Human Development 1

Theories of Human Development

Piagetian Ideas of Human and Cognitive Development

Jean Piaget, a genetic epistemologist, has been one of the most profound and influential theorists in regards to human development. In particular, his research into the cognitive development of children and adolescents has shaped both the global understanding of how the young person’s mind works cognitively and psychologically, and how they young people are regarded and taught educationally. His findings shed great insight into how young people learn and, how and when young people ought to be taught certain subjects. According to Piaget, there is a strictly defined dichotomy in a child’s intellectual development; the two facets of this development are psychosocial and spontaneous, or psychological. Psychosocial and spontaneous development parallel the dichotomy between a priori and a posteriori knowledge in German transcendentalism, propagated by Immanuel Kant. Knowledge gained “a posteriori” is that which is learned through experience or action while “a priori” is that which can be known without experience. Kant’s transcendentalism is essentially a branch of epistemology, the study of knowledge. Being a genetic epistemologist, Piaget would certainly have been aware of this debate and his research shows the implications thereof. Psychosocial development has to do with all those things that a child receives. In other words, everything a child learns as a transmission of knowledge, whether it is from parents, educational institutions, or other sources, is termed psychosocial. In this sense, the child is the receptor to which knowledge is sent. Spontaneous development consists of the development of the intelligence itself, those aspects of knowledge that the child acquires without being taught and those ideas or concepts that must be learned but cannot be taught (Piaget, 1976, p. 2). Piaget’s work took place primarily in the latter of the two types of development. Also, it must be noted that intelligence and knowledge, although related, are separate ideas. Knowledge can be equated with understanding while intelligence is the ability to understand.

Of the two types of development, time plays are far more crucial role in spontaneous or psychological development. Psychological development cannot be successfully rushed. There are things that the child must learn in a natural order. Piaget uses the ideas of conservation of matter, conservation of weight, and conservation of volume to demonstrate this. A simple example occurs when a short, wide glass of water is poured into a slender, tall glass. Most adults and even adolescents take it for granted that there is the same amount of water in both glasses, that the water weighs the same, and that there is the same volume of water. While it seems intuitive, gaining an understanding of these processes takes several years for children.

Stages and events in psychological development must happen in a particular order; there are no specific ages attached to a stage or an event, but there are averages that can be used as markers to show when most people will go through each stage. Piaget’s studies, as well as further studies done all over the world to substantiate his studies, showed that children always discover concentration of matter before conservation of weight, and conservation of weight before conservation of volume. On average, this process takes about four years. Any given child will likely determine conservation of matter around the age of eight, conservation of weight around the age of 10, and conservation of volume around the age of 12. While some children may attain an understanding of a concept a little earlier or later, they always come to an understanding of the concepts in the order given above, no matter where the children come from or what society they have been raised in. This order cannot be altered or really even accelerated through direct instruction. Direct instruction in these concepts merely results in the memorization of results not the internalization of underlying ideas. Therefore, time is an integral component in psychological development and, as such, cannot be disregarded or underestimated (Piaget, 1976, pp. 4-10).

One of the reasons that it takes time for children to understand these concepts can be found in the idea of the cognitive unconscious. The cognitive unconscious is the term that Piaget uses to describe thought structures, which are the methods by which people, not only children, solve problems. An example thought structure discussed by Piaget is “transitivity.” Transitivity refers to being able to understand that building A is equally as tall as building C, if building A is as tall as building B, and building B is as tall as building C. Adults, having already developed this thought structure, are able to process this data extremely quickly, even seemingly without having to think about it. Children are not born able to think in this manner. They have to develop new thought patterns as their understanding grows, even though child, and people in general, are rarely aware of their thought structures (Piaget, 1976, pp. 32-35). This is one of the reasons that psychological development cannot be accelerated. It is very difficult to teach another person how to think.

There are multiple reasons for a lack of awareness of thought processes on the part of children. The first reason is possibly the most complex. Children unconsciously repress understanding of thought processes that will contradict or interfere with existing thought processes before they can become conceptually formulated. Then, when asked to describe a thought process, create one based on the limited conscious understanding that they do have (Piaget, 1976, pp. 38-39). The second reason is that a “well-adapted” process does not require being thought about and that thinking overmuch about it can have counter productive results. A well-adapted process is that which works easily and yields the necessary results. An example could be running. Trying to think about how to move each leg before or during running could make the act itself more difficult (Piaget, 1976, pp. 40-41).

