Philosophy of Mind and Language

Department of Philosophy

MA in Philosophy

Autumn Term 2005

Learning Outcomes

In this course, students will gain knowledge of central aspects of contemporary work on the Philosophy of Mind and Language. In particular, students will be able to explain:

Quine’s argument against the analytic/synthetic distinction;
Quine’s account of the indeterminacy of translation;
Quine’s argument for the and the inscrutability of reference;
the Quine-Chomsky debate on the objectivity of linguistics;
Davidson’s account of theories of meaning for natural languages;
Davidson’s theory of radical interpretation and its consequences for the relation between language and reality;
Davidson’s account of subjectivity;

Davidson’s theory of triangulation;
Davidsons’s interpretationist theory of mind; and
Davidson’s account of objectivity.

After mastering the content of these topics, students are expected to engage critically with them in order that they may develop their own views on language, mind and their relation to each other. In addition to mastering the content of one of Philosophy’s perennial subjects, students will develop skills necessary for the study of Philosophy generally, which include:

defining key terminology in a central topic in Philosophy;
describing accurately the content of major works of Philosophy;
distinguishing different solutions to philosophical problems;
proposing new solutions to longstanding philosophical problems;
appraising the persuasiveness of arguments concerning core issues in Philosophy; and
comparing the treatment of central philosophical questions offered by philosophers working in different traditions.

In general, students will develop their reading comprehension skills, which are essential not only to the study of Philosophy, but are also essential to many sorts of careers. Thus, students will also develop generic and transferable skills, including explaining complex material, analysing arguments, and formulating solutions to problems.

Assessment

The assessment for this module counts for 12.5% of the total assessment for the MA in Philosophy. A student may be assessed either by closed examination or by essay. (Remember that a student on the MA in Philosophy must take at least one closed examination.)

Closed Examination

The examination for the module (and for the other components of the MA Seminar: Metaphysics and Epistemology; Ethics) will be held in Week 1 of the Summer Term (24 April – 28 April 2006). The precise time and date of the examinations will be confirmed at a later date. Students are advised to consult the timetable published by the University Examinations and Timetabling Office for the precise time of the examination. It is entirely the student’s responsibility to ensure his or her presence at the examination.

The examination will be three hours in length, during which students are expected to answer three out of a possible eight questions. Questions will be drawn from the required reading for the module, for examples of questions please see the enclosed list of practice exam questions. All and only the required reading is examinable.

Essay

The essay should be 3,500-4,500 words in length and the title may either be the student’s own (by agreement with the tutor) or be taken from the enclosed list of essay titles. Two copies of the final draft of the essay are due onMonday 16 January 2006to the Departmental Office. Should a student miss this submission date, she may not be allowed to submit an essay for assessment, in which case, she must take the closed examination for assessment.

Students are also advised to consult the Department’s Assessment Policies and Practices as set forth in the MA Handbook.

MA Mark Scale

Mark

90 – 100Essays one would advise the student to revise for publication.

80 – 89Exceptional and outstanding work that presents original ideas and arguments which are clearly worked out and set in the context of a well-understood philosophical debate.

70 – 79Excellent work that shows a capacity for independent thought and clear evidence of critical reflection on the module material; clear and accurate presentation of the issues and arguments, and which shows a sophisticated grasp of the subtleties of the philosophical debate.

MA Distinction (70)

60 – 69Very good work that is well-structured and which accurately presents philosophical positions, arguments, and problems, which shows a good solid grasp of the main elements of the philosophical debate, and which shows an ability to exercise philosophical judgement.

50 – 59Solid work that reflects a sound understanding of the central issues and arguments, as well as a familiarity with a good range of module material.

MA Pass (50)

40 – 49Work that coherently presents a limited range of relevant module material in a structured essay.

DiplomaPass (40)

35 – 39Work that shows some understanding of a limited range of module material.

0 – 34Work that shows some understanding of some of the basic issues covered in the module material.

Procedural Requirements

Attendance

Students are required to attend at least two thirds of seminars. This means that a student must attend:

7 out of the 10 seminars in which the course reading is discussed, and
6 out of the 9 seminars in which the videos are shown.

