Prof. Ephraim Ya'ar and Dr. Tamar Hermann

Peace Index - January 2000

Prof. Ephraim Ya'ar and Dr. Tamar Hermann

Last month parallel discussions were held on the Israeli-Palestinian and Israeli-Syrian channels. In both cases, seemingly, considerable difficulties arose, preventing any significant progress in the talks. This situation emerged against a backdrop of problematic domestic events linked to recently-revealed suspicions of improper behavior by leading political figures and organs. Developments, as described below, reflect on the extent of public confidence in Israel's political establishment with all that this implies.

The Palestinian issue -- the Jewish public in Israel views the future of Jerusalem as far more important in the negotiations with the Palestinians than any of the other questions, such as the borders, and settlements in the territories. The public is also agreed that the present status of Jerusalem as a united city and sole capital of Israel must be preserved, mainly for historic and religious reasons. Nonetheless, many lack an accurate concept of the "map" of the city and its neighborhood quarters. In general, it was found that this concept is not determined by the geographical location of the neighborhood quarters, i.e. whether certain quarters are situated nearer the heart of the city or on its periphery, but much more influenced by their national-ethnic composition which determines whether they are perceived as belonging to Jerusalem and whether Israel should be prepared to concede them in order to attain a peace agreement with the Palestinians. Thus, farther distant Jewish quarters such as Neveh Ya'akov, are perceived as part of Jerusalem to a greater degree than nearby Arab neighborhoods, such as Sheikh Jarrah and Wadi Joz.

The Syrian issue -- the lack of any positive indications of progress in the Israel-Syrian talks, jointly with the growing impression that the Jewish Israeli population is far from enthusiastic about the formula calling for full withdrawal from the Golan Heights -- focused this month's poll on the issue of the referendum -- its need and the anticipated outcome if held. The results of our poll indicate that the public is by no means ready to waive the right to have its say on a peace agreement with Syria. As things stand now, a solid majority is opposed to a full withdrawal in return for full peace, and does not agree with those who believe that the result of the referendum must be accepted if a relative majority is obtained.

These are the main conclusions emerging from two surveys held recently within the context of the Peace Index project. The survey on Jerusalem was held on 30 November 1999 and that on the referendum and an agreement with Syria was held on 31 January 2000.

Asked: "What, in your opinion, is the most important issue to be resolved on the peace negotiations between Israel and the Palestinians?" 51% of respondents cited Jerusalem, 16% cited the Palestinian state, 11% -- settlements, 9% -- refugees, 6% -- water, and 5% -- the border issue. In other words, the question of Jerusalem is considerably more important than all other issues. In light of these figures it is scarcely surprising that an overwhelming majority of the public (90%) feel that it is very important, or important, that Israel retain its present status with a united Jerusalem as its sole capital. This consensus on the importance of Jerusalem as a matter of principle is somewhat eroded once the possibility is raised that east Jerusalem become the capital of the Palestinian state -- provided this does away with the last obstacle to attaining a peace agreement with the Palestinians. 66% are against such a possibility, but 28% are in favor, and 6% don't know. In other words, a sizeable part of those favoring the preservation of Jerusalem's present status are prepared to consent to a division of the city for the sake of peace.

This stand could perhaps be explained by the fact that almost one half of the public (45%) agree that Jerusalem is in effect already divided into two cities -- the eastern city and the western city. 49% do not think so, and the remaining 6% have no clear opinion on the subject. It is extremely interesting to note that the actual residents of Jerusalem are less convinced that their city is virtually divided, than the rest of the public: Only 32% are conscious of a division as against 65% who are not. (3% don't know).

Why is Jerusalem so important to the Israeli-Jewish people? 53% state that the historic reason is uppermost in their mind, 22% cite religion as the most important reason, 16% feel that the security aspect predominates, 7% said that the reason is political, and 2% feel that it is the economic factor, i.e. the two principal reasons for the importance the public attaches to the subject of Jerusalem are spiritual-symbolic in nature (75% in all) while the remaining reasons are of secondary importance (25% in all).

