rawls’ position that shame is equivalent to a loss of self-esteem. As Deigh points out, self-esteem can be high or low at different times and on different occasions. Furthermore, it can be high in anticipation of future successes or in remembrance of past successes even when the present circumstances do not appear to warrant such a state. In other words, self-esteem is not a constant so any loss could not be a permanent loss in terms of a given quantity. However, he agrees with Rawls that high self-esteem can exist only in the simultaneous presence of two conditions: “…a sense that one’s life has meaning and a confidence in one’s ability to achieve one’s ends….” (137).
Achievement based vs. aristocratic based self-esteem:
While ultimately agreeing with Rawls on what self-esteem is, Deigh asks if we can all agree on what happens when you lose self-esteem and how, if at all, that relates to a sense of shame. He considers various origins for shame that do not fit within Rawls’ definition of shame as loss of self-esteem, including what he terms an aristocratic vs. achievement ethic. In the latter case, shame when one fails to live up to one’s own expectations can perhaps be equated with a sense of loss of self-esteem, as Rawls suggests. However, in the former case, i.e. where one is part of a privileged class, one’s worth is not determined by personal merit or achievement but rather is automatically bestowed by virtue of being born into a certain situation. As such, it cannot be lost - yet, clearly people feel shame if they have not lived up to the standards expected of their class, have not fully conformed to its rules of deportment, for example. In the ‘achievement’ case, a sense of personal worth is defined by what useful things one intentionally does with one’s life but in the ‘aristocratic’ case “…One’s status, and so one’s worth, is fixed independently of one’s conduct.” (149). In the achievement case the concern may be with measuring up to one’s personal standards but in the aristocratic case the concern is not with loss of what cannot be lost, i.e. self-esteem around one’s sense of place, but rather with a threat in the form of other’s refusal to recognize one’s proper status.
Shame as threat vs. shame as loss:
To encompass both these cases Deigh proposes that we must not conceptualize shame as a reaction to loss but rather as a reaction to a threat, the threat of being exposed as not worthy in the ways one says one is and hence the threat of being publicly demeaned. As such, shame is a self-protective emotion, like fear. Deigh goes on to state: “… first, that a liability to shame regulates conduct in that it inhibits one from doing certain things and, second, that experiences of shame are expressed by acts of concealment.” (151).
It is the concealment issue on which Deigh ultimately hangs his argument against the Rawlsian conception of shame since shame as a sense of loss cannot explain its accompaniment with acts of concealment. Shame, then, is not related to a perceived loss of worth but rather to the sense that the worth one has is threatened. In other words, shame is a self-protective emotion like fear and Rawls’ characterization of shame as loss is, according to Deigh, clearly wrong.
A psychologist’s approach to shame:
One area in personality theory where the concept of shame has been explored quite thoroughly is Narcissistic Personality Disorder (NPD). This disorder is primarily associated in both DSM-IV-TR and in the popular mind with arrogance, entitlement and grandiosity. Along with this goes a lack of empathy, a sense of being special and unique and a concomitant need for excessive admiration. Individuals with NPD are often envious, quite willing to exploit others, even those close to them, to achieve their own ends and, when aroused to a level of fury (easily reached because of their impaired affect regulation) they can be utterly malicious towards those who cross them or annoy them in some way.
In the last quarter century another type of narcissist has been described. She is often female, as opposed to the classic picture of the male narcissist described above, and that which most tellingly describes her is shyness (interpersonal inhibitions) and a sense of shame with compensatory grandiose fantasies (Cooper and Ronningstam, 1992). Like the traditional narcissist, she can be envious and exploitative, has difficulty committing and has impaired or absent empathy. The shy narcissist is, according to the literature, avoidant and hyper-vigilant, overly sensitive and constantly scanning for slights and criticism from others. This portrayal is consistent with Deigh’s formulation of shame as a threat, the threat of being exposed as less than what one says one is.
What both types of narcissists have in common, although it is primary in this second case, is vulnerability to shame. In the second case, unlike the first, guilt and remorse can be present on reflection for wrong acts and in both cases, unlike what one finds for those with Antisocial Personality Disorder, there is some sense of conscience, i.e. capacity for moral behavior, as described by Ronningstam (2005):
Narcissistic individuals can be found among those who openly take pride in their high moral standards and who criticize and devalue people with different and ‘lower’ sets of rules and values. In more extreme cases, the narcissistic person may even show intolerance and condemnation of others to highlight the virtue of his or her own superior ethics. Nevertheless, inconsistent and contradictory moral standards are most common. Narcissistic persons may have strict demands for ethical or professional perfectionism, especially in others, at the same time as they are ready to cut corners, be dishonest, compromise rules and standards, or even commit a crime, all in the service of protection of their self-image. Another less striking ethical compromise and a way to avoid feelings of shame and inferiority is the tendency to shift meanings and misrepresent or reconstruct events. (p. 105).