Students should contact the course tutor in advance of missing a seminar so that an alternative tutorial can be arranged, or if it proves impossible to contact the tutor in advance, students should contact him as soon as possible after the seminar.

Reading and Study Questions

Additionally, students are required to come prepared to seminars, which includes having read carefully the reading set for the seminar and completed the study questions. Students’ work will be checked periodically.

Preparation for Assessment

Finally, students are required to write either

three answers, each of which should be 750 words in length, to questions taken from the enclosed list of practice exam questions, or

an essay of 3,500-4,500 words in length on a topic from the enclosed list of essay titles and bibliographies or on a topic previously approved by the course tutor.

Clearly, students who intend to take the examination for assessment should choose the former option, while those students who intend to write an essay should choose the latter option.

Whichever option the student chooses, the draft work is due in Week 8. I will discuss a student’s procedural work with her in an individual tutorial in Week 10.

Reading Schedule

Week 1

Quine on Analyticity

Required Reading:

Quine, ‘Two Dogmas of Empiricism’, in Quine, From a Logical Point of View (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1953).

Recommended Reading:

Quine, ‘Truth by Convention’, in Quine, The Ways of Paradox and Other Essays: Revised and Enlarged Edition (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1976).

Quine, ‘Carnap and Logical Truth’, in Quine 1976.
Quine, ‘Two Dogmas in Retrospect’, The Canadian Journal of Philosophy (1991): 265-74.

Week 2

Quine on the Indeterminacy of Translation

Required Reading:

Quine, Word and Object (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1960), chs. 1 and 2.

Recommended Reading:

Quine, ‘On the Reasons for the Indeterminacy of Translation’, The Journal of Philosophy 67 (1970): 178-83.
Quine, The Roots of Reference (La Salle, IL: Open Court, 1974), chs. 1 and 2.
Quine, ‘Indeterminacy of Translation Again’, The Journal of Philosophy 84 (1987): 5-10.
Quine, ‘Progress on Two Fronts’, The Journal of Philosophy 93 (1996): 159-63.

Video Session:

Boolos Panel Part I:George Boolos leads the panel to consider some of the major Quineian theses: his objections to the analytic/synthetic distinction and meaning scepticism.

Week 3

Quine on the Inscrutability of Reference

Required Reading:

Quine, ‘Speaking of Objects’, in Quine, Ontological Relativity and Other Essays (New York: Columbia University Press, 1969).
Quine, ‘Ontological Relativity’, in Quine 1969.

Recommended Reading:

Quine, ‘On Empirically Equivalent Systems of the World’, Erkenntnis 9 (1975): 313-28.
Quine, ‘Things and Their Place in Theories’, in Quine, Theories and Things (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1981).
Quine, ‘Empirical Content’, in Quine 1981.
Quine, ‘Five Milestones of Empiricism’, in Quine 1981.
Quine, ‘Facts of the Matter’ in Shahan and Swoyer (eds), Essays on the Philosophy of W.V. Quine (Norman, OK: University of Oklahoma Press, 1979).

Quine, ‘Three Indeterminacies’ in Barrett and Gibson (eds), Perspectives on Quine (Oxford: Blackwell, 1990).

Quine, Pursuit of Truth, rev. ed. (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1992), chs. 1-3.

Video Session:

Boolos Panel Part II:George Boolos leads the panel to consider some of the major Quineian theses: inscrutability of reference and indeterminacy of translation.

Dennett Panel: Daniel Dennett is the guest panelist in this discussion which includes Quine’s doctrine of the inscrutability of reference.

Week 4

The Quine-Chomsky Debate on the Objectivity of Semantics

Required Reading:

Quine 1960, ch. 3.
Chomsky, ‘Quine’s Empirical Assumptions’, in Davidson and Hintikka (eds), Words and Objections: Essays on the Work of W.V. Quine (Dordrecht: Reidel, 1969).
Quine, ‘Reply to Chomsky’, in Davidson and Hintikka (eds) 1969.

Quine, ‘Mind and Verbal Dispositions’, in Guttenplan (ed), Mind and Language (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1975).