We tried to ascertain how the public perceives Jerusalem's borders, given the city's composition of Jewish and Arab neighborhoods of various degrees of proximity to the city center. We listed ten neighborhoods for the respondents -- one half Jewish and one half Arab, and asked: "When you think about Jerusalem, which of these neighborhoods do you consider a part of the city?" A distinct majority cited all the Jewish neighborhoods -- Ramot (72%), Pisgat Ze'ev (71%), Gilo (68%), Neveh Ya'akov (62%) and Har Khoma (69%). On the other hand, only a minority perceived the five listed Arab neighborhoods as belonging to Jerusalem, including those near the city center -- Wadi Joz (30%), Sheikh Jarrah (32%), Shu'afat (42%), Ras al-Amud (41%) and Abu Dis/al-Ayzaryeh (22%). Prominently featured in the replies to these questions was the rate of "don't know"s, particularly regarding the Arab neighborhoods. But also with regard to the Jewish quarters, their rate varied from 40% (Shu'afat) to 59% (Abu Dis) for Arab neighborhoods and from 26% (Pisgat Ze'ev and Ramot) to 33% (Neveh Ya'akov).

As expected, considerable conceptual differences exist between the residents of Jerusalem and the remainder of the Jewish population, on the various neighborhoods' "belonging" to Jerusalem. Generally speaking, the number of Jerusalemites who consider the neighborhoods listed by us -- Jewish or Arab -- to be part of the city,

is significantly higher than an equal number of the remaining public. However, the general disinclination to perceive the Arab neighborhoods as part of the city is also found among Jerusalemites. For instance: 95% consider Pisgat Ze'ev and Neveh Ya'akov to be part of Jerusalem, while only 45% see this as true of Wadi Joz, and 24% of Abu Dis. (Parallel numbers among the public as a whole were, as stated, 67% and 57% respectively of Pisgat Ze'ev and Neveh Ya'akov; 27% and 21% respectively of Wadi Joz and Abu Dis).

Asked as to which, of the listed neighborhoods, Israel could concede in a peace agreement with the Palestinians, the majority of the public opposes concessions of Jewish neighborhoods, even if these are distant from the city center, such as Neveh Ya'akov and Gilo. On the other hand, only a minority is opposed to conceding Arab neighborhoods, even if these are close to the city center, such as Sheikh Jarrah and Wadi Joz. As anticipated here, too, on the subject of concessions, considerable differences exist between inhabitants of Jerusalem and the remaining public. While Jerusalemites tend to oppose concessions, even of Arab neighborhoods -- albeit not as strongly as in the case of Jewish neighborhoods -- non-Jerusalemites are less determined in their opposition to concessions, and many of them have no clear opinion on this issue. For instance, 91% of Jerusalem residents are not prepared to concede Gilo, while their non-Jerusalemite counterparts total 57%. Similarly, 76% of the Jerusalemites are against conceding Shu'afat, whereas only 41% non-Jerusalemites are opposed.

The conclusion arising from the overall findings regarding the public stand on Jerusalem indicates a broad consensus on the cardinal symbolic importance of the city, whereas the public's attitude on "temporal" Jerusalem tends to be less unified and less resolute.

As for the fundamental question: In democratic countries where the public elects its leaders for fixed periods of time -- should a referendum be held between elections, when the subject on the agenda is of such paramount impact on the national interest? Apparently more than three-quarters (76%) of the public supports the holding of a referendum in such cases. Only 17% feel that there is no room, under these circumstances, for holding a referendum between elections, and 6% don't know. We attempted to pin down our respondents with an additional question: "Certain people contend that it was a mistake to promise a referendum on peace with Syria in return for our withdrawal from the Golan Heights, and that this mistake can still be rectified, and, moreover, this decision must be left to the prime minister and the experts , since only they possess the relevant information and that is why they were elected in the first place. On the other hand, others claim that the public must be asked, precisely because this is such an important and controversial issue. With which of these two opinions do you agree?" Support for holding a referendum was even higher here -- even if such a decision may have been mistaken from the outset: 80% favored a referendum and only 16% opposed it. (4% had no clear opinion).

Conclusions to be drawn from the above indicate a democratically aware public, which acknowledges the need for active civil involvement in the decision-making progress. However, there is a fly in the ointment: the figures show that while a small majority in this country (54%) believes that all Israeli citizens -- Jews and Arabs --are entitled to participate in a referendum, however a sizable minority -- 42% -- feels that only Jews should have the right to vote in a referendum on Syria. (4% didn't know). Asked what majority would be required to enable the government to sign an agreement, 63% replied that an overwhelming majority would be needed, 31% said that a normal majority would suffice, and 6% didn't know.