Of note, the above can be compared to the lower, ‘conventional’ level of moral development as described by various developmental stage psychologists from Piaget to Maslow and actually reflects the level of moral understanding one would expect to find emerging in late childhood.
Publishing in the ‘60’s and ‘70’s, psychoanalyst, object relations theorist and self psychologist, Hans Kohut, wrote about ‘the tragic man’, a narcissistically disordered individual. Elaborating on Kohut’s depiction, “Morrison (1983) stated that shame is the major distinguishing affective experience of the tragic man, shame caused by ‘the failure to realize ambitions, to gain responses from others, at the absence of ideals.’” (p. 367).”
This is a picture of shame as loss, but is it, as Rawls suggested, loss of self-esteem? I think not. It seems more like a loss of recognition by others needed to mirror the narcissist’s sense of self and hence of personal identity.
Protection of and preoccupation with self-image lie at the very core of Narcissism, as described 2000 years ago in the Myth of Narcissus. Narcissists are unable to know themselves directly but only as reflected back through another medium. For the original Narcissus this was his mirror image in a pool of water,but in our modern understanding of Narcissism this reflection comes through the instrumental use of other people. In the above quotation one can best understand Narcissistic shame as a threat to self-image, a threat so unbearable that the Narcissist might go to any lengths to escape it, even crime. Shame as loss of self-esteem is a far less credible theory in this case because the very question of an autonomous self on which to hang such self-esteem is in question. The talk of a ‘false self’ in the literature on Narcissism is quite common.
The problem of personal identity and how to define it has long been a topic of concern to philosophers, most notably John Locke (1632-1704) with his theory of mind which became the basis for the notion of personal identity further elaborated by Hume, Kant and other philosophers. In psychology, Erik Erikson (1902-1994), a developmental psychologist, was one of the first to be interested in the topic of personal identity and how it is formed.
When we consider the developmental roots of the narcissistic personality, to the best of our current understanding, we can see how a sense of personal identity is undermined. It is now clearly established that there is a definite interactive effect between genetics and environment (Ronningstam, 2005, citing Schore, A., 1994): “…of specific importance for the development of NPD are inherited variations in hypersensitivity, strong aggressive drive, low anxiety or frustration tolerance, and defects in affect regulation.” (pp. 50-51). Yet, as Ronningstam goes on to say, only some children with these genetic tendencies develop NPD, and only some children with positive environmental indicators for NPD become narcissistic.
There are various theories as to what type of parenting style and early environmental circumstances guide the genetically predisposed child towards a narcissistic personality disorder of either the shy or overtly grandiose type. Lack of external affect regulation, i.e. parent’s inability to respond to and moderate appropriately the developing child’s emotional state is one factor. Objectification of the child, i.e. turning him or her into the channel for the parents to satisfy their own narcissistic needs for recognition through a process of projection, is another. The grandiose child is idealized, indulged, never thwarted and, in common parlance, “spoiled rotten”. Therefore, he or she develops a sense of entitlement and never learns how to regulate affect in the face of frustrating or upsetting situations. The child who will become the ‘shy narcissist’, prone to intense shame reactions (Ronningstam, p. 105) also suffers a form of objectification and depersonalization. He or she is often parentified and expected to look after siblings physically or even a parent psychologically while little or no attention or sensitivity is shown towards his or her own emotional needs. Both types of children come to exist only in the way that others expect them to be and as such have no solid, core sense of self andno clear sense of personal identity. They have been reared, in Deigh’s language, in an ‘aristocratic’ rather than an ‘achievement’ micro-society, in that their worth or lack of worth was assigned to them at birth and not earned.
Shame Sensitivity, Affect Regulation and Personal Identity:
Affect regulation and personal identity are closely linked. Let us consider two individuals we will call John and Mary. They don’t quite know who they are and therefore never canbe sure who they are not; hence, incidental stressors can have an extraordinary effect in terms of causing them tosecond guess themselves. This is really the focal issue for any person with NPD. But how can anyone not know who he or she is? The answer is a paradox. John is loved and admired too much, taken to be someone heis not quite sure is real but rather an idealized version of him. By contrast, Mary is loved too little, demeaned, disregarded and generally made to feel like nothing, although as life goes on she feelsher power in certain ways and is quite sure she is worth something although not exactly what. Neither of these situations can lead to a clear and positive sense of personal identity, resulting in the need to forever seek a sense of worth in the eyes of the other by being surprisingly better than expected and constantly endeavoring to trigger, admiration and regard, i.e. engaging in ‘proving behavior’.