Recommended Reading:

Quine, ‘The Problem of Meaning in Linguistics’, in Quine 1953.
Quine, ‘Linguistics and Philosophy’, in Quine 1976.
Quine 1974, ch. 3.
Quine, ‘Methodological Reflections on Current Linguistic Theory’, in Harman (ed), On Noam Chomsky: Critical Essays (Garden City, NY: Anchor Press, 1974).
Chomsky, Reflections on Language (New York: Pantheon Books, 1975), pp. 179-204.
Chomsky, Rules and Representations (NY: Columbia University Press, 1982), pp. 12-24.

Video Session:

Boolos Panel Part III: George Boolos leads the panel to consider some of the major Quineian theses: inscrutability of reference, indeterminacy of translation, behaviourism and Quine’s differences with Chomsky.

Week 5

Davidson on Truth and Meaning

Required Reading:

Davidson, ‘Theories of Meaning and Learnable Languages’, in Davidson, Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1984).
Davidson, ‘Truth and Meaning’, in Davidson 1984.
Davidson, ‘True to the Facts’, in Davidson 1984.
Davidson, ‘Semantics for Natural Languages’, in Davidson 1984.
Davidson, ‘In Defence of Convention T’, in Davidson 1984.

Recommended Reading:

Tarksi, ‘The Semantic Conception of Truth’, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 4 (1944): 341-75.
Quine, Philosophy of Logic, 2nd ed. (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1970), ch. 3.
Foster, ‘Meaning and Truth Theory’, in Evans and McDowell (eds), Truth and Meaning (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1976).

Video Session:

Segal Discussion: Gabriel Segal joins Davidson to discuss theories of meaning for natural languages. Among the questions addressed are: what is
the goal of a theory of meaning?; what is the evidence to which a theory of meaning is answerable?; what is the relation between accounts of the truth
conditions of sentences and of inferential relations between sentences?; where, and how much, does logic figure in theories of meaning?

Week 6

Davidson on Radical Interpretation

Required Reading:

Davidson, ‘Radical Interpretation’, in Davidson 1984.
Davidson, ‘Belief and the Basis of Meaning’, in Davidson 1984.
Davidson, ‘Thought and Talk’, in Davidson 1984.
Davidson, ‘Reply to Foster’, in Davidson 1984.

Recommended Reading:

Lewis, ‘Radical Interpretation’ and ‘Postscripts to “Radical Interpretation”‘, in Lewis, Philosophical Papers, vol. 1 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1983).
Quine, ‘Comments on Donald Davidson’,Synthese 27 (1974): 325-29.
Davidson, ‘Replies to Lewis and Quine’, in Davidson 1984.
Davidson, ‘A Nice Derangement of Epitaphs’, in Davidson, Truth, Language and History (Oxford: OxfordUniversity Press, 2005).
Fodor and Lepore, ‘Is Radical Translation Possible?’, in Tomberlin (ed), Philosophical Perspectives 8: Logic and Language (Atascadero, CA: Ridgeview Press, 1994).
Davidson, ‘Radical Translation Interpreted’, in Tomberlin (ed), 1994.

Chomsky, ‘Language and Interpretation: Philosophical Reflections and Empirical Inquiry’, in Chomsky, New Horizons in the Study of Language and Mind (Cambridge: CambridgeUniversity Press, 2000).

Video Session:

Hopkins Discussion: Jim Hopkins joins Davidson to discuss his unified theory of interpretation and its relation to the work of Wittgenstein.

Week 7

Davidson on Language and Reality

Required Reading:

Davidson, ‘On the Very Idea of a Conceptual Scheme’, in Davidson 1984.
Davidson, ‘The Method of Truth in Metaphysics’, in Davidson 1984.
Davidson, ‘Reality Without Reference’, in Davidson 1984.
Davidson, ‘The Inscrutability of Reference’, in Davidson 1984.

Recommended Reading:

Quine, ‘On the Very Idea of a Third Dogma’, in Quine 1981.
Quine, ‘Where do We Disagree?’, in Hahn (ed), The Philosophy of Donald Davidson (Peru, IL: Open Court, 1999).
Davidson, ‘Reply to Quine’, in Hahn 1999.

Video Session:

Quine Discussion: In this crucially important interview of Davidson by his mentor (and vice-versa), the similarities and differences of the two are brought into focus. Among the questions raised are: whether Quine is committed to a ‘third dogma of empiricism’ and the relative importance of distal versus proximal stimuli in empiricist philosophy.

