Practical Consequences Deduced from Speculative Principles?
The Political Implications of Hume’s Philosophy
Steven Gamboa
Abstract:What is the relation between Hume’s philosophical and political commitments?Three positions are explored: (1) Hume’s philosophy is logically irrelevant to his political outlook; (2) Hume’s politics is logically entailed by his philosophy; (3) Hume’s philosophy is logically relevant to his political thought, but does not entail any particular political outlook.After briefly considering the first option, I provide an analysis of Donald Livingston’s arguments for a version of the second view.After showing why Livingston’s arguments fail to support the second view, I provide considerations in favor of the third interpretation.
How do Hume’s positions in ‘speculative’ philosophy, Hume’s epistemology, metaphysics, and meta-ethics, connect to his views on “practical” matters, Hume’s opinions on social, historical, and political questions?Do the philosophical principles logically entail the social and political commitments?Or, do the philosophical convictions give some reason, though perhaps not demonstrative ones, for Hume’s social and political outlook?Or, are they—the philosophical and the political—compatible but logically independent with the appearance of deeper logical unity explained by our tendency to connect things in the imagination for utterly contingent historical reasons?
Addressing the relation between Hume’s philosophical and practical commitments would seem to require first clearly defining the respective relata.What should be understood as “Hume’s philosophical principles”?What should be understood as included under the heading “Hume’s social and political commitments”?As a rough start, we can divide up the terrain in terms of Hume’s works, placing key claims from the Treatise, the two Enquiries, and the Dialogues concerning Natural Religion in the ‘speculative philosophy’ category, while views expressed in the Essays, The History of England, and Hume’s epistolary writings are filed in the ‘practical social-historical-political’ category.This strategy does nothing to alleviate the many controversies and disputes among Hume’s readers concerning the correct interpretation of both the philosophy and the politics.
On the philosophy side, we find interpretations of Hume’s main philosophical aims and methods that emphasize competing verificationist, realist, empiricist, skeptical, and naturalist themes in various combinations.On the political side, there has been even less consensus, both in Hume’s day and our own.In his own time, Hume’s political allegiances were viewed with suspicion by both Whigs and Tories. Thomas Jefferson famously had Hume’s History banned from the University of Virginia because of what he perceived as its pernicious Tory biases, but Hume’s antipathy towards established religion and lack of piety, as well as his general skepticism, made him unacceptable to died-in-the-wool Tories such as Samuel Johnson.Hume’s oft quoted remark, “My views of things are more conformable to Whig principles; my representations of persons to Tory prejudices,”[1] did little to allay the suspicions about his politics.Contemporary scholarship has offered up a diversity of readings of Hume’s politics, ranging from staunchly conservative to progressive liberal and many shades in between.Everyone acknowledges that these labels are anachronistic when applied to Hume and his 18th century context, but I do not think it is wrong to expect that a philosophically informed political outlook (assuming that Hume had one) should be relevant to political issues framed in terms of categories different from those of its own specific historical context (though clearly it would be a mistake to demand that Hume fit into one or another contemporary category without remainder).
It is not necessary to settle these interpretive disputes before the main question of this essay can be addressed.In fact, the hope is that examining the links between Hume’s philosophical and political commitments can provide some new leverage for addressing long-standing debates within both domains of interpretation.The interpretive options can be grouped into three categories:on one view, Hume’s philosophical commitments carry no logical implications for Hume’s politics; on a second view, there are clear logical and conceptual entailments between Hume’s philosophical principles and a well-defined, articulated political standpoint; on a third (intermediate) view, there are implications for how we should think and converse about political life from Hume’s philosophy, but these implications do not provide a normative grounding for any particular view about the best political and social order.
Advocates of the first view might argue that, just as no one seriously expects to find logical or conceptual entailments between someone’s theoretical commitments in physics, chemistry, or mathematics and her political outlook,[2] one should not look to discover political implications from someone’s metaphysical and epistemological commitments.On this view, technical philosophy and politics are as much non-overlapping domains as algebra and ornithology.Despite a shared rationalist epistemology, Descartes was a reactionary royal absolutist, and Spinoza, a radical republican.Many have held that there is a logical or conceptual link between empiricism and political liberalism.But perhaps the appearance of logical relevance is, as David Miller puts it, “best explained by the historical fact that certain philosophies have emerged at the same time as their (seemingly) associated ideologies.”[3]As with the rationalists Descartes and Spinoza, the shared empiricism of Neurath and Quine clearly did not entail a common political outlook.