Related to the idea that children learn concepts in a predetermined order as the mature psychologically, is Piaget’s idea that children go through a set of four distinct stages of intellectual development. For there to even be stages, Piaget has laid out criteria that must be met: the order through which the stages are progressed must remain constant, the stages must all build on the foundations of the previous stages, the thought structures developed must require an entire stage to develop, a stage will both prepare the child for the next stage and allow those structures in development to reach completion, the point at which they do not require any further development, and there will be lags, which are repetitions or reproductions of operations, across different stages (Piaget, 1976, pp. 50-53). If any of these criteria cannot be met, then the theory of stages is progressive stages of intellectual development is flawed.

The first stage, which lasts about two years, is called the period of sensorimotor intelligence. It lasts from birth until the onset of speech. At this stage, there is intelligence, but there is not thought because speech is the representation of thought. Intelligence allows the young child to reach a goal that is not accessible immediately. It takes almost two years because speech and thought are interrelated and it takes a significant period time to develop the thought structures necessary for speech (Piaget, 1976, pp. 11-13).

The first 18 months or so of a child’s life are some of the busiest in terms of intellectual development. This is when the basic thought structures of objects, space, time, causality, object permanence (occurring around 10 months of age) and others are formed (Piaget, 1976, 13-15, 54-56). It is easy to see how important these thought structures on. This is the foundation upon which more complex and rational thought can be built.

The next stage, usually beginning between 18 and 24 months of age, is termed the period of preoperational representation. This is when symbolic function develops. This is when the child develops the capacity to represent something with something else. There are many manifestations of this. The most noticeable is speech, which is “a system of social signs” (Piaget, 1976, p. 16). A child will begin to use gestures to represent ideas. Symbols will be incorporated into play. Children will be able to begin to imitate and form mental pictures. Symbolic thought is essential to the further stages of development (Piaget, 1976, pp. 16-17).

The third stage is the period of concrete operations, which occurs at about the age of seven on average. This is when a child becomes capable of some logical thought. This logic is not based on speech or argumentation, but rather upon the classifications and relations of objects. In terms of thought processes, this is the first time that a child is able to grasp the idea of reversibility. The child can understand and manipulate objects in a series. The child will be able to classify objects into different categories (Piaget, 1976, pp. 20-24).

The last stage is the period of formal operations, which usually begins around the age of 12 and reaches a level of equilibrium at about 15. It is only in this final stage that a child develops the ability to utilize deductive reasoning. The child can now understand verbal propositions and reason based on them, as opposed to only being able to reason based on the classification of objects (Piaget, 1976, pp. 24-25).

It is also important to note that language is not a prerequisite of operational thought but rather an extension thereof, according to Piaget. For example, organizing different types of words into parts of speech, such as verbs, nouns, etc…, is classification. This is a type of concrete operational thought. Language as a type of formal operational thought can be seen in propositional arguments. An example of a propositional argument could be an “If… then…” statement. Reasoning over propositions is one of the distinctions of formal operational thought (1976, pp 109-112). Thus, language can illuminate the stage of intellectual development of a child.

Bruner’s Theories on Linguistic Development

Whereas much of Piaget’s work focused on cognitive development and used language mostly as the marker of a transition between two early stages of that development, Jerome Bruner, in his 1983 book Child’s Talk, studied the development of language itself in the child, using an understanding of cognitive development to explain the development of language. Piaget and Bruner were studying two different aspects of one thing: the overall maturation process of the child. By studying both separate parts, a greater understanding of the whole will be gained.

According to Bruner, language cannot be separated from culture because language is what a person uses to interpret the culture (1983, p. 24). For a long time, the study of linguistics has had two dominating schools of thought. For a theory to be complete, it needs to cover syntax, semantics, and pragmatics, many of which are not discussed in classical theories. Syntax is the structure of language; semantics refers to understanding that sounds represent objects; pragmatics refers to the intent or desire hoped for in what is said. This first major theory, propagated by St. Augustine, is that children learn language simply by imitating the names of objects. This really only covers vocabulary, a limited aspect of language, and is therefore an incomplete theory. A second theory is, put forth by Noam Chomsky, is that people are born with a Language Acquisition Device, which allows them to innately understand the structure of language and “universal grammar.” This theory is convenient, but covers little of the actual process of acquiring language skills (pp. 31-42). Thus, a more complete theory must be sought for.