Week 8

Davidson on the Subjective

Required Reading:

Davidson, ‘First Person Authority’, in Davidson, Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective (Oxford: OxfordUniversity Press, 2001).
Davidson, ‘Knowing One’s Own Mind’, in Davidson 2001.

Davidson, ‘The Myth of the Subjective’, in Davidson 2001.
Davidson, ‘What is Present to the Mind?’, in Davidson 2001.

Recommended Reading:

Quine, ‘Quantifiers and Propositional Attitudes’, in Quine 1976.
Quine 1960, ch. 6, §§42-45.
Davidson, ‘On Saying That’, in Davidson 1984.

Putnam, ‘The Meaning of ‘Meaning’’, in Putnam, Philosophical Papers: Mind, Language, and Reality (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1975).
Burge, ‘Individualism and the Mental’, in French, Uehling and Wettstein (eds), Midwest Studies in Philosophy (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1979).

Video Session:

Smith Discussion: Barry Smith explores first person authority and what Davidson takes this notion to be, elaborating on the similarities and differences between first and third person knowledge of mental content. After exposing Davidson’s views to various objections and criticisms, Smith ends the session by questioning Davidson about the alleged tension between externalism and the view that we have first person authority with respect to our mental states.

Week 9

Davidson on the Intersubjective

Required Reading:

Davidson, ‘Rational Animals’, in Davidson 2001.
Davidson, ‘The Second Person’, in Davidson 2001.
Davidson, ‘The Emergence of Thought’, in Davidson 2001.

Recommended Reading:

Davidson, ‘Turing’s Test’ in Davidson, Problems of Rationality (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004).
Davidson, ‘Representation and Interpretation’, in Davidson 2004.
Davidson, ‘Could There Be a Science of Rationality?’, in Davidson 2004.
Davidson, ‘What Thought Requires’, in Davidson 2004.

Video Session:

Stroud Discussion: Barry Stroud questions Davidson about his views on how we come to gain knowledge about the external world, and how that route to knowledge avoids scepticism. Particular attention is paid to the role of perception in our acquisition of knowledge, to Davidson’s thesis of triangulation, and to Davidson’s criticisms of empiricism.

Week 10

Davidson on the Objective

Required Reading:

Davidson, ‘A Coherence Theory of Truth and Knowledge’, in Davidson 2001.
Davidson, ‘Afterthoughts’, in Davidson 2001.
Davidson, ‘Three Varieties of Knowledge’, in Davidson 2001.

Recommended Reading:

Davidson, ‘Empirical Content’, in Davidson 2001.
Davidson, ‘Epistemology and Truth’, in Davidson 2001.
Davidson, ‘Epistemology Externalized’, in Davidson 2001.

Davidson, ‘Externalisms’ in Kotatko, Pagin and Segal (eds), Interpreting Davidson (Stanford: CSLI Publications, 2001).

Davidson, ‘Quine’s Externalism’, Grazer Philosophische Studien 66 (2003): 281-97.

Video Session:

Martin Discussion: Michael Martin joins Davidson to discuss epistemology. Martin elicits Davidson’s responses to a variety of rival views about how we come to have empirical knowledge, focusing particularly on the claim that there might be a nonconceptual epistemic intermediary between the world and our beliefs about it. Davidson also gives his own positive view of perceptual knowledge, and discusses how to deal with problems of illusion and hallucination in perception.

Key Texts Reading List

Davidson, Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1984). AL 99 DAV

Davidson, Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective (Oxford: OxfordUniversity Press, 2001). AL 99 DAV

Davidson, Problems of Rationality (Oxford: OxfordUniversity Press, 2004). AL 99 DAV

Quine, From a Logical Point of View (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1953). A 64 QUI

Quine, The Ways of Paradox and Other Essays: Revised and Enlarged Edition (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1976). A 04 QUI

Quine, Word and Object (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1960). A 49.94 QUI

Quine, The Roots of Reference (La Salle, IL: Open Court, 1974). A 49.94 QUI

Quine, Ontological Relativity and Other Essays (New York: Columbia University Press, 1969). A 11 QUI

Quine, Theories and Things (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1981). AL 99 QUI

Quine, Pursuit of Truth, rev. ed. (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1992). A 11.83 QUI

Essay Titles

Are there epistemically analytic sentences?

Quine, ‘Two Dogmas of Empiricism’
Boghossian, ‘Analyticity Reconsidered’, Noûs, 30 (1996): 360-91
Harman, ‘Analyticity Regained’, Noûs, 30 (1996): 392-400

Is there any overriding reason to translate ‘gavagai’ as ‘rabbit’ in Quine’s thought experiment?

Quine, Word and Object, ch. 2

Quine, ‘Ontological Relativity’

Evans, ‘Identity and Predication’, Journal of Philosophy, 72 (1975): 343-63.

Are there facts about meaning?

Quine, Word and Object, ch. 2

Davidson, ‘Radical Interpretation’

Davidson, ‘A Nice Derangement of Epitaphs’

Chomsky, ‘Language and Interpretation: Philosophical Reflections and Empirical Inquiry’

Is Davidson’s proposal that a truth theory for a language L can serve as a theory of meaning for L consistent with the requirement that a theory of meaning for L states something knowledge of which would suffice for interpreting utterances of speakers of L?

Davidson, ‘Truth and Meaning’
Foster, ‘Meaning and Truth Theory’
Davidson, ‘Reply to Foster’

What role does the principle of charity play in translation and interpretation?

Quine, Word and Object, ch. 2

Grandy, ‘Reference, Meaning, and Belief’, Journal of Philosophy, 70 (1973): 439-52
Davidson, ‘Radical Interpretation’

Davidson, ‘On the Very Idea of a Conceptual Scheme’

Is social externalism incompatible with first person authority?

Burge, ‘Individualism and Self-Knowledge’, Journal of Philosophy, 85 (1988): 649-63
Davidson, ‘What is Present to the Mind?’
Heil, ‘Privileged Access’, Mind, 97 (1988): 238-51

Does having a mind require having a language?

Davidson, ‘Thought and Talk’
Dennett, ‘True Believers’, in his The Intentional Stance (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1996), pp. 13-26.
Searle, ‘Animal Minds’ in his Consciousness and Language (Cambridge: CambridgeUniversity Press, 2002), pp. 61-76

What role does experience play in the acquisition of empirical knowledge?

Quine, ‘Two Dogmas of Empiricism’
Davidson, ‘A Coherence Theory of Truth and Knowledge’
McDowell, ‘Experiencing the World’

Practice Exam Questions

Does having a language require having a largely correct, shared view of the world?

Is the truth of an utterance relative to a conceptual scheme?

Are utterances made true by things in the world?

Must languages be translatable?

Can a person have just one belief?

Does the inscrutability of reference entail the relativity of reference?

Do truth theories for natural languages have metaphysical implications?

Is there a sharp distinction to be drawn between encyclopaedias and dictionaries?

Does the indeterminacy of translation entail that linguistics is not a natural science?

Does the indeterminacy of translation entail the relativity of reference?

Must a theory of meaning be holistic?

Is conceptual relativism intelligible?

Is it intelligible that our beliefs about the world are massively false?

Does having a belief require having the concept of a belief?

How could we determine whether a being is rational?

Is there a viable distinction between theory and language?

Is the indeterminacy of translation (a problem that afflicts linguistics) just a version of the under-determination of theory by data (a problem that afflicts physics)?

Is it plausible that language is a ‘complex of present dispositions to verbal behavior, in which speakers of the same language have perforce come to resemble one another’ (Quine, Word and Object, p. 27)?

If ‘language is a social enterprise which is keyed to intersubjectively observable objects in the external world’ (Quine, ‘Mind and Verbal Dispositions’, p. 84), what, if anything, follows concerning the relationship between mind and language?

What should the evidential base of radical translation be?

Does translation/interpretation require a principle of charity?

Does holism about meaning entail the principle of charity?

Could a translation manual serve as a theory of interpretation?

Is meaning a normative concept?

Does Davidson’s theory of radical interpretation entail Quine’s thesis of the indeterminacy of translation?

How does Davidson’s holism about language learning:

‘in so far as we take the ‘organic’ character of language seriously, we cannot accurately describe the first steps towards its conquest as learning part of the language; rather it is a matter of partly learning’ (‘Theories of Meaning and Learnable Languages’)