A well-known theory pertaining to public opinion -- the theory of the spiral of silence --- posits that people are inclined to join what they feel is the majority opinion. We therefore attempted to ascertain the public's current assessment of the results of the referendum, if held, and how the respondents themselves feel. Only 24% of the respondents believe that if the referendum were to be held today, a majority would vote for an agreement including full withdrawal in return for full peace. 60% believe that such an agreement would not attain a majority vote in the referendum (16% were unable to decide). A similar picture, reflecting a majority against full withdrawal in return for full peace, was obtained when we asked respondents how they themselves would vote if a referendum on this issue were held today: 25% said that they would vote in favor of such an agreement, 51% were opposed, and 23% felt that their vote would depend on the exact text of the agreement. (1% didn't know). By crossing the general estimate with personal stands, we find that there is, in effect, a clear link between personal stands and the assessment of how the general public feels. Those who responded that they themselves would vote in favor of withdrawal, 59% estimated that their stand would be shared by a majority of the public, and only 28% believed that support for a full Israeli withdrawal in return for full peace would not obtain a majority. On the other hand, among those who stated that they would vote against a withdrawal, 77% estimated that a vote in favor of withdrawal would not obtain a majority, and only 10% believed that they would obtain a majority vote if a referendum is held. Those who stated that their vote depended on the wording of the agreement comprised a majority (56%) who believed that supporters of a withdrawal would not obtain a majority vote, and only 18% felt that they would obtain a majority vote in the event that a referendum is held.

The strong support of the public's involvement in political decision-making could also derive from recent exposure to several cases where leading political figures are suspected of corruption, thereby eroding public confidence in national institutions. It has indeed been noted that public confidence in such institutions, which supposedly represent Israeli democracy, is now alarmingly lower, whereas the IDF -- as in the past -- enjoy the fullest confidence of the public (93% of respondents expressed their full confidence, or confidence); 79% have confidence in the High Court, and 59% in the Police, despite recent reports of corruption on the part of senior officers. Only 46% of respondents expressed full confidence, or confidence, in the Knesset, 45% in the government, 41% in the media, and only 28% in the political parties.

There was no real change in the peace indices this month: the general peace index for January was 58.6 (59.9 in December); the Oslo index was 50.0 (48.3 in December) and the Syrian index is 42.1 (42.4).

The peace index project was conducted by the Tami Steinmetz Research Institute for Peace at Tel Aviv University, headed by Prof. Ephraim Ya'ar and Dr. Tamar Hermann. Phone interviews were carried out by the "Mikhshuv" Institute on 30 November 1999 and 31 January 2000, and comprised 523 and 500 respondents respectively, representing the adult population of this country (including Judea and Samaria, and kibbutzim). Margin of error in a sample of this size is approx. 4.5%.

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PERMANENT QUESTIONS ON THE GENERAL PEACE INDEX

1. Do you believe or not believe that in the coming years there will be peace between Israel and the Arabs?

1. Certain there will be peace / 11.7
2. Think there will be peace / 32.4
3. In the middle / 11.2
4. Think there will not be peace / 17.0
5. Certain there will not be peace / 23.5
6. Don’t know/no opinion / 4.2

1. In general, do you consider yourself a supporter or opponent of the peace process between Israel and the Arabs?

1. Greatly opposed / 12.1
2. Somewhat opposed / 7.6
3. In the middle / 8.3
4. Somewhat supportive / 30.4
5. Greatly supportive / 37.8
6. Don’t know/no opinion / 3.8

PERMANENT QUESTIONS ON THE OSLO INDEX

1. What is your opinion on the agreement that was signed in Oslo between Israel and the PLO (Agreement of Principles)?

1. Heavily in favor / 16.0
2. Somewhat in favor / 22.5
3. In the middle / 16.4
4. Somewhat opposed / 14.2
5. Heavily opposed / 19.1
6. Don’t know/no opinion / 11.7

1. Do you believe or not believe that the Oslo Agreement between Israel and the PLO will bring about peace between Israel and the Palestinians in the coming years?

1. Greatly believe / 19.0
2. Somewhat believe / 24.9
3. In the middle / 8.9
4. Somewhat don’t believe / 15.3
5. Certainly don’t believe / 25.0
6. Don’t know/no opinion / 6.9

PERMANENT QUESTIONS ON THE SYRIAN INDEX

1. What is your position regarding support for a full peace treaty between Israel and Syria in exchange for withdrawal from the Golan Heights?

1. Greatly in favor / 14.0
2. Somewhat in favor / 9.5
3. In the middle / 11.9
4. Somewhat opposed / 12.2
5. Greatly opposed / 46.5
6. Don’t know/no opinion / 5.9

1. Do you believe or not believe that in the coming years there will be peace between Israel and Syria?

1. Certain there will be peace / 15.2
2. Think there will be peace / 32.5
3. In the middle / 10.7
4. Think there will not be peace / 16.4
5. Certain there will not be peace / 19.1
6. Don’t know/no opinion / 6.0

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