4/25/2019
TURKMENISTAN:
Political, Economic and Regulatory Issues
Summary
Of all the countries in Central Asia, Turkmenistan is now being looked upon as a “laboratory of transition.” The sudden death of Turkmen President Saparmurad Niyazov in December 2006 initiated a new phase for the region -- succeeding a leader born of the Soviet era. The new president, Gurbanguli Berdimukhammedov, was elected in February 2007,garnering 89 percent of the vote and ushering in the possibility of a new era.Still, with social, political and regulatory issues unresolved, Turkmenistan’s debut on the international stage is an uncertain work in progress.
Country Overview
Turkmenistan is a desert state slightly smaller than Texas located north of Iran in the heart of Central Asia and bordered to the west by the landlocked Caspian Sea. The former Soviet
republic gained its independence in 1991 after the Soviet Union dissolved and, until President Saparmurad Niyazov’s death [by cardiac arrest? yes]on Dec. 21,2006, was under the rule of one man.An eccentric rule it was. Niyazov adopted the name “Turkmenbashi” (“Father of the Turkmen”) and crafted a cultof personality around it, applying his appellation to a meteorite and a line of household products and erecting statues of himself in the country’s capital, Ashgabat.
Aside from its former leader, Turkmenistan’s biggest claim to fame is that it is believed to be the home of the world’s fifth-largest natural gas supply. Currently, its existing infrastructure is Soviet-era and creaking, and it sends nearly all of its natural gas exports -- about 67 billion cubic meters per year -- north and west to Russia. Without those shipments, Russian state energy firm Gazprom would find it impossible to both satisfy domestic Russian natural gas demand and fulfill its export contracts with Europe and Turkey.
Turkmenistan’s natural gas fields -- the ones that are currently being exploited and those that have never been touched -- are often pointed to as sources for potential energy infrastructure projects that could send natural gas to Asia via Kazakhstan, to South Asia via Afghanistan or to Europevia a subsea Caspian pipeline. If Gazprom, the world’s largest producer, shipper and exporter of natural gas, believes Turkmenistan is of critical importance, thena presidential death and a shift in direction could have significant economic implications for the region[-- and the world? yes].
But to understand how Turkmenistan is today, one has to understand its late leader. The dark clouds of Niyazov’s reign still overshadow the country, keeping virtuallyall international powers from making any economic orgeopolitical inroads. However, most observers inside and outside Turkmenistan believe these clouds will dissipate over the next few years, allowing a scramble over the country’s spoils. Large global players are now trying to lay the groundwork for this free-for-all.
Turkmenbashi’s Regime
Niyazov was among the most bizarre leaders in human history, renaming himself Turkmenbashi only because the Turkish government threatened to cut off relations if he
went with his first choice: Ataturk(the name of the Republic of Turkey’s founder). In addition to renaming products and erecting status of himself, Niyazovalso renamed the months of the year to more accurately reflect his “central role in human history”; created a spiritual guidebook of his personal wisdom that has largely replaced all other texts in the country’s educational system; and introduced a brand of Turkmenbashi vodka for consumption in an ostensibly Muslim nation.
To rule in this way, Niyazov had to rid his country of anyone who might have been willing to oppose him -- or even question him. While his violent tendencies could hardly be compared to those of Josef Stalin, Niyazov instituted purge after purge to remove any semblance of opposition -- or independent thought -- from his domain. His sense of irony often showed in his actions, such as the time a railroad minister was “accidentally” run over by a train. At other times he couldsimply be creative. Niyazov used a likely fictitious assassination attempt against him as a pretext to banish or arrest the few opposition politicians who remained in the country.
The results of his strong-arm tactics were predictable. Eventually, aside from a small cadre of loyalists whose sole duty it was to ensure Niyazov’s physical safety, there was no one left in the country who possessed the mix of competence and charisma needed to step into Turkmenbashi’s shoes.
The Successor
In Central Asia, if a late leader has not groomed a protégé, it is traditional for countries looking for a successor to follow the old rules andpass the torch to a member of the leader’s family. In Niyazov’s case, this was easier said than done. His son had not been seen in public for years (and was rumored to be dead) and his daughter was locked away in an insane asylum. Constitutionally, Niyazov’s rule should have passed to a figurehead leader from the country’s pseudo parliament, in this case National Assembly President Avesgeldy Atayev. However, since Atayev was under investigation at the time[for what?corruption], the National Security Council named Deputy Prime Minister Gurbanguli Berdimukhammedov president before being “elected”[do you mean, “without bothering to hold any kind of “election” or “before holding any presidential ‘election,’ which finally occurred on Feb. 11, 2007, as a pro-forma confirmation of Berdimukhammedov’s appointment”? they held an election, but there was no doubt Berdi was going to get the overwhelming support]
Berdimukhammedov had long been rumored to be Niyazov’s illegitimate son, bornshortly afterNiyazov turned 18. This could explain why Niyazov promoted Berdimukhammedov -- who was trained as a dentist -- all the way to the highest circle of government positions despite his lack of politicalfinesse[experience might be a better word. Not sure we’ve made it clear why he would lack finessecan we have both words? He’s a very clumsy and farcical leader]. The remarkable resemblance between Niyazov and Berdimukhammedov has further fueled this rumor.