With respect to Hume’s case, the view advises against expecting to find support for Hume’s political conclusions in his philosophical premises.The view that Hume’s strictly philosophical commitments are irrelevant to his opinions on political matters has been endorsed by a number of prominent figures. Bertrand Russell cited Hume and himself as examples to show the absence of any necessary connection between epistemological and political views: while they agreed on abstract philosophical matters, they disagreed completely in their politics.[4]Duncan Forbes may also be included among those skeptical of any entailments.In his major work on Hume’s political thought, Hume’s Philosophical Politics, Forbes uses the term “philosophical” mainly in the sense of being disinterested and non-partisan, and thus seems to deny (at least implicitly) any deeper logical connections between the theoretical side of Hume’s philosophy and his political views.[5]
Hume’s remarks in section I of the Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding seem to lend support to the ‘no-entailment’ view.Hume writes that
The abstruse philosophy, being founded on a turn of mind, which cannot enter into business and action, vanishes when the philosopher leaves the shade, and comes into open day; nor can its principles easily retain any influence over our conduct and behavior.[6]
If speculative philosophy has little influence on conduct or behavior, it would follow that it can offer no consequences for political life.However, in the remainder of the section, Hume first qualifies, and then reverses, this initial verdict on the relevance of abstract philosophy for practical affairs.First, just as the detailed work of the anatomist is useful to the painter, so the rigors of speculative philosophy may be of benefit to the more practically minded politician by encouraging greater “foresight and subtility” in their reasonings.[7]Like a contemporary academic philosopher asked to defend the value of her discipline, Hume here highlights the improvement in critical thinking skills subsequent to the study of philosophy.But beyond improving our reasoning skills, the pursuit of abstract philosophy in the Humean mold offers two services of tremendous importance for practical affairs: one critical, the other positive.First, since it is needed to combat ‘false metaphysics’ and ‘deceitful philosophy’, ‘true philosophy’ provides a philosophical and moral hygienic against superstition and fanaticism that pose serious practical dangers, if left unchecked.Secondly, there is the possibility that philosophy, “if cultivated with care, and encouraged by the attention of the public,” will develop a genuine science of human nature that would constitute an “addition to our stock of knowledge, in subjects of such unspeakable importance.”[8]
The view that Hume’s philosophical principles have no relevance for his politics does not appear to have been shared by Hume himself.Contemporary Hume scholarship is much more inclusive in its treatment of all aspects of Hume’s thought than was previously the case—providing a much fuller and richer picture of Hume as philosopher, moralist, historian, and political theorist, developing what might be called a unified ‘Humean outlook’ across a wide range of issues. Stuart Hampshire captured the spirit of much of this work when he remarked that, “it was the application of a true understanding of human nature, with a view to a sane management of human affairs that finally interested Hume, rather than pure philosophy so called.”[9]Given these considerations, a view that denies any entailments among these domains should be treated as prima facie unwarranted and avoided unless, and until, attempts to delineate an underlying unity are found to fail.
The second view on the relation between Hume’s epistemological and metaphysical principles and his political commitments holds that there are strong entailments between the two domains, such that the former in some sense fix or ground the latter.In his essay “Philosophy and Politics,” Russell maintains that there do exist logical entailments linking various philosophies to political systems, though this position clearly contradicts his earlier pronouncements cited above.With regards to Hume specifically, Russell contends that Hume’s philosophical skepticism was logically related to his Toryism.
After setting forth his skeptical conclusions, which, he admits, are not such that men can live by, [Hume] passes on to a piece of practical advice which, if followed, would prevent anyone from reading him.“Carelessness and inattention,” he says, “alone can afford us any remedy.For this reason, I rely entirely upon them.”He does not, in this connection, set forth his reasons for being a Tory, but it is obvious that “carelessness and inattention,” while they may lead to acquiescence in the status quo, cannot, unaided, lead a man to advocate this or that scheme of reform.[10]
For Russell, Hume’s thorough-going philosophical skepticism leads logically to a reactionary politics.But beyond these broad strokes, Russell offers little support for his generalizations.
The Hume scholar who makes the most forceful case for a strong version of the second interpretation is Donald Livingston.[11]In his ambitious and wide-ranging work Hume’s Philosophy of Common Life, Livingston argues that Hume’s semantic and epistemological principles are intended to provide a foundation for a ‘doctrine of limits’ beyond which political criticism of the existing social and political order cannot go. Livingston argues that Hume’s aim is to provide political conservatism with a philosophical response against all forms of political radicalism by showing that they are either incoherent or self-defeating.His account of Hume’s political philosophy requires that he discover, in Hume’s thought, the resources to construct conceptual barriers to the possibility of radical critique of the existing social and political order.For Livingston’s Hume, the authority of the existing social-moral-political life-world cannot be challenged in any wholesale way without incurring incoherence.This is intended as a logical result, and not a mere matter of prudence and moderation:
The conservative character of Hume’s philosophy is often thought of as an appeal to moderation, but that would be a fundamental mistake.Moderation implies an activity that is acceptable. […] Philosophical criticism of common life…is not an acceptable activity.It is logically incoherent and self-deceptive, and one cannot speak of a proper degree of that activity.[12]
According to Livingston, while it would be a mistake to categorize Hume among the “metaphysical conservatives” who appeal to divine authority to sanction this-worldly social and political arrangements, Hume “does, in his own way, share with them the conviction that established order has a sacred character and that this sacred character constitutes part of the authority of that order.”[13]
There is a dilemma faced by anyone wishing to argue for the rational authority of the existing social and political order.How can we know that our existing plan, even if brought to its full potential through gradual internal reform, represents anything more than a local optimum in terms of social utility?The suspicion remains that there might be an alternative social and political arrangement that offers a higher utility optimum, perhaps even a global optimum.Unfortunately, such a peak may not be accessible from our current slope; reaching it would require a radical transformation of our social order, an abandonment of our current plan.This possibility is the source of radical hope.