In order for linguistic abilities to be able to develop, the child must possess some communicative abilities prior to the onset of speech. First, the child is born with what Bruner calls “means-end readiness.” In simpler terms, it just signifies that the child does many activities designed to result in a specific objective. Bruner conducted a study in which infants were shown a blurred picture that only became clear when they sucked on their thumbs. The infants quickly learned to suck on their thumbs while looking at the picture and to turn their heads away from it when not sucking on their thumbs (1983, p. 25). This illustrates the idea that even infants are able to control their actions so that they result in a specific objective. In this case, it was to make the picture clearer. Second, infants, as is well known, are very social. They depend upon social interaction and reciprocal responses. Without social responses from caregivers, infants will not thrive (pp. 27-28). Third, infants show a natural predisposition towards “systematicity,” or the ability to act in a coordinated order. This stems, in part, from the fact that most infants spend a large percentage of their time doing a small number of activities in constrained settings. This natural predisposition prepares them for and helps them to pick up language because language is an extension of this thought; it is another order or system (pp.28-29). Fourth, despite many claims to the contrary, children are capable of abstract thought because the onset of speech because without abstract thought, language would not be possible (pp. 29-30). These four cognitive abilities provide the foundation upon which language can develop.

Most parents and infants play basic games. Often, they take the form “Peek-a-boo,” or revolve around an idea of object permanence. According to Bruner, these games are essential to the maturation and development of the young. Higher order primates also play games with their young. It is a way for the young to experiment with societal or cultural mores without fear of consequences. The difference between humans’ and primates’ games is the involvement of language; humans’ games are often centered around language and without language the games would not be possible in their current form. The language is often simplified and it gives children an opportunity to learn and use language in a safe environment that they actually enjoy (1983, pp. 42-63).

As children develop, their referential ability grows. Reference is the ability to indicate or articulate what the subject of one’s thought is and to communicate that with another person. Reference can vary in precision from vague to detailed. It is a type of social interaction that requires joint attention. Reference requires more than one person, as opposed to the idea of simply the subject of one person’s thoughts and the outside world. Lastly, there are a set of procedures and linguistic devices through which joint attention may be gained. Reference relies heavily, although not exclusively, on language and links cognitive and linguistic development (Bruner, 1983, pp. 67-69).

Though exactly when is not, and possibly cannot, be known, the child begins to understand on a basic level that patterned sounds represent objects in the real world, which is otherwise known as semantics. Children, at an early age, are able to respond to both physical and verbal cues from others by redirecting their attention. Children generally can follow the line of sight of someone else and will respond more to a pronounced upward change in intonation, such as would be evident in a question. However, reference, especially for young children, is heavily context dependent. Thus, adults will often try to simplify context to increase the ability of reference (Bruner, 1983, pp. 67-70).

There is a multitude of ways to establish joint attention. The most common of which among very young children is making direct eye contact. Bruner shares an observation of a mother and child; the mother would introduce a new object by bringing between herself and the child while they were making eye contact and she would vocalize with an upward intonation. Children seem to respond more to upward intonation than to other forms for purposes of redirecting attention. This reinforces the child’s referential ability because now both the mother and the child are able to jointly focus on one object. Jointly focusing on the one object then makes naming that object easier for the child (Bruner, 1983, pp. 67-73).

There is an important shift around six months of age. At this time, the child’s focus and attention are dominated by external object. What is important is that the child now can give signals about desired objects as opposed to just receiving them. This progression continues as the children learn to point, which begins as a way of marking things that are worthy of note more than of requesting things that are out of reach. Combined with pointing, children soon become able to make “consistent but nonstandard expressions by which the child comes to ‘indicate’ objects” (Bruner, 1983, p. 76). As the child progresses through Piaget’s period of sensorimotor intelligence, the ability of reference grows steadily.

The development of the ability to request parallels the development if the ability of reference in many ways. There are four basic types of request that develop in young children: request for an object, request for an unseen object, request for joint action, and request for supportive action. The child’s first request is generally for an object. Usually, it begins when an adult is showing or handing an object to a child and the child reciprocally reaches for it, often with a sound of effort. From this step, the child proceeds to point and make a sound to request an object. Most of the time, the object is in another’s possession. Then, the child will move on to reaching with less effort and with more of a “stylized request call” (Bruner, 1983, p. 95). Requesting an object that is not immediately visible is a much more complicated and advanced action. On average, this ability develops around 14 months of age. The child will still attempt to use reaching with vocalizations, but it is not easily interpreted. This is followed by nominals, even though they may be nonstandard expressions. The child learns to say, often through prodding or questioning, what is desired. The child begins to use language for the purpose of getting things done (pp. 95-104).