Berdimukhammedov was schooled in Russia, considers himself “Russified” and speaks the language fluently. Before becoming president, he had always dealt only with Moscow but in his new position has declared that Turkmenistanis willing to establish relationships with other global powers and develop the long-isolated state. No leader of Turkmenistan had ever suggesteddealing directly with any powers other than Russia, Central Asiancountriesand Iran (Turkmenistanalso is a former Persian province).
The possibility of Turkmenistan’s opening up to foreign investment and relations piqued global interest, although nothing has changed legally or diplomatically to facilitate this opening. Berdimukhammedov is preoccupied withthe possible fracturing of his county and needs to address this issue before he can look beyond it.
Purges and Clans
One of Niyazov’s great achievements was that he was able to keep Turkmenistan stable and unified despite the historically volatile clans that make up the country’s population -- much like Afghanistan, Pakistan, Uzbekistan and Tajikistan. Turkmenistan is composed of five regions: Ahal[Akhal? Lets stick with Ahal], Balkhan, Dasoguz, Lebap and Mary[are these also clan names? If so, is the region named after the largest clan?Only in some cases], each having one or two clans. Niyazov set up a system in which his clan, Akhal[Ahal?], ran the government and oversaw everything that had to do with the Caspian Sea. All other clanswereeither crushed by larger clans or bought off by being allowed to control certain aspects of the country’s economy or government. The largest clanin Turkmenistan, Mary, does not participate in governancebut reaps all the financial gains of Turkmenistan’s extensive drug tradewith Afghanistan. The Lebap clan is in charge of the country’s secret services and the Balkhan clan is in charge of the energy infrastructure.
Keeping all these clans content with the status quo is a precarious balance, but it is something that Niyazov was quite good at. Berdimukhammedov has not proved to be so adept. The new president is concerned that each of the other clans[other than which clan? Other than his own Ahal] hold something [more? yes]powerful in the country (drug money, petrodollars, the intelligence branch)[than his clan does? Which is? That could overturn the Ahal clan’s hold on the government]. He has made moves to consolidate these powers under him. All the clans answered to President Niyazov, but Berdimukhammedov wants not only more control but also to ensure that the clanswill not overthrow him. This is why he started his own series of purges.
First, Berdimukhammedov was determined to break Turkmenistan’s tradition of transporting drugs to Europe and Russia -- though this has put him at odds with the Mary clan, [which consists of more than 80 percent of the country’s population?yes]. Berdimukhammedov alsodecided thathe wants to control the secret services, but this has pitted him against the head of the Lebap clan, Lt. Gen. Akmurat Redzhepov, who is also the country’s second most powerful man behind the president. Moreover, Redzhepov was heavily tied to both the [Soviet? yes]KGB and its [Russian? yees]successor,the Federal Security Service (FSB). Berdimukhammedov has already removed Redzhepov from his position but he has not truly gone away; Redzhepov’s allies are still in control of the country’s police and military hierarchy.
The possible instability and need for internal reconsolidation has kept the new president from implementing political and economic reforms, though he vows to sort through the disarray and turn his attention to what he considers more important: bringing in foreign investment to develop his country.
[Although this section is titled “Purges and Clans,” and we refer to Berdi’s purges, we mention only one, that of Lt. Gen. Redzhepov. Were there other purges?Yes, but after looking at the section again, can we rename it to “Internal Stability” or “Clan Stability” or something? ]
Turkmenistan’s Place in the World
UnderNiyazov, Turkmenistanassumed a “neutral” role geopolitically. This has turned into more of an isolationist policy despiteBerdimukhammedov’s expressed desire to attractforeign investment. Preoccupied with internal issues, he has taken no specific action to date in terms of improving the investment climate.Meanwhile,Russia, Iran, the United States and Chinaare jockeying into position not only to get their hands on its vast energy wealth but also to exploit its strategic position among so many regional power brokers.
Currently, Russia still holds the most power over Turkmenistan, even though Moscow cannot dictate Ashgabat’s behavior.Russia must have Turkmen natural gas to keep its strategy of using energy as a foreign policy hammer; replacing Turkmen supplies would take a decade and tens of billions of dollars in cash that Gazprom simply does not have. This policy is the foundation of Russia’s grand strategy[meaning its one dominant geopolitical strategy? yes], and there is little Moscow would not do to ensure that it gets its way and maintains control over Turkmenistan.
Meanwhile,China is in the process of drawing a knife across Central Asia, slicing off the southern four republics from their traditional overlord, Russia, by running a pipeline to Turkmenistan(more about this below). Turkmenistan makes up the bulk of Central Asia’s natural gas exports, so by securing access to Turkmen natural gas, Beijing could cripple Moscow’s ability to meet Russia’s and Europe’s natural gas needs. Turkmenistan is fully open to China’s moves, especially since China pays up front without any political strings. However, because Ashgabat has yet to dropor modify its laws on foreign investment, Beijing is still waiting to flood the country with investments and deals.
For Iran, Turkmenbashi’s death presenteda uniqueopportunity[to do what, exactly? to possibly strengthen ties or pull Ashgabat into more Tehran-friendly relations ]. Turkmenistan is the borderland between the Persians, the Central Asian tribes and the Russians. For the first time since the early 1990s, [however? yes],relations between Ashgabat and Tehran appear to have cooled, especially since Turkmenistan began asserting itself as a natural gas supplier, charging something closer to a market price. This led to a natural gas cut-off from Turkmenistan to Iran in January 2008, at the height of winter.
Notably absent from this game has been the West, until just recently. Optimistic Americans and Europeans might think Niyazov’s death gave them an opening, and indeed they are nowattempting to secure some provisional deals. But Berdimukhammedov is coming off of years of weary Turkmen foreign policy toward the West[what do you mean by this? can we say, “… a virtually non-existent foreign policy toward the West”?yes].
Niyazov was a supporter of the 2001 war in Afghanistan launched chiefly by the United States, support that stemmed from his fear that Afghanistan’s instability would spill over into his tightly controlled country. But the 2003Iraq war deeply affected Niyazov and the rest of the Turkmen government, particularly their view of the United States. The Iraq war was, in Niyazov’s mind, essentially the United Statesoverthrowing a very familiar-looking government. After Saddam Hussein was removed from power -- and particularly after Libya’s Moammar Gadhafi reached a rapprochement with the United States-- Niyazov became convinced that he was the next target on Washington’s hit list.
In addition, there was a wave of “color” and “velvet” revolutions that began in Serbia in 2000, swept Georgia in 2003 and Ukraine in 2004, and finally reached the Central Asian countries Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan in 2005. Not only was the Turkmenbashi terrified that the West --accused of sparking the revolutions -- would attempt one in his country, but he also knew that Turkmenistanwould be more vulnerable to such a revolution because it had a far more brittle power structure and weaker security services than the other countries.
This all led Niyazov to sign a rather comprehensive defense agreement with Moscow that abandoned Ashgabat’s previous policy of neutrality and placed Turkmenistan back under Moscow’s security umbrella. However, Berdimukhammedov is a more level-headed leader and is making his own decisions. This is why we have, for the first time in Turkmenistan’s history, its president planning to attend the NATO summit April 2-4[in Bucharest, Romania? yes]. Though Turkmenistan has always been wary of the West, the new president is feeling out his options for security outside of Moscow’s umbrella.
An Economic Balancing Act
Berdimukhammedov’s behavior may seem a little schizophrenic at times, but Turkmenistan is in a difficult position. It is coming out from under two of the world’s most oppressive regimes -- the Soviet Union and the Turkmenbashi -- only to face a slew of powerful suitors wanting to tap its vast wealth. At the same time, Turkmenistanneeds to consolidate internally to keep from battling itself. This has led Berdimukhammedov to pull Turkmenistan’s energy and economic policy in all directions without a clear focus.
Although Gazprom and the Kremlin do not hold all the cards, they do have long-established relations with Ashgabat and have the advantage of being able to deal with the entire Turkmen hierarchy.And while Russia still controls the export routes for hydrocarbons, it apparently does not know the total amount of reserves in the country, and its control over the price of natural gas is clearly eroding, with recent hikes to closer to European prices.
Despite U.S. efforts, a conclusive victory[“completion”? unclear as isconclusive victory in even landing the deal] of the Transcaspian project is still not in the offing, even though rumor has it that Kazakh President Nursultan Nazarbaev has discretely agreed to provide 20 billion cubic meters[of what? Natural gas] annually if Turkmenistan commits itself to the project. But most of the U.S. energy supermajors -- ExxonMobil, BP[U.S.? yes], Chevron[are these most of the U.S. supermajors or most that are involved in this project?The companies that have their sights on Turkmenistan for energy development, not just TransCaspian] -- have set up shop in Ashgabat, ready to attack when the president begins dropping the restrictions. In addition,former investment entities[do you mean those that formerly invested in Turkmenistan and are thinking about investing again?yes]suchasthe European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, the International Monetary Fund and the U.S. Agency for International Development are reconsidering their [current?yes]positions of havinglittle or no investment in the country, and their decisions will have a significant impact on Turkmenistan’s modernization.