Hume was aware that it is impossible to refute such radical hope from purely empirical or historical evidence.His own historical work showed that radical transformations of existing political structures could, and did, make possible improvements in social utilities that would have been impossible under the previously existing regime.Hume’s treatment of the Puritan rebellion in the English civil war is enlightening in this regard.That he considered the members of the Puritan party fanatics consumed by metaphysical fancy is clear from a casual reading of the first (published) volume of his History of England.Yet, despite his distrust of Puritan fanaticism, Hume concedes that “the new plan of liberty,” which made Britain’s mode of governance the envy of the cultured world, was made possible only by that very fanaticism.
So absolute, indeed, was the authority of the crown, that the precious spark of liberty had been kindled, and was preserved, by the puritans alone; and it was to this sect, whose principles appear so frivolous and habits so ridiculous, that the English owe the whole freedom of their constitution.[14]
Hume’s honesty in assigning credit attests to his integrity as a historian, but it does leave our understanding of the Puritans in a curious state: on the one hand, their religious fanaticism must be regarded as subversive of any kind of political order; but on the other hand, in pursuing their fanatical objectives, they struck the spark that ignited the flame of liberty.J.G.A. Pocock captures this point: “The great originality of [Hume’s] history of the Puritan Revolution is his insistence that the fanaticism of the Puritan sect was both an excessive threat to rational freedom and a necessary step towards its establishment.”[15]Hume’s account of the Puritan episode makes it plain that no purely historical argument could serve to abolish radical hope in a future, more perfect social and political order.
These considerations lead to the dilemma mentioned above: the conservative can either dogmatically reject any change to the status quo, or accept that radical schemes are in principal coherent, and present possible vehicles for social improvement. If I understand him correctly, Livingston’s idea is to use Humean resources to resolve this dilemma for conservatism.In Livingston’s view, Hume does not merely say that radical designs are impractical or fraught with dangers (empirical claims all), but that they are, in principle, incoherent and self-defeating when they engage in a wholesale critique of the “sacred” norms of the existing moral world.[16]Demonstrating the incoherence and self-defeating nature of radical projects is what Livingston means by providing “conceptual barriers” to radicalism.
If Livingston’s project were successful, it would establish entailments of the strongest logical sort between Hume’s philosophical principles and a fully articulated normative political position.Critical response to Livingston’s work, since he developed these views in the mid-1980s and 1990s, has generally acknowledged its bold originality and insight, but most critics have not been persuaded to accept his more dramatic conclusions.[17][i]Yet, despite Livingston’s prominence among contemporary Hume scholars, there has been no detailed attention to the key arguments he offers to support his interpretation.Dissenting critics have cited textual evidence that seems to tell against Livingston’s bold interpretation, and in favor of their more moderate views, but Livingston’s case for his interpretation deserves consideration in its own right.Livingston is not only offering a novel interpretation of Hume’s thought, but trying to show how certain putatively Humean political positions can be derived from Hume’s philosophical principles.To give such an effort its due requires that, beyond contesting its conclusions, we show where the arguments go wrong.The exercise should also prove helpful in deciding whether any version of the strong entailment view is viable, and if not, what a better understanding of the relation between Hume’s philosophy and politics would look like.
In Livingston’s account, Humean conservatism confronts three philosophically or religiously inspired radical challengers: (1) Metaphysical Radicalism; (2) Sacred Providential Radicalism; and (3) Secular Providential Radicalism.Metaphysical radicals hold that the standards governing existing social and political institutions are false until they can be shown to be in accord with intuitively certain propositions.The actual, historically determined social order is judged according to atemporal, abstract standards derived from self-evident axioms.Both types of providential radicalism, sacred and secular, differ from metaphysical radicalism in that they are historically based.Unlike the metaphysically inclined, the providential radical finds the standards for critique of existing social and political arrangements, not in some abstract, atemporal, rational order, but in the historical process itself.In this respect, both varieties of providential political theory share with Livingston’s brand of Humean conservatism the view that normative standards are always derived from an understanding of temporally determined concepts.According to Livingston, however, there is a fundamental difference between providential theories and Humean conservatism: the conservative explicates historical standards as a relation between the normative past and the present, whereas providentialists explain historical standards as a relation between a normative future and the present.For Livingston, the providential framework disposes one to criticize the present in terms of total revolution, rather than one of reform: